Dalit Politics in Contemporary India
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Dalit Politics in Contemporary India

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Dalit Politics in Contemporary India

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About This Book

This book is a ground-breaking intervention on Dalit politics in India. Challenging received ideas, it uses a comparative framework to understand Dalit mobilisations for political power, social equality and justice. The monograph traces the emergence of Dalit consciousness and its different strands in north and south India — from colonial to contemporary times — and interrogates key notions and events. These include:



  • the debate regarding core themes such as the Hindu–Muslim cleavage in the north and caste in the south;


  • the extent to which Dalits and other backward castes (OBC) base their anti-Brahminism on similar ideologies; and


  • why Dalits in Uttar Pradesh (north India) succeeded in gaining power while they did not do so in the region of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh (south India), where Dalit consciousness is more evolved.

Drawing on archival material, fieldwork and case studies, this volume puts forward an insightful and incisive analysis. It will be of great interest to researchers and scholars of Dalit studies and social exclusion, Indian politics and sociology.

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Yes, you can access Dalit Politics in Contemporary India by Sambaiah Gundimeda in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Politik & Internationale Beziehungen & Politik. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.

Information

Year
2015
ISBN
9781317381044
Part I
Uttar Pradesh

1
Making Claims for Power

Dalit politics in Uttar Pradesh, 1919–671
The Indian national movement was not only a struggle for freedom from colonial rule. It was, as forcefully argued by Aloysius (1997: 93), essentially a struggle for power among diverse castes and communities. These diverse communities could broadly be categorised into two groups: Brahmin communities that include the first three castes/communities in the varna order and the subaltern or non-Brahmin communities, which include Dalits, Shudras, Adivasis and Muslims (ibid.). As these categories represent different layers in the hierarchical social order, the social discourse of each group was also largely shaped by their social standing. Not surprisingly, the same social discourse was reproduced in their political consciousness and agenda. By the early 20th century, the dichotomies between those two social forces – the Brahmin and non-Brahmin communities – were more obvious. Both were demanding the transfer of political power from the coloniser into the hands of the colonised. Yet, for each group, the intentions behind this demand were in direct contradiction to one another. While the Brahmin group was demanding transfer of power to retain its dominance in the social structure, as well as to gain a hold in the emerging power structure, the non-Brahmins, whose position within the sociopolitical structure until recently had appeared to be immutably fixed at the bottom rung through the formidable doctrines of karma and dharma, were aspiring for the homo genisation or equitable distribution of power within society.
While these disparate social forces engaged simultaneously in collaboration with each other against the coloniser and in competition with each other for power, two events in the 1920s changed not only the nature and course of the national movement for freedom, but also the discourse of power. The proposal for further devolution of power to Indians by the colonial government was one event; the entry of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (hereafter, Gandhi) into the Indian national movement was the other (Brown 1969; Parekh 1989 and 1989a; Arnold 2001; Hardiman 2003).2 Dalits in the United Provinces (UP) responded to these events, first by launching the Adi Hindu movement, and later, through the activities of the United Provinces Scheduled Caste Federation (UPSCF). They made two claims: that they were Mula Bharatvasi (original inhabitants of India) and that they wanted separate representation for themselves on the lines of Muslims in the political institutions. Through these claims, Dalits sought both social equality and their due share in the emerging political power. The greatest significance of these organisations was that, until they came into being, Dalit struggles had been concentrated on gaining social respectability and acceptability by caste Hindus. The Adi Hindu movement and the UPSCF redirected the energies of Dalits towards gaining their share of power in the emerging democratic representative institutions.
As suggested in the introduction, the claims regarding Dalit politics made by some well-known scholars, especially those made by Ashutosh Varshney (2000), Sudha Pai (2002) and Christophe Jaffrelot (2003), are inexplicable. In his attempt to capture much of 20th-century politics in northern India through the framework of religious cleavages between Hindus and Muslims, Varshney turns a blind eye to those politics that organised around other cleavages. In a similar vein, Pai claims that unlike the western and southern parts of India, the northern province of UP did not witness any anti-Brahmanical movements by Dalits prior to independence. Her assertion that there was ‘delayed development of Dalit consciousness in the United Provinces’ (Pai 2002: 27) was based on false assumptions. Finally, Jaffrelot, who studied the rise of lower-caste politics, argues that with its four orders (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra) and untouchables, north Indian society comes closer to the varna model. As such, he asserts that ‘the demographic weight of the upper castes and their role in the local power structure prepared the ground for the development of conservative ideologies and the establishment of the Congress’s clientelistic politics’ (2003: 8). He even went to the extent of claiming that since Congress was the sole political force among them until the 1960s, Dalits ‘remained not only prisoners of Sanskritisation but also of bhakti’ (ibid.: 185). Therefore, the main objectives in this chapter are twofold: first, to establish how, in reality, caste was the main axis around which lower-caste, particularly Dalit, politics was organised in colonial UP. It is also intended to show that Dalit consciousness in UP was far more developed than in other parts of India during the colonial era. The second objective is to explore Dalit politics in immediate postcolonial UP through the Republican Party of India (RPI).

