Traditions of Systems Theory

Major Figures and Contemporary Developments

Darrell Arnold

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135013684
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Computer Science
• Subtopic: Computer Science General
• Index: Computer Science

The term 'systems theory' is used to characterize a set of disparate yet related approaches to fields as varied as information theory, cybernetics, biology, sociology, history, literature, and philosophy. What unites each of these traditions of systems theory is a shared focus on general features of systems and their fundamental importance for diverse areas of life. Yet there are considerable differences among these traditions, and each tradition has developed its own methodologies, journals, and forms of anaylsis. This book explores this terrain and provides an overview of and guide to the traditions of systems theory in their considerable variety.

The book draws attention to the traditions of systems theory in their historical development, especially as related to the humanities and social sciences, and shows how from these traditions various contemporary developments have ensued. It provides a guide for strains of thought that are key to understanding 20th century intellectual life in many areas.

Part I
Early Developments and Their Continued Repercussions

Introduction to Part I
Early Developments and Their Continued Repercussions

Darrell P. Arnold

“Systems theory” characterizes a set of disparate yet related approaches to fields as varied as information theory, cybernetics, biology, sociology, history, literature, and philosophy. North Americans often associate it with (1) the general systems theory first developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy and work by first- and second-order cyberneticians such as Norbert Wiener and Gregory Bateson, as well as the contemporary extensions of such work into ecology, cognitive science, AI, and disciplines as varying as psychology, literature, and media studies, (2) dynamic systems theory, as developed inter alia by Ilya Prigogine, with various developments into chaos and complexity theory, or (3) the world-systems analysis as expounded preeminently by Immanuel Wallerstein. By contrast, Germans and many other Europeans tend to associate it with (4) the work of Niklas Luhmann and his school of sociology. What unites each of these traditions of systems theory (with the exception of perhaps world-system analysis, which focuses more exclusively on economic and political systems) is a shared focus on general features of various systems and their fundamental importance for diverse areas of life. Yet there are considerable differences among these traditions, and each tradition has developed its own methodologies, journals, and forms of analysis.

This book provides an overview of and guide to the traditions of systems theory in their considerable variety. Part one of the book begins with a discussion of the influences of systems thinking on twentieth century thought. This is followed by an article on the early proponents in information theory, a review of cybernetics, and an overview of the Macy Conferences and their impacts; it then treats a group of the main figures in systems theory and second-order cybernetics in areas as diverse as biology, engineering, and earth science and assesses their continued relevance. Part two subsequently examines developments of systems thinking in sociology in the work of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann, and Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems analysis. Part three provides an introduction to various current developments and uses of systems thinking, including an analysis of the work of systems theory in literature, a proposal to use systems heuristics in the study of digital culture, an overview of one theory of systems ecology, a discussion of Ilya Prigogine and dynamic systems theory, and an exposition of the history and trends of systems thinking in organizational management. The conclusion is an excursus on Gregory Bateson’s thought and the continued relevance of cybernetics. It issues a call to cultivate a systems outlook and to live cybernetics.

Short introductions precede each part of the book, discussing the topic of the respective part and outlining the contributions of the authors who write on that topic. The remainder of this introduction serves this function for part one of the book.

The Chapters for Part 1

Chapter 1 of the book provides a general outline of some main developments in systems theory, with a focus on general systems theory and cybernetics—movements to which most of the thinkers in this volume have some relationship (albeit sometimes a distant one). It highlights some of the early impulses of systems theory and evaluates its mixed results. One main point of Chapter 1—which is borne out in the contributions that follow—is that much of the success of systems theory and cybernetics has been because of their influences on developments that continued without them. Because that influence is very significant and often unacknowledged, the history of systems theory can productively be read as a secret history.¹ Still, attention will also be directed to some of the important developments in still-existent forms of systems theory and cybernetics, also a topic of numerous papers in this volume.

In Chapter 2, “The Persistence of Information Theory,” Philipp Schweighauser traces the influence of Shannon’s and Weaver’s communications model into various domains while especially focusing on its value for literary theory. He provides a succinct analysis of Shannon’s and Weaver’s respective views on noise and of the cybernetic and systems theoretic critical reception of their views. He notes Shannon’s own skepticism about applying his communication model beyond the world of communications, and he compares and contrasts Shannon’s and Weaver’s views with one another and with the work of latter cybernetics and sociological systems theory. Schweighauser concludes by arguing that the work of Shannon and Weaver is worth returning to precisely because it plays up the concept of noise more than the work of cybernetics and systems theory. While cyberneticists and systems theoreticians do critically incorporate the early work of communication theory in important ways, in the end they do not focus on noise but rather on those elements from the noise that can be systemically reordered. In Schweighauser’s concluding assessment, in literary theoretic terms, the difference between a Wienerian and a Shannonian conception of art runs parallel to that between the New Critics’s “organic unity” doctrine and Theodor Adorno’s reflections on the necessary negativity of art. Schweighauser emphasizes the particular value of the latter and argues it has a tendentially greater critical social function than the generally more conservative system theoretic approaches.

