Altruistic Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior (PLE: Emotion)

Nancy Eisenberg

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317597414
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Emotions in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Originally published in 1986, this book was an effort to integrate thinking and research concerning the role of emotion and cognition in altruistic behaviour. Prior to publication there was a vast body of research and theorizing concerning the development and maintenance of prosocial (including altruistic) behaviour. This book focusses primarily on a specific set of intrapsychic factors involved in prosocial responding, especially emotions and cognitions believed to play a major role in altruistic behaviour. In the final chapters these intrapsychic factors are also discussed in relation to a variety of other relevant factors including socialization and situational influences on altruism.

1	Introduction

 

 

 

 

 

The history of the human race is replete with examples of human cruelty, aggression, and selfishness. Indeed, instances of atrocites and injustice can be found in accounts of nearly all cultures and societies, ancient or modern. Given the abundance of negative behavior among people, it would seem that the capacity for evil and destructiveness is a part of human nature. Yet humans are also capable of a wide variety of good, kind, and caring behaviors. Examples of such behavior, like instances of cruelty and aggression, are readily evident in everyday life as well as in historical or religious accounts.

The broad range of human potentialities for good and evil has inspired philosophical debates for thousands of years, as well as numerous psychological inquiries in recent decades. Few individuals deny that humans have the capacity for great selfishness and evil; indeed, philosophers such as Hobbs (1642/1973) and psychologists such as Freud (1925, 1930) and Lorenz (1966) have suggested that humans are egoistic and aggressive by nature. There is more disagreement, however, concerning humans’ capacities for altruism, self-sacrifice, and unselfishly motivated behavior. Indeed, some philosophers have claimed that self-sacrifice is psychologically impossible for humans, and would be ethically inappropriate if possible (e.g., Hobbs).

Some of the disagreement regarding the existance of truly altruistic behavior is based on discrepancies in definitions of altruism. Altruistic behavior is often defined as voluntary behavior that is intended to benefit another and is not motivated by the expectation of external reward (Eisenberg, 1982; Staub, 1978). When defined in this manner, most modern philosophers and psychologists seem to agree that altruism does exist (e.g., Blum, 1980; Hoffman, 1981; Nagel, 1970; Rushton, 1980; Staub, 1978). However, although some psychologists view acts of assistance that are internally rewarded as altruistic (e.g., acts motivated by guilt, the desire to maintain a positive self-image or sympathy; Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977; Staub, 1978), others believe such acts are basically hedonistic in nature (cf. Batson, 1984; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Cialdini, Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982). Moreover, there is a lack of concensus concerning the proximal determinants of altruism, that is, the factors that produce an act of altruism in a specific situation. Both cognitive processes and affective responses frequently have been cited as potential motivators of altruism, but there is considerable disagreement concerning the relative contributions of each to the development and maintenance of altruistic behavior.

The purpose of this book is to consider the role of both prosocial emotions and cognitions in altruistic action. Altruism will be defined as described previously and, consequently, will include behaviors motivated by sympathy, guilt, and other self-evaluative reactions associated with internalized values. Altruism is considered to be but one subtype of prosocial behavior, that is, voluntary behavior intended to benefit another (regardless of motive). Although altruistic prosocial behaviors generally are perceived as being moral, prosocial acts can be motivated by nonmoral (e.g., the desire for social approval) or even immoral (e.g., the desire to manipulate another for one’s own benefit) motives.

As was already suggested, the bases for altruism can be varied. Some altruistic acts seem to be based primarily (but not entirely) on emotional factors (e.g., sympathetically motivated behavior), whereas others are somewhat more cognitive in motivation (e.g., based upon conscious, cognitive values or norms, perhaps accompanied by self-evaluative emotions). This is not to say that any motive is solely cognitive or affective. Before considering this issue in further detail, let us turn briefly to the more general issue of the cognitive-affective interface.

COGNITION AND EMOTION

Determining the nature of the interrelations between cognition and emotion has been a thorny problem for psychologists. The issue that probably has generated the most attention is the “chicken and egg” dilemma; for years, writers have considered and debated the question of which comes first, cognition or affect. However, although numerous models of the affect-cognition link have been proposed, the issue is far from resolved.

A number of theorists and researchers have considered affect to be primarily a consequence of cognition (Mandler, 1975, 1980; Royce & Diamond, 1980; Schachter & Singer, 1962). They generally have regarded emotion as a product of the cognitive interpretation of events or arousal. This interpretation can be of any component of emotion, including the elicitors, expression, and experience of emotion (Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson, 1984).

