From the Socratics to the Socratic Schools

Classical Ethics, Metaphysics and Epistemology

Ugo Zilioli

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317516064
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de la Grèce antique

In the two golden centuries that followed the death of Socrates, ancient philosophy underwent a tremendous transformation that culminated in the philosophical systematizations of Plato, Aristotle and the Hellenistic schools. Fundamental figures other than Plato were active after the death of Socrates; his immediate pupils, the Socratics, took over his legacy and developed it in a variety of ways. This rich philosophical territory has however been left largely underexplored in the scholarship.

This collection of eleven previously unpublished essays by leading scholars fills a gap in the literature, providing new insight into the ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology as developed by key figures of the Socratic schools. Analyzing the important contributions that the Socratics and their heirs have offered ancient philosophical thought, as well as the impact these contributions had on philosophy as a discipline, this book will appeal to researchers and scholars of Classical Studies, as well as Philosophy and Ancient History.

1 Plato’s Representations of the ‘Socratics’

Voula Tsouna

Historically, when we speak of the Socratics and of the Socratic circle, we have in mind a fairly stable group of thinkers whose most prominent members were philosophers that, after Socrates’ death, are alleged to have founded their own schools and who, during Socrates’ life, admired and loved him, and regularly sought his company for the purpose of philosophical conversation. This is the picture emerging from the doxographers, who also attest that many Socratics, including Plato and Xenophon, wrote dialogues, the so-called Socratic dialogues, and that they shared a number of core philosophical intuitions and beliefs that have their origin in the philosophy of Socrates and have subsequently been developed by different Socratics and their schools in different ways. From a methodological point of view, a notable feature of these writings is that they are composed as ad hoc investigations into various subjects, conducted by means of question and answer, between two interlocutors at a time (Socrates being typically one of them), following certain dialectical rules, and with the ostensible purpose of pursuing the truth of the matter rather than of gaining victory in the debate. The protagonist of these debates is Socrates, and his interlocutors often correspond to historical personages comprising some of Socrates’ companions as well.

From a philosophical perspective, interpreters generally attribute to the Socratics ethical views characterized, very broadly, by eudaemonism and also intellectualism of some sort. Regardless of ramifications and differences, all Socratics are believed to be committed to the supreme ideal of happiness, the position that virtue is an essential constituent of the good life, and the idea that virtue crucially depends or is identical with some kind of knowledge or understanding that, most of all, we ought to pursue and acquire. Historical accounts also emphasise, and rightly, the value that the Socratic writings ascribe to self-knowledge, self-control, and self-sufficiency, and also the correct understanding of virtue and of each of the five virtues belonging to the Greek canon, i.e., courage, sôphrosynê, justice, piety and, of course, wisdom. In metaphysics and psychology, there should be no quarrel with the historical claim that the Socratics endorse a sort of dualism involving a distinction between the body, which is related to desire and pleasure (or, as Plato sometimes argues, the irrational aspect of the psychê), and the soul, which may or may not be immortal and is often identified with the self. Both the major and the so-called minor Socratics recognize that, to achieve goodness, the soul must be properly educated, and this can only happen by means of philosophy; but, true pedagogy goes far beyond the traditional curriculum and may even undermine it. Besides, many Socratics problematize one form of conventional education, namely the erotic relation between a boy or youth and an older man, who is expected to play the rôle of a mentor and gradually introduce the youth to adult society and the responsibilities of a citizen. Some Socratics, notably Plato, explore eros as a transcendental state, while others, like Antisthenes and Aristippus detach sex from love or education, and yet others, like Xenophon, show Socrates making fun of himself by telling a prostitute that he is unavailable because of his engagement in public affairs (Mem. 3.11). In fact, according to the historians of philosophy, none of the first-generation Socratics was really a politician. Rather, they were interested in politics theoretically, e.g., in the sort of government that could ensure the prevalence of rationalistic ideals and the good life.

Of course, all this is well known and it indicates just the sort of approach suggested by the doxographers and developed in modern handbooks.¹ So far as it goes I believe it to be perfectly legitimate, and the same holds for endeavours to explore the philosophical engagement of various Socratics, and especially of Plato, with the views of their peers.² However, although the selective outline offered above serves as background for my own argument, nonetheless this latter does not have to do with the historical circle of the Socratics, but with certain interlocutors of Plato’s Socrates whom I call ‘Socratics’ for lack of a better word, without prejudice as to whether Plato might have called them so or thought of them in that way.³ They are characters represented as interacting with Socrates in different social occasions, geographical locations, and chronological periods. And some of them lend their name to the dialogue in which they appear—a convention followed by many authors of the Socratic circle. So, the scope of my chapter is narrow and confined within the realm of Plato’s fiction: I am interested in the way in which Plato represents the aforementioned characters, not in the corresponding individuals themselves.

