1 Isocrates and Modern Public Relations
An Overview
âContemporary philosophy, especially with respect to the theory of knowledge, exhibits a growing awareness of the importance of models and paradigms in the history of thought.â
âMichael Cahn(1989)
âIf all writing about the past is partly an effort to understand the present, a confusing and contradictory present would seem to call more insistently for historical analysis and explanation. This is particularly true for the profession and academic discipline of public relations.â
âRon Pearson (1992)
â[Y]ou are eager for education, and I profess to educate; you are ripe for philosophy, and I direct students of philosophy.â
âIsocrates (To Demonicus)
Aesthetics. Analysis. Apologia. Asymmetry. Autonomy. Axiology. Chaos. Crisis. Critical. Criticism. Cyber-. Democracy. Demographics. Deontology. Dialectic. Dialogue. Dilemma. Dogma. Dynamics. Economy. Epistemology. Ethics. Ethnicity. Geodemographics. Grammar. Graphics. Harmony. Hegemony. Hierarchy. History. Idea. Ideology. Logic. Logistics. Macro/meso/micro. Mentor. Methodology. Music. Normative. Ontology. Orthodoxy. Paradigm. Paragraph. Pathos. Phenomena. Philanthropy. Philosophy. Photography. Policy. Politics. Practice. Practitioner. Pragmatism. Problem. Program. Pseudo-. Psyche. Psychographics. Psychology. Rhetoric. Schema. Strategy. Symbol. Symmetry. Synergy. System. Tactic. Technician. Technology. Teleology. Telephone. Theory. Thesis. Topoi. XenophobiaâŠ.
The term public relations undeniably finds its etymological roots in Latin, but, as the catalog above indicates, the language and heritage of much of the profession's theory and practice is Greekâand not simply the Greek of the agora, the marketplace. The lexicon of public relations employs the Greek of the philosophers and rhetoricians; the Greek of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; the Greek of the greatest of the classical Athenian rhetoricians: Isocrates. In Cicero's De Oratore, as the assembled Roman rhetoricians assess their Greek forebears, they praise Isocrates as the âfather of eloquenceâ (2:3) and âthe Master of all rhetoriciansâ (2:22).
In one sense, however, Isocrates might consider these accolades a provocation. Locked in battle with Plato regarding weighty matters such as the possibility of true knowledge and the role of public opinion, Isocrates maintained that he taught and practiced not rhetoricâa term with a definition as contested as that of public relationsâbut, rather, philosophy. Iso-crates, in fact, avoided using the word rhetoric1âand yet the gravitational pull of the seventy-plus Greek words that open this chapter still can lead us to a tantalizingly rich idea: A profession such as public relations, which has appropriated the language of a particular culture, might do well to consider the broader cultural offerings that infused those words with meaning.
Rhetoric is not the least of the language-related cultural offerings that we might ponder. Whatever rhetoric may beâwe will discuss that debate in a momentâit was, in the words of historian George Kennedy, â[o]ne of the principal interests of the Greeks ⊠[and] was basic to the educational system of Isocratesâ (1963, pp. 3, 7). Cicero maintains that Aristotle, in a work now lost, traced the formal beginnings of rhetoric to Corax and Tisias of Syracuse, who in the fifth century BCE invented a method of putting forth logical probabilitiesâas opposed to certaintiesâto help settle land disputes (Brutus, 12). Though some scholars argue that Corax and Tisias were the same individual (Kennedy, 1994, p. 34), there survives a perhaps apocryphal anecdote of the master Corax suing the student Tisias for failure to pay for his instruction. Corax argued that if his case prevailed, he wonâand that if Tisiasâ case prevailed, he still should win, for in winning Tisias had proven himself to be a learned rhetorician who should pay for his knowledge. Tisias allegedly countered that if he won, he need not payâand, if he lost, he proved that he hadn't learned enough of the art of presenting logical probabilities to merit payment. Public relations may be a modern Tisias in not acknowledging the influence of classical rhetoricâor, even while acknowledging, not embracing and appreciating the extent, value, and possibilities of the influence.
