Beyond Reductionism

A Passion for Interdisciplinarity

Katharine Farrell, Tommaso Luzzati, Sybille van den Hove

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136281709
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

This is a book about the work of scientists in the era of the Anthropocene: where human beings appear to have become a driving force in the evolution of the planet. It is a diverse collection of empirical, methodological and theoretical chapters concerned with the practice of interdisciplinary social-ecological systems research. The aim of the contributors is to give the reader an appreciation for the range and complexity of the challenges faced by researchers, research institutions and wider communities trying to make sense of the causes and consequences of the this new era of global environmental change.

The tragedy of the Anthropocene, of the large scale anthropogenic habitat destruction and planet-wide impacts of anthropogenic climate change, is not that science has failed humanity but rather that it has served humanity all too well, making possible in just a few hundred years volumes and scales of human activity far exceeding anything ever seen before. Coming to terms with that success was the aim of the 1969 Alpbach Symposium, from which this book draws its name, where contributors including Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Bertalanffy, asked themselves: what theory, practices and standards are required to move beyond reductionism? Like those from 1969, the answers presented in this collection are hugely diverse, ranging from PhD students concerned with research methods and institutional obstacles, to mid-career scholars presenting their innovative 'beyond-reductionism' research methods, to emeritus professors looking back over what has been achieved in the past 30 years and suggesting where things might go from here.

All the contributors begin from the premise that the challenges of the Anthropocene can only be successfully met if interdisciplinary research effectively brings together social and natural sciences, the humanities, stakeholders and decision makers. They conclude, in unison, that both the institutional and the methodological foundations needed to do this work are still sorely lacking. While this may seem a dismal position, the book is full of success stories, such as: the integrative approach of MuSIASEM (Multi-Scale Integrative Assessment of Social-Ecological Metabolism) developed by Mario Giampietro's group in Barcelona, Spain; the alternative perspectives of what Ariel Salleh calls the 'meta-industrial' discourse in Ecofeminism; or the innovative trans-departmental status of the Stockholm Resilience Centre in Sweden. Putting both the theoretical and methodological challenges of moving beyond reductionism on the table for discussion, this text aims to help a growing community of passionate thinkers and actors better understand themselves and their work.

Preface 1

Beyond the argument culture

Robert Costanza

We are experiencing today an explosion of new scientific information about the environment and humanity’s past, present and future relationships to it (Diamond 2005; Costanza et al. 2007). And yet the linkages between science and environmental policy continue to be poor. What are the root causes of this lack of connection on an issue that is so central to humanity’s current and future health, and how can we rectify the problem?

One of the root causes is that we live today in an ‘argument culture’ (Tannen 1998) in which even the most complex problems are cast as polar opposites. Most discussion is cast as a debate between two extremes in which one side is presumed to be right while the other is wrong. The media, the law, politics and especially academia are all caught up in this argument culture, and its influence and control over our lives is increasing. For example, the current structure of academic disciplines highly reinforces the argument culture. There is an almost obsessive desire in academia to stake out intellectual turf and defend it against outsiders, because that is the kind of behaviour that is most highly rewarded. As Tannen notes:

Throughout our educational system the most pervasive inheritance is the conviction that issues have two sides, that knowledge is best gained through debate, that ideas should be presented orally to an audience that does its best to poke holes and find weaknesses, and that to get recognition, one has to ‘stake out a position’ in opposition to another.

(1998: 261)

The argument culture encourages the defining and protecting of personal and disciplinary territories on the intellectual landscape. Sharp boundaries between disciplines, unique languages and cultures within disciplines, and lack of any overarching view makes problems that cross disciplinary boundaries (including most environmental problems) very difficult, if not impossible, for traditional academics (both faculty and students) to deal with. There are also large gaps in the intellectual landscape that are not covered by any discipline.

The situation is analogous in the media, politics, law and other areas that influence science and environmental policy. In the media, conflict and controversy sell, while consensus does not. The law is at its core an adversarial system and the modern, confrontational courtroom is taken as a model for how to resolve all issues. Politics is becoming more fractious and polarized by the day.

The problem is that, while there is nothing inherently wrong with debate and direct confrontation on some issues, it does not work for all issues. Certainly the complex environmental issues that we face today require a more multifaceted, complex approach – one that encourages real dialogue and does not cast every discussion as a zero-sum, win–lose, either–or dichotomy (Costanza et al. 2000).

The argument culture is so pervasive in the world today that it is difficult to break from its grasp. Even within the ecological economics community, some continue to argue that what we should be doing is differentiating ourselves from other disciplines. For example, some argue that there is ‘too much of this discipline’ or ‘too much of that conventional approach’ appearing in the journal. They imply that if an article overlaps substantially with some existing discipline, it cannot also be ecological economics. This only reinforces the argument culture and misses what truly differentiates ecological economics – that it is a transdiscipline.

