Reducing Intergroup Bias

The Common Ingroup Identity Model

Samuel L. Gaertner, John F. Dovidio

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317774945
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychologie
• Subtopic: Geschichte & Theorie in der Psychologie

Considers situations and interventions that can foster more inclusive representation and ways, both theoretically and practically, and that a common ingroup identity can facilitate more harmonious intergroup relations.

1 CHAPTER

Introduction and Overview

This book is about reducing intergroup bias. Over the past century, psychologists have made substantial strides in identifying the causes and consequences of fundamental biases, such as racism. The field has been less successful, however, in developing theories and pragmatic interventions to reduce these biases. In a sense, this book is an autobiographical account of our attempts to delineate the nature of contemporary racial attitudes and then to pursue a theoretically-grounded strategy we have been developing for combating their destructive consequences. We have not tried to write an encyclopedic text on intergroup relations, one that documents all of the literature in intergroup relations but without structure. Instead, we were asked to produce a more focused monograph, organized around our own research. We greeted the invitation to prepare such a volume with great excitement and sense of challenge. This book extends far beyond our own work, however. We use the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the model we developed through our research, as an integrating framework for understanding the connections among a range of other relevant theories and studies in the literature more broadly. In addition, although this is not a “how to” book, the principles outlined in the volume have direct relevance to practical interventions.

You might say that this book took almost 30 years to write. the research on which it is based developed out of a collaboration that began that long ago. the first author, a professor at the university of delaware, had been working for several years on the topic of aversive racism, a contemporary and subtle manifestation of racial bias. his work on this topic began with a serendipitous finding in what otherwise would have been an interesting but theoretically unexciting field experiment (Gaertner, 1973).

The study involved the willingness of registered Liberal and Conservative Party members in New York City to help a Black or White motorist (identifiable on the basis of their dialects) whose car has broken down on a local highway, who further claimed to have been dialing their mechanic’s telephone number from a public telephone. Our Black or White callers explained that they now needed the respondent’s help to call the mechanic because they used their last coin for this wrong number call. Consistent with the classical research literature on political ideology and prejudice (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), Conservative Party members discriminated by helping Black callers less frequently than White callers, whereas liberals did not discriminate in terms of helping. Surprisingly, however, Liberal Party members discriminated in a different way. Although Liberals helped without regard to race when they knew their assistance was needed, they terminated this encounter more readily for Black than for White callers prior to learning fully of the caller’s need for their help. That is, they hung-up prematurely. The results were puzzling, and we began by applying the notion of aversive racism (Kovel, 1970) to explain why supposedly non-prejudiced Liberals discriminated against Blacks, but only when they were not sure their help was needed.

In 1973, the second author came to Delaware as a graduate student. He came with a range of interests, including altruism and nonverbal behavior, but with a primary personal interest in intergroup relations and prejudice. Together, the two of us collaborated on many articles, chapters, and books on a variety of topics. But the work on aversive racism was the start and is at the heart of it all.

In this chapter, we next consider the nature of contemporary racism, and aversive racism in particular. We then explore the relationship between this specific type of prejudice and the development and nature of intergroup biases, illustrated more generally almost 50 years ago by the compelling field research at Robbers Cave by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues. Drawing on this classic work and the pioneering research of Henri Tajfel, Gordon Allport, and others, we outline basic principles of intergroup processes that form the foundation of the Common Ingroup Identity Model. We present the model briefly and provide overviews of the chapters that review the relevant research and theory associated with its key elements.

□Aversive Racism

What specifically is aversive racism? In contrast to “old-fashioned” racism, which is blatant, aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986a; Kovel, 1970) represents a subtle, often unintentional, form of bias that characterizes many well-intentioned White Americans who possess strong egalitarian values and who believe that they are nonprejudiced. Aversive racists also possess negative racial feelings and beliefs (which develop through normal cognitive biases and socialization) of which they are unaware or which they try to dissociate from their nonprejudiced self-images. Because aversive racists consciously endorse egalitarian values, they will not discriminate directly and openly in ways that can be attributed to racism; however, because of their negative feelings they will discriminate, often unintentionally, when their behavior can be justified on the basis of some factor other than race (e.g., attributions to a perceived lack of effort of the other person; see Frey & Gaertner, 1986). Thus, aversive racists may regularly engage in discrimination while they maintain a nonprejudiced self-image. The negative feelings that aversive racists have for Blacks do not reflect open hostility or hate. Instead, their reactions involve discomfort, uneasiness, disgust, and sometimes fear. That is, they find Blacks “aversive,” while at the same time find any suggestion that they might be prejudiced “aversive” as well.

