Imagination is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (1973) as âthat faculty of the mind by which we conceive of the absent as if it were presentâ, illustrating this with Shakespeareâs oft-quoted (Williams and Waddell 1991) credo (put into the mouth of Theseus in A Midsummer Nightâs Dream):
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown;
The poetâs pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothings
A local habitation and a name.
(Shakespeare 1911/1962)
If, as Barratt (1984) suggests, psychoanalysis is in essence a ânegative dialecticâ, i.e. a discipline whose starting point is absence (cf. Green 1997; Gurevich 2008), concerned with that which is unconscious, repressed, dissociated, split off â as Conan Doyle might have put it, a discourse of the dog that didnât bark â then imagination is a key psychoanalytic capacity. The collaborative job of patient and analyst is to conjure up, capture and transform what is missing, or conspicuous by its absence, from the patientâs mental life. The starting point of this chapter is the idea that the means by which this is achieved is through harnessing the imagination in specific and systematic ways.
Shakespeareâs Theseus points to some important aspects of the workings of the imagination. First, like the unconscious, it is impersonal â an âitâ rather than an âIâ â bodying things forth rather than purposively thinking them up. Second it is corporeal, being both in and of the body, especially, but not exclusively the visual system; imaginative activity starts with a quasi-bodily feeling or half-glimpsed âformâ, or image, in the mindâs eye. Third, there is an intimate relationship between this embodying process and language: the âpenâ of the poet transforms âformsâ unknown into definite âshapesâ, places and names.
Theorising imagination can be traced to a coherent intellectual framework, but one that tends to be downplayed in todayâs clinical and political climate. Its origins lie in the German romantic tradition which predates, but undoubtedly influenced Freud, which also has its own independent lineage in Anglo-Saxon culture. This in turn has fed back into the British contribution to psychoanalytic thought and practice.
The roots of imagination as a construct lie with Kant, Schelling and German Romanticism (Watson 2010). Coleridge introduced these ideas into the Anglophone world (Holmes, R. 1999), transforming them in his own idiosyncratic way. They were developed psychoanalytically by Sharpe (1940), Bion (1962), Winnicott (1971) and Rycroft (1985); and more recently by Britton (1998), Ogden (1997), Turner (2004), Ferro (2012) and Waddell (1998). These authors clearly draw on pre-1914 Freud (Barratt 1984, 2012) where the romantic impulse of The Interpretation of Dreams and the development of free association technique were still to the fore. In addition, I suggest that there is a Coleridgean tradition which contributes to their thinking in a separate line of intellectual influence. Rycroft (1979, p. 167), for example, saw it as his aim to âmarry the thinking of Freud and Coleridgeâ.
What then is the âtherapeutic imaginationâ? The related phrase âclinical imaginationâ is not new (e.g. Havens 1982; Dimen 2001; Rustin 2001). The purpose of adding a definite article, capitalising the concept and broadening from âclinicalâ to âtherapeuticâ is to suggest â in a spirit which might perhaps be seen as anti-imaginative â that imagination can be systematised and anatomised, and that it provides a useful framework for thinking about the components of psychoanalytic activity in the consulting room.
Jung saw an aim of psychoanalysis as fostering its patientsâ âactive imaginationâ â whether through daydreaming, painting, writing or other artistic activities (cf. Holmes 2012b). Within the Anglo-Saxon tradition the phrase is the medical/psychotherapeutic analogue of âthe poetic imaginationâ (Weir 1996). Psychoanalytic writers compare the poetic transformation of experience into words with a similar process in psychoanalytic sessions. A key lineage runs backwards from Bionâs injunction to the analyst to be âbeyond memory and desireâ, through Keatsâ ânegative capabilityâ â the ability to be remain in doubts, mysteries and uncertainties â to Coleridgeâs âwilling suspension of disbeliefâ. Full play of the imagination entails temporarily bracketing off veracity-testing; in the world of the imagination anything goes â and needs to be allowed to â if the necessary âdream workâ, in its wider sense, is to be given free reign.
Bion picks up on the Coleridgean notion of poetic âreverieâ and uses this to describe the analystâs state of unprejudiced receptiveness, reborn in Ogdenâs idea of âdreaming the sessionâ. The animating notion is that of the capacity of the analyst, like the poet, to allow thoughts and feelings spontaneously to arise within her; to transform these imaginative stirrings into gesture and words which can be put to therapeutic use; and thereby to help the patient better understand his unconscious thoughts and feelings. Poetry and therapy both, represent a âraid on the inarticulateâ (Eliot 1954, p. 31).
But psychotherapy is not poetry; as Britton rightly says, the analyst who explores âhis own psychic reality while attributing it to the patient ⌠has forfeited his role of analystâ (Britton 2003, p. 103). Therapeutic imagination, while sharing some features of poetic imagination, has a distinct identity and structure of its own. It can be thought of as a general process informing clinical encounters, whether medical, psychiatric or psychotherapeutic. In addition to reverie, it comprises a number of other components which feed into, and flow from, the act of reverie. These can be divided into a five-part sequential structure. The first step, following Bowlby, might be called primary attachment. Reverie, the poetic analogue is next. Then, Coleridgean again, comes logos. These are then followed by action and reflection. This cycle repeats itself in a âfractalâ way in both micro-moments of the session, as an overall trajectory for whole sessions, and for on-going periods or âpassagesâ of a therapy.
