The Act in Context

The Canonical Papers of Steven C. Hayes

Steven C. Hayes

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317594260
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psicología
• Subtopic: Psicología cognitiva y cognición

The Canonical Papers of Steven C. Hayes is a compilation of his most pivotal articles written from 1982-2012. Through these selected papers, Hayes again revisits the theoretical struggles between behavioral and cognitive-behavior theories, taking us from the 1980s into present day, discussing the breakthroughs and follies. Using this as a focus point, he discusses the tradition of behavior analysis and its difficulties in addressing human language and cognition. Moving forward into the 90s, he chronicles the changes in a behavioral approach that emerge from a contextual perspective on human cognition, and lays out the foundation for a contextual behavioral science approach that he argues is more likely to lead to an understanding of human action and an alleviation of human suffering. Although the articles have previously been published, they have been edited and compiled ensure this branch of research is clear to the modern audience. The compilation was chosen by Dr. Hayes to enhance his vision for a functional contextual approach to complex human behavior.

Section 1

Origins and Assumptions

Planting the Seeds of Contextual Behavioral Science

Fredrick Chin and Steven C. Hayes University of Nevada

Section 1 of the volume is about the origins and foundational assumptions of a contextual behavioral science approach. There are seven articles in this section: three were published in the 1980s; two in the 1990s; and one in 2004.

These articles describe an early attempt to understand cognitive processes using the direct behavioral principles available at the time, followed by a much later but very short piece that waives off falsificationism and entity postulating theories. In the gap between these two lies a question: How are we going to address the challenge of human language and cognition from a functional point of view? The answer implicit in what follows is this: First get your philosophical house in order. Get your assumptions clear, consistent, and known. The other pieces describe how that is done. They lay out the development of functional contextualism and its key characteristics as a modification of Skinner’s radical behaviorism. They show a pivotal difference in the willingness of functional contextualists to consider the use of any term on pragmatic grounds, regardless of its literal status. They explicate a pragmatic truth criterion, explain the environmentalism of a functional contextual approach, and show how functional contextualism differs from other contextualistic approaches, primarily in its goals.

Section 1 is the longest of the three sections of the book and the least obviously connected to clinical matters. These articles are the most important in many ways, however, despite their obscurity. Without clarity about foundational assumptions, it is impossible to create a coherent and progressive research program that is as ambitious as contextual behavioral science.

Article 1— Rule-Governed Behavior: A Potential Theoretical Framework for Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy. The first item in Section 1 is an early attempt to understand cognitive behavior therapy by applying and expanding the traditional Skinnerian model of rule-governed behavior. The Zettle and Hayes (1982) chapter tried to demonstrate that behavioral ideas could be used to explain and to guide therapeutically significant processes of change in cognitive and behavioral psychotherapy. The chapter is an ambitious piece that had to reach beyond the existing empirical work in order to link rule formation and following to psychopathology and its amelioration. At its best, Zettle and Hayes’s chapter shows that a bottom-up application of behavioral thinking to cognitive behavioral approaches was not that difficult to construct. Astute readers may recognize holes within this account, however. For one thing, it was impossible to define what a verbal antecedent was, and as a result the concept of rule-governed behavior itself was left hanging. In order to answer this question, it would become necessary to create a new basic behavioral theory of language and cognition, but that would happen only later as RFT emerged. The other quality of this chapter is that it does not tell you much about what to do differently. Part of that was deliberate since the piece explicitly assumed all of CBT is basically useful in order to set the foundation for an account. The social basis of cognitive change is noted and a few other such matters seem innovative, but there is a sense of reinventing the wheel. This was the last such effort—a new approach was needed. But it left us with some useful concepts that came to life later in ACT.

Article 2—Falsification and the Protective Belt Surrounding Entity Postulating Theories. This short article (Hayes, 2004) will not make full sense unless you first read Paul Meehl’s classic article (1978) about the slow progress of soft psychology, but the general drift will be evident without doing so. Falsification is almost universally embraced by empirical clinical psychology, and Meehl’s article is often used to justify this step. Hayes’s 2004 article shows the flaws in Meehl’s argument. In limited forms contextualists use falsification as well, but for them it is not the golden road to the Truth, and this article explains why. The problem is that the gap between terms and the conditions under which they are measured and applied can always be blamed for failures. That is especially true for entity postulating theories because the gaps there are very large. In functional contextualistic approaches the gap is usually small, as Meehl himself acknowledges, but when it is small, verification of extensions of functional models works as a test of conceptual quality. This piece explains why the twin steps of falsification and entity postulating theories are toxic to progress and outlines the alternative approach that CBS explores.

