The Army and Ideology in Indonesia

From Dwifungsi to Bela Negara

Muhamad Haripin, Adhi Priamarizki, Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000202588
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is an analysis of Indonesia's civil-military relations in the post-1998 reform era. It focuses on the political thinking of the Indonesian Army during the time of democratic consolidation.

The book examines the army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, TNI AD), a pivotal player in the political scene of Indonesian state, and the aspect of military ideology development. Based on in-depth interviews with civilian and military figures and applying the methodology of utilised process tracing and empirical analysis surrounding the appearance of military thinking, the book argues that the Indonesian military pursues to sustain its political power by propagating a set of values construed as moral compass for all members of society. Specifically, the book discusses the origins and impacts of 'proxy war' and ' bela negara ' ('defend the state'), which was promoted by former TNI Commander Gatot Nurmantyo (2015-2017) and former Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu (2014-2019). The authors demonstrate that both ideologies facilitate expansion of the military's influence in all aspects of life and protection of its corporate interests in the age of democracy.

Offering insights for theoretical discussion on the influence of military ideology to civil-military relations, particularly in the post-authoritarian period, this book will be of interest to academics and policy makers in the fields of Southeast Asian Politics, Asian Politics and Civil-Military Relations.

1
Introduction

The army and ideology in Indonesia

Muhamad Haripin, Adhi Priamarizki, and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki

The Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat: TNI AD) has been a dominant force, both within the military organisation and in the national politics of Indonesia. The army has a tutelary belief as the guardian of the Indonesian nation – a belief that is rooted in the armed forces’ experiences during the early days of the founding of the republic. The army was self-established, organised, and armed organically following the surrender of Japan imperial government and the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945.¹ Further underlying the belief is their experiences in guerrilla resistance against the Dutch’s attempt to regain control of Indonesia during 1945–1949, which earned the soldiers a role to play in policy formulation as well as to shape the national political life. In justifying this belief, the army formulated doctrines that accommodate their interests and presence in politics.

The Indonesian Army also held deep-seated distrust of civilian elites and saw them as weak, incapable, and disorganised groups – a view that became prevalent and deeply embedded within the military following Sukarno’s, the first Indonesian president, refusal to support General Sudirman’s, the first commander of Indonesian military, guerrilla resistance against the Dutch following the breakdown of the Renville Agreement in 1948.² Various experiences following this consequential turning point led to deep embeddedness of the military in all aspects of life, later the army as the backbone of the authoritarian regime of New Order (Orde Baru) from 1966 until 1998 under President Suharto, the successor of Sukarno. Political economy change in the late 1990s, however, brought democratisation and compelled the Indonesian military to undertake a reform.

Previous studies on the ideology of Indonesian army particularly during the New Order era argue that the dynamics of internal thinking among officers have been a result of collective self-examination on the potential and imminent external challenges encountered by the state and how the military has been or will be affected by them. In this sense, however, we must be aware that ‘external challenges’ believed by the army elites, for instance the threats of foreign invasion and territorial infringements, do not always mean entirely out of the realm of military. Instead, such assessment often reflects intra-division and infightings among the high-level officers.³ In contrast with popular belief that the military is a cohesive institution and bounded by organisational discipline, the very existence of dynamics of internal debate itself suggests otherwise. The ‘external challenges’ discourses were brought in by particularly one faction to justify the institutional necessity to adapt with new political circumstances; meanwhile others might suggest different outlook or even demand no change at all. This army factionalism was argued to be part of cut-throat competition among military elites to obtain President Suharto’s favour. Different camps wanted to win the president’s political support and business channels.

In this regard, we see an established pattern of political competition – at least – between two major camps throughout the history of Suharto’s New Order: ideology has often been exploited by the competing parties to justify their political stance in front of dictator ruler and to gain economic privileges. We will elaborate this discussion in the succeeding sections.

This study argues that the introduction of ‘proxy war’ and bela negara (herein after ‘defend the state’) – twin ideologies under the duumvirates of Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI) Commander General Gatot Nurmantyo (2015–2017) and Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu (2014–2019) – demonstrates a new pattern of army’s ideological trend in Indonesia’s democratisation period. ‘Proxy war’ narrative gained nationwide recognition following Gatot’s ascension to national political scene in July 2014. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the sixth president of the Republic of Indonesia, appointed him as the army chief of staff, replacing General Budiman. In many of his public statements, Gatot often reiterated the danger of ‘proxy war’ in Indonesia. Following the tradition of all-encompassing concept of threats in army establishment, he explained that many countries and non-state actors have great interests of Indonesia’s wealth and natural resources and will do whatever they can to exert influence and domination over the archipelago. The instrument of proxy war, according to Gatot, is non-military, and the subterfuge nature of the instrument caused identifying the actors a difficult undertaking. Yet, Gatot asserted that the result of their insidious works can be seen from the various excesses of unbridled liberal democracy (demokrasi kebablasan) that has been instituted since Reformasi in 1998, including economic over-dependence, the domination of foreign companies in national oil and gas sector, as well as cultural appropriation by other countries. This foreign infiltration is then called a ‘proxy war,’ borrowing the term from Cold War period when the United States of America and the Soviet Union competed for world domination through war and other means via proxy beyond their own national territory.

