Kant and Education

Interpretations and Commentary

Klas Roth, Chris Surprenant, Klas Roth, Chris W. Surprenant

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136597220
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophy of judgement have been and continue to be widely discussed among many scholars. The impact of his thinking is beyond doubt and his ideas continue to inspire and encourage an on-going dialogue among many people in our world today. Given the historical and philosophical significance of Kant's moral, political, and aesthetic theory, and the connection he draws between these theories and the appropriate function and methodology of education, it is surprising that relatively little has been written on Kant's contribution to education theory.

Recently, however, internationally recognized Kant scholars such as Paul Guyer, Manfred Kuehn, Richard Velkley, Robert Louden, Susan Shell, and others have begun to turn their attention to Kant's writings on education and the role of education in cultivating moral character. Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary has gathered these scholars together with the aim of filling this perceived void in Kant scholarship. All of the essays contained within this volume will examine either Kant's ideas on education through an historical analysis of his texts; or the importance and relevance of his moral philosophy, political philosophy, and/or aesthetics in contemporary education theory (or some combination).

1 Kant’s Contribution to Moral Education

Chris W. Surprenant

Kant’s deontological ethics, along with Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Mill’s utilitarian ethics, are often identified as one of the three primary moral options between which individuals can choose. It is surprising, therefore, that little has been written on Kant’s important contributions to moral education—moral instruction through catechism. By memorizing a series of moral questions and answers, an individual can acquire knowledge of basic moral principles in the same way that Martin Luther believed an individual should be habituated to the tenets of Christianity. The difficulty with this position, however, is that a catechistic approach to moral education appears to violate a central tenet of Kantian morality: an individual is morally praiseworthy only if he performs virtuous acts out of a recognition that those acts are required of him (i.e., out of respect for the moral law itself), not because he has been habituated to act in that manner. The project of this chapter is to demonstrate why Kant’s contribution to the field of moral education is significant by showing how a catechistic moral education establishes the foundation necessary for autonomous, moral action.

Any discussion of moral education must begin with a brief examination of its object—morality or virtue—and, for Kant, becoming virtuous requires an individual not only to adopt the correct principles or maxims, but also to adopt those maxims for the correct reasons. It is for this reason that he divides his discussion of moral education in the Doctrine of the Method of Ethics (MM: 6:477–491) into two parts corresponding with these two components of virtue. The first, “Teaching ethics” (MM: 6:477–484), outlines why virtue must be taught and the process by which individuals come to adopt virtuous maxims. Although this section contains Kant’s discussion of moral education, the second section, “Ethical ascetics” (MM: 6:484–685), is critical to understanding his position on this topic because it outlines the components of virtue that cannot be taught. For example, virtue requires an individual to develop “a frame of mind that is both valiant and cheerful in fulfilling its duties … [because] what is not done with pleasure but merely as compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to his duty in this way” (MM: 6:484). Although one can be taught the basic principles of virtue, one cannot be taught how to acquire this disposition. Instead, it is acquired through what Kant calls “ethical gymnastics,” or through the repetitive practice of combating natural impulses when those impulses conflict with virtue. “Hence,” Kant concludes, “[the process of performing ethical gymnastics] makes one valiant and cheerful in the consciousness of one’s restored freedom” (MM: 6:485), allowing an individual to overcome the forces of heteronomy, which provide a barrier to moral action.

Keeping in mind that the focus of moral education must be on assisting an individual in adopting moral maxims (the first component of virtue), rather than on the disposition with which those maxims are adopted (the second component of virtue), let us turn our attention toward Kant’s discussion of ethical instruction in the “Doctrine of the Method of Ethics.” Kant begins by examining why virtue must be acquired and why it must be taught. He writes:

The very concept virtue already implies that virtue must be acquired (that it is not innate); one need not appeal to anthropological knowledge based on experience to see this. For a human being’s moral capacity would not be virtue were it not produced by the strength of his resolution in conflict with powerful opposing inclinations. Virtue is the product of pure practical reason insofar as it gains ascendancy over such inclinations with consciousness of its supremacy (based on freedom). (MM: 6:477)

Since individuals are not born with the ability to resist heteronomous impulses, one must cultivate this ability, and, thus, cultivate a propensity for virtue. According to Kant, that a propensity for virtue “can and must be taught already follows from its not being innate” (MM: 6:477). His reasoning can be explained as follows: (1) because virtue is not innate, it must be acquired; (2) applying Kant’s “ought implies can” principle, because individuals have a moral duty to become virtuous, it is possible for them to acquire virtue; (3) that which is not innate but can be acquired must be learned; (4) thus, it follows that virtue must be taught.

I. DIALECTIC AND DOGMATISM: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE ON MORAL EDUCATION

Let us assume Kant is correct in concluding that virtue is not innate and must be taught. Historically, others arriving at this same conclusion about virtue have argued that it must be taught either through a dialectic or dogmatic approach. One of the first formal theories of moral education can be found in the Platonic dialogues where Socrates elicits moral principles from his students through continuous questioning and refinement of ideas. Central to this process of dialectical education is that the questions do not come from the teacher alone, but rather all of the participants are able to question the reasonableness of the ideas that have been proposed. To participate in the dialogue, however, an individual must enter the discussion with some preexisting knowledge of the issue being discussed—in this case, the principles of virtue. In the Platonic dialogues, this preexisting understanding of virtue can be traced to the Socratic belief that individuals are born with complete, theoretical knowledge, including knowledge of moral principles (Meno: 81c–d).

