Democracy and Violence

Global Debates and Local Challenges

John Schwarzmantel, Hendrik Kraetzschmar

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781317985464
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Illustrated most dramatically by the events of 9/11 and the subsequent 'war on terror', violence represents a challenge to democratic politics and to the establishment of liberal-democratic regimes. Liberal-democracies have themselves not hesitated to use violence and restrict civil liberties as a response to such challenges. These issues are at the centre of global politics and figure prominently in political debates today concerning multiculturalism, political exclusion and the politics of gender.

This book takes up these topics with reference to a wide range of case-studies, covering Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Europe. It provides a theoretical framework clarifying the relationship between democracy and violence and presents original research surveying current hot-spots of violent conflict and the ways in which violence affects the prospects for democratic politics and for gender equality. Based on field-work carried out by specialists in the areas covered, this volume will be of high interest to students of democratic politics and to all those concerned with ways in which the recourse to violence could be reduced in a global context. This book has significant implications for policy-makers involved in attempts to develop safer and more peaceful ways of handling political and social conflict.

This book was published as a special issue of Democratizations.

Democracy and violence: a theoretical Overview¹

John Schwarzmantel

Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, UK

This article sets out a number of central questions which should be kept in mind in any discussion of the relationship of democracy and violence. Democracy aims at the exclusion of violence, and theoretically should render violence unnecessary, since all groups and individuals should be able to express their views and interests through a process of rational deliberation. Yet this is obviously not always the case. The democratic state, like any other, uses violence when necessary to maintain itself in existence and to resist those violent movements that reject democratic processes. The danger is that such use of violence may escape democratic control and undermine foundational rights which are supposedly being defended. Some contemporary democracies are challenged by violent movements, but these are in many cases expressions of a demand for recognition and inclusion. The question thus has to be probed of how democratic societies should respond to such challenges. It is suggested here that institutional reform and a new discourse of politics should be important elements of such a response.

Introduction

The problem of violence is one which is of the utmost importance for students and scholars of democracy and democratization, and the contributions in this volume are designed to provide empirical and theoretical material for advances in research in this field. In the light of recent and not-so recent events, the significance of the topic is all too obvious. Events like 9/11 in the United States and the Madrid and London bombings of September 2004 and July 2005 highlight the problem that some established liberal-democracies are targeted by violent groups which seek to disrupt the normal pattern of democratic politics. Are any generalisations possible concerning the causes of such attacks, and the nature of those who perpetrate them? Do they stem from the alienation and disaffection of certain groups who are excluded from effective participation in the institutions of existing liberal-democratic systems? Or should more weight be given to global factors, connected with a global ‘clash of civilisations’,² the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism seizing on issues such as the conflict in the Middle East to protest against what were seen as foreign policies directed against the Muslim word, with (at least in some cases) a broader opposition to liberal-democracy per se? These two classes of explanation need not, of course, be mutually exclusive. They in turn raise the empirical question of how liberal-democratic societies respond to these violent challenges, and also the more normative question of how they should deal with such challenges without at the same time undermining the democratic rights and freedoms which constitute the fundamentals of the democratic order. One recent anthology of writings on violence poses the question, ‘Can any policy work to limit or reverse the effects of violence?’³ and offers the hope that ‘Rather than blink at violence, that hidden face of modern and post-modern life, we remain confident that its exposure will help others to wrestle with its force and to find ways to transform its potential for destruction into options for growth, if not peace.’⁴ One of the crucial questions for investigation is certainly the discussion of how the politics of violent confrontation might be steered into peaceful paths of democratic discussion and compromise. How should democratic polities, their elites as well as their citizens, react to the challenge of violence in ways that diminish rather than exacerbate the resort to violence?

Given the need to define key terms, the discussion in the present contribution is based on a ‘minimalist’ definition of political violence as the use or threatened use of physical coercion to achieve political ends. Such actual or threatened acts of coercion are, in the present definition, carried out by identifiable persons, whether they are acting as agents of the state or as members of non-state bodies opposing the state. Political violence is here understood as the use (actual or threatened) of physical coercion to achieve a change in the nature of the political order, or (when carried out by agents of the state) to defend that order in its existing form. Political violence is thus defined as distinct from criminal violence, since that is carried out for personal gain. Political violence is here understood as challenging or defending particular policies or more generally the nature of the political regime in question, through the use by identifiable agents of the specific means of physical coercion, or the threat of such coercion. This definition is ‘minimalist’ in that it avoids the idea of ‘systemic violence’ invoked by some contributors to this volume (e.g. Ramsay), in which violence is seen as inherent in the working of a particular social and political system. The definition employed here also makes no distinction between ‘violence’ and ‘force’, since it sees both terms as equivalent in signalling the use of physical coercion for political ends, whether those ends are the defence of, or the attack on, a particular political order. It does however allow us to see that states themselves (acting through particular agents) are violent actors, so that violence is not just the preserve of anti-state or non-state movements. It therefore includes in its scope violence committed in the name of democracy, whether in a domestic or in a foreign policy setting, as in attempts to ‘export’ democracy and to impose it by force, as happened in Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001), or to combat its real or supposed enemies in an international context.

