The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union

Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

Richard Mole

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136327728
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Baltic States are unique in being the only member-states of the EU to have fought to regain their sovereignty from the Soviet Union, only then to cede it to Brussels in certain key areas. Similarly, no member-states have had to struggle as hard as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to preserve their identity after fifty years of Soviet nationality policy in the face of sub-state and supra-state challenges. The post-communist experience of the Baltic States thus allows us to examine debates about identity as a source of political power; the conditioning and constraining influence of identity discourses on social, political and economic change; and the orientation and outcome of their external relations. In particular, the book examines the impact of Russian and Soviet control of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the Baltic independence movements of the late 1980s/early 1990s; the citizenship debates; relations with Russia vis-à-vis the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Army; drawing of the shared boundary and the rights of Russian-speaking minorities as well as the efforts undertaken by the three Baltic States to rebuild themselves, modernise their economies, cope with the ensuing social changes and facilitate their accession to the EU and NATO.

1 Identity and political legitimacy: independence won and lost

As any historian will attest, the fact that ‘individuals and societies use the past in order to sustain current identities’ is ‘one of the clichés of historiographical discussion’ (Davidson, 2004, p. 204). Nothing serves to unite and mobilize a people as effectively as memory of a shared victory or, in particular, collective suffering. (Indeed, Latvians have more holidays when the flag is flown at half-mast than when it is waved energetically.)¹ The aim of this chapter is thus to present the panoply of events, myths and symbols that have served to unite and mobilize the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians throughout their histories rather than to provide an all-encompassing history of the three nations per se.² In charting the emergence of national consciousness among the Baltic peoples and in analysing their struggle for self-determination, I will focus on the colonization of the Baltic littoral by various European powers, the relationship between the Baltic territories and Russia before and after the former’s incorporation into the Romanov empire, changes in social structures in these territories and the developments in political thought that set in train the struggle for independence. The final section will examine the history of sovereign statehood up to the outbreak of World War II.

However, this chapter is more than simply an exercise in understanding the past. The past, present and future of any society are inextricably linked. As Karl Marx wrote in one of his more insightful passages, ‘Men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past’ (Marx and Engels, 1973, p. 398). Analysing the conditions of possibility in the past that allowed specific discourses to become hegemonic in the present – naturalizing social hierarchies, legitimating a particular worldview and conditioning and constraining political action – is thus a further aim of this chapter. Contrary to Kant, who argued that such conditions of possibility are ‘made possible by pre-given categories of the human mind’ and are therefore ahistorical and invariable, I argue that the former are subject to political struggle and historical change (Howarth and Torfing, 2005, p. 10). Identifying the conditions of possibility that enabled the establishment and/or dislocation of specific hegemonic discourses is thus essential if we are truly to comprehend both the histories and the contemporary politics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Colonization and political control in pre-modernity

As discussed in the introduction, the concepts of national self-determination and popular sovereignty did not exist in pre-modern Europe, with political control over territory exercised largely through conquest, marriage or succession and legitimized in terms of Divine Right. The historical conditions of possibility allowing the hegemonic discourse of Divine Right to be dislocated and the principle of national self-determination to emerge and delegitimize foreign control were not established until the late eighteenth century in Western Europe, and these revolutionary ideas did not make their way to the Baltic littoral for 100 years after that. From the thirteenth century until the early twentieth, the history of the peoples of the Baltic lands was thus largely one of conquest by and submission to foreign rulers.

Of the three modern Baltic nations, archaeologists claim that it was the tribal ancestors of the Estonians who were the first to settle in the region. While the term Estones was not used until the thirteenth century, archaeological evidence shows that Finno–Ugrian tribes arrived some 3,700 years earlier (Lieven, 1997, p. 38). The structure of society in the Estonian lands in the early medieval period was relatively simple, with little institutionalized or centralized political organization. Society was structured round the kihelkond (parish), made up of several villages, and the maakond (district), which consisted of several parishes. Each administrative subdivision was headed by an elder but, despite the fact that a council of maakond elders would meet sporadically to discuss administration and trade and conclude or revoke treaties of war, there was no single leader, administrative jurisdiction was limited, each district was self-governing and relations among them were uncoordinated. Nevertheless, while political unity was only nascent, the Estonian lands remained free of foreign dominance until the German conquest in the thirteenth century.

While the inhabitants of the medieval Estonian lands were believed to be broadly homogenous in terms of ethnic markers, the same could not be said of the population of the lands to the south. In the early 1100s, the territory of modern-day Latvia and Lithuania was home to the Prussians, Lithuanians, Couronians, Livs, Lettgallians, Semigallians and Selonians, who are believed to have migrated to the region around 2000 BC (Christiansen, 1980, p. 34). These main groups comprised various smaller tribes, constituting the main political units throughout the pre-modern period. Although they would mobilize armies, assemble meetings and take collective responsibility for maintaining frontiers, there is no evidence of ‘any consciousness of common membership’ (Plakans, 1995, p. 7). Even the social developments of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries – militarization, class distinction, lordship, accumulation of heritable wealth etc. – failed to engender a sense of solidarity. As late as 1219, for example, the tribes in the Lithuanian lands still obeyed five major chiefs and 16 minor ones. The lack of political centralization was equally evident among the neighbouring tribes to the north. While chronicles in Latin referred to the various Latvian territories as ‘states’, this should not be understood in the modern sense of the term, in that numerous castle sites suggest that each was multi-centric, with a variety of leaders (ibid., p. 6). It was this lack of cohesion that made it difficult for the various tribal groups to withstand the invasion by the German crusaders in the early thirteenth century.