Individuals are not taught the principles of virtue through the dialectical process. Instead, by participating in the dialogue individuals are able to refine their understanding of how these principles should be applied (Gordon 1999: 34). Therefore, as Kant observes correctly, the foundation of an individual’s moral education cannot be established through dialogue alone (MM: 6:479). Individuals participating in the dialogue enter this discussion either with or without preexisting knowledge of moral principles. If one enters the dialogue already possessing this knowledge, then the person may learn how best to apply these principles through the dialectic. However, if one does not have a preexisting understanding of moral principles when entering the dialogue, then the dialectic is unable to function in the appropriate manner. Kant writes, “The formal principle of such instruction does not … permit Socratic dialogue as the way of teaching for this purpose, since the pupil has no idea what questions to ask; and so the teacher alone does the questioning” (MM: 6:479). Without the ability of all participants to take part in the questioning process, moral discussions that resemble dialogues become nothing more than instances of dogmatic instruction.

Kant’s rejection of the dialectic method as the starting point for one’s moral education follows from the previous point that individuals are not born with an innate understanding of moral principles. If it were the case that individuals were born with some innate understanding of these principles, then it could be argued that the dialectical structure is more appropriate to serve as the basis for one’s moral education. By arguing against dialectic teaching as the basis for moral education, Kant aligns himself more closely with Aristotle. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics emphasizes the importance of the state and family in implementing laws that compel individuals to act in a manner consistent with virtue. He writes:

We acquire [virtues] by first exercising them. The same is true with skills, since what we need to learn before doing, we learn by doing … So too we become just by doing just actions, temperate by temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions. What happens in cities bears this out as well, because legislators make the citizens good by habituating them [through the laws], and this is what every legislator intends … If one has not been reared under the right laws it is difficult to obtain from one’s earliest years the correct upbringing for virtue, because the masses … do not find it pleasant to live temperately and with endurance … [Therefore,] the person who is to be good must be nobly brought up and habituated, and then spend his life engaged in good pursuits … And this would happen when people lived in accordance with a kind of intellect and a correct system with power over them. (NE: 1103a27–1103b6, 1179b28–1180a15)

While the laws compel an individual to perform acts consistent with those performed by the virtuous man, Aristotle asserts that a person is not virtuous unless he performs those actions from the appropriate state: “first, with knowledge, secondly, from rational choice, and rational choice of the actions for their own sake, and, thirdly, from a firm and unshakable character” (NE: 1105a31).

It is not clear, however, how habituation through compulsory action, what Kant refers to as Aristotle’s dogmatic approach to moral education, is able to accomplish the goal of making individuals better in the way that he suggests. If one must be compelled or coerced to perform acts consistent with virtue, we would not consider that individual to be virtuous. Rather, that individual is said to have performed acts consistent with those of a virtuous man, but not from the appropriate state of character (NE: 1144a15; CPr: 5:152). Such a result appears unavoidable if dogmatic instruction lies at the foundation of one’s moral education, especially in situations where this instruction is reinforced by threats of punishment or promises of reward.

This problem that Kant identifies in his critique of Aristotle is the same problem identified by R.S. Peters’s “paradox of moral education” (1981: 45–60). As explained by Kristján Kristjánsson, this paradox contains two distinct, but interrelated paradoxes: a psychological paradox and a moral/political paradox.

The psychological paradox is this: How can it be true at the same time that it is the aim of moral education to develop persons who conduct themselves by their intellects … and that can best achieved through inculcating in them from an early age certain ready-made habits of action and feeling?… The moral/political paradox, on the other hand, is this: How can it be true at the same time that the aim of moral education is to create individuals who, moved by their own conception of the good, cherish and assiduously apply their own unencumbered autonomy and that this can best be achieved through means that necessarily involve an extrinsic motivation? (2006: 103)

If the role of moral education is to provide individuals with the principles underlying right and wrong action and to develop their character in such a way so that they are able to learn how these principles should be applied (CPr: 5:159), then neither Socratic dialectic nor Aristotelian dogmatism alone can provide a complete moral education. The dialectic approach fails because of its content—it assumes that one has already acquired a basic understanding of moral principles. Likewise, the dogmatic approach fails because of its form—it trains an individual to perform actions consistent with virtue, but these actions are not performed from the correct moral disposition. In the words of Otfried Höffe, “[The] criterion for morality is met only if one does what is morally correct for no other reason than because it is morally correct. An action is good without qualification only if it fulfills duty for the sake of duty. Only in such cases does Kant speak of morality” (1994: 143).