At the outset, it may be helpful to outline the criteria that I shall apply, jointly or severally, in order to identify Plato’s Socratics. They are biographical, methodological, philosophical and psychological. In broad and general terms then, I shall call ‘Socratics’ the characters that, as Plato represents them, knew or liked or admired or loved Socrates; were familiar with and willing to submit to Socrates’ method of cross-examination; shared with Socrates, to a greater or a lesser extent, a certain philosophical outlook; and/or indicated that they thought of themselves and of Socrates as belonging to the same circle. I aim to establish that there is a striking discrepancy between Plato’s picture of the ‘Socratics’ and the image of the Socratics drawn by the doxographers and developed by modern scholars. While the people that the doxographers call Socratics are mainly Socratic philosophers, namely members of Socrates’ circle who are reported to have gone on to write philosophical works and/or to found schools, the people that I call ‘Socratics’ are members of Socrates’ circle who are influenced by Socrates but do not go on to become philosophers or teachers of philosophy. Plato, I contend, typically represents Socrates’ conversations with the latter group of personages, not with the former.⁴ Moreover, among the most gifted ‘Socratics’ depicted in Plato’s dialogues are two figures conspicuously absent from the majority of historical reconstructions.

In Part I of the chapter, I argue the case at the level of drama. In Part II, I briefly outline certain philosophical views and tendencies manifest in Plato’s Socratic conversations.⁵ In Part III, I question the widespread assumption that Plato’s representations of Critias and of Alcibiades, brilliant as they may be, nonetheless suggest that neither of these characters was an intimate of Socrates and that neither had a serious interest in Socratic philosophy and method. In Part IV, I speculate on Plato’s philosophical motivation for representing the ‘Socratics’ in the way he does.

1. Plato’s ‘Socratics’ as Dramatic Characters

To begin, I should like to draw attention to the following important fact. While the names of the first-generation Socratics who left behind them an institutional legacy are mentioned alongside the names of other friends of Socrates in the Phaedo (58c-59c), Plato never represents any major philosopher of that list as an active player in a dialectical argument. Phaedo suggests to Echecrates that he frequently participated in Socratic conversations (cf. hôsper eiôtheimen: 59a) but, in the narration that follows, he is mostly a listener and not a speaker. Euclides and Terpsion are, the one the putative author of the Theaetetus, the other the audience of Euclides’ reading; however, neither of them is depicted as a conversant in the main body of the dialogue. Antisthenes and Aristippus are not identified in connection with specific philosophical views, even when it would have seemed natural for Plato to have mentioned them, nor does Plato ever depict them in debate.⁶ The same goes for Aeschines. As for Xenophon, Plato does not mention him at all.⁷ On the other hand, the Platonic Socrates converses with several other characters (some of whom are also found in Phaedo’s list), who correspond to real people and who exhibit the behavioural and intellectual characteristics designated above, on account of which they might be considered Socratics: notably, they show familiarity and affection for Socrates, and exhibit methodological and philosophical affinities with him. Also, they seem to have some perception of themselves as Socratics in so far as some of them emphasize the fact that they are acquainted with his thoughts and methods and hold views similar to his own.⁸ These are the characters that constitute my primary object of study.

At the level of drama, a first cluster of problems that arises when we try to determine who should count as a Socratic has to do with the fact that the Platonic characters under discussion strike us as quite different individuals. They are older or younger, noblemen or laymen, highly polished or rather coarse, of various professions and walks of life, with different values and aspirations, with different idiosyncrasies and characters, with a greater or lesser degree of familiarity with Socrates and his ways. How are we to decide who are Socratics and who are not? On the one hand, take the portrait of Crito, who is in Phaedo’s list and is also depicted in the Crito in his effort to convince Socrates to escape. He strikes us as an older man (49b) of wealth and position, with a down-to-earth practical side, sensitive and decent, with the deepest affection for Socrates and the will to express that affection in deeds (45a). He tells us that he has been visiting Socrates in prison every day or almost (43a), and the shortcuts in his conversation with Socrates (47c-48b) strongly suggest that the two of them have been talking philosophy for years (cf. also 49a, e). This impression is bolstered further by Crito’s unreserved assent to the principle of justice (49e). And although his philosophical credentials are controversial, nonetheless his identity as a Socratic has been unquestioned. Plato and the doxographers appear in agreement on that score.

