Elites and Identities in Post-Soviet Space

David Lane

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135697952
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The dissolution of the communist system led to the creation of new states and the formation of new concepts of citizenship in the post-Soviet states of Central and Eastern Europe.

The formation of national identity also occurred in the context of the process of increasing economic and political globalisation, particularly the widening of the European Union to include the central European post-socialist and Baltic States. Internationally, Russia sought to establish a new identity either as a European or as a Eurasian society and had to accommodate the interests of a wider Russian Diaspora in the 'near abroad'. This book addresses how domestic elites (regional, political and economic) influenced the formation of national identities and the ways in which citizenship has been defined. A second component considers the external dimensions: the ways in which foreign elites influenced either directly or indirectly the concept of identity and the interaction with internal elites. The essays consider the role of the European Union in attempting to form a European identity. Moreover, the growing internationalisation of economies (privatisation, monetary harmonisation, dependence on trade) also had effects on the kind of 'national identity' sought by the new nation states as well as the defining by them of 'the other'.The collection focuses on the interrelations between social identity, state and citizenship formation, and the role of elites in defining the content of concepts in different post-communist societies.

This book was originally published as a special issue of Europe-Asia Studies.

Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States

DAVID LANE

THIS COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IS DERIVED FROM TWO SEMINARS on Elites and the Formation of Identity in Post-Soviet Space sponsored by the Centre for East European Language Based Areas Studies (CEELBAS). The first was convened in King's College, Cambridge in November 2009 and the second was held at Emmanuel College, Cambridge in June 2010: we acknowledge the support given by these colleges and the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies.

The essays address two major topics related to post-Soviet space: the formation of elites and patterns of social identity. Social identity is a notion or concept about the way that people classify or associate themselves with others in the formation of social groups and collectivities—who we are and who other people are. The process of formation of identity is concerned with individuals identifying themselves with socially constructed categories (Anderson 1991); these may be associated with places or with groups of people on the basis of their gender, age, education or class, or on a geographical basis. Hence identity may have many forms and people have many identities. In his essay Heinrich Best develops the multi-dimensional character of identity in terms of its emotive, cognitive-evaluative and projective-conative dimensions.

From a political point of view, the most important of these forms of association are national and ethnic identities; occupation and class are significant from a social point of view and also have political implications. People are not born with identities; they acquire them through the process of socialisation (Gellner 1983). Some writers on identity focus on the formation of self-identity constructed through individual choice. Individuals, they contend, choose roles of liberation (Giddens 1991, Chapter 7). For writers like Giddens, emancipatory politics involves the personal becoming the political. Demands for liberation by indigenous peoples, women, and national and ethnic minorities are generated ‘from below’. One problem with this approach is that it obscures the institutions and political forces which shape how identities are made. Institutions influence the formation of identity (Jenkins 2004, pp. 134–36). Identities are not only socially constructed but also politically sanctioned. The relationship between the personal and political is usually the other way around: the political shapes the personal.

This is particularly the case in the period of the transformation of the post-state socialist societies where there has been an abrupt fracture in the socialisation process. At the level of the society, communist ideology, which politically defined people's political identity, and the political institutions which framed the formation of ideology, were swept away. As Pawel Karolewski points out in his essay, it is important to distinguish between the self-ascription of an individual to a group, and the dimension of a collective identity. New states and new identities are formed principally by elites. Here it is crucial to focus on how identities are acquired; to consider ‘the world of material causes and effects’ (Jenkins 2004, p. 137). Elites construct, reconstruct or deconstruct collective identities.

Political elites are made up of people who make the rules, those who occupy top positions, or decisively influence the making of decisions which are national in scope. The analysis of who drives the policy of transition has focused on elite behaviour: ‘transitions’ are depicted as the consequences of settlements between elite actors (Kullberg et al. 1998, p. 107). They articulate ideologies, make constitutions, and enter agreements with actors which define the boundaries of states and their languages (Pakulski & Waters 1996, p. 147). In this way they contribute to the formation of national identities.

