Restructuring Public Transport through Bus Rapid Transit

An International and Interdisciplinary Perspective

Munoz, Juan Carlos, Paget-Seekins, Laurel

• Publisher: Policy Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781447333845
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Transportation & Navigation
• Index: Technology & Engineering

Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is commonly discussed as an affordable way for cities to build sustainable rapid transport infrastructure. This book is the first to offer an in-depth analysis of BRT, examining the opportunities it presents along with the significant challenges cities face in its implementation. A wide range of contributors from both developed and developing countries bring expertise in fields ranging from engineering, planning and public policy to economics and urban design to provide a big picture assessment of BRT as part of a process for restructuring transit systems. Academically rigorous, based on five years of research conducted by the BRT Centre of Excellence in Chile, the book is written in an accessible style making it a valuable resource for academic researchers and postgraduate students as well as policy makers and practitioners.

Section 1
Institutional Relationships

THREE

The path toward integrated systems

Darío Hidalgo, Juan Carlos Munoz and Juan Miguel Velásquez

Introduction

The main goal of an urban transport system is to provide accessibility for the inhabitants of an urban region. As this book shows, Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects can play an important role in urban mobility, but they cannot stand alone. A combination of different transport modes is needed to serve the demand which varies across different times and geographical areas of the region. Residents have to navigate the transport system to reach their destinations. The service they receive depends on the characteristics of each of the segments they must follow (including the access to and egress from public transport) and the experience of transfer between them. The system will provide a higher level of service to its users if it is designed for passengers to move between trip legs as smoothly as possible, and if they understand the system’s inherent complexity so as to be able to find their best possible route choice (see Chapters Twelve and Thirteen). The more convenient transfer experiences are within the system as a whole (for example, no additional fare and a short walk), the better the use that passengers will make of the available network of services. Alternatively, passengers may avoid certain service combinations due to inconvenient transfer experiences. Thus, users (and therefore the urban region) will always benefit from offering an integrated system with seamless transfers.

An integrated network that provides seamless access between all points is ideal; however, this is a complicated undertaking, especially when the system is fragmented into different authorities or decision makers, or when the starting point is an informal bus network, as described in Chapter Four. In this chapter we discuss the challenges faced by two integration pathways – sudden and gradual – and suggest a framework for advancing public transport integration which mitigates the main issues observed in these cases. The framework is designed for implementing integrated public transport systems in a context where regulation is insufficient and multiple private operators are involved. We found that this context is quite common, particularly in developing countries.

The issue of public transport integration

Integration has been a recurring topic in transport policy. Preston (2012) traces back the policies for transport integration in the UK to 1947 and in Europe to 1952, but indicates that integration has proven hard to achieve in practice due to the difficulty of defining and operationalising integration. He also shows an emerging body of evidence of successful practices which have not yet been mainstreamed (Givoni and Banister 2010). Hull (2005) suggests that integration is a ladder with an ascending order of organisational difficulty. The ladder’s lower steps refer to horizontal integration of different aspects of the transport system (information; services; fares and ticketing; and infrastructure provision, management and pricing). The ladder’s higher steps refer to vertical integration with aspects of governance and environmental, economic and social policies. In this chapter we concentrate on the horizontal integration of different aspects of the public transport system – the first steps, which are still rare in developing countries.

The success of integration comes from the pursuit of synergies (May et al 2006). Synergy implies reinforcement to achieve system objectives: better operational performance and integrated ticketing result in higher user perception and increased ridership. An integrated public transport system approach usually involves physical, operational and fare integration (see, for example, Mendeville et al 2006). The concept has been extended to the system image (brand), user information and management institutions, among other topics (see a literature review on the topic including case studies by GIZ 2010).

Integration of public transport systems has been elusive in developing countries as a result of dispersed institutional frameworks. As indicated by Flores Dewey (2013), public transport in many developing countries is characterised by ‘a quasi-informal network of privately owned transport operators historically responsible for satisfying most of the public’s mobility needs with minimal intervention from the state’. In the developed world, the levels of integration vary greatly from country to country. For instance, German cities have had fully integrated public transport systems for over 20 years (GIZ 2010), whereas British cities, with the exception of London, face significant barriers to integration in part due to the model of competition that they have adopted (Preston 2012). Similarly, cities in the United States show wide variations, with many cities unable to achieve high levels of integration as a result of governance hurdles typical of transit systems crossing multiple jurisdictions (Miller 2004).

