Knowledge, Virtue, and Action

Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work

Tim Henning, David P. Schweikard

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136227233
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are for. The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, with a special emphasis on our practical lives. In essence, the essays here put epistemic virtues to work.

1
Knowledge, Testimony, and Action

John Greco

Recently I have defended a virtue-theoretic account of knowledge and a framework for the epistemology of testimony.¹ Both are designed to accommodate and exploit the intimate relations between knowledge and action. In this chapter, I wed the account and the framework together. In doing so, I continue to exploit the knowledge-action relation. In particular, I continue to rely on two important ideas in recent epistemology: that knowledge is (something like) a norm for practical reasoning, and that the concept of knowledge serves to govern the flow of actionable information.

The first section introduces the virtue-theoretic account and the second section introduces the framework for the epistemology of testimony. The third section combines the two and defends the general picture that results. The final section uses the new framework to address several issues in the epistemology of testimony.

A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Knowledge

A promising approach in epistemology understands knowledge as a kind of successful virtuous agency; that is, in cases of knowledge, S is successful in getting at the truth because S has formed her belief in a virtuous manner.² Here we employ a distinction between virtuous agency that happens to be successful and success that is due to or attributable to virtuous agency. The idea is that knowledge embodies the latter. The present approach, then, understands knowledge to be an instance of a familiar normative kind: Knowledge is a kind of success from virtue (or success from ability, or success manifesting competence), as opposed to a mere lucky success, or a success that is otherwise not attributable to one’s own virtuous agency.³

The essential distinction is familiar outside epistemology. In moral theory, we find cases where S acts morally and a good outcome results, but the good outcome is not sufficiently attributable to S’s virtuous agency so as to gain S credit for the good result. Rather, the good result is put down to good luck, or perhaps someone else’s moral agency. In legal theory, we find cases where S acted badly and a bad outcome results, but the bad outcome is not sufficiently attributable to S’s vicious (or merely negligent) agency so as to make S liable for the bad result. Inside epistemology, this kind of disconnect between agency and result is manifested in Gettier problems. Thus consider this familiar case from the literature:

Office Worker. Jones believes that someone in the office owns a Ford, basing his belief on extensive evidence that his coworker, Nogot, owns a Ford. But Jones’s evidence about Nogot is misleading—Nogot owns no Ford. However, another coworker in the office, Havit, does own a Ford, although Jones has no evidence for this.⁴

In this standard case, Jones’s belief is true (someone in the office does own a Ford), and it is formed in a virtuous manner (Jones reasons well on his available evidence). But Jones does not have a true belief because he has formed his belief in a virtuous manner. Rather, Jones’s true belief can be put down to coincidence.

Clearly enough, our promising approach depends heavily on a distinction between (a) success with virtuous agency, and (b) success that is attributable to virtuous agency. In Sosa’s terminology, we are leaning on a distinction between (a) agency that is successful and competent, and (b) agency that is successful because competent. What does that distinction amount to? How are we to understand it?

One idea is that, in cases of knowledge, S’s virtuous agency has explanatory salience; that is, S’s virtuous agency is important in an explanation why S has a true belief, rather than a false belief or no belief at all. More generally, a good result is attributable to S’s virtuous agency just in case S’s virtuous agency is salient in an explanation of the good result. More generally still, a result (good or bad) is attributable to S’s agency (virtuous or vicious, competent or incompetent) just in case S’s agency is salient in an explanation of the result.

But now, what makes S’s agency salient in an explanation of a result? The answer I propose is that S’s agency must be involved ‘in the right way,’ where ‘in the right way’ refers us to relevant interests and purposes. To illustrate the idea, consider a case in which an athletic success is attributable to the skillful play of an athlete. For example, a soccer player skillfully puts the ball in the net by kicking it outside the reach of the goalkeeper. Contrast this with a case in which the ball makes it into the net, but only due to gross incompetence on the part of the goalkeeper. For example, we can imagine that the ball is kicked feebly and directly at the goalkeeper, but that he allows it to trickle between his legs. Our ‘good’ case can be contrasted with others as well. For example, suppose that the ball is kicked skillfully, but one’s teammate is out of position and is therefore struck by what would have been a perfect shot. Bad luck! But wait—the ball takes a lucky bounce off the hapless teammate, and into the net. Good luck!

Now here is the point: In the good case, where the goal is attributable to the skillful play of the athlete, the athlete’s agency is involved in the right way. In the bad cases, where the success is not attributable to skillful agency, skillful agency is either not involved at all, or is involved but not in the right way. How are we to understand the all-important notion of ‘in the right way’ here? The suggestion is that this refers us to relevant interests and purposes. In the present cases, ‘in the right way’ means ‘in a way that would regularly serve soccer-playing purposes.’