Other current theories of racism also propose that racism is now more subtle, indirect, and less conscious than in the past. According to symbolic racism theory (Sears, 1988) and its related variant modern racism theory (McConahay, 1986), negative feelings toward Blacks, which Whites acquire early in life, are relatively stable across the life span and thus persist into adulthood. When primed, these predispositions influence responses to racially-associated attitudinal objects, such as race-related policies (Sears, van Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman, 1997). However, because explicit beliefs change more fully and rapidly than these racial feelings and are likely to be more egalitarian to conform to prevailing norms, these negative attitudes are expressed indirectly and symbolically, in terms of opposition to busing or resistance to preferential treatment, rather than directly or overtly, as in support for segregation. McConahay (1986) further proposed that because modern racism involves the rejection of traditional racist beliefs and the displacement of anti-Black feelings onto more abstract social and political issues, modern racists, like aversive racists, are relatively unaware of their racist feelings. However, whereas symbolic and modern racism are subtle forms of contemporary racism that seem to exist among political conservatives, aversive racism seems to be more strongly associated with liberals. Nevertheless, like aversive racism, the negative effects of modern and symbolic racism are observed primarily when discrimination can be justified on the basis of factors other than race.

In summary, aversive racism, modern racism, and symbolic racism theories all hypothesize that discrimination is currently expressed more subtly than in the past, but they differ in their assumptions about the underlying causes and general motivations associated with this discrimination. Whereas modern and symbolic racism perspectives emphasize the central role of particular political and social ideologies (e.g., meritocracy and the Protestant Ethic), aversive racism theory focuses on the conflict between an individual’s negative feelings and his or her personal self-image of being fair and nonprejudiced.

When we described our findings formally, in papers and presentations, and informally, a common question arose: What can we do about subtle biases, particularly when we don’t know for sure whether we have them? Like a virus that has mutated, racism may have evolved into different forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but also to combat. The subtle processes underlying discrimination can be identified and isolated under the controlled conditions of the laboratory. However, in organizational decision making, in which the controlled conditions of an experiment are rarely possible, this process presents a substantial challenge to the equitable treatment of members of disadvantaged groups. Krieger (1995), in the Stanford Law Review, notes that this aspect of contemporary bias poses a particular problem for society and the legal system: “Herein lies the practical problem. … Validating subjective decision making systems is neither empirically nor economically feasible, especially for jobs where intangible qualities, such as interpersonal skills, creativity, and ability to make sound judgments under conditions of uncertainty are critical” (p. 1232).

In addition, to the extent that legal proof of discrimination requires the demonstration that race is the determining factor and that the actions were intentional, the biases of aversive racists are immune to legal prosecution. Aversive, modern, and symbolic racists discriminate only when other, non-race-related factors can justify their negative treatment of Blacks, and their biases are normally unconscious and unintentional— factors that may disqualify many employment discrimination suits from successful outcomes (Krieger, 1995). Krieger (1998) concludes, “These more subtle, incremental forms of discrimination are difficult to recognize, and neither our cultural understanding nor our jurisprudential models illuminate or provide ways to reckon with them” (pp. 1332-1333).

Because of its pervasiveness, subtlety, and complexity, the traditional techniques for eliminating bias that emphasize the immorality of prejudice and illegality of discrimination are not effective for combating aversive racism. Aversive racists recognize that prejudice is bad, but they do not recognize that they are prejudiced. Modern and symbolic racists believe that discrimination “is a thing of the past.” Thus, contemporary, subtle forms of racism must be addressed at multiple levels—at the societal and intergroup level, as well as the personal level.

Although we continue to pursue research on aversive racism, much of our earlier work was summarized in our edited book, (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986) Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. We had three chapters in that book. The first reviewed historical trends and contemporary approaches in the study of prejudice and racism. Another summarized our research on aversive racism. The last chapter of the book, “Problems, Progress, and Promise,” considered new ways of fighting racism and introduced the basic ideas and initial research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model. Where that book left off, this book begins. This book is about the Common Ingroup Identity Model: past research, current challenges, and promise as a theoretical framework and a potentially practical strategy for fighting bias, including subtle types such as aversive racism.

One basic argument we have made in our research on aversive racism is that the negative feelings that develop toward other groups may be rooted, in part, in fundamental, normal psychological processes. One such process, identified in the classic work of Tajfel, Allport and others, is the categorization of people into ingroups and outgroups—”we’s” and “they’s.” People respond systematically more favorably to others whom they perceive to belong to their group than to different groups. Thus, if bias is linked to fundamental, normal psychological processes, then attempts to ameliorate bias should be directed not at eliminating the process but rather at redirecting the forces to produce more harmonious intergroup relations. By shifting the basis of categorization from race to an alternative dimension, we can potentially alter who is a “we” and who is a “they,” undermining a contributing force to aversive racism.