Tannen concludes her book with a summary of what’s fundamentally wrong with the argument culture. She notes:

What’s wrong is that it obscures the complexity of research. Fitting ideas into a particular camp requires you to oversimplify them. Again, disinformation and distortion can result. Less knowledge is gained, not more. And time spent attacking an opponent or defending against attacks is not spent doing something else – like original research.

(1998: 289)

She goes on to challenge us to find ways to go beyond the argument culture: ‘It will take creativity to find ways to blunt the most dangerous blades of the argument culture. It’s a challenge we must undertake, because our public and private lives are at stake’ (ibid.: 290).

The argument culture has also been described (in more academic terms) by Jürgen Habermas (1979, 1996) as the ‘culture of technical control’. According to Habermas, information in the modern world is compartmentalized and controlled by various technical elites who do not communicate with each other. The result is that experts from various fields often hold contradictory opinions and the public cannot resolve these conflicts. The public therefore develops inconsistent and volatile opinions and policies. One implication of this compartmentalization is that each group involved in science and environmental policy (different disciplines, different policy communities, different affected stake-holder groups) has in the past determined which problems are important without adequate reference to the other groups and to society’s basic needs. For example, scientists determine their research priorities too often with reference only to their own discipline (or subdiscipline), which frequently covers only one time and space scale and one piece of the system. Policy-makers and implementers see only their own short-term needs for information of a particular kind in order to make a specific decision, without adequate reference to the broader scientific and policy enterprise and longer-term policy questions. The result is a lack of effective communication of scientific work, both across scientific disciplines and between science and policy. Disciplinary isolation has hindered understanding of the interconnections between different parts of the environment and between the environment and human systems.

Effectively linking science and environmental policy also faces several other difficulties, including:

• the inherent complexity of environmental systems and the inherent uncertainties in understanding and modelling their behaviour and their impacts;
• the inadequacy of baseline data coupled with the difficulty in obtaining and interpreting reliable observations of the environment’s behaviour and in synthesizing data and information into an effective knowledge base;
• the uncertainties in the way in which humans affect the environment and the inherent uncertainties in understanding human responses to environmental change.

Major problems also arise because of the multiplicity of scales at which different decision-makers have to operate, from the global to the regional, national, state, local, individual business and to the individual human being. The environmental significance of change often varies enormously between these scales. Regulatory frameworks also vary with scale and context. Thus, state, national and international regulations and agreements can often be in conflict, hindering rational decision-making.

Effective environmental policy-making demands that we synthesize understanding between the natural and social sciences. For example, understanding of fundamental concepts such as ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘value’ has to be integrated with an understanding of changing societal values. But integrated work between these groups is often missing, and few research institutions have mechanisms to encourage such collaborations.

Ecological economics, as described in this collection, is an ongoing effort to get beyond the argument culture and move towards real, sustainable solutions to integrated environmental and social issues. These solutions will come from building a shared transdisciplinary understanding of complex living systems at all scales, from cells to the entire planet. The solutions will come from building an extended peer community that can effectively communicate and overcome the ‘culture of technical control’. The solutions will come only with a concerted and sustained effort directed towards a shared goal: creating a sustainable and desirable future.

References

Costanza, R., H. Daly, C. Folke, P. Hawken, C.S. Holling, A.J. McMichael, D. Pimentel and D. Rapport. 2000. ‘Managing our environmental portfolio.’ BioScience 50(2): 149–155.

Costanza, R., L. Graumlich, W. Steffen, C. Crumley, J. Dearing, K. Hibbard, R. Leemans, C. Redman and D. Schimel. 2007. ‘Sustainability or collapse: what can we learn from integrating the history of humans and the rest of nature?’ Ambio 36(7): 522–552.

Diamond, J. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking.

Habermas, J. 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society. Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tannen, D. 1998. The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue. New York: Random House.

Preface 2

Embracing fewer answers

Richard Norgaard

The transdiscipline of ecological economics came of age two decades ago, at the turn from the 1980s into the 1990s, when the world was seeking answers to two questions: how to sustain ecological systems and how to create just societies. While the global economy is in free fall as I write, in early 2009, continuing human population growth, rampant materialism and market expansion have further exacerbated ecosystem decay and social injustice during the transdiscipline’s short history. The chaos of climate change has arrived sooner than expected. Decisions must be made to reduce and reverse the accumulation of greenhouse gases, not because we have clear scientific answers, or even rough predictions as to how the future will unfold if we do not act, but because of the immensity of the uncertainty that is overtaking nature and humanity.