From claiming Kshatriya status to taking Shuddhi: Dalits in UP at the dawn of the 20th century

The Dalits in northern India, like their counterparts in other parts of the country, were deeply discriminated against and prevented from entering public places by caste Hindus. By the 1920s, these caste-based exclusions and discrimination had become so pervasive that Dalits were prevented from engaging in any form of economic or public activity. Such exclusions were not confined to rural areas; even urban-based Dalits were victims. For instance, other than menial jobs, such as sweeping, scavenging and leather work, there were very few economic avenues available for Dalits in urban areas (Gooptu 2001: 143–84)3; the upper-caste Hindu employers preferred Shudras for unskilled manual labour. In addition to this religious and tradition-based discrimination, the urban local policies of the colonial government added insult to the injuries suffered by Dalits. Nandini Gooptu mentions three problems: first, after World War I, through its municipal sanitary by-laws and licensing regulations, the government began to put tremendous restrictions on the occupational activities of Dalits, particularly on those who handled dead animals, hides and skins or engaged in pig-rearing; second, the government’s new scheme of the Improvement Trusts for sanitary improvement; and finally, the development of non-reclaimed lands. The effect of such government policies was to displace Dalits from residential areas and dispose them of their sources of livelihood (ibid.: 153).
In addition, Dalits were also excluded from the available intellectual spaces at that time. For instance, some educated Dalits – despite being few in number – aspired to participate in the burgeoning Hindi public sphere. But they came to experience exclusion from those public debates, simply on account of their low caste status, as well as their social concerns (Wilkerson 2006: 31). Indeed, as Francesca Orsini’s study on the Hindi public sphere in the early decades of the 20th century demonstrates, educated Dalits were almost entirely neglected by the participants of the mainstream Hindi literary field. For the mainstream participants, who were invariably drawn from Brahmanical communities, ‘only matters which appeared under the jatiy or “national” guise were fit to be discussed. Anything which appeared particular or heterogeneous was, as a consequence, not part of the “public”’ (Orsini 2002: 12). Thus, the Dalits were sandwiched between the Brahmanical communities, who practised untouchability in the name of caste and religious sanctions, and the colonial government which, in the name of developmental activities, dispossessed them by placing restrictions on their only economic activities. Against these sanctions and restrictions, Dalits began to actively seek ways and means to achieve educational and employment opportunities.
It may be noted that at the dawn of the 20th century, there was a mushrooming of caste associations throughout India. At the bottom of this phenomenon lay the introduction of a caste-based census by the British colonial government. Except Brahmins, all the other upper castes and lower-caste Shudras claimed Kshatriya status. Drawing from the preexisting Hindu cultural traditions that relied upon itihas-puranic sources (i.e. treating Puranas as historical sources), a number of caste-based histories were written in support of claims for Kshatriya status. Dalits, particularly Chamars in UP, also established their caste-specific associations, such as Jatav Mahasabha of Agra, Jatiya Chamar Sabha of Meerut and All-India Jatav Youth League of Aligarh. Ramnarayan Rawat notes that a series of Dalit histories were written and published during the first half of the 20th century. Four important books from this series were: U. B. S. Raghuvanshi’s Shree Chanvar Purana (1910–16), the Jaiswar Mahasabha’s Suryavansh Kshatriya Jaiswar Sabha (1926), Pandit Sunderlal Sagar’s Yadav Jivan (1929) and Ramnarayan Yadvendu’s Yaduvansh ka Aitihas (1942) (Rawat 2011: 123). One notable feature of these writings that appeared in the first two decades of 20th century is that the Dalits, contrary to the assumptions of many historians,4 were not critiquing Hindu religion. Instead, they were placing a strong claim for Kshatriya status.
