Russia and Europe

Building Bridges, Digging Trenches

Kjell Engelbrekt, Bertil Nygren

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781136992001
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Russian-European political relations have always been problematic and one of the main reasons for this is the different perspectives on even the very basic notions and concepts of political life. With a worldwide recession, the problems as well as the opportunities in Russian-European relations are magnified. While most works on Russian-European, Russian-American and Russian-West relations focus on current policies and explain them from a standard set of explanatory variables, this book penetrates deeper into the structural and ideational differences that tend to bring about misperceptions, miscalculations, misinterpretations and misdeeds in this two-directional relationship. It applies a very broad conceptual framework to analyse differences that are as relevant for Europe and the EU as it is to Russia's immediate neighbours and, while doing so, identifies the key factors that will dominate Russia-EU ties in the next decade.

1 A reassertive Russia and an expanded European Union

Kjell Engelbrekt and Bertil Nygren

DOI: 10.4324/9780203854648-1

At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Russia–Europe relations came under a cloud. Disruptions of Russian deliveries of gas to Ukraine and several member states of the European Union (EU) in 2006 and 2009, along with the Georgian war of August–September 2008, even prompted some observers to speak of a looming new Cold War. Others pointed to indications of a ‘rearmament race’ on the continent, with a new US-sponsored defence system against missiles launched by rogue states at the forefront, as well as to numerous signs of neoauthoritarianism in the way in which the Kremlin wields power over Russian society.

Meanwhile, economic cooperation between Russia and Europe continues to evolve, with interdependence deepening in a variety of areas. Because of the increasingly structural character of institutional and business relations, today's conflicts do not necessarily spill over into fields of established cooperation. However, that does not mean that the twists and turns of Russia–Europe ties do not have important repercussions for both sides, or that the current level of engagement is smooth and non-conflictual. In particular, the EU's aspirations to consolidate the European marketplace and to enhance cooperation in foreign, security and defence policy among its own member governments are objectives that require tighter coordination of policies with respect to Russia's activities in its ‘near abroad’ as well as on the global stage. For its part, Moscow seems increasingly ambivalent, sometimes even adamantly opposed, to either project.

The rise of Dimitry Medvedev to the post as President of the Russian Federation has not altered most of Moscow's fundamental views and the ways in which it goes about doing business with its European counterparts. With Vladimir Putin still running much of the day-to-day executive policymaking and quite possibly preparing for regaining the presidency in a coming election, anything else would be sensational. This is not to say that there are not very important ‘unknowns’ in the relationship between the two men, in their mutual or separate plans for the future, as well as in the political dynamic of a country where elections are regularly held and where the Kremlin no longer can control the entire press and the thickening flow of electronically transmitted information.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the worldwide economic recession sparked in 2008 poses a series of more profound challenges for Russia, its leadership and to Russia–Europe relations. Russian leaders will no longer be able to point to a steady growth in government revenues from which to draw legitimacy. Its neo-authoritarian modes of operation may have enhanced the government's capacity to contain discontent in the short term, but render some of its institutions increasingly brittle over the medium-to long-term, as the discrepancy between political rhetoric and reality possibly widens. What, if anything, can Europeans and the EU in particular do in this situation? Is it wise to try and further expand relations at present, or should one wait for a more opportune moment sometime in the future? Either way, what priorities should be set for the continued development of Russia–Europe ties?

This volume is based on the premise that relations between Russia and the EU inevitably involve tensions that influence the ways of doing business across the entire spectrum of multilateral and bilateral ties, yet have reached a point at which moderate political or economic fluctuations do not undermine the broader pattern of growing interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2001). From the vantage point of that premise, it seeks to disentangle the medium-and long-term trends from short-term occurrences and primarily to focus attention on the former. The ambition is to identify the key factors and types of relations that will dominate Russia–EU engagement in the next decade. As we see it, three parameters are poised to strongly influence that relationship.

The first parameter consists of the norms, values and institutions that Russia presently embodies both internally and externally, and which from time to time compete or clash with those of the EU. Most recently, there has been serious contention regarding the democratic process and respect for human rights in the countries situated west and south of Russia, but there are several layers of historical, cultural, diplomatic and other ideational aspects to this competition or ‘friction of ideas’.

A second parameter is constituted by Russia's relationship to Brussels and, even more importantly, to European great powers such as Germany, France and Great Britain, each with a long historical lineage. To a lesser extent, it also pertains to Moscow's ties to Poland, Italy, as well as Spain, as significant players in the Union. In any case, here we are dealing with the so far limited potential for a cohesive Russia policy on the part of the EU as long as important and long-lasting interests of major European powers are at stake. The partial withdrawal of the United States from the European continent as a mitigating factor on intra-EU political relations should be noted in this context, along with economic considerations concerning trade, foreign investments and energy.

