Pre-Communist Indochina

R.B. Smith, Beryl Williams

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781136604713
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Asiatische Geschichte

This book explores the history of pre-communist Indochina, from the fourteenth century to the 1940s. It examines the early state of Vietnam, comparing and contrasting its political and social systems, with both those of neighbouring states such as Thailand and those prevalent at the time in Europe. It identifies the forces that shaped Indochina before the arrival of European colonial powers, in particular the impact of China, which was not only a military threat and extracted payments of tribute, but was also an important commercial and cultural influence, not least through the export of Confucianism. It demonstrates clearly that the events and transformations of the late 16th and early 17th centuries are the starting point of developments which by around 1800 established the broad pattern of political and economic relations that existed before the nineteenth century 'impact of the West' began. It goes on to consider the impact of European colonialism in Indochina, focusing especially on French Indochina. It explores the ways in which the French occupiers groomed a new indigenous colonial elite to replace the existing elites who refused to co-operate with the authorities, and examines the growing opposition to French rule, including the role played by the often misunderstood religious and political movement of Caodaism. It analyses the different avenues of expression of Vietnamese nationalism, including the emergence of the Constitutionalist Party - the nearest French Indochina had to a democratic party in the Western sense. It shows how it sought to seek, through the actions of the French themselves, reforms that would lead to the modernisation of the country and more liberty for its inhabitants; and explains why it ultimately failed to achieve its objectives. Written by the late Ralph Smith, a highly respected historian of Asia, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the history of Indochina.

1 Contrasting political, social and intellectual perspectives

A comparison of Vietnam and England in the fourteenth century

Source: Paper for Hamburg Synposium on Religious Diffusion and Cultural Exchange in South East Asia, 7–9 September 1998; corrected version March 1999.

I

The subject of historical difference between ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ has been of scholarly concern since at least the late 18th century, when J.G. von Herder posed the question: how and why did Europe emerge as the focal point of human history? The theme was important for many of the major philosopher–historian–sociologists of the period 1820–1940, and any serious historiographical treatment would need to take into account the works of Hegel and Comte, Marx and Weber – to mention only a few of the ‘giants’. Their dominant concern was with European ‘progress’, which contrasted sharply with the apparently unchanging quality of Asian societies in the centuries since the emergence of classical Greek and Roman ‘civilisation’. During the same period, however, Europe produced its own ‘oriental’ scholarship which, although assuming the same philosophical framework, also developed a high level of scholarly respect for the classical languages and texts of one or another of the Asian ‘traditions’. Max Weber’s comparative studies, especially, depended on that growing body of specialised research.

The influence of Weber’s sociological approach remained strong in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in the United States. In the political aftermath of the European retreat from Asia and the rise of American hegemony, many Western social scientists and historians defined the ‘task’ of Asian ‘modern-ization’ in essentially socio-cultural terms. The ‘quest for modernity’ was seen as a product of the ‘impact of the West’ on Asian societies, during the ‘age of imperialism’ from 1800 to 1940.¹ Current and future problems of development were approached by way of essentially Western (and behaviourist) conceptual norms, centering above all on that of the nation-state and its theoretical sovereignty.

During the same period, Marxist theoreticians grappled with the issue of the ‘so-called Asiatic mode of production’, in terms which had grown out of a debate of the 1930s, when Stalin had insisted on eliminating Marx’s own formulation of that concept and on the universality of ‘feudalism’ as a stage of Asian history. In 1957 Karl Wittfogel sought to rehabilitate Marx’s concept, in terms which would also satisfy Weberian social scientists, by launching his controversial Oriental Despotism.

Much of the conceptual framework of Weberian sociology was incorporated into American social (especially political) science by the mid-20th century, and was also adopted by many historians. The trend was especially marked in the case of Asian studies which – in the United States more than in Europe – were avowedly inter-disciplinary in their focus on ‘areas’ defined according to the necessity of acquiring language expertise. It became most prevalent of all in the field of South-East Asian studies, whose financial viability depended on a small number of academic centres embracing expertise in several different countries of that region. The adoption of a common conceptual framework facilitated comparative discussion in seminars made up of specialists working on a range of different countries and languages.

Since the 1960s a somewhat different approach to ‘pre-modern’ Asia has developed, in an academic context shaped by Fernand Braudel’s work on the expansion of long distance trade by Western capitalist enterprises; and by a debate on the European ‘general crisis’ of the 17th century, initiated by Eric Hobsbawm and H.R. Trevor Roper in the journal Past and Present. In relation to the social and economic development of Asia, the growing output of specialist research during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to a clearer understanding of the global significance of these themes. Long-distance trade was seen as having steadily transformed Asian society, at least in maritime regions, through a somewhat less one-sided process of interaction than earlier stereotypes had allowed. ‘Traditional’ Asian societies began to appear much less ‘static’ than had once been supposed, and much more lively in their response to external intrusions between the 16th and 18th centuries. In South-East Asia, Anthony Reid and others began to explore the repercussions of a seventeenth century ‘crisis’ whose scope and quality now appeared to be truly global, not just European. Nevertheless, the fact remained that it was Europeans who had expanded their operations into Asia – as traders and as missionaries – not the expanding economic activity of Asians which had taken them to Europe. As far as comparative history was concerned, the underlying question was still one of explaining European ‘exceptionalism’.