Planners and decision makers in several countries have used mass transit as a tool for advancing institutions and regulation towards full integration (Preston 2012; Halcrow Fox 2000). In the developing world in particular, BRT has been the seed for larger integrated public transport systems (Flores Dewey and Zegras 2012; Hidalgo and Carrigan 2010). Some cities like Cali and Bogotá in Colombia, and Leon in Mexico, have decided to integrate public transport around the initial BRT corridors, to achieve citywide integration gradually (Hidalgo and King 2014). Other cities, like Santiago de Chile, have advanced integration in a single step, labelled as a ‘Big Bang’.

Both approaches (gradual and sudden) have advantages and disadvantages, which we explore in this chapter. Our central question is whether urban regions should adopt a gradual or a ‘Big Bang’ approach for regional public transport integration. We also explore the underlying question of how regional integration may be advanced in urban regions starting with dispersed, quasi-formal public transport.

Methodology

We use two case studies to describe the sudden (or ‘Big Bang’) and the gradual approaches to regional public transport integration, Santiago and Bogotá, respectively, and indicate advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches. We also draw from the results of Hidalgo and Velasquez (2015), presenting a high level financial model summarising capital and operational costs of different integration scenarios to indicate the costs to government and operators of these alternative approaches to allow us to make general policy recommendations. The approach has some limitations as it generalises two case studies from a high level financial model, nevertheless, we still believe the analysis allows planners and decision makers to consider alternative approaches.

We use this working definition of regional public transport integration: physical, operational, fare, image and institutional integration in a city or metropolitan area (Hidalgo 2009). By physical integration we mean the opportunity for exchange of passengers between different types of services and transport modes. Operational integration refers to coordination of schedules, so passengers can transfer smoothly from one service to another (May et al 2006).

Fare integration, arguably the most important integration element, allows passengers to use different services with the same payment method, such as an electronic contactless card, and, hopefully, the total cost of travel is less than where services are not integrated. Fare integration cuts barriers to transit access, encourages participation in monthly pass programmes, and potentially serves as a new revenue source for transit agencies (Goldman and Gorham 2006). Fare integration also enables more sophisticated network designs in which passengers can take advantage of very efficient trip legs while not paying significantly more for their fare. In the case of Santiago, the metro system saw its demand almost double on a single day when transfers became free of charge (Muñoz et al 2009).

Image integration results in a common presentation of the system in a way which indicates that all the different services belong to the same system (Carrigan et al 2011). Institutional integration involves the management agencies coordinating the activities, hopefully under a single authority for strategic planning and oversight (see Chapter Five). This authority should be able to coordinate all transport modes over the whole metropolitan area. Some of the best examples of adequate institutional arrangements may be Transport for London, Syndicat Transport Ile de France (Paris), Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid, and the Singapore Land Transport Authority (Meakin 2004).

Case studies: Santiago and Bogotá

Santiago and Bogotá have some similarities in their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The Santiago Metropolitan Area has 6,300,000 inhabitants in 984 square kilometres (km2) (6,402 persons/km2) (INE 2012); Bogotá has 7,878,783 inhabitants in 307 km2 (25,663 persons/km2) (DANE 2013). Santiago has a higher GDP per capita (US$21,393 vs US$15,891) (Brookings Institution 2012). When both cities started to integrate their public transport, the structure of their services was fairly similar, with persistent bus oversupply, competition on the road, and a prevalence of individual ownership of buses. Both cities embarked on citywide transport reforms as described below.