While it is now commonplace to point out that identities are manufactured, it is infrequent to find studies which define how identities are made. ‘System’ or ‘regime’ change involves processes by which incumbent elites lose power and insurgents gain it. Domestic elite conflict, enabled by the weakness of the incumbent state leaders, leads to ‘within system’ challenges to the state system. Sometimes, though not always, popular support is courted to fortify ascendant elites against internal rulers. In the dynamics of the movement from state socialism, elites have played a major role in creating the conditions for the formation of new identities.

In the view of elite theorists such as John Higley, ‘elite settlements’ are crucial to ensure effective leadership of the transformation process (Higley & Burton 1989, p. 27). In the process of transformation,¹ elites pursue their interests through the formation of political and social identities: elites, interests and identities are intertwined. Ruling elites in the process of transformation allocate ownership of property; define the membership of, and rights in, a nation state; they influence how social and political change should take place; and they legitimate international alliances and linkages. In the post-communist states, they actively shape institutions which form identity: churches and religious rituals replace communist institutions and ceremonies; nations replace classes as forms of social identification; a consumption ethic is a lifestyle ‘choice’. Dominant elites play a crucial role in shaping identities and in denying identities. As Goldstone puts it, ‘[a] state-centred view focusing on elite dynamics may provide a better explanation of how the revolutionary process began in the late 1980s’ (Goldstone 1998, p. 100). The ruling elite secured consent and guided, as best it could, policy to develop capitalism and polyarchy. The formation of new identities—based on religion, national identity, a consumption ethic, as well as affinity with market-type political processes, expressed through competitive elections and parliaments—is part of the process of transformation. Elite approaches, however, ignore class actors and do not consider the motivations of classes to build capitalism.

Contributors to this collection recognise that international actors are important. The international political elites were decisive backers, initially, of the move to political (electoral) and economic markets and, later, to privatisation. The international hegemony of the USA has played a crucial role in the expansion of capitalism on a world scale. Not only did it subvert economically and politically the socialist states in the 1980s, but it provided an image and an ideology which has been irresistible to the masses. In this way an external agency provided the mass gravitas—the popular support for social change—which initially was hailed as a ‘move to the market’ and to democracy. Endogenous counter-elites to the communist leadership were sustained by international political elites who played a major role in the collapse and subsequently in the transition to capitalism.

How then, and to what extent, have the post-socialist countries become subject to the pressures of exogenous elites? How do endogenous and exogenous elites interact? Have they succeeded in creating unitary societies or are they presiding over fragmented ones?

Pawel Karolewski, in his essay, considers the notion of identity making and identity transfer in the context of the EU. He describes a top-down mechanism by which the EU applies identity technologies in an attempt to construct collective identity. These include the promotion of positive self-images, and the generation of common symbols (such as the European Union anthem and the common currency) or visibility by enhancement of common values (such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights). He contends that the EU attempts to legitimate its own policies by shaping the rules, norms and institutions in third countries and thus promotes the EU as a ‘normative power’. The self-images promoted by the EU are those of ‘cosmopolitan Europe, civilian power and normative power’. Elites in the old and new member states shared similar interests in seeking to break with the communist past and hence a ‘return to Europe’ led to acceptance of the conditionality requirements of the EU. By the same process elites not only define the collective interest of the self, but also of the ‘other’

This is of particular importance in the process of democracy promotion in countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. However, Karolewski's essay also indicates that elites have to operate in the context of the values and interests, and of identity technologies which will not work, or will work badly, if they are not in keeping with the perceptions of their subjects. As the EU has expanded territorially and deepened institutionally, it has become increasingly vulnerable to the instability of public support. Moreover, when the EU acts as an ‘identity hegemon’ it shapes conceptions of ‘the normal’ in the EU and concurrently promotes values ‘of the superior’ to those outside. As Karolewski aptly puts it: ‘the EU shows a missionary zeal on the one hand, [but] refused to grant complete conversion [by offering EU membership to countries such as Ukraine] on the other’. Here he raises a general problem of the elitist approach: do elites act instrumentally in advancing their own interests, or are the norms genuine for all? If actions suggest the former, then they may amplify resistance, particularly if third party countries possess elites critical of the EU who may articulate different norms and possess different interests.