A third parameter concerns the relations between the EU and Russia by way of the states and areas geographically located between the latter two, regardless of formal EU membership on the part of those states. This parameter is related to some novel – but mainly to historically charged – problems regarding borders, minorities and lingering legacies of deep-seated distrust, though also an increasing need to regulate trade, migration and citizenship across such borders. Countries not encompassed by the EU's enlargement program are the most vulnerable, straddling the ‘spheres’ of Russia and the Union, respectively. Also here, of course, economic ties and energy issues constitute a substantial challenge because of existing or potential dependence on Russian energy supplies. In the rest of this introductory chapter, we will flesh out what we mean by the three parameters, in an attempt to set the scene for the contributing chapters and the questions that guide them.

The ‘friction of ideas'

As just mentioned, the first parameter concerns the competing norms, values and institutions of Russia and of the EU, respectively. It is clear that, in recent years, there has been growing contention regarding the democratic process and respect for human rights in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, including Russia itself. For several of these countries, the ideational friction might not surprise us since the political and social cultures of Central Asian countries are deeply influenced by Islam and largely based on extended families and clans in terms of their social structure, rendering them distinctly different from Europe as well as the western portions of Russia. With respect to Europe and Russia, however, the political, social cultural differences are by far not as distinct. Indeed, the entire democratization and marketization effort after the demise of the USSR was built on the assumption that Russia was democratically, socially and economically ‘transformable’ to European standards precisely because of these similarities (Opalski 2001). Almost two decades later, domestic and outside observers are visibly less optimistic and perhaps somewhat wiser than before (Sakwa 2005; McAllister and White 2008; Wagnsson 2008), but still without an explanation as to why the distance between European and Russian norms and values seems to have widened.

Among the contentious policy issues of the last decade were: (1) the conflict with the United States over plans for national missile defence installations in the Czech Republic and in Poland, (2) the (second and then third) debate on the further enlargement of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), (3) the issue of Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and (4) the continuing acrimony over human rights issues, in particular of how to deal with the situation in Chechnya. In addition, since 2004, there is the issue of electoral democracy in Russia and other CIS countries where Russian and some CIS leaders, notably in Central Asia and in Belarus, starkly contrast with European expectations on Russian democracy. Finally, in the recent past, gas deliveries to Europe, the Moscow's abandonment of the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty and the Russia–Georgia war have surfaced on the agenda.

It is a commonplace to assert that some of the present conflict issues are linked to ideational friction that, in turn, stems from deep-seated cultural differences between Europe and Russia. This difference is alternatively formulated as concerning the ‘European-ness’ of Russia, how ‘European’ Russia actually is, to what extent Russia ‘belongs’ to Europe, whether Russia forms part of Europe or not, or, as Alexei Arbatov rhetorically asks, if Russia (geographically and culturally) constitutes the ‘Eastern part of Europe or Western tip of Asia?’ (Arbatov, 1998). Such questions are virtually perennial and always hotly debated in Russia, although the answer to each of them is bound to be inconclusive. One reason for the inconclusiveness is that by asking whether Russia is one or the other, the question itself excludes the possibility that Russia is both European and Asian or neither – a particular and different (from both continents) entity. As a geographical fact, of course, Russia covers much of both European and Asian territory, so, in that respect, the answer is quite simply that it is both (Trofimenko 1999: 187).

However, most domestic commentators find the geographical dimension less intriguing to explore than notions of identity and national interests (Trofimenko 1999: 187, fn 3). Trofimenko refers to the ‘theme of split orientation, of dualism in the national psyche of Russians’, as a constant in Russian intellectual debates both before 1917 and after the demise of the Soviet Union, more precisely in the controversy between Westernizers and the Slavophiles. Trofimenko's conclusion is that there is an ‘emerging consensus’ that Russia ‘has to follow its own unique ways and traditions because Russia is neither a purely Western nor purely Eastern nation, but blends in its nature a combination of both cultures, psyches and even genes’ (Trofimenko 1999: 187–88, fn 3).

In recent years, under the Putin insignium, this notion of self-assertion seems to have become a virtual doctrine. It certainly is a leading idea in Russia's political life of today, embraced by the Unified Russia political party controlling the State Duma, the ‘Nashi’ movement with its near-fascist undertones, advocates of state ownership of ‘strategic resources’, and the ‘Chekist nomenklatura’ controlling a large amount of business ventures; in fact, many of these groups directly support the idea that there is a particular definition of Russian democracy, so-called ‘sovereign democracy’. So, how do we find clues as to the reasons for this emerging cleavage between Russia and Europe, given that common values were widely promoted only a decade ago?