With regard to elicitors, researchers have suggested two types of theories: discrepancy and appraisal theories. According to appraisal theories, emotion is the result of an individual’s appraisal of a situation (e.g., Averill, 1980; Lazarus, 1968; Lazarus, Averill, & Optin, 1970). If the appraisal of a situation is positive or benign, the individual’s affective response will be positive; negative appraisals lead to negative affect. In contrast, in discrepancy theories, emotions are believed to be the consequence of discrepancies or incongruities between external events and the individual’s cognitive representations (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Kagan, 1978). Stimuli that are too novel or discrepant are viewed as evoking unpleasant affect, whereas an optimal degree of novelty evokes interest or other positive reactions.

A number of writers have been concerned with the relation of cognition to the expression rather than elicitation of emotion. In general, these investigators have suggested that facial and other emotional expressions are, at least in part, a consequence of learning. As part of the socialization process, children learn which expressions are appropriate at which times (Saarni, 1979, 1982), and which expressions are desirable or reinforced (Lewis & Michalson, 1983).

Still other writers have suggested that our experience of emotion is shaped by cognition. For example, James (1884, 1890) and Tomkins (1963) proposed that emotion is a response to the perception of physiological bodily changes such as trembling or facial expressions. One is fearful because he or she perceives the self to be trembling. Other researchers have asserted that the individual’s cognitive interpretation of general arousal (Schacter & Singer, 1962; cf. Reisenzein, 1983) or other aspects of one’s own functioning (thoughts, behaviors; Mandler, 1975, 1980) result in the experience of emotion.

Not all writers have focused on the causal effects of cognition. Others have proposed that affect preceeds and structures cognition. Darwin (1872/1965) concluded that emotions were biologically based, and that cognitively-based processes do relatively little to modify their expression. Similarly, for Freud (1933/1968), emotion was primary. In Freud’s theory, the development of the id (containing irrational drives and instincts) is prior to the development of cognitive processes (the ego). Moreover, Freud believed that the ego functions in service of the id, and that irrational processes frequently disrupt cognitive functioning. Numerous other writers have proposed that affect is primary and central to human functioning, and can lead to behavior without much contribution from cognitive processing (Izard, 1977, 1984; Tomkins, 1981; Zajonc, 1980). Nonetheless, most investigators or theorists who have emphasized the independence or primacy of affect have acknowledged the role of cognition in affective responding (e.g., Freud, 1926; Izard, 1977; Tompkins, 1981; Zajonc & Markus, 1984).

In recent years, numerous psychologists have attempted to go beyond the issue of emotional versus cognitive primacy to propose more integrative approaches for conceptualizing the complex interactions between emotion and cognition (e.g., Cowan, 1982; Lewis et al., 1984; Plutchik, 1977). These conceptulizations vary somewhat. For example, Cowan adapted Piaget’s (1981) perspective that emotions and cognitive are not totally separable; cognitive schemas are always accompanied by affect, and affect always has some cognitive organization. Moreover, he suggested that primarily affective schemas can lead to cognitive activities or vice versa. Lewis et al. also noted a complex interplay between emotions and cognition; they labeled the intercycling of the two the “cognitive emotional fugue.” In their view, emotion and cognition are interwoven, in that one leads to the other in a continuing cycle. For example, emotion may sometimes precede cognition, which in turn leads to new emotions and cognitions.

The issue of the relation between affect and emotion is far from resolved. Clearly, the association is complex and probably is not unidirectional. Moreover, interrelations probably vary depending upon how one defines “cognition” and “affect” (cf. Izard, 1984). Consequently, there is unlikely to be a simple formula that can depict the relative inputs of cognition and affect for all aspects of human functioning.

Emotion and Cognition in Altruism

The notion of a complex interplay of emotion and cognition undoubtedly applies to altruistic responding. Individuals’ cognitive evaluations of and expectations in a potential helping situation must affect their emotional reactions to a potential recipient of aid and the recipient’s plight. For example, the attributions that a potential benefactor makes with regard to the origins of another’s need will influence the likelihood that the potential benefactor will empathize with or devalue a needy other. Similarly, an individual’s cognitive constructions of the nature of morality affect emotional responding in a given situation by influencing one’s interpretation of that situation, and, consequently, anticipated self-evaluative responses for different behavioral choices. Furthermore, emotional reactions such as empathy and guilt may induce a more intensive cognitive appraisal of a situation or cognitive restructuring of the specific issue at hand (e.g., reinter-pretation of the degree of the other’s need).

At a more basic level, even the emotions associated with altruistic behavior are often based, at least in part, on cognitions, whereas moral cognitions associated with altruism have emotional concomittants. On the one hand, sympathy, which is believed by many to promote altruistic responding (see Chapter 3), is an emotional reaction apparently based on certain cognitive skills such as perspective taking (Hoffman, 1984a). Similarly, self-evaluative responses such as guilt and self-reward seem to derive from the comparison of one’s behavior (or anticipated behavior) with behavior in accordance with internalized values and norms; these values and norms involve cognitive representations and often a complex cognitive network. On the other hand, cognitive consideration of values, norms, and other nonmoral factors is sometimes accompanied by emotional responding (e.g., the anticipated self-evaluative responses already discussed). Moreover, cognitive attributional processes concerning a needy other or even one’s own behavior often elicit emotional responding (see Chapters 5 and 6).