The transformations of the post-socialist states have taken place in the context of a process of globalisation. This is a process involving greater interdependence of countries, one with another, through trade, integrated production chains, flows of money and finance and people movement, as well as the development of interstate regional associations. Such an integrated network is facilitated through developments in media, particularly electronic means of communication, and international ownership and control of physical assets. National economies and societies become interdependent and subject to forces outside the control of governments. The growing internationalisation of economies (the role of foreign direct investment in privatisation, monetary harmonisation, growth in trade) has had effects on the kind of ‘national identity’ sought by the new nation states. Elites ‘outside’ influence those ‘inside’ and hence the manufacture of identity has an international dimension. This is particularly important for the new member states of the European Union as they have sought to forge a national identity concurrently with that of a European identity.

The essays in this collection carry this theorising forward by defining the character of elites in the post-socialist states. How can elites create a sense of identity to their advantage and how can they politicise political and economic identities to legitimate their activity or to gain popular support? How are divisions utilised by elites to create identities shaped in their interests? Who makes this agenda—what is the relationship between internal elites and external ones? Which groups in particular look to their nation states or to the global system as instruments to further their interests? In this context, the formation of different types of identities gives rise to diverse patterns of political allegiances.

‘Manufacturing’ identity calls for the identification of actors. The role of exogenous elites and institutions is clearly brought out in the essay by Peter Zeniewski which maps the changes in Solidarity's values from social justice, worker self-management and ‘bottom-up labour activism’ to a movement advocating a neo-liberal policy of free market economics.

Zeniewski draws our attention to the fact that Solidarity in its formative period, before the fall of state socialism, had an ideology which infused social identity in a collectivist way bringing together a common set of interests, rather than being a fragment of a differentiated social group in civil society. In power, however, it changed its character and became an agent for neo-liberal reforms. According to Zeniewski, a crucial role here was played by the active intervention of ‘Western’ economists, such as Jeffrey Sachs, who helped to legitimate the radical neo-liberal wing of Solitary which shifted civil society discourse from a collectivist entity, autonomous from the state and market, to a more pluralist individualistic liberal type of civil society predicated on private property and a free market. Neo-liberal terms of engagement for countries transiting from communism were laid down by the EU and the IMF. Exogenous elites from institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, foundations (such as the Stefan Batory and Soros Foundations) and high prolife academics such as Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton and Stanislaw Gomulka allied with endogenous elites. The internal elites were, of course, committed to neo-liberal policies. The outsiders were crucial, not only for their influence on policy making but also in legitimating policies. Solidarity experienced an identity change; it turned from being a collectivist bottom-up association to an individualistic market oriented top-down organisation.

While many writers dwell on the influence of international interests on identity formation, Richard Sakwa addresses the problem in his essay of how ‘the international’ may constitute an internal dimension to national identity. Here Russia's concerns for its own sovereignty and autonomy need to be coherent with its conception of its international identity. The problem facing Russia is that such identities may not be reciprocated by other states. Sakwa points out that the tension between the Soviet Union and the West was derived from its advocacy of an alternative international world order. While this has disappeared, Russia still considers itself as autonomous in terms of its civilisation and its regional economic and political power. Sakwa contends that ‘the “international” in Russian thinking has been both constructive of its civilisational identity while at the same time the source of systemic conflict’. In the framing of Russia's identity, internal political elites are confronted with domestic values and beliefs which may be misunderstood or misinterpreted abroad when they come into conflict with Western values. ‘Democracy promotion’, as understood by Western politicians, may conflict with Russian values of democracy and also may be viewed by the Russian elite as illegitimately undermining their own sovereignty and identity as a nation state.

