Epistemology

Indian Philosophy

Roy W. Perrett

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135703011
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First Published in 2001. The five volumes of this series collect together some of the most significant modern contributions to the study of Indian philosophy. Volume 1: Epistemology is concerned with the nature and scope of Indian pramana theory, i.e. that part of Indian philosophy concerned with the nature and sources of knowledge. Indian philosophers developed a causal theory of knowledge and acknowledged the existence of a number of valid ways of knowing, including perception, inference and testimony. The Indian pramana theorists thus discussed many issues that have also occupied Western epistemologists, often offering importantly different perspectives on these matters. They also sometimes addressed various interesting questions about knowledge that are unfamiliar to Western epistemologists. The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of epistemological topics like the means of knowledge, realism and anti-realism, truth, knowledge of knowledge, illusion and perceptual error, knowability, testimony, scepticism and doubt.

INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE of this introductory study is to clarify the concept of truth in Indian philosophy, especially in the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya systems, and also to attempt a critical appraisal of the prāmāṇya theories. In both these respects the task before us is bewildering. Not much attention has been paid by scholars to a precise explication of the concept of truth in Indian philosophy. If we could throw some light on this and clarify the concepts, we could also to some extent clarify the amazingly complicated tangle of discussions that have grown up throughout the ages around the apparently simple question: Is prāmāṇya svataḥ or parataḥ? This is one of those questions to which every school worth the name came forward with an official answer. Arguments and counter-arguments were produced in never-ending stream. What we propose to do with regard to this vast mass of material at our disposal is in the first place to clarify the nature of the issue round which the theories centre, and then to examine the nature of the arguments that have been advanced by the different schools in support of their contentions. Since the primary purpose of this study is clarification of concepts, no attempt will be made here to take sides. But it is quite possible that certain conclusions are likely to emerge which would reflect our attitude towards this entire problem. It is needless to say that Gaṇgeśa's great contribution to the problem would be brought to the foreground wherever possible. To anticipate a general conclusion that is likely to emerge, it is very much plausible that the views of the rival schools are not really mutually incompatible as they at the first sight certainly appear to be. They may even be regarded in the long run as supplementing each other. The apparent incompatibility between these views then may partly be due to the fact that though it would seem they were giving different answers to the same questions, they were not always unanimous in their formulation of the problems, so that sometimes they were really answering very different questions.

I. PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS

Certain fairly well known distinctions may be mentioned at the very beginning.

1. Two senses of ‘prāmāṇya’: The word ‘prāmāṇya’ may mean either the property of being instrumental in bringing about true knowledge (pramākaraṇatva), or simply the truth of a knowledge (pramātva). In the former sense, prāmāṇya belongs to the various instrumental causes of true knowledge. In the latter sense, it characterizes a knowledge itself, if that knowledge is true. Of these two senses the second one is logically prior inasmuch as the very idea of being an instrumental cause of true knowledge cannot be understood without understanding what is meant by true knowledge and in effect without understanding what is meant by truth. The theories of prāmāṇya—the well known svataḥ and parataḥ theories—are concerned with prāmāṇya in the second sense, i.e. with the truth of a knowledge.¹

2. Two kinds of pramātva: The Vedāntins who form a major group of participants in the controversy prefer to distinguish between two kinds of truth²: metaphysical truth (tāttvika prāmāṇya) and empirical truth (vyāvahārika prāmāṇya). A knowledge is metaphysically true if it can never be falsified at any time, past, present or future. Metaphysical truth then consists in traikālika abādhitatva. The truth which the Advaitins take to be svataḥ (in the sense or senses to be explained below) is not this metaphysical truth, but empirical truth³, whose nature has yet to IDQ made precise. It is this empirical truth which besides is, according to the Mimainsaka, the cause of unwavering activity (niṣkampa pravṛtti). This shows that although the Advaita metaphysics has the conception of an eternal truth, this does not lead the Advaitin to the utter scepticism of regarding all other knowledge falling short of the knowledge of Brahman as false. The svataḥ and the parataḥ theories are concerned with the empirical truth of—it is needless to add—the knowledge of finite human beings, and are not concerned with any other more perfect kind of knowledge, be it knowledge belonging to a God or be it the knowledge of Brahman.

3. The theory of prāmāṇya and the theory of prakāśa: The theory of prāmāṇya should be distinguished from a connected but quite different theory, namely, the theory of prakāśa. The latter is concerned with the apprehension not of truth but of the knowledge itself whose truth or falsity may at any time be under consideration. The prāmāṇya theory asks, how does a knowledge become true, and how is its truth ascertained? The theory of prakāśa, on the other hand, asks the question, how is the knowledge itself known? How do I know that I know? One way of bringing home the fact that they are two distinct theories is to look into the various ways in which the different views about prāmāṇya have been combined with the different views about prakāśa. Bearing in mind that in each case we have a svataḥ theory and a parataḥ theory we may expect that there should be four different combinations. This expectation in fact stands confirmed. The four combinations are:

i. the theory of svataḥprakāśa combined with the theory of svataḥprāmāṇya (upheld by Advaita and Prābhābara Mīmāṃsā);

ii. the theory of parataḥprakāśa combined with the theory of svataḥprāmāṇya (upheld by the Miśra and the Bhāṭṭa schools of Mīmāṃsā);

iii. the theory of svataḥprakāśa combined with the theory of parataḥprāmāṇya (upheld by the Bauddhas); and

iv. the theory of parataḥprakāśa combined with the theory of parataḥprāmāṇya (upheld by the Nyāya school).