The twenty-first century is an ideal time for public relations to explore models of its past, present, and, possibly, future. Debates regarding its fundamental nature and practices continue to roil the profession. Even the prevailing definitionâthat public relations is the management of relationships between an entity and the publics essential to its success (Broom, 2009)âhas not gone unchallenged (McKie & Munshi, 2007; Ihlen, van Ruler, & Fredriksson, 2009). Different models of the discipline compete for both normative and practical status. In one direction lies excellence theory, the product of a decades-long study sponsored by the International Association of Business Communicators, with its focus on two-way symmetry and an idealistic worldview:
Two-way symmetrical describes a model of public relations that is based on research and that uses communication to manage conflict and improve understanding with strategic publicsâŠ. With the symmetrical model, both the organization and publics can be persuaded; both also may change their behavior. (J. E. Grunig, 1992a, p. 18; J. E. Grunig and White, 1992, p. 39)
In another direction is contingency theory, which posits a spectrum of behavior ranging from, at one extreme, radical accommodation to publicsâ demands to, at the other extreme, asymmetrical advocacy of a client/employer's viewpoint. Contingency theory holds that an entity's situational relationship-building strategies vary along the spectrum, driven by variables in the environment; in fact, scholars have identified more than eighty such variables:
[C]ontingency theory offers a perspective to examine how one party relates to another through the enactment of a given stance toward the other party at a given point in time; how those stances change, sometimes almost instantaneously; and what influences the change in stanceâŠ. This stance can be measured and placed along a continuum, with advocacy at one extreme and accommodation at the otherâŠ. Most organizations fall somewhere in between and, over time, their position usually moves along the continuumâŠ. Put simply, the stance we take is influenced by the circumstances we face. (Cameron, Pang, & Jin, 2008, pp. 136â137)
A further enrichment of the ontological debate involves the importation of social theory, largely from European and Australasian sources, that generally approaches public relations not from a microlevel (individual) or mesolevel (organizational) but from a macrolevel (societal) viewpoint (Durham, 2005; McKie & Munshi, 2007; Ihlen, van Ruler, & Fredriksson, 2009). Marsh (2011) has proposed evolutionary biological theories as a foundation for what he terms the âsocial harmony frameworksâ (p. 1) of public relations, including communitarianism (Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988), excellence theory (J. E. Grunig, 1992a), fully functioning society theory (R. L. Heath, 2006b), and aspects of the reflective paradigm (Holmström, 2004).2
Given this theoretical diversity, public relations may be anything from âthe engineering of consentâ (Bernays, 1947) to âbuilding and maintaining relationships that benefit not only the organization but also public membersâ (Ledingham and Bruning, 2000, p. 65) to a broadly reflective process that helps maintain an organization's social legitimacy (van Ruler & Vercic, 2005). With their focus on organizations, however, such definitions create increasing controversy: Is public relations the exclusive domain of formal organizations? Do individuals or loosely organized activists not practice public relations (Duffy, 2000; Holtzhausen, 2007)? As early as 1976, Harlow had found and studied almost 500 definitions of public relations.
To the degree that public relations has sought antecedents in and guidance from rhetoric, the focus largely has been on modern theorists, primarily Kenneth Burke, rather than classical theorists such as Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates. By way of example, the index of the first edition of Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations (Toth & Heath, 1992) affords Aristotle and Isocrates together seven entries; Plato has none. Burke alone has 27.3 Rhetoric in general, and classical rhetoric in particular, fare little better in journals devoted to public relations scholarship. A search of articles in Public Relations Review and Journal of Public Relations Research from 2000 through 2010 reveals only nine articles with the word rhetoric or rhetorical in their titles. Of the nine, only three offer more than a cursory glance, if that, at classical rhetoric.4 And yetâŠ.
Motivated by public relationsâ thirst for academic legitimacy and professional respectâand, no doubt, by true intellectual curiosityâscholars have included rhetoric in calls for a wide-ranging exploration of potential theoretical bases for the profession. In 1992, Elizabeth Toth wrote, âRhetorical and critical scholars must at least define what they mean by rhetoric and public relations; and, at best argue how their findings contribute to our theoretical understanding of the domainâ (p. 12). Eight years later, however, she lamented, â[R]hetorical studies of public relations may have reached their greatest concentration in the early 1990sâ (2000, p. 141). Cheney and Christensen (2001) write, âWe see public relations as a contested disciplinary and interdisciplinary terrainâŠ. A vibrant discipline, we believe, needs to pursue a visionâor visionsâof what it ought to beâ they list ârhetorical studiesâ as one vision that merits additional research (pp. 167, 172). R. L. Heath (2009) includes rhetorical theory within the âcall for pluralistic studies in public relationsâ (p. 14) and does trace origins to Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates (2008, pp. 209, 210, 215â222). A continuing research project led by Lynne M. Sallot has identified twenty-seven âtheory developmentâ categories within current public relations research, including âRhetorical Underpinningsâ (Sallot et al., 2008, pp. 356â357).
