Plato's Theory of Ethics

The Moral Criterion and the Highest Good

R.C. Lodge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317830238
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 2000. This is Volume IX of ten in the International Library of Philosophy in a series on Ancient Philosophy. Written around 1928, this book looks at Plato and his work on ethics. The author looks at 'Dialogues' which he handles dialectically to show how they are more connected to his obscure problems connected with his personal history and the personal evolution of his views than his other works.

PART I

THE MORAL CRITERION IN PLATONISM

IF we read the Dialogues in the spirit of a pupil rather than of a judge, we find many avenues of approach to the question of the distinction between good and evil, and to the tests or criteria by which that distinction is established. In the first place, in view of the great diversity of opinion as to good and evil—a diversity to which the Dialogues do full justice—it seems necessary to settle the question as to who is entitled to pass judgment, and to select a group of experts whose verdict will be in accordance with the evidence and will give us the whole truth and nothing but the truth. This problem occupies an important position in platonic reflection upon ethics, and is, in general, an attempt to answer the question, “Who is the judge?” In the second place, we have the attempt to answer the question, “How does the judge pass judgment?” That is to say, by reference to what objective features of the cases before him does he arrive at his decisions? In the third place, we have the attempt to answer the question, “What standards does the judge apply?” In the fourth place, we have a psychological analysis of the moral judgment, an attempt to answer the question, “How, in a psychological sense, does the judge come to make his decisions?” That is to say, (a) what elements in his nature are behind his judgment?, and (b) what is the genesis, the history of the development of his powers of judgment? Finally, in the fifth place, we have the more metaphysical attempts to explain the validity of moral judgments in the universe in general. There are a number of minor problems which also touch upon the topic of the moral criterion, but in the main there seem to be these five chief lines along which the discussions of this subject in the Dialogues pass, and, if we wish to be just to the discussions as we find them, we must study them in this way, completely, and without a priori bias. In the five chapters which follow, an attempt is made to deal dialectically with the passages which discuss these five fundamental questions, and finally, in the sixth chapter, to sum up the results of our enquiry, so far as these results directly concern the general distinction between good and evil.

CHAPTER I

WHO IS THE JUDGE?

IN answer to the inquiry, Who is the judge in ethical questions?, the platonic dialogues furnish a number of replies:—(1) Everyone, (2) The many, (3) The interlocutor, (4) The good man (just man, man of character and moral education, etc.), (5) The experienced man, (6) The wise man, (7) The philosopher (dialectician, man of knowledge, understanding, or reason), (8) The legislator or guardian. Under these eight heads is concentrated all the evidence relative to the question, and it should be possible, by proceeding inductively and taking somewhat in detail the various answers grouped under each head, eventually to arrive at a point where the general platonic answer to the main question—if there is any such general question and general answer—can be formulated, and, when formulated, also definitely verified. Such somewhat detailed examination with the hope of discovering the general outlines of the Platonic position on this question, is the aim of the present chapter.

1. Everyone.

In the first place, it is frequently stated, sometimes by Socrates, sometimes by his interlocutors, that some form of moral sense is universal, that “everyone” is rightly regarded as a judge in matters of conduct. Just what is Plato’s attitude on this point? Stated negatively, Plato seems to mean that moral judgment is not a matter for a few technical experts. It does not require a long apprenticeship or elaborate specialized education, such as is necessary to acquire sound judgment in architecture, shipbuilding, etc. It is not a prerogative of noble birth and social position, and is entirely independent of economic status.¹ More positively, a moral sense is strictly universal. Every citizen possesses it, and, like language, it is an attribute of humanity as such. We all have the root of the matter in us, an “eye of the soul,” a sense of honour and justice.² We all foster its development, in our contemporaries and especially in the rising generation, by word and deed, by public law, and by all the devices of a general, non-technical education.³ Absence of such a sense of honour and justice is unnatural, pathological, the worst of diseases, a sign of subnormality, an insanity indicating a state of mind less than human, a “lie in the soul” abhorred alike of men and gods.⁴