In Chapter 3, “Cybernetics: Thinking Through the Technology,” Ranulph Glanville offers a general overview of major developments in cybernetics and a catalogue of basic terms needed to understand it. He also offers a counterargument to some of the dominant views in the field. For one, he argues against the broadly accepted view—in part developed under Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s sway—that cybernetics is a part of a broader, more theoretical “systems theory.” In Bertalanffy’s very influential view: “Cybernetics, as the theory of control mechanisms in technology and nature and founded on the concepts of information and feedback, is but a part of a general theory of systems; cybernetic systems are a special case, however important, of systems showing self-regulation.” ² Glanville argues that this is wrongheaded and thinks that an analysis of the ideas will show that cybernetics is in fact the more philosophical of the approaches, and systems theory a rather more applied branch of it. This book does indeed highlight much of the theoretical power of those who identify themselves as cyberneticists, so it offers some support for Glanville’s position. Nevertheless, the approach generally taken in this volume is that since systems theory and cybernetics serve more as heuristics than as hard-and-fast research programs, it is in many cases acceptable, as Gordon Pask also thought, to use the terms interchangeably.

Glanville further argues in his chapter that the fundamental characteristic of second-order cybernetics—the inclusion of the observer as part of the system observations—was already existent in first-order cybernetics. Margaret Mead’s call for a “cybernetics of cybernetics” entailed precisely such a viewpoint. The trouble was that this perspective was not emphasized, and Wiener’s early work set the tone for an understanding of a more technological and less humanistic understanding of cybernetics. While Glanville’s careful reading on this point is especially important for a more precise understanding of the history of cybernetics, Glanville, too, still does honor a difference in emphasis between first- and second-order cybernetics. Consequently, in elucidating key terms of cybernetics, he respectively divides his analysis between those concepts dominant in first-order cybernetics (covered in the first part of his chapter) and those dominant in second-order cybernetics (covered in the latter part of the chapter). This chapter—itself written by a key figure in the history of cybernetics—makes important arguments for understanding the history of cybernetics, and it will serve as a helpful reference for a general understanding of some of its basic concepts.

In Chapter 4, “Expanding the Self-Referential Paradox: The Macy Conferences and the Second Wave of Cybernetic Thinking,” John Bruni offers an interpretation of how the shift in emphasis in second-order cybernetics gradually occurs in the course of the Macy Conferences and beyond. His article builds on N. Katherine Hayles’s view, which he succinctly summarizes, “that the conferences’ singular achievement was to create a ‘new paradigm’ for ‘looking at human beings . . . as information-processing entities who are essentially similar to intelligent machines,’ by routing Claude Shannon’s information theory through Warren McCulloch’s ‘model of neural functioning’ and John von Neumann’s work in ‘biological systems’ and then capitalizing on Norbert Wiener’s ‘visionary’ talent for disseminating the ‘larger implications’ of such a paradigm shift.”³ Bruni’s argument, however, is that the conferences show this new paradigm only in its “embryonic state.” For its development one needs to look at the further work of Norbert Wiener and Heinz von Foerster, as well as at that of members who did not participate in the Macy Conferences, such as Humberto Maturana—all of whom emphasize “circulaity,” “reflexivity,” and “self-reference.” This later work captures the ethos of the Macy meetings.

In Chapter 5, “The Hermeneutical System of General Systemology: Bertalanffian and Other Early Contributions to Its Foundations and Development,” David Pouvreau provides an introduction to Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s general systems theory that shows it to set the groundwork for a systemological hermeneutics. He depicts the perspectivist modalism at work in Bertalanffy and shows how Bertalanffy unites hermeneutical and hypothetical deductive methods, always keenly aware of holism. Pouvreau also evaluates the metaphysical, axiological, and praxeological character of Bertalanffy’s work. This very comprehensive overview fully situates Bertalanffy’s thought in reference to his own contemporaries and to important present work in systemology. Pouvreau concludes that Bertalanffy had implicit elements that were later more clearly developed in critical systems theory, but that theoreticians in that area would still strongly benefit from a...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Routledge Studies in Library and Information Science
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Part I Early Developments and Their Continued Repercussions
• Part II Systems Thinking in Sociology
• Part III Further Contemporary Developments
• Contributors
• Index