It is not my intention in this paper to become deeply involved in these larger controversies. I am, however, tempted to take as a starting point some reflections on one important recent contribution to the continuing debate: namely Victor Lieberman’s attempt to ‘transcend East–West dichotomies’ by developing a comparative analysis of societies in various parts of the ‘rimland’ of ‘Eurasia’ during the centuries from c.1450 to c.1830. It has direct relevance to my present theme since he gives special prominence to three countries of mainland South-East Asia (Burma, Siam and Vietnam), which he proceeds to compare with three more widely scattered ‘rimland’ countries: France, Russia and Japan. His main purpose is to demonstrate that – when seen ‘from inside’ rather than primarily in terms of their external contacts – all six of these societies exhibit a common trend towards greater political, social and cultural ‘integration’ during the period in question.²

I should say immediately that on one level I am entirely in sympathy with Lieberman’s conclusion that these three South-East Asian countries (Burma, Siam and Vietnam) had already taken on what might be called their ‘modern’ political and social structure well before they experienced the ‘impact of the West’ in the first half of the 19th century. I am less convinced of the appropriateness of extending the (originally European) label of an ‘early modern’ to the history of Asian societies. But there is every reason to identify a period in that history during which significant political and cultural ‘integration’ took place, starting in the second half of the 16th century (possibly earlier) and ending by around 1800. I would go further and suggest that the developments of 1800–1940 can be seen as a postlude to that longer evolution: a period in which the region was ‘internationalised’ without being structurally transformed. In other words, I would argue that the transformation of the region which occurred in the period 1600–1800 was even more fundamental than that brought about by the ‘impact of the West’ in the colonial era.³

I do, however, wish to take issue with Professor Lieberman’s methodological approach to his theme, and to the larger problem of comparative history in relation to Europe and Asia. Two possible criticisms seem to me worthy of closer attention.

First: It is impossible to attempt a comparative study of such widely distant and culturally different societies, each governed by its own language, without adopting a highly conceptualised approach: one which, for English-speaking scholars, is ultimately rooted in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ political and philosophical tradition, and that of its ‘classical’ antecedents. Discourse originating in very different Asian languages is thus reduced to a common conceptual framework in order to allow the formulation of more general questions. But this carries with it the danger that some aspects of diversity will be neglected, while those common features most readily drawn into the conceptualised discourse receive disproportionate attention. When this approach is applied to comparisons between pre-19th century South-East Asia and other areas of ‘Eurasia’, the dangers become especially great.

On the one hand, considerably less research has been undertaken on the history of countries like Vietnam, Siam and Burma during Lieberman’s period, than in the case of European societies or even Japan. Worse still, when we take into account of the actual volume of source materials available for the study of South-East Asian countries during the centuries before 1800 – especially the ‘indigenous’ sources – we find that European countries are vastly better off. Many types of detailed research that have been successfully attempted for European countries are inherently impossible for Burma, Siam or Vietnam in this period. The required sources, if they ever existed at all, simply have not survived. As a result, concepts originally formulated in relation to better-researched societies cannot always be effectively tested for their genuine applicability to less fully researched areas. The comparative historian may too easily fall into the ‘trap’ of allowing conceptualised generalisation – which ought in principle to be based on detailed research – to become instead a substitute for such research. In these circumstances, conceptual similarities and differences are liable to take shape ‘in the eye of the beholder’.

Second: Lieberman’s approach involves more than ‘synchronic’ comparisons between two or more societies as they existed at one particular moment in history. Influenced by the fashionable preference for studying the longue duree rather than events in a shorter time span, he seeks to compare European and Asian societies in terms of a dynamic process of change which he sees taking place over several centuries. He is thus measuring European and Asian societies against one another in terms of a ‘shared’ pattern of long-term political and cultural evolution. Such an exercise can begin by identifying an essentially European sequence of change, and then seek to impose it on the countries of mainland South-East Asia. Alternatively it can begin by identifying a number of apparent changes in the countries of the latter region, and then concentrate on highlighting those themes – at the expense of others – when looking at France or Russia. In either direction, the approach is liable to exclude from consideration those features which do not fit into the conceptual ‘paradigm’ and to produce a very superficial analysis of actual political, cultural and social change.

In relation to economic change during these centuries, Lieberman finds considerable difficulty in adducing hard information to sustain vague assertions about the pace and implications of ‘economic growth’ in his South-East Asian countries. He notes the increasing importance of monetary transactions as opposed to payments in kind, and also touches on modes of taxation from the point of view of the peasant; but these trends cannot be represented in statistical terms, even for particular localities. Nor does he get to grips with the problem of commercial capitalism – whether European or Asian – and the related question of government finance. Marxist critics would also emphasise his failure to explore the possible relevance of the issue of ‘modes of production’ to his general thesis. Clearly before we can attempt serious generalisations about long-term economic and social change it is necessary to attempt a great deal more research on material conditions and administrative regulations in particular localities at more precisely defined periods.