Unlike in the new post-communist member states of the EU, a democratic transformation for Russia could not lead to subordination to the hegemonic states of the West. Whereas in the former, electoral democracy could supplant communist procedures and the new member states would enter the world system as minor players (or possibly for Poland a regional player), in Russia, the ideology of communism could be undermined domestically, while its new political elites sought to maintain Russia's status as a great power, or at least its regional power status. Russia, like China, seeks to enter the world system and benefit from it, but not at the expense of its traditional values and its own international identity. Richard Sakwa identifies the actors in international politics not just as states but as ‘state-society complexes’. This concept can include state actors as well as ways in which interests and socialisation can interact. Globalisation and the undermining of sovereignty of nation states can suit the interests of some domestic elites, but not of others and it is here that the elite structures and ownership patterns of different states shape international politics. The Russian political elites, as Sakwa points out, oppose the ‘desovereignisation accompanying globalisation’, while others with a stake in multinational companies, one might assume, do not.

Elite analysis is incomplete without a historical perspective. The second section of the collection considers elite formation in the post-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe. Two of the essays, by Heinrich Best and Győrgy Lengyel, are based on data collected for the Intune (Integrated and United) Project sponsored by the European Union's FP6 initiative.¹ Heinrich Best's study of 18 European countries extends and elaborates the idea of state-society complexes. While pointing to the importance of elites shaping and ‘inventing’ collective identities, he contends that there are historical givens and experiences that shape the collective memories of the population. His essay brings out the divergences between leaders and masses and reminds us that ‘identities’ can vary not only between states but also within them. The importance of systematic divergences between elites and the population is that they may indicate the absence of predispositions of the latter to behave in the ways desired by the former. The successful formation of nations and nationalism overcomes such divergences by creating a common identity expressed in national solidarity. Such forms of identity and feelings of belongingness predispose individuals to act collectively and hence elites seek to forge group identification in support of their own interests.

Best's work shows that such unitary ideologies do not exist. His empirical work shows quite convincingly that in Europe there are enormous international differences when it comes to defining nationality. A common language, he points out, is one of the most salient characteristics of nationality; but even here there are important historically determined differences. He also points to variation in perceptions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. Ascriptive ‘national sameness’ is greater in Eastern Europe, whereas among German and British political elites, ideas of ‘blood and soil’ are completely discredited. The new member states of the EU have ‘more rigid and exclusive definitions of political identities’. Essentialist criteria are more likely to be part of the masses’ world view than they are of the political elites, except in Estonia, where such views are shared by the ruling elites and the eponymous population.

Best defines significant differences between elites and populations which are dependent on the elites’ ‘empowerment strategies’. Elites support a common foreign policy, but do not wish to give up control over national welfare systems. Differences between the concepts of elites and publics with respect to national identity suggest that ruling elites may face resistance when trying to forge collective identities over some matters. International norms seem to have more influence over economic elites who are exposed to global pressures whereas citizens are more likely to adhere to historically conditioned values of national inclusiveness.

Magdalena Solska takes up this issue ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge Europe-Asia Studies Series
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• 1. Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States
• 2. European Identity Making and Identity Transfer
• 3. Russia's Identity: Between the ‘Domestic’ and the ‘International’
• 4. Neoliberalism, Exogenous Elites and the Transformation of Solidarity
• 5. The Elite–Population Gap in the Formation of Political Identities. A Cross-Cultural Investigation
• 6. Business Elites and the Role of Companies in Society: A Comparative Study of Poland, Hungary & Germany
• 7. Supranational Attachment of European Elites and Citizens
• 8. Balancing National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation: Identity Building and the Role of Political Parties in Post-Orange Ukraine
• 9. Chechen Elites: Control, Cooption or Substitution?
• 10. Citizenship, Collective Identity and the International Impact on Integration Policy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
• 11. The Dynamics of Elite Networks and Patron–Client Relations in Afghanistan
• Index