China's Soft Power and International Relations

Hongyi Lai, Yiyi Lu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136331084
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

China's soft power has attracted considerable attention in the recent decade. In this volume scholars from the U.K., Europe, the U.S., Singapore, Australia, Hong Kong and mainland China, including a number of well established and well known analysts on China, examine main areas where China has made noticeable advances in its appeal and influence. They include China's foreign policy discourse, international communication, cultural diplomacy, and foreign assistance. In addition, Chinese concept of soft power, foreign policy strategy, and the relationship between its international standing and that of the U.S. are also closely analysed. The volume covers some of the most recent development and assesses China's soft power critically. This book offers an assessment of China's efforts to cultivate its international image, as well as a critique of Nye's theory of soft power. It draws on case studies of the Chinese diplomatic practice and utilizes world opinion polls. This volume offers a theoretical and empirical perspective on the discussion on soft power with a particular focus on China's soft power.

1 Introduction

The soft power concept and a rising China*

Hongyi Lai

After three decades of phenomenal economic growth, China has become a global economic power. It became the world’s largest exporter in 2009. Its nominal gross domestic product (GDP) surpassed Japan to become the second largest in the world in 2010. Concomitant with its rapidly expanding economy is China’s apparently increasing global political influence, as well its rapidly expanding soft power. Soft power, according to its best-known intellectual proponent, Joseph Nye, is the ability of a state to influence other states through means other than guns and money. In recent years, China’s rising soft power and its expanding foreign aid have attracted a great deal of attention from policy-makers, journalists, and analysts from around the world. However, the two topics have been inadequately explored in academic circles, except for a small number of publications.

This volume aims to address this deficiency in the literature and to distinguish itself from the few existing studies. It offers a critique of Nye’s theory of soft power on the basis of international poll data on the major powers, as well as on Chinese diplomatic practice. Moreover, it examines China’s soft power from perspectives such as its official discourse, public and cultural diplomacy, foreign aid, and political strategies in the course of its rapid ascendance on the world stage. Finally, it also analyzes constraints on the expansion of China’s soft power and international perceptions of China’s economic and international rise in the light of its development up to 2010.

Existing Literature on China’s Soft Power

A number of books on China’s soft power have been published, most of which are edited volumes. These studies have advanced our understanding of several aspects of China’s soft power. These aspects include the popularity and the causes of soft power in China, Chinese efforts to expand soft power in the world, especially in South East Asia, Africa, and to a lesser extent Latin America, as well as the tools China has employed to advance its soft power. These tools include official discourse, culture, and to a lesser extent, trade. Two studies attempt to discuss the effects of Nye’s soft power theory in China, as well as its limits. The following sections will review these studies in light of these aspects.

It is noted in the literature that soft power has gained considerable currency in the official and scholarly discourses in China. Mingjiang Li reported the result of his survey of Chinese articles published in Chinese journals and periodicals that were collected in a large database called the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database. It was found that the annual number of the articles with reference to “soft power” in the article text averaged about eight during 1994–2000. This number jumped to 53 during 2000–2004, and continued to grow to 314 during 2005–2007.¹ During 2004–2007, Chinese top leaders, including President Hu Jintao and Chairman of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin, stressed in several high-profile meetings that that China should strive for its soft power.² The reasons behind the popularity of the concept of soft power could be traced to China’s need to fend off the China threat argument, and to assure the world about the peaceful nature of a rising China³ and that soft power had been “embedded” in Chinese traditional ideology, culture, and foreign strategies.⁴

Next to the popularity of soft power in China and its reasons for this, China’s efforts to cultivate soft power have formed the bulk of discussion in the literature. Indeed, in one of the most noticeable publications on China’s soft power, Joshua Kurlantzick described China’s cultivation of a good image in the developing world.⁵ Similarly, Kurlantzick, Zhu, and Wibowo documented China’s soft power building in Africa, South Korea and Australia, and South-East Asia. They noted China’s recent success in this regard in these regions, especially in Africa.⁶ Similarly, Ding provided an overview of China’s attempts to polish its image and project its soft power around the world.⁷

