1 Introduction
The political history of Pakistan since independence can be neatly divided into its pre-1971 and post-1971 phases. The year 1971 is an important watershed in Pakistanâs political history, for it was in this year that Pakistan earned the distinction of being the first state in the post-war era to experience disintegration. The story of East Pakistan is well researched and documented, signifying the plight of the Bengali populace and the political, economic, social and cultural policies that the Pakistani state instituted in denying power and participation to its own people. The present work seeks to move beyond 1971, to critically evaluate the new Pakistanâs treatment of its non-dominant ethnic groups. The story of post-1971 Pakistan, as will be seen, is not markedly different from pre-1971 Pakistan. In more ways than one, the Pakistani state and its despotic powers continued to manifest themselves with the same force and intensity in the post-1971 era. In this important phase, the range of ethnopolitical actors increased with the addition of an assertive Sindhi and Mohajir ethnic movement, while the Baloch ethnic movement remained potent, as was the case before the separation of East Pakistan.1
In moving towards the post-1971 phase of the state of ethnic politics and movements in Pakistan, two preliminary thoughts informed my interest in the subject:
- What lessons, if any, had the Pakistani state learned in the aftermath of the secession of East Pakistan where an army-led military action against the Awami League resulted in disintegration of the Pakistani nation(s) state?
- An initial review of post-1971 Pakistan revealed a picture of increased ethnic conflict highlighted by military action against the Baloch in the 1970s, against the Sindhis in the 1980s and Mohajirs in the 1990s. Ethnic conflict and ethnic movements in post-1971 Pakistan had certainly not abated but had shown a remarkable tendency to rise.
Before moving further, it is prudent to designate the key features of the post-1971 state as distinct from the pre-1971 Pakistani state:
- In terms of territory and geography, the post-1971 Pakistani state was distinct from the pre-1971 state as the province of East Pakistan had now separated, after a successful secessionist movement, and emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh. The post-1971 Pakistani state was thus a dismembered and fractured polity in which ironically the majority had seceded from the minority.
- The post-1971 Pakistani state was distinct from the pre-1971 Pakistani state in terms that the former now professed an avowedly democratic ideal as opposed to the latter which was overwhelmed with bureaucratic and military centralised authoritarianism. Bhutto and the Pakistan Peopleâs Party had won elections in West Pakistan after Pakistan experimented with universal adult franchise for the first time in its political history in 1970. The post-1971 state thus ushered in a new era of democracy and ascendancy of a popularly elected democratic government.
- The post-1971 Pakistani state formalised the dilemma of the pre-1971 Pakistani state where politically dominant ethnic group(s), yet numerically in a minority, ruled over the majority group (the Bengalis). After the secession of East Pakistan, the political dominance of the Punjabis came in consonance with their numerical majority in the new state of affairs. Thus, the Punjabis were now both politically and numerically dominant while before 1971 they were only dominant politically.
Theoretically, the focus of the present work is on three major concepts, the âstateâ, ânationalismâ and âpolitics of ethnicityâ. All three concepts are elaborately dealt with and key works from international relations, political science, comparative politics, sociology as well as nationalism and ethnic studies are studied and analysed. With regards to the state, I bring forth the work of three major theoreticians, Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann and Joel Migdal. By combining these three perspectives together, the notion of the state as a âbordered power containerâ (Anthony Giddens) emerges which has at its disposal both âinfrastructural and despotic powersâ (Michael Mann) which all manifest themselves inwards, with respect to a stateâs relation with its society (Joel Migdal) and outwards, with respect to foreign policy and international relations.
