New Participatory Dimensions in Civil Society

Professionalization and Individualized Collective Action

Jan van Deth, William Maloney, Jan W. van Deth, William A. Maloney

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136498664
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

This book examines citizen engagement in contemporary democratic politics and the development of new participatory forms. Based on empirical information gathered from citizens, activists and organizations, it examines the changing face of democratic participation.

Advanced democracies are 'plagued' by the complex problem of basing political decisions on the active engagement of citizens and citizens' organisations. Although the benefits of an active citizenry appear great, the reality is that most citizens positively embrace a relatively marginal role in organised politics. The conventional activist –citizens as active members engaged in voluntary associations and collective decision-making – seems to be replaced by passive supporters and donors or ephemeral or episodic democratic participators. This volume aims to address several issues at the core of this transformation: the rise of checkbook participation, the growing attractiveness of individualized forms of participation, and the increasing relevance of professional expertise.

Looking beyond the traditional single focus on participation or on organizations in isolation, the book innovatively examines the empirical link that can be established between actual developments in democratic participations and the organizational framework in European countries.

New Participatory Dimensions in Civil Society is essential reading for students and scholars of democracy, participation, civil society, politics and sociology.

1	Introduction

Democracy, Professionalization and Participation

Jan W. van Deth and William A. Maloney

“Some do and Some do not”

By now Abraham Lincoln’s assurance that “government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth” seems to have materialized with about half of the world population living under democratic rule. Yet the challenges of these political systems are immense. Democracies are continuously beset by the complex problem of basing political decisions on active engagement of citizens and citizens’ organizations. From an instrumental point of view, citizens’ participation is required to articulate interests and demands and to arrive at decisions based on these interests and demands. From this perspective government “for the people” can be obtained only “by the people”. Developmental approaches do not emphasize results of decision-making processes. Instead participation is primarily required to enable citizens to develop their social and human capacities. From a developmental perspective government “by the people” is identical to government “of the people”. Irrespective of the position one adopts it is clear that the democracy label loses its currency if political decisions and decision-making processes are not based on citizens’ participation.

The recognition that citizens’ participation is indispensible for any vibrant democracy is undisputed. For example, Lorentzen and Hustinx (2007: 105) refer to the civic trinity – i.e. to be a good citizen one should “actively participate in one’s community . . . care for others in the community, and . . . advance common interests by public debate and involvement”. They note however, that the civic trinity has been

replaced by more specialist participant roles whose ties to the collective and organizational bases of civil society are increasingly tenuous and nonexclusive. The active participant has been replaced by the consumerist and/ or passive citizen. ‘Finally, the citizen role shifts from a mediated engagement, channelled through conventional collective representation, to a new kind of monitorial citizenship’ (Schudson, 1998).

(ibid.)

Accordingly, debates do not focus on the necessity of citizens’ democratic engagement, but on the amount and modes of participation. First, not all modes of participation are viewed as enriching or supporting democracy or indeed as democratically acceptable. To be democratically compatible participation should be inherently consent oriented and non-violent in character. Second, the idea that the more participation there is the higher the quality of democracy is somewhat naive and overlooks the potential hazards of unrestrained political involvement among large parts of the population, or the use of unrestricted modes of participation that threaten the rights of other citizens. In their seminal discussion of the relationship between democracy and voting Berelson et al. (1954) highlighted the functional democratic requirement of a

balance between total political war between segments of the society and total political indifference to group interests of that society . . . With respect to group or bloc voting, as with other aspects of political behaviour, it is perhaps not unfortunate that “some do and some do not”.

(320, emphasis added)

In this view a lack of political participation is not depicted as a shortcoming of democracy as long as activism and apathy are mixed – an idea most famously developed further by Almond and Verba (1963) in their concept of a “civic culture”. As Katz (1997: 72) argued: “Participationist democracy does not require that everyone participate in every decision, merely that everyone participate regularly in some area and that all people can participate fully in any area in making decisions that affect themselves and their community.” Accordingly, a vibrant and vital democracy, then, does not require active or passionate political engagement of each and every citizen, but a general willingness to participate as well as active involvement every once in a while.

Although these requirements of individual citizens are rather modest, the reality is that most citizens don’t find political involvement attractive. Many citizens very willing embrace a passive role in organized politics – eschewing direct and active political involvement in favour of chequebook participation (Hayes, 1986) – i.e. paying professionals to represent their interests. These two developments are congruent and mutually supportive. An emancipated and individualized citizenry increasingly rejects conventional, organized modes of political participation and prefers – if active – loosely organized or spontaneous forms of action, which do not require many resources or initiatives. At the same time the professionalization¹ process continues apace via a rapidly growing number of political action committees, social movements and pressure groups. Strømsnes et al. (2009: 393) highlight:

From the beginning of the 1980s we see a gradual organisational change. Organizations became more professionalised, specialised and centralised (Tranvik and Selle 2005). Many voluntary organisations changed their view on membership and gave less priority to organizational democracy. The new organisations adopted market logics and cooperated more frequently with market actors.