Daniel Deronda
Before developing these ideas in more detail, let us look at a specific example, taken not from the consulting room, but the literary canon. In George Eliotâs last great novel, Daniel Deronda (1876/1986), the eponymous hero rescues a young woman from suicide â which might be seen as one of the ultimate justifications for psychotherapeutic work. Eliot was fluent in German and would have been fully conversant with German Idealist and Romantic ideas. This, I suggest, forms the philosophical background to her account of a proto-psychodynamic encounter and suicide rescue (cf. Rotenberg 1999; Waddell 1989).
This Romantic connection is tangentially referred to when Eliot states that Deronda, a beautiful young man, âbore only disguised traces of the seraphic boy âtrailing clouds of gloryââ (Eliot 1876/1986, p. 225) â an explicitly Wordsworthian/Coleridgean reference to the formerâs Intimations of Immortality (cf. Chapter 5). Deronda chafes against his formal and narrow education:
He longed now to have the sort of apprenticeship to life which would not shape him too definitely, and rob him of the choice that might come from a free growth ⌠Derondaâs demerits were likely to be on the side of reflective hesitation âŚ
(ibid. p. 220)
Free growth and reflective hesitation might be seen as desirable antecedents of a career as a psychotherapist.
The story begins in London. One evening while rowing on the Thames, Deronda notices a slim dark girl at the riverâs bank, whose
âeyes were fixed on the river with a look of immovable statuesque despairâ.
Momentarily, their eyes meet:
âhe felt an outleap of interest and compassion towards herâ.
Then he reflects ruefully on his reaction: perhaps it is just because she was beautiful that she excited his interest. But no:
âI should not have forgotten the look of misery if she had been ugly and vulgarâ
he says to himself. He rests on his oars in a state of âsolemn passivityâ. Reaching the bank, he
âenters a state of âhalf-speculative, half-involuntary identification of himself with the objects he was looking atâ, wanting to âshift his centre till his whole personality would be no less outside than the landscapeâ.
(ibid. p. 228)
Suddenly he sees the girl preparing to plunge herself into the river. Quickly he sculls across, and âspeaking but very gentlyâ:
âDonât be afraid âŚYou are unhappy ⌠Pray, trust me ⌠Tell me what I can do to help youâ.
She responds and reminds him that she had heard him singing earlier. He replies:
âBut I fear you will injure yourself staying here. Pray let me carry you in my boat to some place of safety.â
Daniel realises that the girl has stirred a chord in him, evoking thoughts of his own mother, about whom he knew nothing:
âThe agitating impression this forsaken girl was making on him stirred a fibre that lay close to his deepest interest in the fates of women â âperhaps my mother was like this oneââ.
She enters the boat (his surrogate consulting room), and he rows: âthey went along swiftly for many minutes without speakingâ. For Daniel: âhis first impression about her, that her mind might be disordered, had not been quite dissipated: the project of suicide was unmistakable âŚâ. He longs to begin a conversation, but abstains, âwishing to encourage the confidence that might induce her to speak first. At last she did speakâ:
âI like to listen to the oarâ
âSo do Iâ
âIf you had not come I should have been dead by nowâ âŚ
Deronda was mute: to question her seemed an unwarrantable freedomâŚ
âI want to know nothing except what you would like to tell meâ.
âThis morning when the light came I felt as if one word kept sounding within me âNever, never!â But now â I begin â to thinkâ her words were broken by rising sobs â âI am commanded to live âŚâ.
Deronda takes her to the house of a family friend whose mother and sisters he knows will look after her. In the cab the story of the Maenads comes to mind. How:
⌠outworn with their torch-lit wanderings they lay down in the marketplace, and the matrons came and stood silently around them to keep guard over their slumbers ⌠He could trust the women he was going to for having hearts as good.
Finally Deronda thinks about his experience, while the author reflects on that refection:
⌠how to make sure that snatching from death was rescue? The moment of finding a fellow-creature is often as full of mingled doubt and exultation as the moment of finding an idea.
This episode may seem somewhat remote from the analytic consulting room. But the image of the river provides a perfect metaphor for the flux of experience â the stream of consciousness â that is the medium of psychotherapy. Deronda aligns himself with the force of the river to direct his boat, to drift, or rest, as the situation demands â a metaphor comparable to Freudâs rider-horse image for the relationship between the conscious and unconscious self (Freud 1900). The fluidity of character Deronda both seeks and is affected by is thereby instantiated. Like Shakespeare, his â⌠nature is subdued/to what it works in, like the dyerâs handâ (1911/1962, Sonnet 111).
The first vector of therapeutic imagination â here Derondaâs â is the clinicianâs alignment or attachment to the person in need of help or cure. The elements of this include: eye contact; an excitation of focus and attention; an âactive passivityâ; identification and a partial dissolving of the self into the object. Next comes reverie: the therapist allowing the process of connection with the other to flow through him, as through an aeolian harp, and to activate its chosen heart-strings. These âmelodiesâ inevitably also reflect the therapistâs own deepest themes â for Deronda the search for the missing mother, which, it later turns out is the girlâs mission too; her suicidal despair reflects a feeling that this is unattainable.
Next comes logos, the âpoetâs penâ: putting experience into words. Here, like the good therapist, Deronda holds back, creating a potential space into which the girl can speak. Only when she makes a seemingly irrelevant comment âI like to listen to the sound of the oarâ does he r...