Rules, Norms and NGO Advocacy Strategies

Hydropower Development on the Mekong River

Yumiko Yasuda

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317417347
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

There is much controversy over the development of new dams for hydropower, where concerns for environmental protection and the livelihoods of local people may conflict with the goals of economic development. This book analyses the opportunities and barriers that NGOs and civil society actors face when conducting advocacy campaigns against such developments.

Through a comparison of two NGO coalitions in Cambodia and Vietnam advocating against the Xayaburi hydropower dam on the Mekong River, the book explores the intricate interactions of formal and informal rules and norms and how they influence advocacy strategies. A framework for analysis is proposed which serves as a tool for analysis by civil society actors. The author generates fresh insights into the way in which opportunities and barriers are created for NGOs to influence state-centric decision-making processes.

The book also discusses Mekong riparian states' negotiation process over the Xayaburi hydropower dam in detail, providing an analysis of the Mekong River's governance under the 1995 Mekong Agreement. The book concludes by suggesting ways to improve the engagement of civil society actors in the governance of transboundary rivers and development projects.

1 NGOs and environmental governance

Role of NGOs in transboundary water governance

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly become important agents in environmental governance (Florini and Simmons 2000; Betsill and Corell 2008). The engagement of NGOs in this field escalated particularly after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 (Betsill and Corell 2008: 1). Agenda 21, the milestone policy document adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 formally recognized NGOs as important partners in the move to sustainable development (United Nations 1992: ch 7). The role of NGOs can be seen at different administrative and geographical levels, including local, national and international levels (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Florini and Simmons 2000).

NGOs often represent actors dependent on the direct use of natural resources; these actors are often impacted by alterations of resource use through development activities (Bruch 2005: 23). Their engagement in decision-making processes over the use of environmental and natural resources could potentially benefit the subsequent management and governance of such resources (Bruch 2005: 23). Decision-making without consideration of these actors’ views, often represented through an NGO, could result in negative consequences when decision-makers face protests or public scrutiny over their decisions (Bruch 2005: 24). NGOs therefore constitute an essential aspect of the governance of the environment and natural resources, and understanding their strategies and behaviours enriches our knowledge and understanding in the field of governance.

In the decision-making process over the use of transboundary rivers, NGOs are often involved in a wide range of advocacy activities associated with hydropower dams. As seen in the case of hydropower dam development around the world, NGOs from the North to the South often create international coalitions in order to raise the voices of local communities to decision-makers (Fischer 1995). As an example, an international campaign to stop Sardar Sarovar–Narmada dam pressured the World Bank to withdraw from the project in India (Fu 2009). Another international coalition of NGOs protested against the construction of 12 hydropower dams in Borneo, Malaysia (Borneo Project 2012). In order to stop the construction of the Xayaburi dam in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), 263 NGOs from 51 countries signed a letter addressed to the Prime Ministers of Thailand and Laos (263 NGOs 2011).

The presence of NGOs and other interest groups could potentially create and enhance either a pluralist or a corporatist society (Almond et al. 2004: 69), allowing wider groups in society to engage in water governance. This could gradually facilitate a move away from an elitist model of governance to a more participatory style. NGOs often express the interests of people who are not well represented in the policy-making arena (Charnovitz 1997: 274), playing a role as ‘bottom-up brokers’. Ebbesson (2007) claims that NGOs are often granted special rights to represent civil society, as opposed to individual actors, networks and social movements that are generally disregarded (Ebbesson 2007: 689). NGOs and civil society actors are therefore often considered as essential pillars in promoting transparency, accountability and other aspects of ‘good governance’ (Edwards 2004: 15). Advocacy through civil society is a potential way of promoting policy change towards democratic governance (Fox and Helweg 1997: 8).