These organizations increasingly rely on professionally trained staff with expertise in several areas – e.g. recruitment, marketing, law, lobbying, science and management. The professionalization of staff went hand-in-glove with technological advancements – e.g. computerized databases, direct mail, telemarketing, automated payments, donations and contributions via text messaging, the Internet and more recent forms of social media (blogs, facebook and twitter). Even when these organizations seek to mobilize members there approach is not broad brush, but “scientifically” targeted. Miller (2009: 14) notes that while bodies such as the “National Federation of Independent Businesses segments its members into categories and recruits them for political action based on perceived likelihood of assent”. Groups such as the Sierra Club “also stratifies its members for purposed of political mobilization”.

The reluctance of individualized citizens to get involved seems to be wholly matched by the offer of professional organizations to act as their agent. In fact, this lack of enthusiasm might even be based on the availability of professional help. If we view this in “market” terms, then these political entrepreneurs can be seen as having identified a viable market and are supplying goods to meet a demand. In other words, the spread of “checkbook participation” and the rise of a “protest business” (Jordan and Maloney, 1997) are flipsides of the same coin. This volume aims to address several issues at the core of these parallel developments: the continuing attractiveness of individualized forms of participation, the rise of chequebook participation and the increasing relevance of professional expertise for organizing political action. Do professionalization and individualization develop differently under different circumstances? Are they causally related, complementary or mutually supportive? Most importantly: are they mutually compatible in democratic political systems?

Individualization and Professionalization

There are several paradoxes at the heart of democratic politics that directly follow from the need to base political decisions on the active engagement of citizens and citizens’ organizations. While concurrently groups abound,² citizens prefer to be passive spectators, or use the market and other seemingly private or non-political arenas as venues for action. The conventional activist – a regular citizen engaged in voluntary associations and collective decision making – seems to be replaced by the ephemeral participator or episodic democratic monitor.

Partly in response to the rise of individualized collective action in recent years many governments and political institutions have been championing a more active civil society to counter this perceived participatory pathology. As Warleigh (2001: 620) notes, civil society has been embraced by both “right and left” either to “defeat ‘big government’ ” or to bring citizens closer to decision-making processes. Famously Putnam (2000) emphasized the importance of the internal aspects of associational life for the proper functioning of democracies and societal integration. Civil society associations are seen as contributing to democracy on several fronts: fostering a more participatory democracy; Tocquevillean schools of democracy that generate pro-democratic values, social integration and social capital;³ as policy-making partners (e.g. agenda setting, design, monitoring, evaluation); representative vehicles; countervailing forces (i.e. to big business and professional interests); or as surrogates for those who lack the necessary political resources (e.g. children, human rights, poverty, debt relief, animals).

While the benefits of an active citizenry and dense networks of civil associations appear great, citizens increasingly leave the “playing field” to professional associations and opt for individualized modes of collective action. Several issues are at the core of this development. Chequebook participation is widely accepted by many citizens and groups (Verba et al., 1995; Pattie et al., 2004). In their survey of charitable organizations based in Washington DC Barasko and Schaffer (2008: 202) found that “the contemporary interest groups sector is focussed more on attracting ‘checkbook members’ than on fostering participation within their organization”. In their study of national level advocacy groups active in Washington DC, Minkoff et al. (2008: 543) argued that, “Two organizational forms – national ‘associations without members’ and nonmembership organizations – tend to dominate the imagery of the national advocacy sector.” Many citizens do not see membership of groups as a means of being active in politics. They perceive professionally supplied passive involvement as a “benefit” and would find groups that sought to impose the “cost” of active participation as less attractive (see Warleigh 2001 and Maloney in this volume).⁴ Much (modern) political participation is of an individualistic nature (e.g. donating money, signing a petition, but especially boycotting and buycotting products or ethical shopping) rather than a collective form (attending meetings, rallies or demonstrations) (see Pattie et al., 2004; Micheletti, 2003; van Deth, 2010). Citizens appear to follow two paths to avoid direct and active political involvement. First, they are content to contract out the participation function (Maloney, 1999) to the policy influencing professionals via donations and/or regular financial contributions. Accordingly, these organizations should not be seen as mass political bodies, but as engaged in “supplier/customer” relationships – groups “sell” protest and ersatz political involvement (Jordan and Maloney, 1997). Second, citizens are increasingly inclined to rely on forms of individualized collective action and shun – almost by definition – involvement in institutionalized organizational life. As Micheletti (2003: 34) remarks:

political problems need not solely be dealt with in the political system, by established political actors and channels, and through mobilizing for action on the basis of established political identities, ideologies, and organizational settings. Rather, the market, the home, and other seemingly private or nonpolitical arenas are also appropriate venues for general responsibility-taking.

The two strategies strengthen each other and result in a growing distance between civil and political associations on the one hand and citizens on the other. The participatory hallmark of the modern era is a mix of low cost “contracted out” and DIY (Do It Yourself) political involvement – citizens make relatively modest financial contributions to contract out campaigning and lobbying on issues of concern to “the professionals” and simultaneously engage in low cost individualistic participation via boycotting and buycotting products or ethical shopping.