Interestingly, in their narratives, the Dalit writers relied upon the puranic sources, just as the colonial and caste Hindu authors did. For instance, claiming that Chamars were originally known as ‘Chanvar’, Raghuvanshi in his Chanvar Purana argued that the present-day Chamars, who belonged to the suryavanshi lineage (the lineage of the Lord Sun, who is the God of Kshatriyas), were powerful rulers during the pious age (dwija kula). But the Chanvars, whose dynasty is mentioned in the anushasan parva (section) of the Mahabharata, lost their status because of the failure of their members to respect ‘Brahmanical knowledge’. In order to give authenticity to his claim, Raghuvanshi argues that the Chanvar Purana was discovered by a sage (rishi), who lived in a cave in the Himalayas. The narrator of this purana, the author further argues, was none other than Shri Narada Bhagavan, who was also the narrator of the Garuda Purana of the caste Hindus. It is interesting to note that in order to achieve legitimacy and create some sort of mythological aura to the text he had written, Raghvanshi was deploying the same strategies as those employed by caste Hindu authors, who always claimed that their puranas came from the mouth of Lord Narada. As such, questioning the authenticity of those texts amounted to sacrilege against the Hindu faith (dharma). Since the narrator of the caste Hindu puranas and the Chanvar Purana was the same, i.e. Lord Narada, Raghuvanshi knew that caste Hindu writers would not dare to question the legitimacy of the Chanvar Purana. He went to the extent of offering a reward to anyone ‘who can prove that Charvar Purana is false’ (quoted in ibid.: 124).
In order to sustain their claim for Kshatriya status and remove their ‘untouchable’ stigma, a number of reform measures were initiated by Dalit associations across UP. For instance, they adopted the so-called pure Hindu rites and practices, such as vegetarianism, and abandoned ‘impure’ practices such as eating beef and doing leatherwork. In July 1926, Chamars in and around Benares passed a number of resolutions and urged their members to abandon the impure and defiling occupation of leatherwork and the practices of removing carcasses, skinning and tanning; in Moradabad, they refused to skin dead animals and repair shoes (ibid.: 133–4). In addition to these activities, Dalits also channelled their energies into improving education among their children. Sunderlal Sagar and Ramnarayan Yadvendu were of the opinion that education was the best way to improve the position of their community, and encouraged fellow Dalits to send their children to school. In all their public gatherings, the leaders of various Dalit caste associations insisted on the right of Dalit children to attend the municipal schools, and urged the government to open schools for their children in their localities. Of course, it should be noted here that due to their obsession with pure Hindu practices, Dalits went as far as levying fines against those Dalits who did not comply with their new rules of purity. They also redefined their relationship with Muslims by ceasing to take food (cooked or uncooked) from them and refusing to dine with them (ibid.: 136). It was at the height of their clamour for Kshatriya status that the Arya Samaj made inroads into Dalit mohallas (neighbourhoods) (Kenneth 1976; Jordens 1978; Van der Veer 1994). A brief examination of the relationship between Dalits and the Arya Samaj will show how ‘the immediate impetus’ for the emergence of Adi Hinduism, as observed by Gooptu (2001: 155), came from shifts in the activities of the Arya Samaj.5
