Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East Asia

Rajat Ganguly

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136311888
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

This book uses empirical evidence from various case studies to examine the relationship between territorial and regional autonomy, the nation-state and ethnic conflict resolution in South and South-East Asia.

The concept of territorial or regional autonomy holds centre stage in the literature on ethnic conflict settlement because it is supposed to be able to reconcile two paradoxical objectives: the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, and the satisfaction of ethnic minorities' right to national self-determination. Critics argue, however, that autonomy may not be the panacea for ethnic conflict in all cases.

The contributing authors begin with the concept of territorial or regional autonomy and subject it to a rigorous empirical analysis, which provides reliable evidence regarding the suitability of the autonomy solution to intractable ethnic conflicts. Drawing upon case studies from Kashmir, Assam, Sri Lanka, Aceh, Mindanao and Southern Thailand, this edited volume argues that autonomy arrangements may at best work to resolve only a handful of separatist ethnic conflicts in South and South-East Asia.

This book will be of much interest to students of South and South-East Asia, Asian security, ethnic conflict, peace studies and IR in general.

1 Prospects for autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir

D. Suba Chandran¹
Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India

Introduction

Jammu and Kashmir as it existed before the partition of India is now broadly divided into two parts – administered by India and Pakistan, divided by a Line of Control (LoC). The territory under Pakistan’s control – what India calls Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) – can be largely divided into two administrative parts – Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the Northern Areas. With Muzaffarabad as its headquarters, the AJK has a separate administrative setup. Independent and international observers have been highly critical of how autonomous the AJK is.² The Northern Areas, for all practical purposes, are a colony of Pakistan, with no administrative setup or fundamental rights.³

On the Indian side, what is generally referred to as J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) is comprised of three distinct regions – Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh – with different people, perspectives and expectations relating to autonomy and freedom. While the Kashmir region – which is actually the Kashmir Valley – is almost monolithic, with the majority of the population being Sunni Muslims, speaking the Kashmiri language, the other two regions can be further classified into sub-regions.

Ladakh can be classified into two sub-regions – Leh and Kargil. The former has a predominantly Budhist population, who speak Bolti; Kargil has a predominantly Shia Muslim population. Both the Shia Muslims and the Buddhists of Leh and Kargil have more in common with the Baltistan and Gilgit regions of the Northern Areas, than the rest of J&k. Historically, they are a part of the much-famed South Silk Route.

The Jammu region can be divided into three sub-regions – the Hindu-majority districts from Lakhanpur to Jammu; the Muslim-majority districts of Rajouri and Poonch; and the Muslim-majority districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban. Unlike the Muslims of the Kashmir Valley, the Muslims of Rajouri and Poonch district speak Pahri and have much in common with the AJK across the LoC. Besides, the Muslims are divided into Gujjars and Pahris. In the Doda region, though the majority are Sunni Muslims, they don’t speak Kashmiri; they speak a local Pahri dialect.

Any discussion on autonomy or azadi should take into account the above differences, for they define the perceptions and demands of these people.

India's policies and strategies: a critique

India’s policies towards Kashmir have been ad hoc and reactive, especially in the last fifteen years. There has been no consistent political approach towards Kashmir, either at the New Delhi–Srinagar level or at the New Delhi–Islamabad level. At the internal level, India failed to pursue a political approach to win over the Kashmiris politically and psychologically, to integrate them emotionally into the Indian mainstream. Externally, its political engagement with Pakistan has remained ad hoc.

Second, India has continually failed to appreciate the differences between the ‘problem of Kashmir’ and the ‘problem in Kashmir’. The ‘problem of Kashmir’ revolves primarily around India’s policies vis-à-vis Pakistan, along with other related issues to do with how the country dealt with the problem at international levels including the UN. The ‘problem in Kashmir’ revolves around a host of internal issues at the New Delhi–Sringar and Srinagar– Jammu-Leh levels, on various issues relating to governance, autonomy, violence, and so on. While Pakistan has in recent years focused more on the problem of Kashmir, the Indian government is yet to take serious long-term measures, a fact which is discussed subsequently in this chapter.

Third, India perceives the ‘problem in Kashmir’ mainly through the prism of militancy. As mentioned above, violence and militancy is only one of many problems. Even on perceiving violence and militancy, there has been no appreciation of the difference between the two. Every incident of violence is seen as a part of militancy, which is externally funded, stimulated and carried out. It is entirely plausible to consider a scenario of violence in Jammu and Kashmir with less or no militancy. Related to this problem has been the Indian government’s perception of peace; an absence of militant attacks is seen as indicating peace and political stability in Kashmir. The problems of governance are seen as an offshoot of militancy; hence it is believed that once militancy is brought under control, there will be better governance. Issues like corruption and bad governance are swept under the carpet of militancy. Counterinsurgency operations have assumed great significance, without appreciating that militancy is the product of political questions; once these political questions are resolved the militancy will die down. These political questions raised by the Kashmiris may be real or imaginary or both, but it would be wise for the Indian government to address them politically.

Fourth, the ‘political’ approach that successive governments in New Delhi believe they have pursued is narrowly based on organizing elections for the state legislative assembly and sustaining the elected state government. Elections, whether rigged or free, are seen as an ‘end’ in Jammu and Kashmir; the party or coalition that forms the government in Srinagar is expected to maintain the status quo, without making any demands on changing the nature of Union–State relations. In the 1980s and 1990s the Union government relied completely on the National Conference (NC) government led by Farooq Abdullah. Between 2002 and 2005, there was an emphasis on the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) government led by Mufti Mohammad Saeed. This was followed by the Congress government led by Ghulam Nabi Azad until his government collapsed leading to the 2008 elections. Now, the Congress, which heads the government in New Delhi, is the coalition partner with the NC. In the above periods, except for the appointments of five working groups and three Round Table Conferences, nothing much happened in New Delhi–J&K relations.