Gatot’s proxy war gained further popularity after he was appointed as TNI commander in July 2015, replacing General Moeldoko. The newly appointed military commander conducted a series of public lectures in universities and private institutions on the topic of patriotism and the danger of ‘proxy war.’ In his lectures and speeches, for instance, Gatot frequently emphasised the crisis of drug abuse among Indonesian youths as a result of foreign infiltration. On top of personal promotion of ‘proxy war,’ there was a strong indication that he took advantage of his position as the highest-ranking officer in the military to promote the ideology, as evident from the promotion of the concept by various branches of the TNI at different level of the chain of command.⁴

Meanwhile, Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu, also a former army chief of staff, promoted the ideology of bela negara (‘defend the state’).⁵ Ryamizard was not the first state official who systematically explained the logics behind bela negara, as the concept has gained prominence since as early as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency (2004–2009 and 2009–2014). However, Ryamizard is arguably the most prominent proponent behind the nationwide promotion of this initiative, which reflects the latest government campaign to instil patriotism, nationalism, and the state ideology of Pancasila among citizens. Bela negara aims to provide some degree of basic paramilitary training and civics education programme for civilians. Taken within this context, the concept of nationalism and/or patriotism that bela negara aims to instil is not regular patriotism but rather a distinctively militaristic interpretation of the word. Subsequently, it includes not only standard curriculum on official national history and its adaptation to modern context but also a vehement apprehension towards ideas and concepts that are foreign and perceived to be harmful to Indonesia’s way of life. Ryamizard frequently invoked caution, perhaps exaggeratingly, against the dangers of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) community, to which the solution would be participating in bela negara training. To advance this initiative, Ryamizard leveraged on his ministerial position to forge cooperation with other ministries and public institutions, including schools and state-owned enterprises, as well as private institutions to conduct training and seminar related with bela negara. The initiative is undoubtedly an ambitious one, as Ryamizard aims to recruit 100 million bela negara cadres by 2025. This move invited uproar among civil society due to concern that it would militarise civilian polity and open a path for the establishment of state-sponsored militia.

Based on these sketches, this study will address the following questions: why does the army establishment promulgate military-based ideology in a ‘stable’ and ‘democratic’ political environment – to date, democratisation has been underway for 20 years in Indonesia, and five consecutive national elections, not to mention regional elections since 2005, have been held peacefully? What does it tell us about the army’s political contemporary outlook? This research argues that, in contrast with previous army’s ideologies, the ‘proxy war’ and ‘defend the state’ (bela negara) have demonstrated a rather peculiar trend in contrast with the tradition of Indonesian army political thinking. If military ideology has proliferated as a defence mechanism against extra-military intervention in the past, the concepts of ‘proxy war’ and bela negara have been more aggressive in nature – in the sense that both ideologies are inherently geared to ensconce the military’s influence in all aspects of life.

Classic civil-military relations literatures have pointed out attempts of military intervention using ‘the guardian of the nation’ claim and doctrine as foundation to legitimise its action.⁶ The arrival of democratisation in Indonesia supposedly calls the military to come up with a new doctrine which fits with the new democratic setting. The case of Gatot’s ‘proxy war’ and Ryamizard’s bela negara shows that encroachment to political realm can be facilitated without officially altering military ideology. In other words, the existence of a military ideology that fits with democratic idea provides no guarantee to keep the armed forces in the barrack. Creation of ancillary thinking, such as Gatot’s ‘proxy war’ and Ryamizard’s bela negara, surfaced as a form of adaptation towards democratic environment and reform pressure, a defence mechanism to protect military corporate interests. This will be the theoretical contribution of this book.

To elaborate the main argument, the structure of discussion will be given as follows. First, we discuss the historical development of army ideology from the 1940s to New Order era. This period is crucial as formative years of tentara rakyat (people’s army) identity and dwifungsi (dual-function) doctrine. The second part of the discussion will elaborate on how the Indonesian army adapts from the authoritarian New Order era to democracy started out in 1998. During this period, the old but highly effective NKRI harga mati concept (figuratively meaning the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is everything; ‘we should defend the country at all costs’) gained prominence. It served two purposes; first, to consolidate internal military and second, to undermine reform pressure and external critics against the defence establishment. The ideology came at a very interesting moment when the country was at the critical juncture of democratic transition. The army was at the receiving end of political attacks for its past abuse of power and human rights misconducts in conflict areas such as Aceh and Papua. Civilian politician and non-governmental organisations formed a ring of fire to delimit military role and function. However, as will be discussed later, NKRI harga mati has proven to be an effective discursive weapon to neutralise the opposition against the army’s political power.

Third, the army ideology expands with the promulgation of ‘proxy war’ and bela negara in the presiden...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction: the army and ideology in Indonesia
• 2 Tentara rakyat and dwifungsi: from Nasution to Suharto
• 3 NKRI harga mati, ketahanan nasional, and MOOTW
• 4 ‘Proxy war’ and bela negara: the historical and political trajectory
• 5 Conclusion: ideology and democratic setback
• References
• Index