As far as the state is concerned, I argue that the state needs to be understood both as an autonomous entity wielding power over society as well as a non-neutral apparatus whose policies and power have the effect of privileging some groups over others. The latter part of the statement is often invoked when estimating the emergence of ethnic movements on the part of non-dominant ethnic groups for such groups claim that the state merely serves to protect the interests of dominant ethnic groups. Though undoubtedly correct, too much concentration on such an argument leads one to obliterate the autonomous power that states invoke which make the state, at times, independent of the social forces (ethnic groups) that constitute it. Moreover, the term âstateâ itself needs to be carefully qualified and set apart from the âgovernmentâ. In post-1971 Pakistan, the oscillation from a statist (army and bureaucracy-led) rule to a government (politicians led) rule needs to be put into proper perspective because the role of the latter is as indispensable in the emergence of ethnic conflict as is that of the former.
Furthermore, nationalism is taken as a discourse which has the great merit of being copied in diverse social and economic settings. In arguing such a line, I go beyond and critique modernist theories of nationalism, specifically Ernest Gellner, and his predilection that nationalism is a product of the advent of the mass-based industrialised society. Looking at the case studies, one is compelled to question such a judgement because of the diverse socioeconomic formations within Pakistan which experienced the rising tide of nationalism after 1971. In theoretical terms, the three instances of ethnic conflict were interesting as they emerged from three distinctive socio-economic settings. The Baloch society was predominantly tribal, the Sindhis rural while the Mohajirs were based in urban areas. However, all three communities utilised the language of ethnonationalism in order to rally their members against a domineering and hegemonic Pakistani state. Thus, nationalism as understood was being replicated in diverse settings by peoples whose rights were being abrogated. What did this mean in the context of the theory of nationalism? Did this imply that modernist theories of nationalism were at fault in implying that the phenomenon was only relevant to the modern developed and industrialised world? Or had nationalism theorists largely failed to appreciate the discursive power of nationalism in the colonial and post-colonial worlds in the twentieth century?
The third major concept in the present work is that of âpolitics of ethnicityâ. The politics of ethnicity perspective is essential, in that, it helps to identify the politics of ethnic groups and the consequent ethnic movement which is generated as a result. A politics of ethnicity perspective, most importantly, helps us identify that though ethnonationalist movements claim to speak for and represent the whole nation, they, in reality, speak for and represent only some members of the nation. Members of one nation feeling exploited and powerless might also contain members who thrive on the support of the state and may be rightly labelled as lackeys of the state. The perceived discrimination that members of a nation grieve about might only relate to those members of the nation that feel such a grievance. Other members of the same community might find it convenient to ally themselves with the state despite protests to the contrary by their co-ethnics who espouse the same culture and speak the same language but are different in terms of their political goals and strategies.2
This analysis leads us to a manifest phenomenon in the politics of ethnicity perspective and that is to see ethnic groups not as holistic entities members of which are bound together in a bond of solidarity permeating the rank and file of the ethnic group. Rather, ethnic groups are internally stratified on the basis of the political choices that they make by allying themselves with the state or standing in opposition to it. Political and ideological divisions stratify ethnic groups into distinct political parties to the extent that conflict not only exists between communities but most crucially inheres within them.3 It is often the conflict with the âOtherâ which dominates national and international news headlines: Bosnian Muslims versus Bosnian Serbs, Hutus versus Tutsis, Mohajirs versus Pashtuns. However, the conflict within communities hardly gets the same news, attention and publicity, despite this fact being an embedded reality of ethnic groups and movements.4 A sentiment or emotion towards a people, language, culture or race might make one feel as part of a larger nation. However, this does not automatically translate into common political action where each and every member of the nation stands united under the banner of a single political party representing their ethnic interests. Moreover, and equally important, the perceived injustice of the ethnic group might be real or imagined only for some or the majority members of the community, but not all.5
Furthermore, the mere presence of ethnic heterogeneity within a polity is not necessarily correlated with ethnic conflict and violence. Ethnic conflict and violence, on the other hand, are dependent on the political system which serves to either attenuate or intensify feelings of ethnicity. As Laitin and Fearon demonstrate in a valuable study on ethnic conflict on what they believe are three common errors which academics, policy-makers and journalists often commit.
