The Resegregation of Schools

Education and Race in the Twenty-First Century

Jamel K. Donnor, Adrienne Dixson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781134070985
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Access to a quality education remains the primary mechanism for improving one's life chances in the United States, and for children of color, a "good education" is particularly linked to their individual and collective well-being. Despite the popular perception that America is in a "post-racial" epoch, opportunities to access quality learning environments and human development resources remain determined according to race, class, gender, and ability. Taking a more nuanced approach to race and the resegregation of the American school system, this volume examines how and why the education quality for the majority of students of color in America remains fundamentally unequal.

1 The Same but Different

“Post-Racial” Inequality in American Public Education

Carey Hawkins Ash and Chaneé D. Anderson

The United States has long struggled with the concept of equality in public education, with race having often been the determining factor in the provision of educational services and opportunities. Though nearly 60 years have passed since the landmark Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), educational inequities still exist in America. Thus, this chapter chronicles the use of race as the legal determiner of educational opportunity in the nation’s education system, to show how the property line now takes the place of race. We argue that although Brown’s desegregation movement was a valiant effort to champion education equity, where one resides has become the “new” proxy for race in distributing quality educational opportunities in this “colorblind” American society. Despite this unfortunate circumstance, the United States must create an equitable, 21^st century education system for all of America’s students. The welfare of our nation depends on it.

Laying the Foundation: Early Inequity in American Education

As early as 1849, courts in the United States wrestled with the issue of race in public education. In Roberts v. The City of Boston (1849), Benjamin Roberts brought suit on behalf of his daughter, Sarah, challenging the regulations of the Boston City School Committee. Specifically, Mr. Roberts claimed that the committee’s regulation created an unreasonable burden on Sarah receiving an education by requiring her to “walk past five white elementary schools to attend the all-black, run-down Smith School,” purely because she was “Black” (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849).

In argument before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the venerable Charles Sumner advanced several notable propositions in support of the Roberts’ claims. First, Sumner reasoned that the school committee could not assume “that an entire race possesses certain moral or intellectual qualities [that makes] it proper to place them all in a class by themselves” (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). To support his position, Sumner cited the fact that “a colored person [in Massachusetts in 1849 could] occupy any office connected with the public schools, from that of governor, or secretary of the board of education, to that of member of the school committee, or teacher in any public school,” and could moreover “vote for members of the school committee” (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). Second, Sumner argued that separating children on the “account of color or race” creates a class system which violates principles of equality (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). Even where Black and White children enjoyed “equal advantages of instruction” in separate schools, Sumner maintained that such could never be equal in fact (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). He argued that Black children could not be forced to accept equal instruction in separate schools because forced attendance at separate schools “is in the nature of caste” (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). Finally, neither could the parents of Black children be forced to accept segregated schooling, as they would be inconvenienced in a way not experienced by White parents, thus denying to them equal protection of the laws (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). Because “the spirit of American institutions,” requires that all “without distinction of color or race” be treated equally before the law, Charles Sumner vehemently defended the premise that Black children “have an equal right with white children to the general public schools” (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). Despite the superior moral strength of his claims in finding a right to equal educational opportunities for all students, Sumner’s arguments were not enough to convince the court that the committee’s regulation was unreasonable, especially in light of the committee’s previous actions (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849).

According to the Supreme Judicial Court, “in the absence of special legislation,” Massachusetts’ law gave school committees the power to regulate the classification of students and the distribution of educational services (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). Moreover, unless a school committee abuses its power, or covers its decision in pretense, the committee’s decision is final and conclusive (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). Thus, in arriving at its determination that the committee’s regulation was legally reasonable, the court relied on the committee’s deliberations and resolution of 3 years earlier.