Article 3—Making Sense of Spirituality. This is widely considered to be the first article that foretells the development of ACT and RFT, and lays the foundation for the use of middle level terms in CBS. The key idea in Hayes (1984) is that naturalistic behavioral approaches need to take seriously the possibility that important phenomena are described by dualistic and mentalistic terms. Spirituality is the queen of such concepts, since it is distinguished in common usage from material events themselves. On analysis, the article argues that there is an important natural phenomenon addressed by the language of spirituality, and attempts to provide a contextual behavioral account. The article appeals to human perspective taking and describes a new approach to self and self-awareness. In doing so, it describes the nascent development of what will later be called deictic relational framing. The article tacitly demonstrates that the basic-applied relationship is bidirectional—that is, identifying applied problems that need to be solved can suggest basic processes as well as the reverse.

Article 4—Finding the Philosophical Core: A Review of Stephen C. Pepper’s World Hypotheses. The next article (Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988) explores the philosophical thought of Stephen C. Pepper and makes the case for behavior analysis as a contextualistic system. The article describes Pepper’s four relatively adequate “world hypotheses” and uses a number of quotes of Skinnerian ideas to show that the expected features of contextualism can be found there. Pepper helps us understand why theoretical disagreements between contextual behavioral approaches and others persist: They are often disguised disagreements about philosophical assumptions. Pepperian thought has at least two immediate benefits for scientists: First, it reduces needless fighting since alternative worldviews are not “incorrect”—they are just different. Second, it helps develop a scientific program that emerges from and remains consistent with a set of philosophical assumptions. Both of these advantages have subsequently been explored in CBS.

Article 5—Mentalism, Behavior-Behavior Relations, and a Behavior-Analytic View of the Purposes of Science. This article (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986) shows that when the purpose of behavioral science is prediction and influence, environmentalism is necessary. It demonstrates the pragmatic problem that emerges from identifying actions as causal variables over other actions and proposes a contextual alternative: the use of contextual variables to alter the likelihood of behavior-behavior relations. This is the very basis of ideas that will later blossom in ACT, such as the use of defusion and experiential acceptance to deal with difficult thoughts and feelings. By focusing on the manipulable variables in the environment that alter not just action but also the relations of action to action, a pragmatic alternative to mental causality is constructed—a critical and necessary step for functional contextualists wanting to enter the lion’s den of cognition and its role in other forms of action.

Article 6—Analytic Goals the Varieties of Scientific Contextualism. This chapter (Hayes, 1993) is the first to distinguish descriptive contextualism from functional contextualism. It argues that a priori verbal goals are necessary for contextualists to use successful working as a scientific truth criterion. Truth devolves into mere reinforcement without the addition of specific goals, and thus all operant behavior would be “true”—leading to an incoherent lack of precision. It also shows that there are at least two distinct families of contextualism based on their analytic goals.

Article 7—Behavioral Epistemology Includes Nonverbal Knowing. Finally, in order for successful working to be maintained as a truth criterion, it needs to be distinguished from correspondence-based truth. The problem is that referring to evidence to support pragmatic claims leads to an infinite regress of “how do you know?” and the very core of the defense of these knowledge claims seemingly rests upon a correspondence truth criterion. The solution to this paradox stands on nonverbal knowing as this chapter (Hayes, 1997) tries to show. As soon as this nonverbal knowledge is made verbal, defense of utility once again pulls toward an appeal to correspondence, but the same process allows the analyst to stay one step ahead of literal language. This is basically the same approach that is used by ACT therapists to defend workability over literal truth, ending (or at least pausing) in the silent knowing of “present moment” and “self-as-context” exercises, or the vitality of valued living itself. Thoughts that ask, “How do you know you’re a good person? What if you’re not?” at least temporarily lose their power in the space where verbal and nonverbal knowing interact—at the locus of experience in which all pragmatic working judgments transition into life itself.

References

Hayes, S. C. (1984). Making sense of spirituality. Behaviorism, 12, 99-110.

Hayes, S. C. (1987). A contextual approach to therapeutic change. In Jacobson, N. (Ed.), Psychotherapists in clinical practice: Cognitive and behavioral perspectives (pp. 327–387). New York: Guilford.

Hayes, S. C. (1993). Analytic goals and the varieties of scientific contextualism. In S. C. Hayes, L. J. Hayes, H. W. Reese, & T. R. Sarbin (Eds.), Varieties of scientific contextualism (pp. 11–27). Reno, NV: Context Press.

Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Relational Frame Theory, and the third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies. Behavior Therapy, 35, 639–665. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80013-3

Hayes, S. C. & Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Mentalism, behaviorbehavior relations and a behavior analytic view of the purposes of science. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 175–190.

Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W. (1988). Finding the philosophical core: A review of Stephen C. Pepper’s World Hypotheses. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50, 97–111.

Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806–834.

Zettle, R. D., & Hayes, S. C. (1982). Rulegoverned behavior: A potential theoretical framework for cognitivebehavior therapy. In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in cognitivebehavioral research and therapy (pp. 73–118). New York: Academic.