In summary, the contributions of emotion and cognition to altruism are mul-tifacted, complex, and interrelated. One cannot really consider one without the other. Those aspects of cognition and emotion that are most directly related to altruistic motives and functioning will be the foci of interest in this book.

PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

There is a vast body of research and theorizing concerning the development and maintenance of prosocial (including altruistic) behavior. At least a dozen volumes concerning altruism have been published (e.g., Latane & Darley, 1970; Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977;Rushton, 1980; Staub, 1978, 1979), as well as hundreds of articles in psychological journals. However, although these various published works are similar in their focus on altruism and other prosocial behaviors, they differ considerably in their level of analysis of the phenomenon.

In specific, writers and researchers have attempted to explain altruistic responding by reference to biological factors (e.g., Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1975), cultural factors (e.g., Whiting & Whiting, 1975), variations in socialization within the family or school (e.g., Hoffman, 1970a, b), situational factors (e.g., Latane & Darley, 1970), the media (cf. Rushton, 1980), and aspects of intrapsychic functioning (e.g., Batson & Coke, 1981; Hoffman, 1975, 1976). All of these levels of analysis have something to contribute to an understanding of altruism. However, it is often useful to probe a single level of analysis in depth.

In this book, we focus primarily on intrapsychic factors involved in prosocial responding, especially emotions and cognitions believed to play a major role in altruistic behavior. Thus, we consider in some detail sympathy and emotions related to self-evaluative responses, both of which have been viewed as potential motivational bases for altruism (Chapters 3 and 10). Moreover, cognitions concerning individuals’ conceptions of altruism and their evaluations of the degree to which specific acts are altruistic are examined (Chapters 4 and 5), as are altruistic values (which have a cognitive basis) and cognitive processes that are basic to moral decision making (Chapters 6 through 10). Each of these issues is examined in some detail, and relevant research and theory in developmental, social, and other areas of psychology are presented. As a developmentalist, I will consider issues related to development in some depth; however, the developmental literature is considered within the context of the larger body of research.

Although the primary focus of the book is upon a specific set of intrapsychic factors relevant to altruism, in the final chapters of the book these intrapsychic factors are discussed in relation to a variety of other relevant factors including socialization and situational influences on altruism. In specific, models including factors influencing both level of prosocial moral reasoning (Chapter 9) and pro-social behavior (Chapter 10) are presented. In this manner, the research and conceptualizing related to cognitive and emotional contributors to altruism are tied back into the larger body of work concerning moral development.

Because individuals’ internal states, including motives, generally are not readily accessible, it frequently is impossible to distinguish altruistic from non-altruistic prosocial acts. Consequently, the research reviewed is not confined to that concerning solely altruistic prosocial behavior. Moreover, given that children’s altruistic responding may develop from less moral modes of prosocial behavior, it is difficult to isolate the examination of altruism from the study of other forms of prosocial behavior. Nonetheless, as much as is possible, we attempt to differentiate altruism from other types of prosocial responding. Indeed, the theory and data concerning altruistic emotions and cognitions are examined with an eye to differentiating altruistic from nonaltruistic prosocial responding.

In summary, the purpose of this book is to examine psychological research and theory concerning those cognitions and emotions most relevant to altruism. However, the issue of the role of emotion and cognition in morality is neither new nor the sole domain of psychologists. Thus, before considering the relevant psychological research related to altruism, it is worthwhile to review the perspectives of philosophers as well as psychologists concerning cognitive versus affective influences on morality. It is to these perspectives that we now turn.

2	Philosophical and Theoretical Roots

The sources of morality, including the role of cognition and affect in altruism, have been debated for centuries. A...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface and Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1 Introduction
• Chapter 2 Philosophical and Theoretical Roots
• Chapter 3 Prosocial Emotion: Methods and Current Research
• Chapter 4 Attributions about Others and Their Prosocial Actions
• Chapter 5 The Development of Self-Perceptions
• Chapter 6 Role Taking, Attributions about the Origins of Another’s Dependency, and Problem-Solving
• Chapter 7 Altruistic Values and Moral Judgment
• Chapter 8 Prosocial Moral Judgment: Cross-Cultural Research
• Chapter 9 A Model of Prosocial Moral Reasoning
• Chapter 10 The Role of Altruistic Affect and Cognitions in Behavior
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index