First, Laitin and Fearon discredit the conventional wisdom that ethnic conflict suddenly resurfaced in the post-Cold War era specifically with the changes in the international system. In fact, civil wars began to accumulate in the immediate aftermath of the post-war era as witnessed in the numbers of deaths which totalled 16.2 million as compared to 3.33 million deaths in interstate wars between 1945 and 1999.6 Second, greater degree of ethnic and/or religious diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict and civil wars. Thus, ethnic and/or religious differences do not in themselves determine whether a particular polity will experience conflict or civil wars. And this by extension leads to the third point, that is, conflict is not a function of differences rather conditions that favour insurgency. Laitin and Fearon hypothesise that âfinancially, organisationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practicesâ.7 Laitin and Fearonâs assessment that differences in themselves do not contribute to conflict is a powerful one. The mere presence of ethnic heterogeneity does not in essence produce ethnic conflict between dominant and non-dominant ethnic communities. Ethnic conflict, in societies where it takes place, has to be qualified with an assertion that takes the state (and government) as important actors and their policies contributing either to ethnic amelioration or assertiveness. It does not matter how many ethnic groups inhabit a single society. All that matters is how ruling elites co-opt different ethnic groups into the political structure of the state by empowering them with decision-making in, for example, a consociational and/or federal political system. One may conclude then by estimating that ethnic conflicts are not generated automatically nor are they necessarily related to degrees of ethnic heterogeneity which prevail within a society. Ethnic conflict is a function of political factors and it assumes importance as a response to the state and its policies.
As far as the three case studies are concerned, my purpose is to draw parallels but at the same time look at the specificities of each case study in detail. First, as mentioned above, each case study emanates from a distinct socio-economic and socio-political formation. Also, it is important to note that when military operation was initiated against the Baloch in the 1970s and Mohajirs in the 1990s, both these ethnic groups and their respective political party was in power. This was not the case when it came to the Sindhi nationalists in the 1980s. Second, as opposed to the Baloch and Sindhis, the Mohajirs have generally been very well represented both in the bureaucracy and the Army in pre-1971 Pakistan. The Mohajirs were major stakeholders in the Pakistan Movement in the colonial era and they assumed important positions of power and authority in the newly independent state of Pakistan. In post-1971 Pakistan, however, the Mohajir community experienced a relative decline in their recruitment to the bureaucracy, a phenomenon which is attributed to the implementation of a new quota system by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. As will be seen in the case study chapters, a marginal increase in the representation of the Sindhi populace is evident in post-1971 Pakistan, while the Baloch continue to be under-represented and marginalised.
Third, anti-Punjabi sentiment is most evident in the case of Baloch and Sindhi nationalism as opposed to Mohajir nationalism. The Baloch and Sindhis and their fear of ethnic domination of the Pakistani state by the Punjabis manifested itself in the early years of Pakistanâs independence. In fact, for the Sindhis, the fear of Punjabi domination of the future Pakistani state made way in the colonial era. For the Mohajirs, it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi, who was most responsible for a change in their fortunes and not the Punjabis, however, it will be seen that a nascent anti-Punjabi sentiment is evident in the early phases of Mohajir nationalism.
Fourth, a common denominator of the three ethnic movements and one which I exclusively focus upon is the variable of intra-ethnic conflict. Intra-ethnic conflict is taken as a key variable in order to comprehend the political divisions that exist within an ethnic group despite their cultural and linguistic commonality. Intra-ethnic conflict is important to analyse for it impacts heavily on ethnic movements experiencing conflict with the state. The state, in such an instance, instrumentalises intra-ethnic conflict in order to divide the power of the ethnic group confronting them. One may be able to hypothesise then that ethnic groups are not homogenous entities rather sites of political contestation and conflict over how best to achieve their political goals vis-Ă -vis the state.