Article 1

Rule-Governed Behavior

A Potential Theoretical Framework for Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy

From Robert D. Zettle and Steven C. Hayes (1982). In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in cognitive behavioral research and therapy (pp. 73–118). New York: Academic.

The emergence and increasingly wide acceptance of cognitively based treatments are major developments in behavior therapy. In recent years there has been the formation of a new journal, Cognitive Therapy and Research, and a special interest group within the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy devoted to cognitive-behavioral therapy (Dowd, 1978), as well as the appearance of several major books in the area (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Kendall & Hollon, 1979, 1981; Mahoney, 1974; Meichenbaum, 1977).

It is unclear which specific intervention procedures comprise cognitive-behavioral therapy (Wilson, 1978), but one suggested area in common is the commitment to behavioral methodology each reflects (Kendall & Hollon, 1979). Methodological rigor has often distinguished behavior therapy from other treatment approaches. In recent years, however, behavior therapy has increasingly neglected conceptual concerns (Hayes, Rincover, & Solnick, 1980). Cognitive-behavioral therapy, in particular, currently finds itself in the unfortunate position of a methodological movement without a firm conceptual foundation. Generally neglected altogether is the potential contribution that a radical behavioral analysis of cognitive-behavioral therapy might provide.

One reason for the relative neglect of radical behaviorism may be unfamiliarity with its view on private events and confusion over how it differs from other forms of behaviorism as a philosophy of psychology. Contemporary radical behaviorism (e.g., as reflected in the current writings of Skinner, Day, Catania, and others) is often confused with Watsonian behaviorism. For example, radical behaviorism is thought to represent the rejection of feeling, thinking, and other cognitive events (e.g., see Shevrin & Dickman, 1980). In fact, contemporary radical behaviorism incorporates these events as behavior—nothing more, but also, nothing less.

It is curious that methodological behaviorism, rather than radical behaviorism, has become a common ground for much of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Methodological behaviorism (as a philosophical position) has emphasized that, for methodological reasons, only publicly observable behavior can be considered as scientifically admissible. We can, however, generate “hypothetical constructs” which we infer based upon public events. Private events are thus relegated to a land of the hypothetical; never directly accessible and never, somehow, on a par with publicly observable organismic activity. Over time, the odious philosophical content of this position has seemingly faded from view for many cognitive-behavioral therapists and the words “methodological behaviorism” have come to mean simply “behavioral methodology,” or for some “the scientific method,” or even “empiricism.”

The fact that radical behaviorism has been so ignored and misunderstood as it applies to cognitive behavior is due in part to radical behaviorists themselves. Much of the applied empirical work done by radical behaviorists has seemingly not required attention to the factors being examined by cognitive therapists.

Due largely to historical factors (Kazdin, 1978), applied work in a radical behavioral tradition has emphasized the manipulation of strong behavioral consequences with severely disturbed populations. Very few adult clinicians, for example, are radical behaviorists. A radical behavioral view of common clinical issues has thus been poorly developed or has been developed in a way that has not led to the needed research (e.g., Skinner’s 1957 book on verbal behavior). Presently, it is sadly true that radical behaviorists have “consistently eschewed the analysis and modification of private events” (Wilson, 1978, p. 8).

The present article is a first attempt to provide a framework for cognitive-behavioral therapy (and semantic therapies more generally) in radical behavioral terms. As such, it is both general and speculative. Nevertheless, it is meant to be testable, modifiable, and clinically applicable. It is written in the hopes that cognitive-behavioral therapists might look anew at radical behaviorism as an approach within which to develop their field. It is also hoped that radical behaviorists will begin to study cognitive phenomena in a rigorous manner.

Radical Behaviorism and Cognitive Phenomena

It is not our intent to describe radical behaviorism in detail, but some generalities about cognitive phenomena are warranted. To the radical behaviorist, behavior is regarded as observable organismic activity. Private events are regarded as stimuli or behavior that can be observed by an audience of one. [Public observability is not regarded as essential for scientific analysis (see Skinner, 1945).] Private events are not given special status simply because of the audience size. This does not mean that thoughts do not have special roles to play (the current article argues that they do) but merely that privacy does not establish that status.

Because the position is functional, causal factors are reserved for those that can be shown directly to help predict and control behavior. It is recognized that behavior can influence other behavior and that behavior can influence the environment so as to influence other behavior (“reciprocal determinism”). Nevertheless, ultimately all “causes” are restricted to environmental events. Behavioral “causes” are not ultimately acceptable since no one can change behavior without changing its context (e.g., through instructions, drugs, consequences, settings).

Thoughts and feelings, then, are behavioral ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• A Note About Changes in the Included Articles
• Functional Foundations of a Contextual Behavioral Approach: Professional and Personal History
• Section 1—Origins and Assumptions
• Section 2—Principles and Strategies
• Section 3—Clinical Methods and Developmental Vision
• Epilogue Looking to the Future of ACT, RFT, and Contextual Behavioral Science
• Index