In the spirit of these criticisms, I would argue the need for a more tightly controlled approach to comparative history in the present state of studies: one limited in the first instance to bilateral exercises focusing on comparisons between only two countries, during relatively short time spans. The present paper will therefore seek to explore similarities and differences between the kingdoms of England and of Dai-Viet during the fourteenth century, with special reference to three sub-periods: the decades from 1320 to 1350; the crises of 1368–77; and the period 1385–1400. In a previous paper I have attempted a comparison of this kind with reference to the 15th and 16th centuries.⁴ There are two reasons for extending that comparison to the 14th century. One is that it will take us back to a period before significant European commercial intrusion became a factor for change in South-East Asia. Another is that a preliminary study of the global perspective of the 14th century has convinced me of the wider significance of changes in Europe and in China at that time. It is especially interesting to compare two countries which were, relatively speaking, on the political and cultural periphery of those two larger regions.

II

In five respects England and Dai-Viet may be said to have been sufficiently similar in the 14th century to allow us to construct a framework of comparison. In the first place they are comparable in scale. The two countries were remarkably similar in size, and probably also in total population. The more precise measurements that are possible in the 20th century indicate that the surface area of what eventually became Vietnam, following its unification for the first time in 1802, is rather larger than that of the whole of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland (the ‘British Isles’ in a geographical sense): around 332,000 sq. km. as compared with 300,000 sq. km. However, in the 14th century the kingdom of Dai-Viet was limited to the northern half of present-day Vietnam: essentially the area north of the Hai-Van pass. Farther south lay the territory of the Cham kingdom. The kingdom of England had conquered the principality of Wales under Edward I (reg.1272–1307), although it was not administratively annexed until 1536; and only some areas of Ireland were under English dominion. Scotland was a completely separate country. Nevertheless, as the following figures show, Dai-Viet (slightly larger than the North Vietnam of 1955) was comparable in extent with England and Wales:

North Vietnam (1955–75): 158, 750 square kilometers

England and Wales: 150, 275 square kilometres

Comparisons of population are more difficult for a period as early as the 14th century – even in the case of England, where we can rely on surviving tax records of the period. The standard scholarly history of the period can do no more than report specialist estimates of the English population at the beginning of the 14th century, varying between 2.5 and 4 millions.⁵ However, it is fairly certain that a substantial decline occurred in mid-century, as a result of the plague epidemic known as the ‘black death’. (Its precise quantification is impossible and suggestions that as much as a third of the population died are probably an exaggeration.) In the case of Vietnam, even that kind of rough estimation is impossible in the Tran period. But Lieberman, citing research by Dr Li Tana, is able to give an estimate of 4.7 millions for the Vietnam of around 1600.⁶ All that can be said with any confidence is that we are dealing with two countries whose population during our period was of roughly the same order.

A second basic similarity concerns the nature and level of material production. Both kingdoms were essentially agrarian societies, with a limited amount of small-scale industrial development – probably rather greater in England than in Dai-Viet. England, although it already had significant craft industries in such spheres as textiles, leather goods and cutlery, was still a long way from the ‘industrial revolution’ which would sharply differentiate its economy from those of South-East Asia by the end of the 18th century. The contrasts in this sphere relate mainly to the differences between an agriculture based on wheat, barley and oats (with a considerable emphasis on livestock) and one based on the cultivation of wet rice. Water control was a more important factor in Dai-Viet than in England, although its irrigation works and dikes did not need to be on the vast scale required by the larger rivers of China.

Thirdly, the two countries were both monarchies in the sense that an enthroned ruler (as king or as vua) stood at the focal point of a ruling elite, which recognised the royal court as the centre of government and power. Also, kingship was hereditary, or dynastic. In Dai-Viet the throne was occupied by the Tran dynasty from 1225 to 1400. In England it belonged to the house of Anjou, established by Henry II in 1154, which in 1399 became the house of Lancaster. (Chronicles of the 16th century refer to the whole period from 1154 to 1485 as the rule of the Plantagenets, but that surname was not adopted till around 1450.) In both countries membership of the ruling clan or family conferred aristocratic status on a number of individuals, who were thereby entitled to substantial resources in land and agrarian labour and had varying degrees of influence at court. The royal capital was connected with lower levels of administration by a hierarchy of non-royal officials, some of whom also controlled private resources of land and labour. In both cases, too, surviving historical works in the form of chron...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. Contrasting political, social and intellectual perspectives: a comparison of Vietnam and England in the fourteenth century
• 2. England and Vietnam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: an essay in historical comparison
• 3. Thailand and Viet-Nam: some thoughts towards a comparative historical analysis
• 4. The cycle of Confucianization in Vietnam
• 5. South-East Asian polities in global perspective, 1590–1800
• 6. The development of opposition to French rule in Southern Vietnam 1880–1940
• 7. An introduction to Caodaism: origins and early history
• 8. An introduction to Caodaism: beliefs and organization
• 9. Bui Quang Chiêu and the Constitutionalist Party in French Cochinchina 1917–30
• 10. The Vietnamese élite of French Cochinchina 1943
• Index