In 1994, Henry Kissinger noted that Russia ‘never had an autonomous church; it missed the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the Age of Discovery, and modern market economics’ (cited in Arbatov, 1998: 101, fn 5). He pointed to some undeniable facts, the consequences of which are nevertheless open to interpretation. Generally speaking, the Russia–Europe relationship has, ever since Russia's earliest days of statehood, been coloured by amity/enmity sentiments, as evidenced in documentation from the courts of Novgorod, Kiev and Moscow. Competition with the ambitions of other European powers intensified in the seventeenth century, as Russia strove to expand to the West, followed by confrontation in the south and southeast in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Attempts to ‘Europeanize’ Russia by Tsar, Peter the Great, had by then increased Russia's imperial appetite, and Russia's fate had become inevitably linked to that of Europe.

Cherkasov has suggested that two varieties of the question exist, one posed in Russia and the other in Europe. The West traditionally does not accept Russia as an equal partner because of the different evolutionary paths of Christianity in the West and the East. This is the traditional argument that the dividing line between Russia and the rest of Europe came about as a result of two important developments. First, there was the schism in the Christian church between Rome and Constantinople, and later the effective closing-off of Russia from the rest of Europe in the mid-thirteenth century and for almost 400 years as a result of the Tartar–Mongol domination (Cherkasov 1998: 19–20, fn 5). When Russia returned to Europe, Europe itself had changed. The real re-engagement came only in the seventeenth century and was strongly reinforced by Peter the Great 100 years later. To later Russian tsars, the question whether Russia belonged to Europe was simply not put: ‘Russia is a European power’, as Catherine the Great stated in 1767, not only because of its participation in European affairs, but also because of the ‘internal structure of the state’ (the innovations introduced by Peter the Great).

The long period of Tartar domination in the medieval ages should be added to the observation that ‘Russia did not experience the Renaissance and Humanism in the European sense of these words’, Cherkasov writes (Cherkasov 1998: 20–21, fn 11). The Mongol rule ‘put a deep stamp on the national character and on the entire Russian political culture’ and, he continues, introduced ‘the traits of despotism which destroyed the shoots of democracy grown in the period of Ancient Rus’. Eventually, this left Russia with many deficits: the lack of property and land rights for the majority of Russians (Cherkasov 1998: 25, fn 11). The Orthodox Church was a major actor in this development of the Russian state and culture and that explains the peculiar prevalence of social utopian ideas as well as its ‘manifestation of messianism’ inherited from Russia's Byzantine past, when Russia proclaimed itself the successor and leader of the entire Orthodox world after the fall of Byzantium in 1453. The outcome, according to Cherkasov, is an entrenched feeling of Holy Russia being repeatedly attacked by enemies out to destroy it, an idea reaffirmed by the twentieth-century communist regime (Cherkasov 1998: 26–27, fn 11).

However, what is then the present-day import of these historical pathways, and how are they perceived? Arbatov says Russians ‘prefer collective labour, communal or state property and a more or less egalitarian distribution of wealth’, in contrast to ‘Western free market economy, clear-cut private property, and individualist self-interest’. And, instead of ‘political pluralism, democracy and the division of state powers, Russia is associated with the overwhelming power of the state, relying on a mighty and huge army run by an authoritative and wise leader, guided not by laws but by conscience and enlightenment’. Further, ‘in contrast to civil society and self-government, Russians are expected to live by communal wisdom and consensus, delegating the exercise of their will to higher authorities’. And, finally, ‘instead of pragmatic adjustment to the inadequacies of the world and making the most of its opportunities, Russians are supposed to believe in the special mission of man and the people’. In short, ‘Orthodox Christianity, Autocracy, Collectivism … is the traditional colloquial triad for the so called “Russian Idea”’ (Arbatov 1998: 102–3, fn 5).

The fact that the Church was subordinated to the state meant that state interests were prioritized, which in turn laid the foundation for state centralization. Furthermore, Russia's geopolitical location and lack of natural and defendable borders on the open plains forced it constantly to fight invaders from the south, east and west, for living space. The military might need to defend the territory, which in turn required state centralization, and defence therefore became ‘the core and purpose of the administrative and economic organization of Russia’. In search of security, Russia expanded its influence, frequently imposing its will on neighbouring weaker societies (Arbatov 1998: 105–7, fn 5).