It should also be made clear that the discussion both in this contribution and in those that comprise this volume focuses on democracy as referring primarily to liberal-democracy as a political system. One basic characteristic of such a system is the aspiration to control and limit the use of violence by agents of the state, and to institute checks and controls on the holders of state power in their deployment of legitimate violence. Such liberal-democratic systems also aim at political and social inclusion, giving citizens an equal voice in the making of laws which affect their lives, in the hope that such equal and effective involvement will make recourse to violence unnecessary on the part of its members. However, it is on the failure of liberal-democracies in their present form to achieve this degree of inclusion and to thus reduce the recourse to violence that this contribution concentrates. Relevant examples would refer to cultural, national, ethnic and religious minority groups in both the ‘new democracies’ of post-Communist societies and within ‘established democracies’ where the degree of cultural diversity makes political community more difficult to achieve.

If violence can represent a severe problem for established liberal-democracies, it is no less a concern for processes of democratisation and establishment or consolidation of forms of democratic politics where democratic institutions and processes are weakly present or totally absent. Following Norberto Bobbio, we can understand democracy as a way of governing in which all participants accept certain ‘rules of the game’ and resort to reasoned argument rather than force to settle disputed issues. In Bobbio’s words,‘the only way a meaningful discussion of democracy, as distinct from all forms of autocratic government, is possible is to consider it as characterised by a set of rules (primary or basic) which establish who is authorised to take collective decisions and which procedures are to be applied.’⁵ However, this in turn presupposes that there is agreement on such ‘rules of the game’. Furthermore, those who are citizens of a democratic order have to regard those who differ from or disagree with them as equal in status, as fellow-citizens who must be respected and argued with, rather than as enemies to be fought or as people who should not be accorded the recognition due to full members of the political community. Violence makes difficult, if not impossible, the establishment of a democratic polity. Such a democratic polity requires that its members ‘lay down their arms’, both literally and metaphorically, and reject violent confrontation or the right of the strongest in favour of processes of dialogue and discussion appropriate to a deliberative process among equal citizens. Ethnic or religious antagonisms (among other sources of conflict) can make such mutual recognition impossible. This impedes or renders impossible agreement on the composition of the democratic polity and on the criteria for membership. Such basic features of a democratic order as free and fair elections are unachievable if they are disrupted by violence, which substitutes physical force for the consensus on procedures (including electoral ones) and on their outcomes which is necessary for democracy. Violence can also arise when there is no agreement on who should form the members of the democratic association. It is frequently a response to a situation in which there are ‘profound problems of political illegitimacy’, arising out of a mismatch between state and nation, whether in contexts such as the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Chechens in Russia, or Arab Israelis in the state of Israel.⁶

Thus political violence presents a challenge not only to the institutions and procedures of a constitutional liberal-democratic order but also to the processes of democratization. There is of course a vast literature dealing with violence, its nature and causes.⁷ Yet the existing literature is focused mainly on a review of the nature and forms of violence, and if it does relate this to democratic politics it does so in very general ways. This introduction seeks to take this debate forward by focusing on four central questions which form the framework for the contributions constituting this volume, with each article seeking to shed light on some aspect of these four basic themes. The underlying problem is of the nature and causes of political violence and the ways in which it challenges both established democracies as well as the processes of democratisation. The hope is that deeper understanding of these issues, seen in a variety of different contexts, will not only illuminate the nature of political violence but will suggest ways in which such violence can be redirected into forms of peaceful democratic politics. The aspiration of such analysis is, in the words of one recent contribution to the debate, to ‘break the spiral of vengeance, hatred and retaliation by turning negative communication between enemies into positive reciprocity between human beings.’⁸

The four central issues can be set out as follows, in a linked sequence.

1. The exclusion of violence through the processes of democratic politics: democracy as a process seeks to replace violent confrontation by debate and discussion, aspiring to the peaceful reconciliation of the conflict and difference which are inherent in any modern complex society. Such a channelling of violent conflict into processes of compromise through the institutions of democratic politics can be envisaged as a gradual process rather than a sudden transformation. In cases where violent conflict has divided a society, the exclusion of violence is bound to be a difficult, protracted and painful exercise. A number of contributions in this volume deal with the problematic process of the substitution of democratic processes to replace violent confrontation, and the agencies involved in such a process. In some cases the acceptance of democratic processes, such as elections, may be a half-hearted choice by elite groups, and may itself stimulate violence where crucial issues of power are at stake, as is shown in the analysis by Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta of elections and electoral violence in Egypt and Morocco. Additionally, the chapters by Boesten and Pearce show, with regard to examples from Latin America, the entrenched nature of forms of violence in both state and civil society, and the contribution which activist groups in civil society can make to exposing deeply-rooted patterns of violence and struggling to eradicate them.