As evidence that moral judgment is not a matter for experts, the practice of the Athenian assembly is adduced—where experts are consulted on technical questions, but on questions of general policy any citizen is given a hearing.⁵ In support of the contention that moral judgment is not the product of a specialized system of education, emphasis is again and again laid upon the fact that men like Themistocles, Pericles, and Thucydides—like Lord Chesterfield in more modern times—failed signally in pedagogic experiments upon their sons or friends among the rising generation.⁶ Finally it is urged that universality of this sense of honour and justice is a sine qua non of civilized life. Men simply could not live together in cities, could not form a true community, unless they could at least trust one another,⁷ and it is a divine law that the subnormal or morally diseased, if hopelessly incurable, should be put to death.⁸

In saying, then, that everyone is a judge in matters of conduct, Plato means that we all have the root of the matter in us. He does not mean that our judgment is infallible, or that it is fully developed in each one of us. Differences of moral opinion are only too glaring, in his eyes,⁹ and on the question of development of moral judgment, it is one of the main points of dispute between him and the sophists, whether the ordinary institutions of Greek life are capable of developing reliable moral judgment (whether supplemented or not by the services of a professional tutor), or whether a new method of reflection, the liberal, non-technical art of dialectic, is not essential to the development of a judgment which shall rise above the contradictions, perplexities, and blindness of every-day, conventional morality.¹⁰

2. The many.

That “the many”—i.e., the numerical majority—should be regarded by Plato as judges in ethical questions, may seem strange to the reader who has derived from the dialogues the impression that Plato is an intellectual aristocrat who looks down with snobbish superiority upon democratic tendencies of all sorts. And it remains true that he by no means accepts their judgments as final.¹¹ But a careful examination of the instances shows that, while often dissenting from their conclusions, he by no means denies them the right and the capacity to judge questions of conduct. Their judgment may not, perhaps, rise much above the level of conventional morality, and may thus come into conflict with his own more highly reflective ethical beliefs, but on the whole it is not the moral judgment of the many as such, of which Plato disapproves, but rather the noise and exaggeration with which it tends to be accompanied in the general assemblies, and the unreasoning violence with which decisions superficially arrived at are carried out.¹² It is, in other words, the unreasoning and conservative, anti-progressive tendencies of the many, to which the philosopher takes exception. It is not that they judge, but that they so soon cease to judge and proceed at once to hasty action, that he finds worthy of censure—not that they judge, but that they do not judge more. It is, in fact, an essential element in his social philosophy that the many should be regarded as capable of recognizing ethical truth when they meet with it, and his one hope for the salvation of society is that they should come to appreciate the value of a “good pilot,”¹³ and trust themselves to the rule of the philosopher-king¹⁴—a contingency which he regards as by no means impossible.¹⁵ It is, in fact, the social duty of the philosopher who has seen the vision, to return to the cave and educate his less well educated brethren—the many, or at any rate the best of the many.¹⁶ The many, then, are judges in ethical questions, though not, of course, final judges.

How does this position compare with the statement that “everyone” is a judge in such questions? There is, of course, no contradiction. “Everyone” meant, as we saw, any and every normal human being, as such. “The many” means a group of such individuals contributing towards the formation of a group judgment, and the group-judgment which these individuals form in their various assemblies, whether professional or political, or simply at the gymnasium or theatre, would seem to constitute an advance upon the isolated judgments of the same individuals apart from society.¹⁷ At the same time, it is plain that for further advance Plato expects the many to rise superior to the methods of the theatre, the club, or the political assembly. The highest degree of enlightenment is hardly to be looked for in such circumstances.

3. The interlocutor.

In the third place, it is universally assumed in the dialogues that in the discussion of philosophical questions in general, and of ethical questions in particular, one or both of the parties to the discussion possess sufficient judgment to give some kind of decision. At times, this is even stated explicitly, especially in passages where the method itself is under discussion.¹⁸ But it is throughout assumed, not only that one of the parties to the discussion is competent to give some sort of answer, but also that the interlocutor is capable of examining the validity of such answers, when given. This, too, is frequently explicitly recognized.¹⁹ This capacity of the interlocutor does not seem to be confined to the specific respondent in the discussion, but extends to the bystanders also, whether these in turn take some part in the discussion and thus become respondents—as especially in the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic—or whether they remain silent and appreciative listeners, as in the case of auditors who repeat the whole dialogue at which they were present without taking active part. It is possible also that this capacity is intended to extend to readers or hearers of the dialogues, who also in some sort take part in the discussions.²⁰

From this brief review of the question, it looks as though under the head of “interlocutor” is included everyone-who-takes-part-in-ethical-discussions. Does Plato’s position here differ at all from his position when he regards “everyone” without qualification as a judge, or when he regards “the many” as judges?

