Rational-Emotive Therapy (Psychology Revivals)

Fundamentals and Innovations

Windy Dryden

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317649748
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Psychotherapy
• Index: Psychology

Rational-emotive therapy was developed over a number of years from the work of Albert Ellis, who set up the Institute of Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York. As a form of therapy it integrates some of the features of both the behaviour therapies and the more traditional psychotherapies, although its closest links are with cognitive behaviour therapy.

Originally published in 1984, this was the first book by a British author on this subject and it brings together all the author's previous work in this area. Its unique character is that it presents both the fundamentals, based on the work of Ellis, and innovations, developed in part by the author, extending this work. The book therefore combines theory and practice and will be of interest to those in counselling, clinical psychology, psychiatry and social work, as well as those in nursing and occupational therapy.

PART ONE: FUNDAMENTALS

Chapter One

RATIONAL-EMOTIVE THERAPY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

All approaches to psychotherapy rest on a number of explicit or implicit theoretical foundations. They all posit an underlying image of the person. They all make statements concerning what constitutes psychological health and psychological disturbance, how psychological disturbance is acquired and how it is perpetuated. Finally, they all put forward viewpoints concerning how individuals change, i.e. how people can overcome their psychological problems. In this chapter, I wish to offer the rational-emotive position on these points. This statement should serve as the theoretical explanatory framework for the other chapters in the book.

1. IMAGE OF THE PERSON

Ellis (1979a) argues that humans are basically hedonistic. Their main purposes are to stay alive and to pursue and maximise their happiness while being mindful that this is to be done within the context of a social world. In other words, while humans had primarily better be self-interested, they had better take into account the goals of others with whom they are involved. Thus, ‘self-interest’ is not to be equated with ‘selfishness’ – which means cynically disregarding the goals and purposes of others (Ellis and Becker, 1982). The individuality of humans is stressed. It is noted that humans differ markedly in what will bring them happiness. Parenthetically, it is not a primary task of rational-emotive therapists to show clients what will bring them happiness, but how they block themselves from pursuing it and how they can remove these blocks.

1.1 Rationality. In RET theory, rational does not have any fixed definition. It means that which aids and abets individuals in achieving their basic goals and purposes. While ‘irrational’ means that which prevents or blocks them from reaching these goals and purposes.

1.2 Human Fallibility. Rational-emotive theory posits that humans are by nature fallible and not perfectible. They have a biological tendency to make errors and defeat themselves in the pursuit of their basic goals and purposes. This roots RET in humanistic philosophy, since humans are urged to accept themselves for their humanity, i.e. their fallibility.

1.3 Human Complexity and Fluidity. Humans are regarded as being enormously complex organisms. They have innumerable traits, aspects, values, beliefs, behaviours, etc. Furthermore, humans are deemed to be constantly in flux rather than static. They have the potential to effect changes in virtually all of their psychological processes and are thus urged to view themselves as ever-changing (rather than fixed) organisms.

1.4 Human Activity. RET theory stresses that human beings can best achieve their basic values and goals by actively pursuing them. They are less likely to be successful in this regard if they are passive or half-hearted in their pursuits.

1.5 Biological Emphasis. Ellis (1979b) argues that human beings have two basic tendencies both being rooted in their biological heritage. First, humans are deemed to have a biological tendency towards irrationality. They are not taught to act irrationally in the absence of such a tendency (Ellis, 1976). Some of the arguments Ellis puts forward in favour of his ‘biological hypothesis’ include the following:

(a)	Virtually all humans show evidence of major human irrationalities.
(b)	Major irrationalities are to be found in virtually all social and cultural groups.
(c)	Many human irrationalities actually go counter to the teachings of parents, peers and the mass media (e.g. people are not taught that it is good to procrastinate but countless do so).
(d)	Major human irrationalities are to be found in the highly intelligent, educated and gifted.
(e)	Humans who are opposed to irrationalities often fall prey to them.
(f)	An understanding of irrational activity does not in itself help overcome it.
(g)	Humans often adopt other irrationalities after giving up former irrationalities.
(h)	Humans often go back to irrational activity even though they have often worked hard to overcome it.
(i)	It is often very difficult for humans to overcome their irrationalities. (Ellis, 1976).

Although this may appear to be a gloomy view, humans’ second basic tendency, in fact, makes the rational-emotive image of the person an optimistic one. Humans are deemed to have great potential to work to change their biologically based irrationalities and to actualize themselves and achieve greater enjoyment. The key factors here, as will be shown later, are persistent work and effort. Ellis (1979a) claims that if humans will actively and persistently work to overcome their psychological disturbances they will often, although not always, achieve a large measure of success.