Both on the domestic and international political scene of today's Russia, democracy and free market ideology remain a foresworn ideal among the rulers. Putin and Medvedev promptly take to blowing up this dual-faced balloon on official occasions, especially when the arena is an international one. They undoubtedly wish to remain among equals, to be important members of the club of democratic great powers. At the same time, the restrictions to democracy and free market ideals have recently received a particularly Russian touch; ‘sovereign democracy’ as to the former and state intervention as to economic and public policy. In many economic sectors of a ‘strategic nature’, representatives of obscure state structures seem to have gained an advantage over private sector businessmen.

The Russian notion of ‘sovereign democracy’ was partly forged as a response to the colour revolutions, especially Ukraine's ‘orange revolution’, in late 2004. The most basic confrontation seemed to concern the actual voting, or the fact that the vote count was challenged both in the first and the second round of elections (since no one received more than 50 per cent). The demonstrations that followed in Ukrainian cities revealed a direct clash of official views. After Yanukovich, the Russian protégé, had won the second round, EU leaders could not hide their disappointment with the count, whereas Putin noted that ‘the race was fierce – but open and fair – and the victory is convincing’ (RFE/RL 23 November 2004). After several top-level European politicians had appealed to Putin to accept a renewed election, he did so, although reluctantly, complaining that Western interference was ‘intolerable’ (RFE/RL 7 December 2004).

It was a major concession and one that Putin later seemed to regret. Renewed elections brought Yushchenko to power and this defeat of ‘managed democracy’ style elections had major repercussions all over Eurasia. The parliamentary elections in Kyrgyztan in spring 2005 ended with demonstrations in the so-called ‘tulip revolution’, which in turn brought about new presidential elections, with the incumbent president fleeing to Moscow. Here too, Russia was deeply irritated over European election observers. The presidential elections in Belarus in the spring of 2006 finally brought the two opposing notions of democracy to the fore. Here, the West, both the United States and Europe, were accused of trying to overthrow Lukashenka.

From this point on, the official Russian attitude towards elections in Eurasia became that Europeans and Americans have no right to criticize the way in which elections in the CIS region are handled. The Russian Duma and presidential elections in 2007/8, similar to the election cycle in 2003/4, then affirmed its exclusive right to interpret elections that actually ‘maintain the appearance of democracy but disdains its essence’ (Kimmage 2005). What initially seemed to be successful Western norm diffusion into the ‘managed democracies’ of Eurasia, precipitating a ‘democratization wave’, later backfired. In Russia, the epithet denoting an alternative to Western-style democracy in 2006 became known (although never expressly endorsed by Putin or Medvedev) as ‘sovereign democracy’ (Krastev 2007). The general and ideologically potent notion is simple if not trivial: sovereignty is a precondition for democracy, which makes sense in a state centred world. The notion is instrumental, reflects ‘mobilization objectives’ (Okara 2007), and suggests that Russia gets its own way (Amsterdam 2006).

The broader question is how we can expect Russia–Europe relations to evolve given a greater amount of friction over values, norms and institutions. How distinctive are the views of the present government and how malleable would they be under a new administration in which neither Putin, nor Medvedev takes part? In addition, how do these views, if still quite distinctive, translate into foreign policy doctrine? Is the EU's diplomatic approach, including its newly initiated ‘Eastern Partnership’ toward Russia's neighbours, compatible with a constructive engagement with Moscow as envisaged by many Union member states?

Russia, the EU and the Big Three

The Russian view of the EU has shifted over the years, from Soviet-era perceptions of the Union as an extension of the United States and NATO to a non-antagonistic but confused relationship in the 1990s. It began with the 1992 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), through which the EU established new principles for dealing with Russia (assisting in its transformation towards a market economy and democracy). Given Russia's recent loss of its empire status, this minor ‘carrot’ was not particularly appetizing. Russia was essentially given the stark choice of either accepting or rejecting a ready-made formula to become a ‘normal European state’. The further, disappointing trajectory of Russia–EU relations had thus been pre-programmed. The PCA was signed in December 1994 and entered into force in 1997, after a prolonged ratification process; but in most policy fields, there has been little concrete progress.

The EU Common Strategy for the first decade of the 2000s ‘welcomes Russia's return to i...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Halftitle Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table Of Contents
• Contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1 A reassertive Russia and an expanded European Union
• PART 1 Norms, values, and institutions
• PART 2 Moscow, Brussels and the big three
• PART 3 ‘In-Between-Europe’
• Primary sources
• Secondary sources
• Index