Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind (Routledge Revivals)

Ashok Vohra

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317688266
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Philosophers since Descartes have felt themselves compelled to make a choice between mind and body. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind, first published in 1986, argues that there is no genuine epistemological problem of mind, and that the widespread philosophical scepticism with regard to our knowledge of other minds is without foundation. Ashok Vohra applies Wittgenstein's method to show that the problem has arisen through a tendency to over-philosophise our simple experiences.

Vohra presents a positive account of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, arguing that to consider his philosophy entirely destructive is misleading. He shows that knowledge of mind is gained through a large complex of intersubjectively identifiable factors such as the linguistic and non-linguistic past, present and future behaviour of the person concerned. He thus justifies the belief, on which psychology and psychoanalysis are based, that mind is not a mystery to which only the owner has privileged access.

1	THE CONCEPT OF SENSATION

In this chapter, I analyse the concept of sensation. This analysis is important, for philosophers, especially the Cartesian theorists, have a tendency to use ‘sensations’, ‘sense-data’, and ‘sensible qualities’ interchangeably. After this analysis, I seek to answer the question ‘What are the immediate objects of observation?’ The scrutiny of the various answers given to it by philosophers, especially the theorists, is necessary, because those philosophers who hold that the mind is a theatre, or an agent, and mental occurrences/events are private are led to think that the immediate objects of observation must be either sensible qualities, or sensations, or sense-data. I try to show that the immediate objects of observation are neither sensible qualities, nor sensations, nor sense-data, but the objects as they are in the public physical world.

A sensation is that which a normal human being naturally has when his body stands in a certain kind of relationship to different kinds of physical objects or different kinds of surroundings. For example, if a human being is made to stand before a furnace for a long time, he starts having an uncomfortable feeling, namely, a sensation of burning. The Oxford English Dictionary describes ‘sensation’ as an operation of any of the senses; a psychical affection or state of consciousness consequent on and related to a particular impression received by one of the bodily organs, or a particular impression required by one of the organs of sense. Based on this description we can draw a distinction between two types of sensation:

(a) those which are connected with special organs of sense, namely, eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin;

(b) those which are connected with other sensitive but non-sensory parts of the body.

The latter are generally called organic sensations. Pains, aches, tickles, prickings, fatigue and giddiness, fall under this latter category (b). Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and feeling come under the former category (a), namely, the sensations connected with special organs of sense. However, the distinction between the two is quite arbitrary because both can, and in fact are, used interchangeably. For example, when our eyes are dazzled, or we have a fish-bone in the throat, or we are pricked in the skin, we readily say that we have pain. Conversely, whenever we have an organic sensation, for example, pain in the throat or stomach, or we are fatigued, we are apt to say that we feel the fish bone in the throat, or suet pudding in the stomach, or the resistance of a log. However, the main point of distinction is that while it is proper to ask for the cause of organic sensations, that is, pain, ache, fatigue, and so on, there is no sense in asking for the cause of the sensations connected with our special organs of sense. For example, in our day-to-day life, we do talk of causes of pain, causes of fatigue, causes of tickling, but we never ask the question, ‘What is the cause of seeing, or tasting, or smelling, or feeling, or hearing?’ In fact this question is analogous to the question: ‘What is the cause of writing the word “Delhi” as it is written? Nobody asks such questions. This question obviously makes no sense. As the question about seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling is analogous to it, therefore, that question also makes no sense. Generally, the cause of an organic sensation can be a sensation connected with our special sense organs. For example, to the questions ‘What is the cause of the pain in the throat?’ or ‘What is the cause of fatigue?’, one is justified in replying that the fish bone in the throat is the cause of the pain in the throat, or that the pressure of a log on the body is the cause of fatigue, or that the cooked beans that one ate the previous night is the cause of the stomach ache.

One of the difficulties faced in discussing the logic of the concept of sensation of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and feeling is linguistic in nature. The linguistic difficulty arises because of the fact that we do not talk in terms of ‘neat’ sensation vocabulary.¹ We do not just talk of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, or feeling alone; but we talk of seeing something (say, haystacks), hearing something (say, the approach of an engine), tasting something (say, apples), smelling something (say, roses), feeling something (say, hot or cold). ‘We ordinarily mention them only in reference to the things or events which we are observing or trying to observe or claiming to observe’.² In fact, we describe our sensations by referring to how common objects regularly look, feel, or sound to any normal human being. For example, when I hear the approach of an engine, I am apt to describe this sensation as a humming thing, or when asked to describe a sensation of taste to someone I readily say that it tastes like sugar. This method of describing our sensations in impersonal or neutral terms is of great theoretical importance for our communication. They are the terms which anybody can in principle observe. We expect that their accounts of such descriptions would tally, or at least are capable of correction until they tally. If we had not couched the description of our sensations in these neutral or impersonal terms, then they would fail to convey anything. These are, after all, the terms which we learned by being taught them by others. We do not and cannot describe haystacks in terms of this or that set of sensations. We describe our sensations by certain sorts of references to observers and things like haystacks.’³