1.6 The Importance of Cognition in Human Experience. Ellis (1962) has stated that emotional experience cannot be considered separately from other modes such as sensing, thinking and acting and has maintained this interactive position in subsequent years. However, he considers that the most efficient way of effecting lasting emotional and behavioural change is for people to change their thinking. Thus, cognition is given special emphasis in his theory. Various types of cognitive processes are discussed in rational-emotive theory and these are outlined in the following model of an emotional episode (originated by Wessler and Wessler, 1980).

At step 1, the person is confronted with a stimulus configuration which is deemed to exist independently of the person confronting it (much has been written on the philosophical problems implicit in this statement, but it is an assumption made in this model). At step 2, the person registers a portion of the stimulus configuration in his sensory apparatus. However, this does not have to be within the person’s awareness. At step 3, the person could, potentially at least, give a purely descriptive account of what occurred at step 2 (e.g. “the man was walking in the direction of the post office carrying an envelope”, as opposed to “the man was going to post a letter”). At step 4, the person makes interpretations of the data gained at steps 2 and 3. This involves going beyond the data at hand and includes such activities as guessing the intentions of others’ actions, making forecasts about the data at hand and assessing the implications of one’s behaviours for self and others. Wessler and Wessler (1980) argue that ‘step 4’ cognitions are non-evaluative in nature but this is strictly speaking not universally true. Thus, the statement: “He acted badly” is an evaluative statement but one which does not yet clarify the emotional experience of the person making the statement. Step 5 cognitions are evaluative in nature and indicate the personal significance of the event for the person concerned. It is step 5 cognitions that enable us to understand the person’s emotional experience at step 6. Behaviours at step 7 are deemed to follow ‘personal significancies’ and give rise to responses from the physical and social environment at step 8 which have reinforcement or punishment value for the individual and which in turn have a potential effect on the person’s future behaviour. Decisions are free-floating in the model in that the person can decide to make changes at steps 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 (emotions are very difficult to change directly) which have ramifications at other steps in the model.

STEP 1:	STIMULUS CONFIGURATION
STEP 2:	DETECTION
STEP 3:	DESCRIPTION
STEP 4:	INFERENCE (Descriptive-Evaluative)
STEP 5:	PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE (Evaluative)
STEP 6:	EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE
STEP 7:	BEHAVIOUR
STEP 8:	REINFORCING CONSEQUENCES (of steps 6 and 7)
Free-floating step: DECISIONS

This model is an extension of Ellis’ (1962) ABC model in which ‘A’ refers to an activating event; ‘B’ – the person’s belief about the event and ‘C’ – the emotional and behavioural consequences of adhering to the belief. ‘A’ in Ellis’ model comprises steps 1–4 in Wessler and Wessler’s (1980) model, ‘B’ is equivalent to step 5 and ‘C’ refers to steps 6 and 7.

2. CONCEPTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTURBANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH

2.1 Rational and Irrational Beliefs. Ellis has addressed himself mainly to two processes at step 5 in the model just outlined. He calls these processes: rational and irrational beliefs. In terms of the model, rational beliefs are matters of personal significance which are non-absolute in nature. They indicate desire, preference, want and wish. When humans get what they desire they experience emotions which indicate pleasure and when they do not get what they want they experience emotions which indicate displeasure, such as sadness, annoyance, concern and responsibility. These are emotions that Ellis considers to be negative but appropriate to negative activating events in that they do not significantly inferfere with the pursuit of established personal goals or, if these are forever blocked, the selection and pursuit of new goals. These ‘rational’¹ emotions then stem from rational beliefs which are non-absolute statements of personal significance.

Irrational beliefs are matters of personal significance which are stated in absolute terms such as ‘must’, ‘should’, ‘ought’, and ‘have to’. Ellis often writes about individuals escalating their desires into demands. Thus, these two processes can be linked. Emotions which stem from adherence to irrational beliefs include depression, anger, anxiety and guilt – emotions that Ellis considers to be negative and inappropriate to negative activating events. These emotions can be deemed to be irrational in that they generally impede the pursuit of basic goals. Even if people get what they deem they ‘must’, they are not happy because of the prospect of losing it. Ellis (1982) further claims that rational beliefs underlie functional behaviours, while irrational beliefs underpin dysfunctional behaviours, such as withdrawal, procrastination, substance abuse, alcoholism, etc.