As these ideas were developing, we also began to consider the possibility that the discrimination we were observing in our studies of aversive racism may have reflected discrimination not only against Blacks but also discrimination in favor of Whites. That is, we began to view aversive racism as a problem that, in part, involved Whites having a more generous and forgiving orientation toward Whites than toward Blacks. Even though this form of racism can be very pernicious, it does not assume an underlying motivation to be hurtful—either consciously or unconsciously. Rather, for aversive racists, part of the problem may be that they do not regard Blacks and other minorities as part of their circle of sharing and caring as readily as they accept Whites. Racially dissimilar others, then, do not ordinarily have the same capacity as fellow Whites to elicit empathic, prosocial reactions. But, what if Whites perceived Blacks and other minorities, even temporarily, as members of their own group—as ingroup members—rather than as members of different groups? Would behavior toward them become more favorable? And how specifically can intergroup contact be structured to reduce bias and conflict?

□□Conflict, Categorization, and Recategorization

In 1954, Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961, reprinted in 1988) conducted the third of a series of field studies about the creation and reduction of intergroup bias and conflict. This particular study was conducted at Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma. In the Robbers Cave study, Sherif and his colleagues engaged psychologically healthy 12-year-old boys from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in what turned out to be a clever (some might say diabolical), carefully orchestrated social psychology experiment about intergroup relations. These boys, who had signed up for three weeks of summer camp, were assigned (without their knowledge) to two groups that arrived at camp on different days. To permit time for group formation (e.g., the development of norms, and a leadership structure), these groups were kept almost completely apart for one week during which they were not given information about each other’s existence. The two groups named themselves the Eagles and the Rattlers.

During the second week, the investigators introduced competitive relations between the groups in the form of repeated competitive athletic activities centering around tug-of-war, baseball, and touch football. As expected, the introduction of competitive activities generated derogatory stereotypes and conflict between the Eagles and the Rattlers. These boys, however, did not simply show ingroup favoritism. Rather, there was genuine hostility between these groups. Each group conducted raids on the other’s cabins that resulted in the destruction and theft of property. The boys carried sticks, baseball bats, and socks filled with rocks as potential weapons. Fistfights broke out between members of the groups, and food and garbage fights erupted in the dining hall. In addition, group members regularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g., “ladies first”) and name calling (e.g., “sissies,” “stinkers,” “pigs,” “bums,” “cheaters,” and “communists”).

During the third week, Sherif and his colleagues arranged intergroup contact under neutral, noncompetitive conditions. These interventions did not calm the ferocity of the exchanges, however. Mere intergroup contact was not sufficient to change the nature of the relations between the groups. Only after the investigators altered the functional relationship between the groups by introducing a series of superordinate goals—ones that could not be achieved without the full cooperation of both groups and which were successfully achieved—did the relations between the two groups become more harmonious. But specifically how, psychologically, did cooperation toward superordinate goals change intergroup attitudes?

In our work on the Common Ingroup Identity Model, we have proposed that social categorization—specifically how people conceive of group boundaries—is a key factor. We have attempted to reduce intergroup bias by changing group members’ cognitive representations from different groups to one group (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). This framework is what this book is about. Rather than trying to summarize the vast literature on intergroup relations generally, consistent with the theme of this book series, we describe a more singular program of research. This book presents a recategorization approach to reducing bias and uses the Common Ingroup Identity Model as an organizing framework.

In application, recategorization from different, potentially competing groups to one group can be achieved by inducing intergroup cooperation, calling attention to existing common superordinate group memberships (e.g., their common university identity) or by introducing new factors (e.g., common goals or fate) that are perceived to be shared by members. We have found that evaluations of former outgroup members significantly improve as these individuals become identified with the superordinate, more inclusive ingroup (Gaertner et al., 1993).

We view the recategorization of different groups into one group as a particularly powerful and pragmatic strategy for combating subtle forms of bias. Creating the perception of a common ingroup identity not only reduces the likelihood of discrimination based on race but also increases the likelihood of positive interracial behaviors. People are more helpful toward ingroup members (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995) and apply different and more generous standards of morality, justice, and fairness to ingroup members than to outgroup members (Opotow, 1990). It is important to note however, that recategorization does not necessarily require members to forsake their earlier group identities because it is possible to maintain a “dual” representation in which both superordinate and original group identities are salient simultaneously (e.g., a football team composed of both offensive and defensive units).

We describe the model and its theoretical and empirical underpinnings more fully in Chapter 3. In general, we propose that factors that affect intergroup differentiation, that influence the nature of intergroup contact (as outlined by the Contact Hypothesis), and that cognitively or affectively prime interactants can shape how people conceive of the memberships. These factors can emphasize intergroup diffe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• About the Authors
• Acknowledgment
• Preface
• 1 Introduction and Overview
• 2 Aversive Racism and Intergroup Biases
• 3 Theoretical Background and the Common Ingroup Identity Model
• 4 Altering the Perception of Group Boundaries
• 5 Conditions of Intergroup Contact
• 6 Cognitive and Affective Priming: Antecedents and Consequences of a Common Ingroup Identity
• 7 Extending the Benefits of Recategorization
• 8 Progress, Problems, and Promise
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index