In particular, several tools employed by the Chinese government to aggrandize its soft power have been examined by a number of scholars. The tool kit in China’s soft power diplomacy includes 1) its reassuring political discourse; 2) its diplomatic conduct including self-restraint over controversial issues; 3) cultural and public diplomacy; and 4) trade and assistance. Grill and Huang noted that culture (including the Confucius Institute), domestic values and policies (especially the Chinese model of development), and foreign policy (including “good neighbor” policies, international peacekeeping, and international aid) became resources of China’s soft power.⁸ In his overview of China’s soft power endeavors, Kurlantzick took note of China’s use of discourse, cultural, publicity, and business tools in cultivating a good image in the developing world, especially South-East Asia and, to a much lesser extent, Latin America and Africa.⁹ Ding also identified three main tools of soft power: the appeal of political values associated with domestic performance; “diplomatic fineness”; and external attraction of the culture. Specifically, in examining the cultural and public diplomacy tools for soft power, he reviewed China’s promotion of Chinese language learning abroad, the popularity of its popular culture abroad, and some of the Chinese efforts up to 2007 for polishing its image through the media.¹⁰ In another collection of studies, Kurlantzick emphasized China’s use of personnel training and energy deals for gaining popularity in Africa. Zhu echoed Kurlantzick’s earlier finding by pointing to China’s use of economic interdependence, peaceful diplomacy, and political, social, and cultural exchanges in forging closer ties with South Korea and Australia.¹¹

In summary, tools that have been explored include policy discourse (especially “peaceful rise”), conduct of foreign policy, economic diplomacy and trade, and cultural and public diplomacy. Tools that have been less frequently explored include China’s model of economic development, China’s overall strategies for managing its external relations, and its mediation of regional crises (such as that in the Korean Peninsula). Indeed, Wibowo noted the rising popularity of the “Beijing Consensus” in South-East Asia and its significance for the admiration of China in the region.¹² Zhongying Pang also assessed the pros and cons of China’s model of development.¹³

The mainstream literature of China’s soft power by and large focuses on the empirical cases of the popularity of soft power in China and the major tools China has used to cultivate soft power and polish its image abroad. Thus, the literature largely follows what Mingjiang Li called “the behavioral approach” of soft power, which actually focuses on the “soft use of power.”¹⁴

The existing literature on China’s soft power has offered only sporadic critical examination of Nye’s concept of soft power. Li was dissatisfied with the fuzzy boundary between hard and soft power. In about four pages of the introductory chapter of his edited book, he made two interesting points. First, culture, ideology, and values needed not be the sole tools of soft power, as they might not generate attraction, persuasion, appeal and emulation (APAE). Second, hard power did not necessarily produce coercion, threat, intimidation, and inducement; it could also result in APAE.¹⁵ Similarly, Yongjin Zhang was also not content with Nye’s ambiguous conceptualizations of soft power and advanced similar criticisms about Nye’s claims of culture being a source of soft power and economic strengths and military resources as sources of hard power. Zhang was equally unimpressed with the existing literature by questioning its claims about China’s soft power. He countered that China had not been able to play any critical role in setting the agenda of key international organizations (IOs) and that it had been largely conforming to the rule of these IOs, by Nye’s conceptualization, that would reflect the absence of China’s international soft power.¹⁶

A more rigorous critique of Nye’s soft power theory is offered in an edited volume to which Nye contributed the second and concluding chapters.¹⁷ Nye admitted that he had overstated the intangibility of resources, that hard and soft power resources were interchangeable, and that the failure to distinguish power behavior, i.e. soft power-enhancing conduct, from power resources, i.e. culture, values, and diplomacy, posed a challenge for the application of the concept of soft power. He offered an explanation for the evolution of his concept of soft power in the context of scholarly dissatisfaction with realist and neo-realist theories and the Bush foreign policy. Nevertheless, he admitted that “soft power is an analytical concept, not a theory.”¹⁸

Despite making the aforementioned advances, the existing literature on China’s soft power has left several noticeable gaps to be filled. On the analytical front, it is necessary to offer a clear explanation about what contributes to a nation’s soft power and how these soft power resources may be linked with those of hard power. In addition, the analytical implications and limits of Nye’s concept of soft power can be further explored. Furthermore, how diplomatic responses to international events may also erode a nation’s soft power has been largely ignored in the existing literature. Among the aforementioned studies, only Li’s edited volume has made useful progress, but that progress is still limited.