In 1846, George Putnam and other “colored” citizens of Boston petitioned the school committee to abolish the system of separate schools for Black and White children (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849). In considering the request, the committee formed a sub-committee which reported back with a resolution, stating: “[It is] the opinion of this board, the continuance of the separate schools for colored children, and the regular attendance of such children upon the schools, is not only legal and just, but is best adapted to promote the education of that class of our population” (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849; emphasis added). Because Putnam’s petition was heard by the Boston School Committee and considered in subcommittee, the Supreme Judicial Court determined:

The [C]ommittee, apparently upon great deliberation, have come to the conclusion that the good of both classes of schools will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate primary schools for colored and for white children, and we can perceive no ground to doubt, that this is the honest result of their experience and judgment. (Roberts v. The City of Boston, 1849; emphasis added)

Honesty is one thing; equity is another. Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the school committee’s determination that separate schools for Black and White children were permissible on the basis of local control. As a result, the court gave up on providing genuine equality of opportunity and instead enshrined in state law the rancid ideology of “separate but equal.” This ruling set the stage for the universal application of the same inequitable principle in all public accommodations and services in Plessy v. Ferguson 47 years later.

Raising the Wall: “Separate but Equal” Becomes the Law of the Land

In 1896, the Supreme Court legalized racial apartheid in the United States in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), by declaring “separate but equal” the law of the land. On June 7, 1892, Homer A. Plessy, a Louisiana citizen of one-eighth Black and seven-eighths White blood, violated the state’s law requiring racial segregation in railway cars by sitting in the company of White passengers on a train bound for Covington, Louisiana from New Orleans (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). The state statute provided “that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches [were to] provide equal but separate accommodations for white, and colored races” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). Under the law, no person was “permitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones assigned to them, on account of the race they belong[ed] to” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). However, Plessy’s “mixture of colored blood was not discernable in him,” but under the “one drop rule,” he was nonetheless “Black” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). Thus, upon refusing to sit in the “Blacks only” car, Plessy was forcibly ejected from the train by the local authorities and jailed for violating state law (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896).

In his defense, Plessy asserted the 13th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. By attacking the Louisiana statute under the 13th Amendment, Plessy claimed that segregated rail cars implied a badge of involuntary servitude upon Blacks, thereby perpetuating a stigma of inferiority in comparison to Whites (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). The Court quickly dismissed Plessy’s argument by saying:

A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color, has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. … [As to] the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority[,] if this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the [statute], but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896)

Sadly, this reasoning gave the Court purview to say that even if segregation could be said to impose a stigma of inferiority upon Blacks, the states nonetheless could mandate racial segregation. Relying on the Roberts decision as its primary example, the Supreme Court declared that if the establishment of separate schools for White and colored children was deemed a valid exercise of state power in Massachusetts, a state “where the political rights of the colored race [had] been longest and most earnestly enforced,” then certainly, separation of the races in all other public accommodations was permissible (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). Thus, through the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plessy, Roberts’ “separate but equal” doctrine became the law of the land. It would be more than half a century before American apartheid would end in Brown v. Board of Education.

The Great Wall Falls: Brown v. Board of Education

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)¹ was a landmark Supreme Court decision that overturned both the Plessy (1896) and Roberts (1849) decisions (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954). Perhaps surprisingly, Brown’s (1954) story is strikingly similar to Roberts’ (1849). In Brown (1954), an African American father, Mr. Oliver Brown, sought to enroll his daughter, Linda Brown, in an all-White school closer to her home so she would avoid walking through a railroad switchyard to attend her all-Black school (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954). Seeking judicial remedy, Brown’s attorneys argued that the designation of separate Black and White schools for elementary-aged school children negatively impacted Black students’ learning, growth, and development, and harmed them socially, psychologically, and emotionally (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954). Chief Justice Earl Warren acknowledged the validity of the Browns’ claims when he stated:

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system. (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954).