What about Cephalus, however? Plato presents him as a very old man, who not only welcomes Socrates to his home—the setting for the Republic— but also regrets Socrates’ rare visits and his own inability to go to Socrates more often, and urges him to ‘become a companion to these lads (sc. including his own son) and frequent [the] house regarding [them] as friends and close intimates’ (328d). Furthermore, by the end of Republic I, Socrates appears to have fulfilled Cephalus’ dear wish: he has won over Polemarchus (335e) and has made Thrasymachus, who has been competing for Polemarchus’ attention, abandon his case (cf. 357a). Neither the doxographers nor anyone else has placed Cephalus or Polemarchus among the Socratics. But, in my view, Plato’s fiction does present them in that light. Consider Adeimantus too. Historically, he is excluded from lists of the Socratics, whereas Glaucon is included in them (D.L. II.124). Nonetheless, Republic II does not drive this sort of wedge between the two brothers. In fact, Adeimantus makes a major philosophical contribution, by developing further Glaucon’s challenge and by enlarging the scope of the question that Socrates undertakes to answer. Their respective rôles in the argument suggest that, if the one is a Socratic, so is the other. Equally problematic is the case of Laches and Nicias, who are absent from the historical and doxographical lists, but nevertheless in Plato’s Laches play major dialectical rôles. Both claim to be acquainted in different degrees with Socrates’ personality and method,⁹ and both show respect and even affection for him (and, as we shall see later, Nicias believes himself knowledgeable about Socrates’ views concerning virtue as well). E.g., Laches says that Socrates ‘is always spending his time wherever there is any such fine study or pursuit for young people’ (180c), while Nicias adds that he too can attest to Socrates’ expertise in education, since the latter has recently found an appropriate teacher for Nicias’ son (180c-d).

Next, consider certain anonymous personages who make an appearance in some Platonic dialogues. The friend (hetairos) to whom Socrates narrates his conversation with Protagoras expresses both intimacy with Socrates and interest in the sort of conversation that Socrates had conducted with Protagoras. The two personages exchange pleasantries concerning Socrates’ pursuit of Alcibiades (309a-c) and then, upon hearing that Protagoras was in town and Socrates had just left him, the friend urges him to relate what was said during that encounter (309d-310a). Clearly, there is intellectual reciprocity in this relation: Socrates says that he would be much obliged to his companion if he would listen, and the latter retorts that he would be equally grateful if Socrates would speak (310a). Even greater is the emotional and intellectual intimacy between Socrates and the ‘noble friend’ (cf. gennadas: Charm. 155d; hetairos: 154b) to whom Socrates reports his first meeting with Charmides and his dialectical engagement, first, with Charmides and then with Critias, the youth’s cousin and guardian. Even allowing for the easy attitude of upper class Athenians towards sexual passion, Socrates’ confession of what happened to him when he glanced inside Charmides’ cloak has a very personal content (cf. 155b-e). And his argument with Critias is so complex and difficult that its narration would have been impossible to follow by the noble listener, unless he were deeply familiar with Socrates’ way of thinking.

Turning to the age group of youths that Socrates frequents for pedagogical reasons, we find that Plato represents many of them as Socratics in the sense designated above, although later authors may or may not include them in their inventories. Of the young protagonists of the Lysis, Ctesippus (cf. also Phd. 59b) and Menexenus (also ibid.) often figure in the doxographical lists, whereas Hippothales and Lysis do not. In the Lysis however, as Socrates is making his way from the Academy to the Lyceum, it is Hippothales who summons him first to the wrestling school where he and his friend pass their time ‘chiefly in conversation’ (204a) under the guidance of Miccus who, as the young man reveals, is Socrates’ ‘friend (hetairos) and admirer (epainetês)’ (204a). Socrates is close enough to Hippothales to ask him straight out whom he fancies (204b). And Ctesippus is sufficiently familiar with both to tease his friend and disclose his love for Lysis without compunction. Like their elders, they seek Socrates’ company for his opinion and advice about their words and deeds—in this case, as Hippothales declares, about ‘what sort of talk and what sort of action would endear one to one’s favourite’ (206b-c). And also, like older characters, they too as well as Menexenus, Lysis’ particular friend, are eager to attend or to engage in dialogue with Socrates, who speaks, first, with Lysis on the rôle of knowledge and utility in love relationships and, second, mainly with Menexenus on the nature of friendship. Menexenus is a keen disputant (eristikos: 211b), whereas Ctesippus demands his share in the conversation (211c) and Hippothales listens. We cannot guess the dialectical ability of the two latter characters, but we do witness Lysis’ gradual development as a conversant. At first glance at least, all four characters meet the social and psychological criteria proposed above, according to which one might say that Plato represents them as Socratics.¹⁰ The same holds for the young protagonists of the Euthydemus, Hippocrates in the Protagoras, and Phaedrus in the dialogue bearing...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Epigraph
• Contents
• Abbreviations and Conventions
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Plato’s Representations of the ‘Socratics’
• 2 The First-Generation Socratics and the Socratic Schools: The Case of the Cyrenaics
• 3 The Socratic Profile of Antisthenes’ Ethics
• 4 Rethinking Aeschines of Sphettus
• 5 Phaedo’s Zopyrus (and Socrates’ Confidences)
• 6 The Sources and Scope of Cyrenaic Scepticism
• 7 The Cyrenaics as Metaphysical Indeterminists
• 8 Diodorus Cronus on Perceptible Minima
• 9 Pyrrho and the Socratic Schools
• 10 Epicureanism and Socraticism: The Evidence on the Minor Socratics from the Herculaneum Papyri
• 11 Socrates, Alcibiades and Antisthenes in PFlor 113
• Contributors
• Index