Transantiago, Santiago

Bus services in Santiago were regulated until 1979 (fares, frequencies, vehicle types, among other elements). From 1980 to 1990 the national government implemented a free-market approach, which improved frequency and coverage, but inflated the number of buses in the city, increasing traffic congestion and pollution (Darbera 1993; Fernández and Muñoz 2007). After 1990 regulation was reintroduced (Koprich 1994). Routes were assigned through bidding processes; fares were adjusted; and bus operators were encouraged to renew bus fleets. Nevertheless, the basic structure in which buses were individually owned prevailed, resulting in inefficiencies and bus oversupply. Motorisation continued as the median income increased and service quality remained low; at the same time accident rates, pollution and congestion increased.

To overcome these difficulties, the national government started planning for an integrated public transport system in 2002. The new system, Transantiago, was intended to advance bus operations and integrate surface services with metro, under government control and regulation. At the time of system planning (2004) the city had 8,000 buses, operated by 120 organisations (more than 3,000 micro-entrepreneurs) and three metro lines (Etcheberry, 2004). Transantiago’s objective was to maintain and increase the use of public transport in the city, improve the quality of the service, and improve sustainability from social, economic and environmental perspectives without subsidising the system’s operations.

The system was launched on 10 February 2007, before most of the infrastructure and information systems were completed. Sudden implementation of most components in a single day, which was dubbed the ‘Big Bang’, resulted in chaos in the city. Users had little information on how to use the system (see Chapter Thirteen), and faced long waits due to the lack of service caused by reduction in the bus fleet to 4,600 buses and poorly designed incentives to operate them (see Chapter Seven). The confused users turned away from the buses onto the metro, which they could now access with the same fare, was the only system component that had not changed, was the most clear and visible place in the city to charge the electronic fare card, and had a reputation for fast and reliable service. Metro had some available capacity but not enough to accommodate the large number of new users, generating overcrowding. There were also user protests demanding better bus services and some of the users started evading payment.

To address the chaos the authorities increased the fleet by 1,500 buses, added a total of 90 kilometres of busways by the end of 2011, and renegotiated the contracts to improve control of service delivery. The result was an increase in bus frequencies and a decrease in travel times (Muñoz et al 2014).

Transantiago has achieved several of its goals. The quality of the service has improved but not enough to win the hearts of its users, despite it being ranked as one of the most advanced in the region (Mery and Astudillo 2014). Positive impacts on externalities are evident, and public transport is now integrated, and more formalised, organised and regulated. However, fare evasion remains very high. Regarding the main goal of increasing the modal share of public transport, the plan could be considered a failure since public transport demand instead dropped at the beginning of Transantiago and then remained stable as motorisation rates grew.

Integrated public transport system (SITP), Bogotá

Before the introduction of Bogotá’s BRT system in 2000, the city’s public transit comprised 21,000 buses, microbuses and minibuses affiliated to 68 different private companies, with scarce regulation by the local authorities (Ardila 2007). As in Santiago, bus drivers rented the bus daily from the vehicle owner and derived their income from the number of passengers. This created competition on the streets, called ‘the war of the penny’. The road battle resulted in street chaos, increased traffic and pollution, high accident rates and frequent but poor quality of service.

The main strategy to overcome the appalling conditions of public transport in the city was the implementation of a feeder trunk system, TransMilenio. The trunk services operate on full BRT corridors inspired by the Curitiba system (Lindau et al 2010) with very high capacity due to a combination of dedicated busways, large stations and buses, off-board ticketing, level boarding and a combination of local and express services (Hidalgo et al 2013a).

TransMilenio started operations with 14 kilometres of BRT plus feeder services in one terminal in the northwest part of the city. It was an instant success, with very high public acceptance and good performance indicators (Hidalgo et al 2013b). The original plan stipulated TransMilenio would cover 85% of the city, with a total of 388 kilometres, by 2016 (CONPES 2000). However, expansion proceeded much more slowly than initially planned. By 2014 only 84 kilometres of BRT were completed. The level of service declined, due to difficulties with maintenance of busways and stations, and very high demand during peak hours.

In 2006, as a response to the severity of service decline, the city approved a ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Notes on the editors and contributors
• Acknowledgements
• ONE: The promise of BRT
• TWO: Global overview of BRT and bus corridors
• Section 1: Institutional Relationships
• Section 2: BRT and the City
• Section 3: Operations and Design