That illustrates the main idea. To apply it to the epistemic arena, we have to identify the relevant interests and purposes involved in making (and withholding) knowledge attributions. Here is where we first invoke the intimate relation between knowledge and action. In the recent literature, this intimate relation is conceived in two major ways. First, a number of authors have argued that knowledge is ‘the norm’ of practical reasoning and action.⁵ The idea, roughly, is that only knowledge should figure into our practical reasoning. Put differently: We should act on what we know, and only on what we know. The ‘knowledge norm’ is suggested by ordinary practices of criticizing and defending each other’s actions. Thus we easily criticize actions with “You knew that…” and “You didn’t know that.…” There has been quite a lot of discussion over how the knowledge norm should be understood, and about whether any version of the norm is valid. But few would disagree that there is a close relation between knowledge and the requirements on action—that knowledge is ‘something like’ a norm for action and practical reasoning.

A second way of conceiving the knowledge-action relation is more indirect. Thus a number of authors have defended the idea that the concept of knowledge and/or knowledge language serves a special purpose vis-à-vis action. The most prominent among these is Edward Craig in his Knowledge and the State of Nature. There, Craig argues that the concept of knowledge serves to flag reliable information and reliable sources of information (Craig 1990, 11–17). More precisely, Craig says that the concept of knowledge functions so as to flag good informants. The idea is that human beings are highly dependent on information for the purposes of action, and we are highly dependent on each other for getting it. The concept of knowledge, Craig argues, grew up in the context of these dependencies. The concept is designed, in effect, to serve our needs for information sharing.

Craig has much more to say in his rich and provocative discussion, regarding both the proper methodology of epistemology and the contours of our concept of knowledge. But the information-sharing idea is all we need take away for present purposes. That is, Craig’s idea that the concept of knowledge serves interests and purposes around information sharing, together with the related idea that knowledge governs practical reasoning and action, are sufficient to apply our virtue-theoretic account of credit attribution to the epistemic arena. The ‘interests and purposes’ relevant to knowledge attribution are those associated with information sharing, practical reasoning, and action.

Accordingly, we get the following account of knowledge:

S knows that p iff (1) S’s believing that p is produced by an exercise of intellectual virtue, and (2) S’s belief being so produced contributes in the right way to S’s having a true belief, that is, contributes in a way that would regularly serve relevant informational needs.

The forgoing account is itself a kind of ‘framework,’ in that it may be elaborated in various ways. For one, it is consistent with both contextualism and invariantism regarding the semantics of knowledge attributions. To see this, consider that both the contextualist and the invariantist can agree to the following:

An assertion “S knows that p” is true relative to a conversational context iff (1) S’s believing that p is produced by an exercise of intellectual virtue, and (2) S’s belief being so produced contributes to S’s having a true belief in a way that would regularly serve relevant informational needs.

Whether we adopt contextualism or invariantism depends on whose informational needs we think are relevant here: (a) those of the subject (the knower), (b) those of the attributor (the person making the knowledge attribution), (c) those of the actor(s) (the person or persons whose practical tasks are at issue), or (d) those of some broader community. We get a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions if what counts as ‘relevant informational needs’ varies across attributor contexts. We get an invariantist semantics if what counts as ‘relevant informational needs’ does not vary across attributor contexts.⁶

A Framework for the Epistemology of Testimony

The first section presented a virtue-theoretic account of knowledge in general. In this section, I present a framework for understanding testimonial knowledge. The framework I defend here is motivated by a dilemma that arises in the epistemology of testimony. That dilemma, in turn, is inspired by a consideration of cases. The problem is this: Many cases of testimonial knowledge seem to put significant evidential burdens on the hearer. It seems that the hearer knows only because she has adequate reasons for thinking that the speaker is a reliable informant on the point in question. But other cases of testimonial exchange seem to place no such burden on the speaker: It seems that the hearer knows straightaway, even in the absence of evidence for the speaker’s reliability. The range of cases suggests that a unified account of testimonial knowledge is unavailable.

First we look at some cases that illustrate the problem. Then we articulate the dilemma more carefully.

Some Cases

• Case 1. A seasoned investigator questions a potentially uncooperative witness. The investigator employs skills learned and honed over a career to discern what is and is not believable in what the witness asserts.
• Case 2. A job applicant tells a potential employer that he has no criminal record.
• Case 3. A visitor to an unfamiliar city asks directions from a stranger. (For example, where is the train station?)
• Case 4. You ask your friend whether he intends to come to your party, and he says that yes, he does.
• Case 5. A third-grade teacher tells his student that France is in Europe.
• Case 6. A mother tells her small child that there is milk in the refrigerator.

Again, there seems to be an important variation...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1 Knowledge, Testimony, and Action
• 2 Deficient Testimonial Knowledge
• 3 Responsibility and Others’ Beliefs
• 4 Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from Disagreement
• 5 The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue
• 6 Epistemic Value and Virtues
• 7 Animal Versus Reflective Orders of Epistemic Competence
• 8 Curiosity and the Response-Dependent Special Value of Understanding
• 9 Freedom of Mind, Self-Trust, and the Possession of Virtues
• 10 Knowledge, Abilities, and ‘Because’ Clauses: A Critical Appraisal of Virtue-Theoretic Analyses of Knowledge
• 11 Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence
• 12 Knowledge—Safe or Virtuous?
• 13 Knowledge, Safety, and Practical Reasoning
• Contributors
• Index