Nearly a century and a half ago, a keen observer of history described this dilemma between the slow pace at which science provides answers and the pressing need for public decisions. For the two closing paragraphs of chapter 1 of Man and Nature, George Perkins Marsh wrote:

But we are, even now, breaking up the floor and wainscoting and doors and window frames of our dwelling, for fuel to warm our bodies and seethe our pottage, and the world cannot afford to wait till the slow and sure progress of exact science has taught it a better economy. Many practical lessons have been learned by the common observation of unschooled men; and the teachings of simple experience, on topics where natural philosophy has scarcely yet spoken, are not to be despised.

In these humble pages, which do not in the least aspire to rank among scientific expositions of the laws of nature, I shall attempt to give the most important practical conclusions suggested by the history of man’s efforts to replenish the earth and subdue it; and I shall aim to support those conclusions by such facts and illustrations only, as address themselves to the understanding of every intelligent reader, and as are to be found recorded in works capable of profitable perusal, or at least consultation, by persons who have not enjoyed a special scientific education.

(1965 [1864]: 52)

Ecological economists are well aware that the central idea of the European Enlightenment – the idea that people could make superior, indeed ever better, decisions by opening their minds to reason and facts, leading (ever more so over time) to their material progress and overall betterment – for all that it has brought into the world, has not turned out nearly so well as was expected. In retrospect, the reasons are clear. Reductionist science produced partially correct answers that proved extremely powerful, giving humankind the ability to deflect and direct the forces of nature in entirely new ways – for example, with the internal combustion engine, electricity and industrial chemical manufacture – but these partial answers never cohered into an understanding of the whole. They were, in effect, partly correct but wholly wrong.

This purely epistemological definition of the problem of reductionism is, however, terribly incomplete. The broader problem is that a whole global economic system, complete with a supporting governance system, co-evolved around these partly correct but wholly wrong answers, and mainly around those that could be captured in the invention of new technologies, economically produced and exchanged in markets. Science and its supporting institutions also co-evolved around this ‘thinking only in parts’ economy, now somehow being driven also from the outside by the reductive forces of its own incomplete understanding. Indeed, had our understanding of the Industrial Revolution been complete, it is very difficult to imagine how human history might have unfolded, what sort of a global economy and complementary global governance we would now have. In the past two centuries we have blindly embraced far too many partly correct but wholly wrong answers, and now we live in a world of material things and technological processes, with a global economy and governance institutions that encourage us towards ever tighter embrace of the partly correct. Meanwhile, with our narrow focus on technological solutions and human aspirations, we continue to stab our now badly injured antagonist, nature, again and again, creating in the process new and deeper problems, for which we duly prepare new partly correct but wholly wrong answers. Nor have we created the social utopia that the thinkers of the European Enlightenment once anticipated, not even an ephemeral one, in the process.

As this book well attests, ecological economists are somewhat humbled by the difficulties of finding a common method across ecology and economics, of appropriately matching different combinations of methods to particular socio-ecological situations and institutional contexts, or imagining the social conditions under which the complementary and contradictory insights of multiple methods might be constructively used. Even as the earth’s social-ecological systems are crashing down around us, our academic communities, the global economy and global governance remain trapped in the hopes of the Enlightenment, in the belief that the search for and embracing of better answers, based in ever higher reasoning and superior evidence, will eventually lead humanity out of misery and into a life of freedom and plenty. But these hopes brought us to the disaster that many ecological economists now feel we were somehow meant to solve.

George Perkins Marsh was right, but now the practical lessons learned by the common observation of unschooled men, and the teachings of simple experience, are also highly compartmentalized and differentiated through specializations intended to serve the global market. Still, many people may well understand that the rapid change we are now experiencing stems from our ignorance of the larger system that we are within, yet also changing. Will the community of scientists, perhaps with ecological economists in the lead, have the courage to admit that we never understood the whole social-ecological system of the planet, or even any of the smaller but also complex local social-ecological systems? Will we have the courage to admit that the current level of human activity is driving systemic change so fast that even if we could understand the whole, even for a short time, we would never be able to monitor emergent phenomena and shift our understanding fast enough to keep track of our impacts?

Enlightenment hopes facilitated both the process of social-ecological change and the ability of scientists to better see the dangers of change. Scientists in the nineteenth century decried the devastation of nature that accompanied the first stages of the Industrial Revolution, and they were instrumental in the social movements that led to the preservation of parklands, the creation of wildlife preserves, and the establishment of land conservation principles and progressive practices of resource management. These decisions were made with rudimentary ecological knowl...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of contributors
• Preface 1: Beyond the argument culture
• Preface 2: Embracing fewer answers
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• PART I The idea of ‘ecological economics’: Interdisciplinarity in theory, method and practice
• PART II Life after reductionism: Exemplary ecological economics beyond reductionism, in practice
• PART III Into the woods: Mapping the challenges and the possibilities for continuing the development of methods that extend beyond reductionism
• Index