NGOs often provide technical information related to the subject of debate as a way of providing input to the policy-making process. Many NGOs are capable of delivering technical expertise on particular topics that government officials need. Government officials can also benefit from this technical expertise through receiving rapid feedback from NGOs on controversial ideas (Charnovitz 1997: 274). NGOs with technical expertise are also capable of contributing to the scientific assessments needed by policy-makers, such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a process initiated by the United Nations Secretary-General in order to assess the consequences of ecosystem changes for human well-being (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; see also Gemmill and Bamidei-Izu 2002: 11). This role of intelligence provider also supports improved environmental governance as politicians and decision-makers may gain alternative ideas from NGOs, which would not have been available through normal bureaucratic channels (Charnovitz 1997: 274).

NGOs as promoters of rules and norms

NGOs can also play an important role in promoting the rules and norms associated with environmental governance. Some environmental NGOs are allowed to be present at negotiations on global environmental agreements, where state representatives are the main actors. While NGOs do not have the official negotiating power that state delegates have, NGOs can play important complementary roles to state delegations, since NGOs represent important civil society groups and can attempt to integrate their proposed norms into the negotiating table (Betsill and Corell 2008: 3). A large number of NGOs gather at Conferences of Parties (COP) of multilateral environmental agreements, and may hold side events promoting various issues associated with the themes of COPs (UNFCCC 2011). At times, these NGOs also network with each other to join voices in a common cause. For example, during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), over 280 NGOs created the Climate Action Network (CAN) in order to coordinate their access and participation in the COPs (Betsill 2008: 46).

Monitoring states’ compliance with law and regulations is another role that NGOs may play (Charnovitz 1997: 274; 2006: 354; Gemmill and Bamidei-Izu 2002). NGOs often raise awareness of state and company violations of legal requirements through filing a complaint or making a claim to a court or authority. If the procedure within a country does not allow an NGO to directly file a complaint, the NGO may provide advice to an individual or an organization which has a right to do so (Bombay 2001: 229). Some NGOs were set up specifically to undertake this task of monitoring compliance with international agreements (Gemmill and Bamidei-Izu 2002: 12). For example, originally established as a specialist group within the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), TRAFFIC is an NGO with particular focus on monitoring and taking action against wildlife trade restricted under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (TRAFFIC 2008). Also, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) Article 15 stipulates a compliance committee which monitors states’ compliance to the Convention (Article 15 Aarhus Convention 1998). NGOs participate in this compliance committee. Monitoring of legal compliance can be a resource-intensive activity, and engaging NGOs that voluntarily monitor compliance can positively result in saving public resources.

NGOs also play roles as norm entrepreneurs and norm developers (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms play important roles in a society due to their functions of creating a common understanding of issues, as well as facilitating the emergence, adoption and implementation of new policies and laws (Brown et al. 2000: 20). Referring to NGOs’ role as norm entrepreneurs, Brown et al. (2000) explain that NGOs are often in close contact with vulnerable populations with less voice within a society (Brown et al. 2000: 20). Norm entrepreneurs are groups or individuals who are able to influence the acceptance, rejection or development of specific norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Koh (1998) maintains that NGOs play an important role as norm entrepreneurs within a process of development of norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) discuss the importance of the framing and interpretation of norms by norm entrepreneurs, influencing the acceptance of norms by society (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896–897). Referring to the roles of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs, Finnemore and Sikkink also suggest that the promotion of norms often requires some type of organizational platform, particularly at international levels. NGO networks can play key roles as they are often part of such platforms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 899).

Influence of rules and norms on NGOs

While NGOs attempt to influence rules and norms, rules and norms also affect NGOs. For example, the 1998 Aarhus Convention provides a framework for public right of access to information and participation in the decision-making process. Certain countries establish official mechanisms for public participation, such as public complaint processes or inspection panels. The establishment of citizen enforcement actions allows citizens to take legal action to enforce environmental laws (Casey-Lefkowitz et al. 2005: 568; Hunter 2005: 637). These rights may be formulated either as a constitutional right, under specific provisions in environmental law, or in accordance with administrative or civil codes (Casey-Lefkowitz et al. 2005: 568; Hunter 2005: 637). A more collaborative approach in some countries obliges government institutions to engage citizens in monitoring their environmental performances (Casey-Lefkowitz et al. 2005: 566). As an example, in the USA some citizen organizations initiated harbour watch programmes to identify oil spills and other emissions in local harbours (Casey-Lefkowitz et al. 2005: 566). Finally, citizen inspection is a method in some countries whereby government agencies contract with groups or individuals to serve as public inspectors (Casey-Lefkowitz et al. 2005: 567).