There is, however, a paradox at the heart of chequebook participation – it delivers both more participation and simultaneously a democratic deficit. Many groups have mobilized the chequebooks and bank accounts (via automated payments) of supporters who are prepared to fund their campaign and advocacy activities. However, many scholars would see chequebook involvement as shallow and weak because for most citizens their involvement remains passive and devoid of much by way of (internal) democratic content: i.e. supporters play no role in the election of group leaders or the selection of organizational tactics or policies. In additional to this, the professionalized recruitment strategies tend to accentuate political inequality. Much chequebook participation is not spontaneous, but reflects targeted activation (Schier, 2000) strategies of groups “supplying participation”. Groups target individuals with specific socio-demographic profiles and lifestyles because they have a greater chance of converting their predisposition into membership. Brady et al. (1999) identified rational prospecting as the first stage of their explanation of citizen political recruitment. Who is being asked to join is crucial. Groups target those most likely to join and such skewed recruitment practices inevitably deliver skewed participation.

Many organizations also see limiting “supporter” involvement largely to financial contributions as the most efficient way to mobilize. From a democratic perspective there are tensions between finding the best way to produce the most effective results and dealing with a bona fide – active and democratically imbued – membership (input versus output legitimacy). Many groups have very little sense of this dilemma believing that they are following a pragmatic path in contemporary politics. Professionalization and political passivity can be seen as driven by four main (and several subsidiary) factors:

1. Shared interests. Many professionalized groups have found that most citizens are content to be financial supporters as opposed to active members and that offering such limited involvement is an efficient way to mobilize. Supporters are persuaded to join through sophisticated recruitment techniques and are only likely to remain supporters (customers) if the demands on them remain financially small. Professional groups appear to share Fiorina’s (1999: 415f.) view that “contrary to the suggestions of pundits and philosophers, there is nothing wrong with those who do not participate, there is something unusual about those who do”.
2. Mobilisation of bias. Groups try to attract citizens (potentially or actually) engaged in individual and collective action. In this way they target the socially and politically most interested (and financially most viable) parts of the population. In short, professionalized groups round up the usual suspects.
3. “The rise of the unelected ” (Vibert, 2007). The nature of the policy-making process means that groups are also partly driven to professionalization by the requirements of public agencies. Many groups have recognized that in day-to-day politics influencing policy outcomes relies more on expertise and technical knowledge, rather than the mobilization of large numbers of concerned citizens (Crenson and Ginsberg, 2002). Thus, there are several implications of these developments. First, as Saurugger (2007: 397–8) notes, interest groups and social movements “increasingly professionalized to represent the interests of their constituency in an efficient way”. Second, professionalization and the highly technical nature of the political discourses around many issues effectively exclude much citizen participation. As Brulle (2010: 83) notes, this development “reinforces existing relationships of power and institutional dynamics. These factors lead to a weakening of efforts to increase political mobilization.” Third, the nature and target of lobbying and advocacy campaigns have altered. As Green and Smith (2003: 335) note:
   There is a natural tendency to gravitate toward tactics that command the attention of others, particularly donors. Campaigns crave attention and credibility: expensive, large-scale, professionally crafted communication is a way to demonstrate one’s seriousness of purpose. This consideration tends to tilt campaigns away from the sorts of grassroots tactics that foster personal contact with voters.
   Fourth, Barasko and Schaffer (2008: 188) highlight the key normative issue:
   As interest groups play an ever-greater role in the policymaking process, it “becomes an increasingly important question whether the organizations replacing former state functions are truly membershipbased and participatory (Walker & McCarthy, 2005, p. 3; see also conclusions in Schattschneider, 1935)”.
   As a consequence, important aspects of the democratic polity are fundamentally changed by this “rise of the unelected” (Vibert, 2007).
4. Members as distraction. Following from point (3) it is expertise and specialist knowledge that is required to influence policy outcomes and this cannot be bought cheaply. Groups look to major institutional sources for patronage to support their campaigning and lobbying activities. For example, Greenwood (2007: 343) noted the EU Commission spends some €1 billion on funding almost the entire (300) citizen interest group universe and some organizations get up to 80–90 per cent of their funding from the Commission. If institutional sources are prepared to fund organizations to operational levels of 80–90 per cent then members can be seen as a luxury, or a “nonlucrative distraction” (Skocpol, 2003: 134). Why commit significant organizational resources to the identification and attraction of members when institutional patronage provides the resources required to engage in professional lobbying? In addition to this, being a membership based group increases organizational costs: servicing a membership is more costly than being a donor or supporter based group where organizations make regular appeals for funds, but don’t have to expend any effort on elections or involving members in deciding policies and strategies.

Research Questions and Outline of the Volume

The ma...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction Democracy, Professionalization and Participation
• Part I Professionalization and Democratic Politics
• Part II Changing Democratic Engagement
• References
• Index