II. KANT’S MORAL CATECHISM

Kant’s solution to the paradox of moral education is the introduction of a moral catechism. He writes:

For the beginning pupil the first and most essential instrument for teaching the doctrine of virtue is a moral catechism … A pure moral catechism, as the basic teachings of duties of virtue, involves no such scruple or difficulty since (as far as its content is concerned) it can be developed from ordinary human reason, and (as far as its form is concerned) it needs only to be adapted to the rules of teaching suited for the earliest instruction … So the way of teaching by catechism differs from both the dogmatic way (in which only the teacher speaks) and the way of dialogue (in which both the teacher and pupil question and answer each other). (MM: 6:479)

By moral catechism, Kant has in mind something similar to Luther’s long and short religious catechisms—both of which played an integral role in Kant’s early religious education (Kuehn 2001: 47). The function of Luther’s catechisms was to teach individuals the fundamental doctrines and prayers of the church through a series of questions and memorized answers. Unlike a religious catechism that is developed to instill within individuals particular tenets of a preexisting religious doctrine, Kant believes that a moral catechism “can be developed from ordinary human reason (as far as its content is concerned)” (MM: 6:479). That is, a student educated via a moral catechism is not memorizing answers that he could not, or did not, generate himself. For Kant, virtue requires an individual to use his reason freely to determine and adopt moral maxims, and then act on these maxims out of respect for the moral law itself (CPr: 5:29–30). Therefore, the question arises as to whether or not it is possible for an individual, initially educated via a moral catechism, to go beyond the first stage of repetition, ultimately arriving at these moral judgments through the use of his reason and not his memory. Simply put, does Kant provide a resolution to the paradox of moral education?

This potential problem becomes clearer once we turn to Kant’s remark after §52 in the “Doctrine of the Method of Ethics,” the “Fragment of a moral catechism” (MM: 6:480–482). Although the portion of the catechism presented here is abbreviated, it illustrates clearly the first two steps an individual must take in order to become capable of attaining virtue. First, he must progress from his original state, one in which he is ignorant of moral principles (MM: 6:477), to one in which he possesses basic knowledge of these principles. Second, he must progress from this intermediate state, one where he can make moral determinations because he has learned moral principles and when they should be applied, to the point where he is able to generate and apply moral principles on his own through the development and use of his reason. If individuals educated under the catechism are unable to progress to this latter stage, their actions would be consistent with the letter of the law (i.e., legally praiseworthy), but not performed with the correct disposition (i.e., morally praiseworthy). Since the role of moral education is to assist an individual’s progress toward becoming morally praiseworthy, for Kant’s catechistic method to be successful it must allow for an individual to progress in this manner.

Catechistic education begins with the teacher eliciting an initial response from the student, or, “should the pupil not know how to answer the question, the teacher, guiding his reason, suggests the answer to him” (MM: 6:480). Then, this answer “must be written down and preserved in definite words that cannot easily be altered, and so be committed to the pupil’s memory” (MM: 6:479). In the fragment of catechism that Kant provides, the teacher begins by asking the student a question that appears only tangentially related to morality: “Teacher: What is your greatest, in fact your whole, desire in life” (MM: 6:480)? To this question, Kant’s student is silent, although it is unclear why anyone, even a child who possesses no understanding of moral principles, would be unable or unwilling to answer this question. One suggestion, offered by Thomas Fuhr, is that Kant’s student is quiet because the question is too complex (2000: 104). However, even if one could not answer the question with an intelligent, well-thought-out reply, it is not unreasonable to expect a shallow reply relevant to the age and interests of that particular student. Through the silence of the student, Kant implies either that a shallow response is the equivalent of silence where moral development is concerned, or that the catechistic education can be successful even if the student cannot answer even the most basic questions concerning the principles that underlie his particular desires. The goal of the first few questions is to arrive at the conclusion that the student’s greatest desire in life is to be happy, which Kant defines as “continuous well-being, enjoyment of life, [and] complete satisfaction with one’s condition” (MM: 6:480). Although an individual may be silent and initially not recognize that this principle is the determining ground of all of his desires, Kant believes it to be a fact of human nature (CPr: 5:25).

Through the next series of questions in the moral catechism, a process that Kant describes as preparatory guidance, the student is guided toward recognizing the problems that result when happiness or desire is the determining ground of his will. This guidance is tailored to the student once the teacher is able to understand the...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction: The Highest Good—the Moral Endeavor of Education
• 1. Kant’s Contribution to Moral Education
• 2. Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education
• 3. Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception
• 4. “Not a Slow Reform, but a Swift Revolution”: Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education
• 5. Kant on Education,Anthropology, and Ethics
• 6. Educating through Perplexity: Kant and the German Enlightenment
• 7. Bringing Morality to Appearances: Kant’s Theory of Education
• 8. Culture and Paradox in Kant’s Philosophy of Education
• 9. Kant’s Invitation to Educational Thinking
• 10. Examples of Moral Possibility
• 11. Moral Education and the Ideal of Humanity
• 12. Enabling the Realization of Humanity: The Anthropological Dimension of Education
• 13. From Discipline to Autonomy: Kant’s Theory of Moral Development
• 14. Kant as Moral Psychologist?
• 15. Kant on the Humanities
• 16. Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies
• Contributors
• Index