This holds good in the case of organic sensations too. We do not merely talk of pains, aches and itches, but we describe, for instance, our sensation of pain as stabbing, grinding, or burning pain. By this we do not mean that the pain is necessarily invoked by a knife, or a drill, or a burning rod; rather we mean that our pain is like the pain which is caused to anybody by such instruments.

Confusion regarding the use of ‘sensation’ arises because many philosophers tend to use words like ‘pain’, ‘itch’ and ‘ache’, as ‘neat’ sensation names. They forget that ‘sensations’ has a complicated use. It is used to refer to three different kinds of entities, namely, (a) an act of awareness, or sensory experience, as, for example, pain, or aching; (b) the entity of which one is aware, or the content of sensory experience, as, for example, aches and pains; and (c) sometimes, it is employed as a comprehensive term to refer to both (a) and (b). Confusion arises because it is frequently used without qualifications as to whether an act of sensation (i.e., sensing) is meant, or the content of sensation (i.e., what is sensed) is meant; or a complex of both act and content is meant. In short, the confusion arises because of the mistake of assimilation of the concept of ‘observing’, that is the act of awareness, to the concept of ‘sensation’, that is, the content of awareness. In what follows, I shall try to draw a conceptual distinction between ‘sensation’ and ‘observation’.

We say that a person is observing something if he is trying with or without success to find out something about it by doing at least some looking, scanning, listening, smelling, savouring, or feeling. Observing something necessarily implies the having of at least one of the visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, or any other sensation. There is a contradiction, a kind of logical oddity, involved in saying that someone was looking or peeping, at something without having a single glimpse of it, or that someone was listening to something without having even a single auditory sensation. ‘Having at least one sensation is part of the force of “perceiving”, “overhearing”, “savouring” and the rest’.⁴ But the converse does not hold good. Having a sensation alone cannot itself be a species of perceiving, hearing, or savouring any more than bricks are houses, or alphabets are words. Observing something entails not only having a sensation but also paying heed to it. In the form of a formula we can say:

Observation = Having a sensation + Paying heed to it.

Furthermore, we can say a number of things about ‘observation’ which we cannot say about ‘sensation’. Firstly, observing is a task which one can perform methodically or haphazardly, accurately or inaccurately, carefully, or carelessly, expertly or amateurishly. One can be good or bad at doing it. One can be more or less successful in it. But one cannot exercise all these ‘powers of observation’ in the case of sensations. One cannot have sensations systematically. For example, one can listen carefully, but one cannot have singing in the ears carefully. Secondly, we observe on purpose (for example, to find out what is happening around us), but we cannot have sensations on purpose. Thirdly, we can make mistakes in our observations but it makes no sense to talk of mistakes in sensations. Sensations cannot be correct or incorrect, veridical or non-veridical. In other words, they are ‘mistake-proof’. ‘But the reason why sensation cannot be mistaken is not because it is a mistake-proof observing, but because it is not an observing at all. It is as absurd to call a sensation veridical as to call it “mistaken”. The senses are neither honest nor deceitful’.⁵ Fourthly, by observing we mean finding out, or trying to find out something; but having a sensation is neither finding out nor failing to find out anything. In other words, observation is necessarily motivational while sensation is not. Fifthly, observing is a mental characteristic. It reflects on the intellect of a person. If a person quickly observes things correctly, we call him intelligent. On the other hand, sensations have nothing ‘mental’ about them. Having a sensation or not having a sensation does not reflect on the intellect of a person. For example, deafness is not a species of stupidity, nor is blindness thought of as a mental defect, nor is the attraction for a particular scent a sign of intelligence. In fact, we readily concede that both men and reptiles may have the same sorts of sensation when placed before a furnace, or when kept in a pond of ice; in short, when they live under the same conditions.