Thus, the Court went on to correct its position in Plessy, and declared that “[t]o separate [Black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in ways unlikely ever to be undone” (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954). At this point, the Supreme Court rose to its full height and proclaimed:

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right, which must be made available to all on equal terms. (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954; emphasis added)

With this pronouncement, Brown (1954) became the beacon of equality in a formerly segregated world as it overturned the long standing “separate but equal” doctrine put forth in Roberts (1846) and firmly established in Plessy (1896). The Brown (1954) ruling knocked down the wall of separation between the races in public accommodations and declared access to public schools without racial discrimination to be a fundamental right in the United States; however, this is not the full essence of what Brown’s parents sought.² Nonetheless, what joy the decision did bring would be short lived, 53 years after the Brown decision, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007) has significantly dimmed Brown’s once bright light.

Removing the Rubble: The Voluntary “Mistakes” of Seattle and Louisville

In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court jointly considered the voluntary desegregation plans of Seattle School District No. 1 and the Jefferson County, Kentucky, Public School System. Both cases presented the question of whether Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public Schools could “choose to classify students by race” as part of voluntary integration programs (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007).

The Seattle Public School District employed a racial tiebreaker “to address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments” (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). In Seattle Public Schools, approximately 41 percent of the students enrolled in the district’s public schools are White and the remaining 59 percent are considered “nonwhite”³ regardless of race or ethnicity (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). Incoming high school ninth graders were permitted to rank the city’s high schools in their preferred attendance order to determine where they would enroll. If too many students listed a particular school as their first choice, a series of “tiebreakers” determined the schools’ attendees, based first on whether a student’s sibling was already enrolled in the particular school, and second, based on the school’s racial composition and the potential student’s race (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). If a popular school was not within 10 percentage points of the district’s white/nonwhite racial balance, it was “integration positive” and a tiebreaker to bring the school into balance was employed (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). If the racial tiebreaker did not decide the students’ enrollment, the geographic proximity to a student’s residence would be the determining factor (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). Notice here that race was not the sole factor in determining student assignment, but one factor in a series of three tie-breakers.

Based on the district’s tiebreaker ordering, it could be argued that keeping families together in school is more important to the district than the students’ race, and that by ranking race second, the district sought to fulfill its duty to alleviate the pain suffered by students in racially homogenous schools as commanded in Brown (1954). This is corroborated by the fact that the district’s preference of last resort was to maintain students’ isolation in their racially homogenous communities. Despite this, Andy Meeks, an admitted student to Ballard High School’s biotechnology program, felt his denial of admission to Ballard High School proper on the basis of race, per the district’s guidelines, was a violation of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). Unlike the Seattle School District, the Jefferson County School District maintained a segregated school system for decades. In fact, it was not until the dawn of the new millennium that a federal district court determined that the school district had successfully dismantled all vestiges of segregated schooling (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). In 2001, the year after the district’s consent decree was lifted, the school district adopted the integration plan at issue in the case, which required all non-magnet schools to maintain a population of between 15 and 50 percent African American students (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). The district’s integration plan operated in one of two ways depending on the circumstances: first, parents of Kindergarteners and first graders and new students in the district listed their first and second preferences among the schools within their assigned geographic area, based on the student’s address (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). Decisions regarding school assignment were to be based on available space and in conf...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Foreword
• Introduction
• 1. The Same but Different: “Post-Racial” Inequality in American Public Education
• 2. From Segregated, to Integrated, to Narrowed Knowledge: Curriculum Revision for African Americans, From Pre-Brown to the Present
• 3. The Power of Counterstories: The Complexity of Black Male Experiences in Pursuit of Academic Success
• 4. Closing the Schoolhouse Doors: State Efforts to Limit K–12 Education for Unauthorized Migrant School Children
• 5. (In)capable and (Un)deserving: A Critical Race Media and Policy Analysis of Educational and Immigration Policies
• 6. Prison Schooling: Segregation, Post-Racialism, and the Criminalization of Black and Brown Youth
• 7. The Impact of School Resegregation on the Racial Identity Development of African American Students: The Example of Wake County
• 8. Interstate School Choice? Evaluating Educational Quality in Metropolitan Regions that are Divided by State Lines
• 9. Toward a Critical Race Case Pedagogy: A Tool for Social Justice Educators
• Contributors
• Index