The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and India

Rajiv Nayan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781317986096
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The relationship of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with India has been an interesting subject in the field of security studies. The nuclearisation of India and its subsequent rise are further forcing the world to redefine its relationship with the treaty. However, the international response is quite mixed. The old mindset still thinks that India may join the treaty as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. Scholars appear divided whether India should join the treaty as a nuclear weapon country.

The book discusses current crises of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which are going to figure in the 2010 Review Conference of the treaty.

This book was published as a special issue of The Strategic Analysis.

Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime

Harald Müller

Abstract: The nuclear non-proliferation regime, despite being frequently criticised for an alleged lack of effectiveness, is in fact an amazing success story. The number of states which had conducted nuclear weapons activities in various stages but which have terminated them at one point surpasses the number of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) by far. At the apex of its success, however, the regime is threatened by erosion from three different directions. A small number of rule-breakers and outsiders undermine its central objective: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The refusal of the official NWSs to fulfil their undertaking of nuclear disarmament violates the principle of justice enshrined in the treaty and thereby destroys its legitimacy, as does the perceived readiness by nuclear suppliers to impede the development of nuclear technology in developing countries. The Gordian Knot can presumably only be cut by a u-turn towards a world without nuclear weapons. This insight has meanwhile reached the mainstream security establishment of the United States, the president included. Whether this road will really be taken will determine the future of the regime—with far-reaching consequences for global security.

The success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: beyond all expectations

The nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its core, can be called one of the most amazing international institutions. President Kennedy’s famous nightmare in the 1960s, that within a decade 20 or even 30 Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) might emerge, has not come true. Even today, the number of nuclear powers or states with active nuclear weapons programmes stays at 10. Five of them are recognised as legitimate nuclear weapons possessors by the NPT, coinciding with the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are credited with nuclear weapon status or have proven it by testing their designs. Iran has been strongly suspected of conducting a determined nuclear weapons programme.

In contrast, no fewer than 26 states, which once explored the idea of moving towards nuclear weapons, conducted feasibility studies, targeted weapon research or even development, or produced nuclear weapons (or inherited them after the decay of the Soviet Union), have renounced these activities or have been forced to do so. These countries make up almost the whole phalanx of middle powers. The miracle of non-proliferation becomes even greater when one considers that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) singles out 44 ‘nuclear capable’ states whose ratification of that treaty is required before it can enter into force. Even more surprising is this mass renunciation of the most powerful weapon of the time in light of the North Korean example: Pyongyang has proven that a bitterly poor country, with the necessary perseverance, can move to the bomb through time. Measured by their gross national product at the outset of the programme, about 100 other states could take the same path. Nuclear weapons are by now an old technology. The barriers on the way to the bomb are not trivial, but they can be overcome. And yet, the NWSs and aspirants are a tiny minority within the international community—why?¹

Nuclear weapons, first and foremost, have been procured out of security concerns. The most popular explanation why states have chosen the non-nuclear option is thus a security guarantee by others.² This proposition, though, opens more questions than it answers. First, it cannot explain why so many ‘renouncers’ come from the non-aligned camp or have no reliable guarantee as successors to the former Soviet Union. Together, these two groups make up 16 out of the 26 ‘convertees’. Many of the ‘allied renouncers’, moreover, gave up their activities at a time when the nuclear guarantee had been compromised. Most of the European countries dropped their nuclear ambitions after the Soviet Union had reached parity with the United States and the ambivalent ‘flexible response’ had replaced the unambiguous ‘massive retaliation’ as NATO’s nuclear doctrine; serious doubts about the reliability of the US guarantee remained and were concealed only with considerable effort.³

We get some indication of the effects of international norms by comparing the ‘before’ and the ‘after’. By far, the major part of the ‘nuclear aspirants’ started their nuclear activities before the NPT was concluded. Only Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, and (possibly) Syria developed their programmes after the NPT had been opened for signature. Interestingly, none of these countries was a democracy when the treaty was negotiated. On the contrary, the large majority of the ‘renouncers’ stopped their programmes during the negotiations or when the negotiations had been completed. Thus, the NPT marked to most of them the magic line beyond which nuclear weapons aspirations lost their legitimacy. The increasingly strong non-proliferation norm shaped the discoursive arena of domestic decision-making and changed the balance of influence between the proponents and opponents of a national nuclear option. The burden of proof that going nuclear was the right thing to do became ever stronger. Notably, during processes of democratisation, when young democracies struggled to prove their ‘good citizenship’ in order to attract international recognition and assistance, renouncing nuclear weapons appeared a particularly fit instrument to demonstrate good international behaviour. Domestically, it could be framed as correcting the misdeeds of the ancien regime. This applies to Spain, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, the three successor states to the Soviet Union, and Romania. In Egypt and Indonesia, the policy shift went hand in hand with important changes in the political systems and foreign policy strategies; in Egypt, in the course of Sadat’s succession to Nasser and in Indonesia, after the coup against the nuclearminded President Sukarno.⁴

In the light of these data, it is clear that the NPT norm, finally established in 1970, exerted a considerable influence on the decision of states to terminate nuclear weapons programmes (or not to start them at all). In addition, democratisation processes helped in this regard, but non-democracies were also accessible to the effects of the norm. The most spectacular non-proliferation success of the last 10 years was the end of the Libyan ambitions, a result of a drawn-out negotiation...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• 1. Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime
• 2. Nuclear Disarmament in a Non-Proliferation Context: A Russian Perspective
• 3. The Current Problems of the NPT: How to Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Regime
• 4. NPT Review Conference 2010: Issues and Prospects
• 5. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
• 6. NPT RevCon 2010: An Opportunity to Refocus Priorities
• 7. India and the NPT
• 8. India and the NPT
• 9. India and the NPT: Separating Substantive Facts from Normative Fiction
• 10. Reforms in the NPT and Prospects for India’s Accession: A Situational Analysis
• 11. The NPT and India: Accommodating the Exception
• Conclusion
• Index