Another difficulty in discussing the logic of the concept of sensation is the tendency in philosophers to assimilate the concept of sensation to sense impressions and/or to the sensible qualities of things. Prominent among those who assimilate sensations to sensible qualities of objects is Berkeley. By sensible qualities are meant such qualities as colour, shape, size, motion, hardness, heat, sound, taste, and smell, in short, the qualities which are said to be perceived by our special sense organs. This assimilation of sensations to sensible qualities, is, however, not justified, because there are a number of things that can be said about the former but not about the latter, and vice versa. Firstly, we say that we see colours, shapes, sizes, motions, spatial relations of things, as, for example, side-by-sideness, above and below; we taste the tastes of things, smell their smells, hear the sounds emitted by them, touch hot things, and so on. In general, we say that we perceive the qualities of things. But, in the case of sensations, we do not say that we perceive sensations; rather we say that we have them or that we feel them.⁶ Secondly, sensible qualities of objects continue to remain even if there is no person to perceive them. For example, the colour or the shape, or the spatial relations, or the emitted sounds, or the smells continue to be even if there is no perceiver. For, there is no contradiction involved in saying that there is/was a sensible quality (colour, shape, size, etc.) of which nobody is/was aware. That sensible qualities can exist unperceived is supported by the fact that in science whenever a new element, for instance, Ruthenium, is found, or a new property of an element, for instance, radioactivity, is found, it is called a discovery and not an invention. The grammar of the word ‘discover’ is such that we use it only in those cases in which we reveal certain qualities, which, though existent, were hitherto unknown. But, in the case of sensations, a contradiction is involved in saying that there was a sensation though nobody felt it. Sensations cannot exist unfelt or unhad. The esse of sensations is sentri. This is to say that sensations can exist only if they are felt or had by someone. We may or may not pay attention to our sensations if they are mild; but we cannot dispense with having them altogether. If we do not feel the pain at all, we certainly are not in pain.

Thirdly, the sensible qualities of physical objects can be perceived by anybody who is suitably placed and whose sense organs are in normal condition. For instance, the blue colour of the table top before me, now, can be seen by anyone who sees it and who is not colour blind. Similar is the case with size, shape, spatial relationships, and other sense-qualities of physical objects. But in the case of sensations, I alone can feel my sensations. Nobody, however competent or well placed he may be, can feel my sensations. In short, everybody in principle can perceive the sensible qualities of a physical object; but nobody except myself can feel my sensations.

Fourthly, in the case of sensible qualities there are chances of misperception. One may mistake, for example, a pink colour for a red colour, or an elliptical shape for a circular shape, or a pair of parallel lines for a pair of convergent lines. That is why it makes sense to say, ‘It seems red to me’, or ‘It seems circular to me’, or ‘It seems a pair of convergent lines to me’, or The water seems warm’, or ‘I seem to have fever.’ But in the case of sensations, misperception is impossible. Talk of mistake in their context is out of place. That is why it is absurd to say ‘I seem to have a pain.’ One may be mistaken about the cause of pain but one cannot be mistaken about one’s having a pain. From this, it follows that sensations cannot be identified with sensible qualities.

Let us now consider the question ‘Are sensations identical with sense impressions, or what Berkeley calls ideas, or what has been called “sense-data” by later philosophers like Price, Moore and Russell?’ By the terms ‘sense impression’, ‘idea’ and ‘sense-datum’, we mean what is present in our visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, or kinaesthetic field. For example, when an object looks blue to me, a psychologist is apt to say that there is something blue present in my visual field. A philosopher, at the same time, says that I am having a ‘sense impression’ or an ‘idea’, or ‘sense-datum’ of a blue colour. The following similarities in sensations and sense impressions have led philosophers to conclude that they are identical:

(a) About both sensations and sense impressions we say that we have them. We never say that we perceive them.

(b) We cannot be mistaken about both. If I say at a time t that I have a sense impression of blue, then I cannot be mistaken about the fact that the object in question seems blue to me at that particular time, t.

(c) As with sensations, I alone can have sense impressions. Nobody, however well placed he may be, can have the sense impressions of blue which I am having right now.

(d) Like sensations, sense impressions cannot exist unhad. If there are sense impressions, then somebody must have them.

Though there are these similarities between sensations and sense impressions, yet the two cannot be identified. For, if we do so, then we can talk about them indifferently, or synonymously and thus use the two expressions ‘sensations’ and ‘sense impressions’ interchangeably. We can speak, for example, about sensation of pain, sensation of colour, sensation of heat, sensation o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Dedication
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. The Concept of Sensation
• 2. Privacy and Private Language
• 3. Self-Knowledge and Personal Identity
• 4. Knowledge of Other Persons
• Concluding Note
• Index