Irrational beliefs, according to Ellis, are absolute demands on reality (namely on self, others and the world). They are thus anti-empirical in that they often fly in the face of reality. For example, if I demand: “I must get what I want”, I am implying that there exists a universal law which leads me to get what I want, which is empirically false. Thus, for example, £1 million does not appear when I want it to appear even though I demand it do so. The rational version: I want what I want (but I don’t have to get it) is empirically correct on two points. First, the belief indicates that my desire exists and secondly it points out that there is no law of the universe which indicates that I will get what I want merely by wanting it. As will be shown in later chapters, Ellis constantly tries to help his clients see the distinction between an empirical law of the universe and a self-created demand on reality. His purpose is to show people that what they consider to be a universal law really exists in their minds and thus is amenable to change (to the non-absolute version). This method is called philosophical disputing. It is paralleled by pragmatic disputing where the therapist points out that the consequences of adhering to irrational beliefs are dysfunctional emotions such as depression, anger, etc. and uses this negatve consequence as a lever to engage clients in the process of attitude change.

The process of making absolute demands on reality is called ‘Musturbation’. It is paralleled by a process called ‘Awfulising’. Awfulising is the process of making grossly exaggerated negative conclusions when one does not get what one believes one must or when one gets what one believes one must not get. Ellis considers the term awful to mean “more than 100% bad” and to reflect the belief that “it should not be as bad as it is”. His argument is thus: If something happens to me that is 100% bad and I am thinking rationally about it, I will have the following beliefs: “I really don’t like this happening. It is really bad. However, there is no law that says that this really bad thing should not happen, so I will try and change it if I can. If I can’t change it, I will learn to live with it and try and get as much happiness as I can even though this has happened. If it really appears that this bad thing means that I will not get any chance of happiness in the future, I may kill myself (rational suicide)”. Here, I have acknowledged that a 100% bad thing has occurred and will experience strong regret, sadness, etc. However, if I believe that this bad thing should not occur or it should not be as bad as it is, I will tend to evaluate it as awful. Thus, awfulizing is linked to musturbation. Wessler (1982a) has argued that these two processes are not inevitably linked. He considers that “awfulising” is primary and musts where they exist are conditional: “since this would be awful, it must not occur”. Ellis counters that ‘awfulising’ usually depends on musturbation. If I did not demand that this really bad thing not be as bad as it is I could not define something as ‘awful’ because I would accept that the really bad thing has occurred and acceptance, while acknowledging my very strong preference, ‘de-awfulises’ the experience. Thus, ‘awfulising’ usually depends on musturbation.

2.2 Self-Acceptance and Self-Damnation. A particular type of awfulising that has received special attention in RET is self-damnation. This implies that I am horrible for doing something that I must not do. Self-damnation involves two processes, (a) the process of rating my self-hood and rating it as totally bad, and (b) the process of “devil-ifying” myself for being totally bad. This second process depends on a theological concept and implies that I should rot in hell as a subhuman (devil). If this devil-ifying process did not occur I could theoretically regard my self-hood as totally bad at this time but with future potential for good. However this is unlikely because in saying I (my ‘self’) am no good I am using the ‘is’ of identify, which means: I = badness, and since this is my functional core this is what I shall always be since a fundamental core cannot change. Ellis sometimes equates global negative self-rating with self-damnation and sometimes distinguishes the two. Another form in which self-damnation occurs is in the belief many people have of being ‘undeserving’ of pleasure and happiness.

The alternative to global negative self-rating and self-damnation is self-acceptance. This implies that I cannot legitimately rate my “self”: (1) since it is too complex to be given a single legitimate rating, (2) since I am constantly in flux, even if I could rate everything that has existed about me at time ‘X’, ‘I’ would have changed at time ‘X+l’ – indeed the process of rating my “self” would lead me to change! Sharkey (1981) has argued that self-acceptance is evaluative. He says that if you accept your “self” as being fallible this means that you are using the term fallible to evaluate the “self”. However this seems to me to be a descriptive evaluation at stage 4 in the model previously described and not one at step 5. Thus I could say at step 5 “I must not be a fallible human being”.

Ellis adopted the concept of self-acceptance to overcome a dilemma. He once advocated that his clients consider themselves to be ‘good’ because they were alive. However some said that they could just as well be ‘bad’ because they were alive. He then suggested that clients rate their “aliveness” and “striving for personal fulfilment” as good and showed them how self-rating impeded this process and was thus “irrational”. He noticed that clients tended to rate themselves globally (either positive or negative) after doing or not doing something. Thus, he identified self-rating as a conditional process: a person considered himself good if certain conditions applied, or bad (or less good) if other conditions applied. His solution was to make self-acceptance unconditional: a way of viewing their self that people could choose not only for sound philosophical reasons but for its pragmatic value. Namely the stance of self-acceptance is ‘rational’ in that it is likely to aid and abet people’s achieving their short and long-term goals, w...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Contents
• Dedication
• Preface
• Foreword
• Part One – Fundamentals
• Part Two – Innovations
• References