Toth's request that scholars âdefine what they mean by rhetoricâ provides a starting point for this book. As Lunsford and Ede (1994) have noted, to the degree that current scholars consider classical rhetoric at all, we tend to embrace the rhetoric of Aristotle's Rhetoric. This book, however, focuses on a different rhetoric, one that may offer a deeper and, in some ways, more suitable influence for public relations: the rhetoric of Isocrates. Isocrates was born in Athens in 436 BCE. His father was a financially successful flute maker, but the family fortune suffered during the Peloponnesian War. To regroup financially, Isocrates became a logographerâa writer of judicial speeches for Athenian litigantsâand then opened a school that became, in the words of Corbett, âthe true fountainhead of humanistic rhetoricâ (1989, p. 275). He was the contemporary of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, having been born 37 years before Socratesâ death, 8 years before the birth of Plato and 52 years before the birth of Aristotle. He died in 338 BCE at the age of 98, shortly after writing a major discourse (Panathenaicus) and a letter to Philip of Macedonia. Some thirty of Isocratesâ discourses and letters survive.5
In the span of those 98 years, Isocrates first challenged Plato over the meaning of rhetoric and philosophy and then similarly challenged Plato's great student, Aristotle. To appreciate Isocratean rhetoric and the promise it holds for enriching modern public relations, we must contrast it with the rhetorics of those great rivals, Plato and Aristotle. And to do so, we must firstâin true Socratic fashionâdefine the thing we wish to analyze. According to Corbett (1990a), rhetoric is âthe art or the discipline that deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or persuade or motivate an audience, whether that audience is made up of one person or a group of personsâ (p. 3). Continuing in the spirit of Socrates, we certainly could challenge that definition: Plato would dispute the notion that rhetoric is an art, whereas Isocrates and Aristotle would resist the emphasis on discourse rather than the critical thinking that precedes effective communicationâbut Corbett's definition provides a common ground from which we can begin.
Before examining the competing rhetorics of Plato and Aristotle, we should note that seeking origins of modern public relations in Isocratean rhetoric is hardly a revolutionary or heretical idea; it is simply an idea that has remained largely unexplored. Among public relations scholars, R. L. Heath (2000) and Marsh (2001) already have made such overtures. Among rhetoric scholars, Morgan (2004) has noted that Isocrates advised âthe hapless Timotheus on public relationsâ (p. 134),6 and others have discussed various public relations functions within Isocratesâ works: Haskins (2004) holds that we could consider Isocrates âthe first advocate of what we now call âliberal educationââ (p. 4), and more than one scholar has referred to Isocrates as a âpublicistâ (Jebb, 1876; van Hook, 1919; Jaeger, 1944; Marrou, 1956/1982).7 Therefore, to Larissa Grunig's important assertion that Aristotle is âoften considered the first public relations practitionerâ (1992a, p. 68), we may add, âBut first there was Isocrates.â
THE RHETORIC OF PLATO
As seen in Gorgias and Phaedrus, Plato (circa 428â347 BCE) rejected rhetoric unless it was in the service of absolute truth ( Phaedrus, 277bâc). Rhetoric, he believed, should be the exclusive province of philosophers who, through the thoughtful give and take of dialectic, had discovered divine, ultimate truths that predated creation (Republic, 484b). Popular rhetoric, such as that practiced by the sophist Gorgias, was not an art at all, Plato wrote; rather, it was a mere technique, like cookery, or, worse, just a form of flattery (Gorgias, 462dâ463c). All too often, he maintained, rhetoric is âsome device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who knowâ (Gorgias, 459c). Plato thus relegates the art of persuasion to those who are certain they are right, who enter a relationship firmly believing that they must change others and remain unchanged themselves.
Possessing such moral certainty, the ideal rulers of Plato's Republic, the philosopher-kings, could use dubious rhetorical tactics to lead lesser beings to the light: âThe rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefit of the stateâŠ. It seems likely that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit of their subjectsâ (Republic, 389b, 459c). Such deception, of course, remained the exclusive privilege of the philosopher-king: âIf then the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying ⊠he will chastise him for introducing a practice as subversive and destructive of a state as it is of a shipâ (Republic, 389d).
Plato's insistence on unshakable knowledge of absolute truth as a prerequisite to rhetoric is, in the words of Jaeger (1944), ârepulsive to ordinary common senseâ (p. 57). Even if such perfection in truth seeking were possible, the breathtaking asymmetry of Platonic rhetoric has prompted ringing condemnations. Platonic rhetoric, writes Kennedy (1994) , is âresponsible for much of the dogmatism, intolerance, and ideological oppression that has characterized Western historyâ (p. 41). Jaeger (1944) calls Platonic rhetoric âuncompromisingâ (p. 70). Black (1994) notes that it deviates into âsocial controlâ (p. 98). Kauffman (1994) finds Platonic rhetoric âtotalitarian and repressiveâ (p. 101). In brief, ...