The theory of prakāśa is in fact logically prior to the theory of prāmāṇya. The question about the apprehension of a knowledge is logically prior to, and independent of, the question about the origin and the apprehension of the truth of that knowledge. For unless the knowledge itself is known, no question can even be raised about its truth. The theory of prakāśa is also wider in scope inasmuch as it pertains to all states of consciousness and not merely to knowledge.

4. ‘Svataḥ’ and ‘parataḥ’: The Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā theory is known as the theory that truth is svataḥ whereas falsity is parataḥ. As opposed to this we have the Nyāya theory that both truth and falsity are parataḥ. The key terms in this controversy are ‘svataḥ’ and ‘parataḥ’, literally meaning ‘from within’ and ‘from without’ respectively. We would sometimes use the English words ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ more for reasons of convenience than for their accuracy in rendering the two Sanskrit terms.

When the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta theory holds that truth is intrinsic to knowledge it means either or both of two things. It may mean on the one hand that the originating conditions of the truth of knowledge are precisely the same as the originating conditions of the knowledge itself. On the other hand, the theory also holds that the knowledge and its truth are apprehended together. Thus, ‘intrinsic’ means both ‘intrinsic with regard to origin’ and ‘intrinsic with regard to apprehension’, both utpattitaḥ and jñaptitaḥ.

Similarly, when the Nyāya holds that truth is extrinsic to knowledge, it means both of two things. On the one hand it holds that the generating conditions of the truth of a knowledge are more than the generating conditions of the knowledge itself. It also holds that the apprehension of a knowledge does not always amount to the apprehension of its truth. Thus ‘extrinsic’ means both ‘extrinsic with regard to origin’ and ‘extrinsic with regard to apprehension’, utpattitaḥ and jñaptitaḥ.

With regard to origin, it should be borne in mind that the Nyāya does not hold that the truth of a knowledge is produced after the knowledge itself has come into being. The Nyāya rather holds (or, at least the majority of the Naiyāyikas do) that though a knowledge and its truth are produced together, their generating conditions are yet not quite the same, nor are they apprehended as a rule together.

Pārthasārathi Miśra in his Nyāyaratnamālā⁴ mentions two meanings of the word ‘svataḥ’ which may mean either ‘what is related to oneself’ or simply ‘from oneself’. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his Dīdhiti on Gaṅgeśa's Prāmāṇyavada also distinguishes between two meanings of ‘svataḥ: ‘from oneself’ (svasmāt) and ‘from what is one's own’ (svakīyāt).⁵ It seems to me that the distinction does not introduce anything new and so may be overlooked for our purpose.

It goes to Gaṅgeśa's credit to have shown that the words ‘sva’ and ‘para’ are relative terms, so that what is sva in one context may be regarded as para in another. Gaṅgeśa therefore (see para 35 of Gaṅgeśa's text) formulates his thesis independent of these terms though that means a more circuitous mode of speech.

II. DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE svataḥprāmāṇya THEORY

Although they all agree that truth of a knowledge originates precisely from those causal conditions which also give rise to the knowledge, the different advocates of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory nevertheless differ amongst themselves as to the nature of the apprehension of truth. Even with regard to this latter question they all no doubt agree that a knowledge is as a rule apprehended together with its truth.⁶ They differ, however, in the first place, with regard to the nature of knowledge and, secondly, as to the nature of our apprehension of a knowledge. Accordingly, we might distinguish between four different forms of the theory: the Prābhākara, the Vedānta, the Bhāṭṭa and the Miśra.

(a) The Prābhākara theory: The Prābhākara stands alone in thinking that there is no positive error. Strictly speaking, the problem of truth and error is simply meaningless on his theory, for there is no cognitive error. Is then the ordinary usage about truth and error without any significance? The Prābhākara would say that the only point about this distinction lies in the practical side of knowledge. When we say a knowledge is false we really mean—the Prābhākara seems to be saying—that it leads to unsuccessful behaviour?⁷ On the cognitive side all knowledge is true. Even the so called false knowledge is, for every knowledge has its object which it manifests.⁸ Bearing this in mind, we might say that the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā distinguish...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Indian Philosophy
• Series Contents
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Series Preface
• Series Introduction
• Volume Introduction
• A Fragment of the Indian Philosophical Tradition - Theory of Pramāṇa
• Nāgārjuna as Anti-Realist
• Introduction to Gaṅge'sa's Theory of Truth
• Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth
• Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?
• Knowing That One Knows
• The Indian Concepts of Knowledge and Self
• Padmapāda's Illusion Argument
• Dreams and Reality: The Śaṅkarite Critique of Vijñānavāda
• Dreams and the Coherence of Experience: An Anti-Idealist Critique from Classical Indian Philosophy
• Astitva Jñeyatva Abhidheyatva
• The Nyāya on Existence, Knowability and Nameability
• Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable?
• On Knowing by Being Told
• The Nyāya Theory of Doubt
• Acknowledgments