Fifth, the Indian government has been inward-looking and skeptical about opening Jammu and Kashmir to the outside world. It is against external mediation on Kashmir; it refused any international observing of problems relating to militancy and counter-militancy; and it has refused any international presence to observe its electoral process.

Sixth, there is no consensus at the national level on what might be India’s game plan in Jammu and Kashmir and how far it could go towards its final resolution. The existing Parliamentary Resolution embodies India’s maximalist position and not what is feasible or pragmatic. The Union government has been reluctant to create a consensus within and outside Parliament. There is a clear difference between the secular moderates and the extremist Hindu Right. Kashmir is not a topic of much debate in India’s southern and eastern states; hence in terms of intensity, there is a difference amongst the various regions. The majority of people in India are reconciled to living with a divided Kashmir, with major parts of it being occupied by Pakistan and China. More than 12,000 square kilometers of territory designated as “Azad Kashmir” and nearly 85,000 square kilometers known as “Northern Areas” are under Pakistan, while China controls nearly 16,500 square kilometers of Aksai Chin. The areas under Chinese control have little or no permanent population; around 25,000,000 live in the areas controlled by Pakistan.⁴ Except for a fringe minority, led by the Hindu Right,⁵ not many in India believe or expect their government to get back the lost territory. No doubt a Parliamentary resolution exists demanding the return of these territories,⁶ but not many believe the government wouldwage awar toget it back. One can conclude that the Government of India, in reality, is reconciled to the status quo.

Is the time ripe to take serious political measures?

Two issues need to be taken into consideration while looking at whether the problems of and in Kashmir are ripe to resolve. First, the political measures required should be taken at the right moment, when the situation is conducive to accepting them. Second, if the government fails to take such measures, once the situation reaches the ripe condition it would make them worse.⁷ It would then require extraordinary measures to make conditions ripe again. In retrospect, it appears that the “problem in Kashmir” was ripe to resolve during 1996–98. New Delhi’s failure to seize the initiative witnessed the conflict transforming into a different level since 1999. A series of happenings since 2004 – natural and man-made – have brought further changes and the situation looked positive and ripe as of January 2009.

The situation was clearly ripe to resolve the ‘problem in Kashmir’ during 1996–98 and also during 2002–8,but both the State and the Union governments failed to capitalize on these developments. The State government failed to ensure good governance, while the Union government lacked a consistent policy in terms of initiating a political dialogue with the people of Kashmir. During thefirst period, the Union government rejected the autonomy proposals unanimously passed by the J&K State legislature without even initiating a discussion at the national level. During 2002–8, it took numerous cosmetic measures, without making any major political commitment. The successes in cross-LoC interactions, which got much publicity, and the Indo-Pak peace process to a large extent, undermined a political process between New Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir.

Changes since 2002: ripe again?

The failure of the State and Union governments to seize the conditions created between 1996 and 1998 led to the ‘problem in Kashmir’ deteriorating, with the Kargil conflict making the situation much worse. A series of events since 2002 presented a new opportunity in Kashmir, hinting that the conflict is transforming further, this time on the positive side.⁸ This change needs to be understood so that the Union and state governments could prepare themselves for the positive transformation.

Identifying conflict transformation is essential, as this always carries the seeds of both positive and negative aspects. Failure to identify negative transformation would result in conflict degeneration. On the other hand, if positive transformation is not identified and appropriate measures not taken, conflict prolongation would occur.⁹ The following changes were significant:

A. The 2002 & 2008 elections: restoration of the credibility of the electoral process

The 2002 and 2008 elections are considered by many, even inside the Valley, as credible and inclusive. The election was seen by many independent analysts as a major and sincere step taken by the Union government to restore the democratic process inside Kashmir.

B. Changed perceptions at the international level

At the international level, the elections were seen as the right step. The international community today, despite recent statements made by officials belonging to the current American administration,including President Obama,understands the changed situation and expects India to make a positive contribution to peace in South Asia.During the Kargil conflict in 1999 and during the Indo-Pak military confrontation crisis of 2001–2, the international community had clearly emphasized that any military solution was unacceptable. Even after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008,the international community,led by the US, reiterated its opposition to any military option taken by either India or Pakistan.

C. The Indo-Pak peace process

The peace process between India and Pakistan, starting with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s April 2003 speech at Srinagar, seems to have understood the importance of Kashmir for any Indo-Pak rapprochement. A series of measures specific to Kashmir have been taken by both countries, which clearly signifies a new approach. This new process focused on Kashmir, though remaining slow, has been steady. Former Pakistani President General Musharraf for the first time made a bold decision for Pakistan when he made the clear announcement that he would no more insist on UN resolutions, which was seen as a major positive step by the Indian side.¹⁰

Musharraf also suggested regional referendums in J&K in October 2004.¹¹ After the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005, he spoke about the LoC becoming “irrelevant” and about self-rule. Some of these s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: is autonomy a solution or an obstacle to resolving ethno-national conflicts?
• 1 Prospects for autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir
• 2 The rise and decline of a separatist insurgency: contentious politics in Assam, India
• 3 Ethnic peacemaking in Sri Lanka: the politics of an autonomy solution
• 4 Ending the war in Aceh: leadership, patronage and autonomy in Yudhoyono's Indonesia
• 5 Mindanao, Southern Philippines: the pitfalls of working for peace in a time of political decay
• 6 When autonomy is not an option? Governing violence in Southern Thailand
• Conclusion: what does the empirical evidence tell us about the suitability of territorial autonomy in resolving ethno-national conflicts in South and South-East Asia?
• Index