In answer to this question we must at once recognize that there are at least certain differences of emphasis. In the unqualified statement that “everyone” is a judge, stress is laid upon the non-technical character of the moral judgment and upon its social value in cementing the bonds of civic life. In saying that “the many” are judges, stress is laid upon certain characteristics of Greek public life, and upon the unfavourable nature of such conditions for developing the very highest type of judgment. In saying that the interlocutor is a judge, we pass at once into a different sphere of discourse. Stress is laid here upon the characteristic standards of truth-as-reached-by-two-investigators-working-together—i.e., upon sincere introspection, upon analysis and gradual synthesis, upon consistency and systematic coherence. Socrates ex professo does not know the true answer to his questions, but he has a grasp upon the demands of scientific method, and can proceed, with the co-operation of his interlocutor, to extend the intellectual context of a given answer and examine the consistency of the statement considered in its wider implications, following the argument whithersoever it may lead.²¹ From the point of view, then, of emphasis and immediate context, to say that “everyone” is the judge, or that “the many” are the judges, is different from the statement that the interlocutor is the judge. But from a point of view which enables us to see further than questions of immediate emphasis, there is no doubt a fundamental unity underlying the three different positions. Everyone has a moral sense, and it is by becoming an interlocutor—i.e., by taking part in ethical discussions which go a little urther than mere acceptance of tradition or convention, and are free from the irrational elements which attend a public debate on political issues—that he develops this moral sense. There is no doubt that practically everyone is regarded by Plato as a possible interlocutor.²² In none of these cases, however, is the immediately resulting judgment regarded by Plato as in any sense final. The interlocutor is capable of judging, capable—at least in many cases—of becoming a good judge. But just because he is an interlocutor and is capable of this development, it does not follow that he has already completed the process of “becoming” and has already, in some sense, summed it to infinity.²³

4. The good man.

The man of good moral character is always regarded by Plato as a judge whose decisions in matters of conduct are peculiarly trustworthy. It is a principle in the production of such a character that, when young, the good man has undergone no contamination from personal acquaintance with evil.²⁴ For evil-doing warps the judgment and gives it a pathological twist. The honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment must be free from everything pathological, and will be formed upon the pattern of honesty. As Plato expresses it, such a character has in itself the pattern of honesty²⁵—i.e., is a personification of the moral standard—and the judgments of such a character result from the direct and immediate application of the moral standard. Hence their accuracy and trustworthiness. In all forms of pleasure,²⁶ in all forms of art,²⁷ in all questions of education,²⁸ and generally speaking in all questions of moral values, his judgment is to be accepted. The man of good moral character is the measure of all things. What he judges to be good, is good, and what he judges to be evil, is evil.²⁹ His judgments, unlike those of the ordinary man, are in no sense capricious or subjective. They are objective—in touch with reality—and are through and through rational.³⁰

How does the good man compare, as a judge, with the cases previously considered? Like “everyone” and “the many,” he has, of course, a sense of right and wrong. But, unlike them, he is utterly uncontaminated, entirely free from any taint of evil which might warp his judgment and obscure the moral standard. He represents human nature at its best, as it can be and as, under a proper system of education, it should be,³⁰ always true to itself and always in vital contact with the reality of things. As compared with the interlocutor, it may be said that the good man takes peculiar pleasure in philosophical discussions and is peculiarly convinced of their value.³¹ He may, in fact, be regarded as an interlocutor with an especially fine character. The emphasis, however, is usually upon his moral, rather than upon his intellectual characteristics, and he would not necessarily be regarded as a...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Analysis
• Preface
• Introduction
• Part I The Moral Criterion in Platonism
• Part II The Moral Criterion and the Highest Good Scales of Goods in Platonism
• Part III The Highest Goods in Platonism
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index of Names
• Index of Subjects