The plan of the book
The second chapter elucidates the theoretical framework by bordering on important works within the literature of nationalism, state and politics of ethnicity. The three hypothetical statements which it seeks to elucidate are: (a) nationalism is impervious to specific socio-economic dynamics and structures and as a form of ideology and politics is universally applicable and relevant; (b) the state is an institution of omnipotence in modern societies determining the salience or otherwise of ethnic movements and conflicts. Moreover, the state needs to be undermined as an institution in modern-day socio-political parlance, where appropriate, and adequate attention is required also on the government and its role in shaping ethnic conflict; (c) the politics of ethnicity perspective and its pioneering theme bordering on instrumentalism/constructivism which treats ethnic groups as political actors and allows one to account for intra-ethnic conflict which inheres within ethnic groups.
The third chapter lays out an empirical analysis of the Pakistani state, government and ethnic movements in post-1971 Pakistan. The purpose is to critically engage with important academic works on politics and ethnic movements in post-1971 Pakistan. The stateâgovernment distinction is brought forth including the role of the latter in precipitating ethnic conflicts as well as the important disjuncture between the state and government as witnessed in post-1971 Pakistan from the governments of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Mohammad Khan Junejo to Benazir Bhutto and finally to Nawaz Sharif. The conventionally accepted arguments relative to the docility of governments in the face of the army-dominated state is critically re-evaluated to present a more informed and nuanced understanding of politics in Pakistan.
The fourth chapter deals with the case study of Balochistan. It begins with a historical development of Baloch nationalism in the twentieth century and specifically, the rise of the Khanate of Kalat as a bastion of Baloch nationalist aspirations. The Khanate of Kalat and its drive towards achieving independence was a major challenge to the Pakistani state and the situation assumed complexity, especially after Kalat declared independence on 15 August 1947. In the post-colonial era, Balochistan, where nationalist activism has remained most assertive, has been the site of ethnic conflict in 1948, 1958, throughout most of the 1960s and from 1973 until 1977, which is the main subject of the book. In the 1970s, Baloch nationalists were involved in a military conflict with the Pakistani state and a political conflict with the Pakistani government. Inter- and intra-ethnic conflict in Balochistan is also accorded attention as well as the ideological orientation of the Baloch nationalist elite.
Chapter 5 deals with Sindh and Sindhi nationalism which emerged as a political force only in post-1971 Pakistan although a distinct Sindhi nationalism had started to take shape in the colonial era. Before 1971, Sindhi ethnonationalism was consumed in the political organisation of the National Awami Party and its manifestation in the 1960s was primarily cultural. However, after the formation of Awami Tahreek and Jeay Sindh Mahaz in the 1970s, the political aims and objectives of the Sindhi ethnic movement became more evident. The chapter will focus on the ideology of G. M. Syed and Rasool Bux Palijo, pioneers of Sindhi nationalism and comprehend the reasons for the military operation in Sindh in the 1980s along with the inter- and intra-ethnic dimensions of conflict in Sindh.
Chapter 6 deals with the rise of Mohajir nationalism in the 1970s and its emergence as a major political force in Pakistan in the 1980s. A major objective of the chapter is to study the politics of the Mohajir (now Muttahida) Quami Movement (MQM), against which military operation was mainly directed in the 1990s. As with the other case study chapters, intra- and inter-ethnic dimensions of conflict make up a pivotal portion of the chapter. Moreover, the ideology of the MQMâs founding leader, Altaf Hussain, along with other relevant ethnic Mohajir parties are also brought into focus.
2 Nationalism, politics of ethnicity and the state
Nationalism, ethnicity and the state are essentially contested concepts which have generated, and still generate, much debate and discussion within the social sciences. In the sections that follow, I propose to critically analyse the available literature on nationalism, ethnicity and the state in light of key works undertaken in the social sciences. The theoretical chapter intends to provide a critically nuanced view of the three major hypotheses outlined in the first chapter: (a) that analysis of ethnic conflict requires that the state and government be treated as two autonomous and distinct entities with the latter as much responsible for ethnic conflict as is the former; (b) th...