2. The actual use of violence by democratic societies, either to safeguard democratic processes from attack, or to use violence in the establishment of a democratic society for the purpose of excluding those unwilling to commit themselves to the reconciliation of conflict through democratic channels. What are the limits to the permissible use of violence in either case, by established liberal-democratic societies in their defence, or by agencies of transition to democracy in democratising societies, and through what institutions and mechanisms can such limits be enforced? Are liberal-democratic states themselves protagonists of violence, and are they all too ready to jettison their supposedly foundational democratic principles when faced with challenges of violence? An affirmative answer to this question is provided in Ramsay’s contribution to this volume, which points to the disturbing readiness of political leaders in the liberal-democracy of the United Kingdom to embrace the use of violence in the name of the defence of democracy.

3. Violence as a challenge to democracy: what exactly is the challenge of violence to democratic procedures? Under what conditions, for what reasons, and in the name of what causes do people resort to violence within the context of democratic politics, or indeed outside that context? This question is highlighted in the contribution by Sadiki who analyses the idea of ‘resistance’ (muqawamah) as articulated by Hamas and Hizbullah. Sadiki argues that this concept is used to expose and criticise the violence inflicted by Western democracies, i.e challenge their democratic credentials, and to oppose such forms of democracy through an alternative concept of political struggle bound up with ideas of sacrifice and community. A further aspect of this question involves violence as opposing the democratic struggle for gender equality and women’s rights. Such violence is practised by agents of the state, such as the army, but more widely by a cultural of male violence within the broader civil society, as is clarified by the discussions of Boesten and Pearce. Their analyses focus on Latin America and show the ways in which violence practised and endorsed by the forces of both state and civil society erodes and distorts democratic values. Pearce uses the concept of ‘perverse state formation’ to suggest that the state in Latin America reproduces and transmits violence in the wider civil society. Boesten focuses on Peru to investigate violence against women during the period of ‘Shining Path’ and its war against the state, and in the years following its defeat. She is critical of attempts made by the government in the post-conflict situation to tackle the question of violence against women. Both contributions help in the analysis of the nature and causes of violence and of the ways in which violence impacts specifically on women. They thus illustrate how feminist and gender perspectives can offer a deeper understanding of violence and its challenge to democracy and to the process of democratisation.

4. What should be the response of democracy to violence? This more normative and speculative question demands examination of the means through which liberal-democracies both do respond and should react to the challenge of violence. In what ways might liberal-democratic states develop policies to steer political action away from violent confrontation towards channels of democratic discussion, compromise and peaceful reconciliation of conflict? Two of the following chapters address this question, with specific reference to Britain. Pantucci’s contribution focuses on the British government’s ‘Contest’ strategy for dealing with the problem of terrorist violence, and the ways in which it has sought to respond to this challenge. He offers a balanced view of the difficulties in this exercise, and the ways in which some policies risk alienating rather than winning over crucial minorities in the citizen body. Briggs analyses the rise of political activity among British Muslims, seeing this as a positive sign of engagement with democratic processes, to be welcomed rather than viewed with suspicion. Both of these authors, using the example of the United Kingdom as a ‘test case’, suggest ways in which liberal-democracies might be made more inclusive and thus reduce the recourse to violence. It has to be recognised, however, that such government policy changes and the development of civic engagement by hitherto marginalised or alienated groups might not be totally sufficient by themselves to achieve the goal of containing violent conflict.

Democracy and the exclusion of violence

The purpose of the rest of this introductory chapter is to analyse in greater depth each of the four issues presented above, and to show by way of conclusion how the various articles in this volume develop these themes in deeper ways, opening up the whole research area of the complex relationship between democracy and violence. Starting then with the first issue, it can be said that the democratic ideal, or the aspiration of a democratic political system, is in Churchill’s words to substitute ‘jaw jaw’ for ‘war war’- to reconcile political differences through debate, discussion and compromise, instead of settling them through violent conflict in which the stronger party wins out through brute force. If democracy is truly successful, violence would be excluded as a way of expressing the conflict and differences which are inescapable aspects of any society. Politics is inescapably concerned with conflict over values and with competition over scarce r...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Democracy and violence: a theoretical overview
• 2. Liberal democratic politics as a form of violence
• 3. A contest to democracy? How the UK has responded to the current terrorist threat
• 4. Hearts and minds and votes: the role of democratic participation in countering terrorism
• 5. Perverse state formation and securitized democracy in Latin America
• 6. Revisiting ‘democracy in the country and at home’ in Peru
• 7. Bullets over ballots: Islamist groups, the state and electoral violence in Egypt and Morocco
• 8. Reframing resistance and democracy: narratives from Hamas and Hizbullah
• 9. Democratisation and ‘criminal’ violence in Kenya
• 10. Democratic and semi-democratic conflict management in Southeast Asia
• Index