As caste discrimination against Dalits in social and economic activities increased, some converted to Christianity as it offered opportunities for education as well as material benefits; others, especially educated young Dalits, began to take an active interest in the activities of the Arya Samaj. The Samaj, through its doctrinal position of ‘Brahmin by merit, not birth’, or ‘varna on the basis of individuals’ merits, actions, and temperaments’ (Dayananda, cited in Jaffrelot 2003: 191) and through its social activities, such as the setting up of schools, hostels and scholarships for the children from the lower castes, attracted many young Dalits. Dayananda Saraswati’s position against Brahmins should also be mentioned, for it catapulted Dalits into the Samaj. Using very strong words against the ‘vicious’ and ‘hypocritical’ Brahmins, Saraswati in his Sathyartha Prakash (The Light of Truth), observes: ‘the sectarian and selfish Brahmins… these ignorant, sensual, hypocritical, irresponsible, and vicious people… (who) often dissuade persons from learning and ensnare them (the lower castes) into their evil ways with the result that they lose health, peace of mind, and wealth’ (in Jaffrelot 2003: 90).
The Arya Samaj, although instituted to serve the interests of the caste Hindus, initially appeared to be serving the interests of Dalits, and for that matter, other lower castes as well. For instance, in the early 1920s, the Samaj responded to the Dalit demand for access to temples and public wells (Rawat 2011: 136). Illiteracy among Dalits was falsely considered to be the cause of their social domination by the educated upper castes, and of their exclusion from better jobs and opportunities (Dinakar in Gooptu 2001: 154). Education had become a highly valued qualification, and naturally, Dalits began to appreciate the efforts of the Arya Samaj. They enrolled their sons in schools run by the Samaj; indeed, they themselves joined these schools. For instance, Manikchand Jatavaveer (1897–1956), one of the founders of the Jatav Mahasabha in 1917, was a teacher in a school run by the Samaj in Agra. Sunderlal Sagar (1886–1952), another co-founder of the Mahasabha was so well-versed in Sanskrit that he was called ‘Pundit’ (Kshirsagar 1994: 230–1). Some Dalit members even became Arya Samaji preachers. For instance, Swami Achhutanand (1879–1933),6 whose given name was Harihar and who was to found the Adi Hindu movement in later years, became its upadeshik (itinerary preacher) under the name of Hariharananda, and preached moral reform, vegetarianism and abstention from alcohol as a means of achieving a purer status (ibid.: 321; Jigyasu 1968). Importantly, the Samaj’s advocacy of the non-hereditary nature of varna was a significant departure from Brahmanical Hinduism, according to which, caste was hereditary and sacrosanct. Such advocacy led Dalits to believe that the Hindu religion was capable of change and of accepting individuals as equal human agents. Moreover, until the establishment of the Samaj, no upper-caste Hindu organisation had ever suggested that an individual’s varna could be improved; all the arguments against the belief in the sacrosanct nature of varna had come from the lower castes, the victims of the system, not from the upper castes, the beneficiaries. Quite naturally, the Samaj’s advocacy of the non-hereditary nature of varna made Dalits and other lower castes believe that by acquiring merit, they could surmount caste divisions, and thereby, enter the Hindu caste hierarchy (Gooptu 2001: 155).
Compared with that of the Brahmanical stance, the doctrinal position of the Samaj was a liberal one. Unlike the varna of Brahmanical Hinduism, the varna in the Hinduism professed by the Arya Samaj was not based on the inheritance of an individual, but upon an individual’s good conduct and actions of merit, not in the previous birth, but in the present. Yet, the doctrinal stance of the Samaj was more a semantic change than a major substantive change of position on the varna. That is to say, although the Samaj condemned the inherited nature of the varna...

Table of contents

  1. Cover Page
  2. Half Title page
  3. Title Page
  4. Copyright Page
  5. Dedication
  6. Contents
  7. Figures
  8. Maps
  9. Tables
  10. Preface
  11. Acknowledgements
  12. Abbreviations
  13. Glossary of terms
  14. Introduction
  15. Part I Uttar Pradesh
  16. Part II Andhra Pradesh
  17. Bibliography
  18. Index