In contrast, other rules and norms restrict NGOs’ activities. As an example, human rights NGOs in Uganda conduct self-censorship when working with sensitive issues, in order to avoid confrontation with the authorities (Ghosh 2009: 483). Ho (2007) suggests that for environmental activism to survive and gain legitimacy in the Chinese restrictive context, it has to be structurally embedded through having ‘self-imposed censorship and a conscious de-politicization of environmental politics’ (Ho 2007: 189).

These examples indicate that rules and norms affect the way NGOs formulate certain actions and strategies. Thus understanding the influence of rules and norms on NGO actors provides important insights into how NGO actors can contribute to promoting participatory governance. However, compared with the large number of existing studies discussing the ways NGOs attempt to influence rules and norms, studies attempting to understand the influence of rules and norms on NGOs are few and far between. A better understanding of this influence will help fill a significant gap in existing academic knowledge; and improved understanding of these mechanisms will provide useful insights for NGOs themselves, leading to enhanced understanding of the linkages between their actions and the rules and norms within which they operate. Ultimately this may lead to improved governance of environmental and natural resources.

Objective and structure of this book

Recognizing the importance of understanding how rules and norms can potentially influence the activities of NGOs, this book aims to examine and analyse how this influence occurs. Through this understanding, the book identifies the opportunities and barriers NGO actors are facing in their activities. In particular, it examines how rules and norms affect the advocacy strategies of NGO coalitions.

NGOs often form coalitions in order to improve their effectiveness in the process of their advocacy work. For the purpose of this book, coalitions are defined as networks of NGOs and other civil society actors sharing broader strategic goals, beyond a single issue and with the ambition to conduct joint actions. The focus on advocacy strategies was chosen as NGO actors focusing on advocacy tend to be in conflict with the authorities, compared with service sector NGOs, who tend to collaborate with the authorities (Ohanyan 2012). Advocacy NGOs are important actors in governance as their focus is to advocate policy change, which may affect resource use.

The book also has an ambition to contribute to NGO actions that are more informed about the rules and norms affecting them. In order to achieve these objectives, the book aims to understand how rules and norms influence the advocacy strategies of NGO coalitions.

This book consists of three parts. Part I introduces the way of analysing advocacy strategies of NGOs, and consists of two chapters. The first chapter in this section (Chapter 2) provides a theoretical overview and analysis related to analysing NGO advocacy strategies, and the influence of rules and norms over advocacy strategies. This overview and the analysis are used to identify a framework for analysing advocacy strategies of NGO coalitions, discussed in the second chapter of this section (chapter 3). The book adopts a comparative case study approach in analysing the advocacy strategies of two NGO coalitions in Vietnam and Cambodia in Southeast Asia. The focus of these NGO strategies is on the Xayaburi hydropower dam, located on the Mekong River in Laos.

The analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 provides the structure for the book’s analysis. This framework identifies five key components important for the analysis of the book: (1) biophysical and material conditions; (2) actors; (3) rules and norms; (4) interactions; (5) strategies. These components guide the structure of the rest of the book.

Part II analyses the first three components: biophysical and material conditions (Chapter 4), rules and norms (Chapter 5), and actors (Chapter 6). Analyses of these three components then feed into analyses of the remaining two components, in order to identify how rules and norms affect the strategies of NGO coalitions.

Part III offers an analysis of how the three components interact and how strategies are developed. Strategies adopted by NGO coalitions during the consultation process of the Xayaburi hydropower dam are first identified in Chapter 7, where four types of strategy depending on...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Legal instruments cited
• 1 NGOs and environmental governance Role of NGOs in transboundary water governance
• I Research design
• II Biophysical and material conditions, actors, rules, and norms
• III Strategies and interactions
• Annex: Interviews and meetings
• Index