On the empirical front, in line with the aforementioned analytical issues, the Chinese case can be further examined.¹⁹ Moreover, several additional resources of China’s soft power can be analyzed, and the Chinese case can be considerably updated. The latter is particularly important, as China, arguably the fastest growing economy, has been also experiencing the quickest change in its international influence and international circumstances. It has also been rolling out new initiatives aiming at great soft power. Many latest developments related to China have not been accounted for by existing literature. These developments may help us to better understand the concept and ingredients of soft power, as well as the progress and limits of China’s soft power. In addition, Chinese policies on foreign assistance, one of the critical components of its soft power, have yet to be closely investigated. Even though existing literature has discussed the discourse on peaceful rise, it can be further examined and the latest developments on the issue can be kept up-to-date. The Chinese political discourse, such as that in the official Chinese discourse on world order, needs to be explored. Importantly, one of the latest Chinese official concepts in this arena, i.e. harmonious diplomacy for a harmonious world, needs to be critically assessed. Preliminary discussion on China’s international communications have been undertaken, but a more systematic analysis utilizing recent cases such as the media coverage of the riots in Tibet and Xinjiang is needed. Similarly, the latest developments in China’s cultural diplomacy in the last three to five years can be updated to advance the existing studies on the topic, and its effectiveness should be assessed critically using up-to-date survey data.²⁰ In a similar vein, the image of China around the world in the recent years is reflected in rich and useful international surveys, but this topic has been underexplored, and so have the factors underlying the changing image of China. Finally, the overall strategy of China in managing its rise also needs a closer analysis. This volume hopes to fill these gaps.

The following sections will first examine Nye’s concept of soft power, its limits, and resources, and factors that help bolster soft power will be discussed. This will be followed by an analysis of the main tools, initiatives, and major constraints of China’s soft power. Finally, a synopsis of the remaining chapters of the book will be provided.

Soft Power: Concept and Elements

Nye’s soft power notion has gained widespread currency in foreign policies of the United States as well as many countries, including China. As Parmar and Cox noted, a Google search found 93 million sites that mentioned soft power.²¹ In this segment on the concept, means, and resources of soft power, Nye’s primary publication on the topic, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, will be scrutinized, and the Pew world opinion surveys of 2002, the main empirical data on soft power of major power which Nye himself cited, will be utilized. In addition, similar surveys on the worldwide opinions of major powers in the world will also be cited.

According to Nye, soft power means “getting others to want the outcomes” that the power-holder wants and soft power “co-opts rather than coerces” others.²² In this chapter I adopt this definition of soft power. However, I do not necessarily agree with all the other points of Nye that will be examined, especially on his insistence that soft power originates from three resources that are soft by nature.

Nye emphasized that soft power differs from command pow...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Notes on contributors
• Preface
• 1. Introduction: the soft power concept and a rising China
• 2. ‘Soft power’ and Chinese soft power
• 3. Soft language, soft imagery and soft power in China’s diplomatic lexicon
• 4. The quandary of China’s soft-power rhetoric: the “peaceful-rise” concept and internal debate
• 5. China’s cultural diplomacy: going for soft power
• 6. Challenges for China’s international communication
• 7. Challenges for China’s harmonious diplomacy
• 8. Debunking the myth of China’s soft power: changes in China’s use of foreign assistance from 1949 to the present
• 9. Is China rising at America’s expense? Anti-Americanism and pro-China sentiments in global public opinion
• 10. China’s foreign policy as a rising power in the early twenty-first century: the struggle between taoguangyanghui and assertiveness
• Index