German traders first arrived in the eastern Baltic region in the 1160s, sailing from Lübeck – via Visby – and creating the basis of what was to become the Hanseatic League. While they were by no means the first outsiders to cross the sea to the Baltic littoral (with Vikings traversing the Baltic lands en route to Kieven Rus’ from at least the ninth century), the changes set in train by German traders and, around two decades later, by Christian missionaries ‘transformed the eastern Baltic littoral thoroughly enough to produce what might be called a new order’ (Plakans, 2011, p. 33). The first two German bishops in the Baltic littoral had little success in converting the local population to Christianity (the second being murdered for his efforts), and it was not until the arrival in 1200 of Bishop Albert von Buxhoevden of Bremen at the head of a large army that the conversion of the indigenous peoples began in earnest. While the main motivation for many colonizers is thought to have been economic (see Kala, 2001, p. 5), ‘the theology and rhetoric of crusading was applied to the Baltic’ so as to legitimize the war against ‘the enemies of the church’ (Jensen, 2001, pp. xix–xx). Indeed, in the few historical records of that period³ the chroniclers presented a sharp difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in both religious and ethnic terms and depicted the locals as ‘less developed and less civilised’ in a bid to legitimize the colonization by Western Kulturträger (ibid., p. xxiv).

With the support of Pope Innocent III and thanks to the military strength of the Order of the Knights of Christ, Bishop Albert succeeded in subjugating the Lettgallians and Livs by 1208 and the Selonians by 1209, before turning his attention to the north.⁴ Conquering the indigenous population of the Estonian lands, however, proved a harder task. Friction between the bishop and the Sword Brethren – as the crusading order was also known – allowed the autochthonous peoples to hold off the invading armies until 1215. However, their lack of political organization made it difficult to mobilize sufficient forces or make a united appeal to foreign allies. This enabled Bishop Albert to conquer the districts of the Estonian lands one by one. Despite winning a decisive victory in September 1217, the Germans were forced to seek the support of King Valdemar II of Denmark, as rivalries between German princes and Rome had led to the closure of Lübeck for the transit of Crusaders (Uustalu, 1961, p. 34). Valdemar landed in Estonia in 1219, and within 12 months the Danish armies had taken control of most of the northern territory of present-day Estonia. From their base in Tallinn (Estonian for ‘Danish fortress’) the Danes pushed southwards until they exercised control over the entire mainland, with the island of Saaremaa the only free territory. In 1223 an uprising by the people of Saaremaa succeeded in ridding the entire region – with the exception of Tallinn – of foreign domination and inflicted heavy losses on the Sword Brethren. However, the combined forces of the German and the Danes had little difficulty in regaining control of the mainland by August 1224, finally conquering Saaremaa in 1227. The failure of the resistance by the native population can be attributed, in large measure, to the strength of regionalism and to the lack of any form of centralized political organization, resulting in ineffective mobilization, while the absence of a central political power meant that they were unable to appeal to and secure foreign allies.

Having taken control of the Estonian lands, the crusading order resumed its attempt to take over the entire Baltic littoral through the subjugation of the peoples of Couronia, Semigallia and Lithuania. However, the Sword Brethren suffered a humiliating defeat against the combined forces of the Semigallians and Lithuanians in 1236. Their numbers seriously depleted, the remaining knights were incorporated into the Order of the Knights of the Cross.⁵ Fighting continued for 50 years, until the Couronians were finally overpowered in 1267 and the Semigallians in 1290. However, neither the Sword Brethren nor the Teutonic Order ever succeeded in taking control of the Lithuanian lands.

Feudalism, religion and identity in the Confederation of Livonia

Following their victory, the conquerors divided the newly established Confederation of Livonia among themselves. The Northern Estonian lands came under the suzerainty of the King of Denmark, the Teutonic Order took control of central and southern Livonia (Livland, in German) and the Church established the archbishopric of Riga and the bishoprics of Dorpat and Courland (Kurland, in German). However, by the mid-fourteenth century political power was exclusively in the hands of the Teutonic Order. An uprising in the northern Estonian territories in 1343–5 had forced Denmark to secure assistance from the German knights. With his territory under their military control, the Danish king had little choice but to sell them his lands.

German rule brought with it Christianity and new social structures, two factors that were to have a significant (in both a positive and negative sense) impact on Estonian and Latvian collective awareness.⁶ While the forced Christianization of the indigenous populations is now interpreted as ‘the beginning of European political history for Estonians and Latvians’ and a ‘baptism of our national identity’, the power of the Church initially kept any sense of national self-awareness firmly in check (Ilves, 1999). The structure of society in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries – which was based on the German feudal system, with villages subordinate to noblemen loyal to the Order or the local bishops – also undermined any potential collective awareness. As Ernest Gellner argues, ‘feudalism hindered the emergence of nations in that political power was decentralized, with little attempt made at integrating the various fiefs and their inhabitants’ (1996, p. 10). Restricted to small feudal units, people in the Middle Ages found it difficult to conceive of the territory in which they lived as part of a larger whole. And so the slow pace of political life in agricultural societies, combined with the lack of realization of any common culture or language, the result of the Church’s control of education and the written word, hampered the spread of national consciousness in the region.

The status of the indigenous peasant population under German rule deteriorated rapidly. Although initially there existed a sizeable group of freemen, their number soon dwindled to nothing as a result of repressive policies pursued by the feudal overlords. Eventually, restrictions were placed on the movements of the native peasant populations, which over the generations resulted in a system of bonded servitude. Growing indebtedness led to a gradual decline in the legal and economic rights of the indigenous masses, until by the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century they were reduced to utter serfdom. Oppressed by rigid feudal structures, the serfs were further excluded from the possibility of social mobility due to their inability to speak their masters’ language, with the social gap widening even further once the status of German increased following its replacement of Latin as the main literary language. Ironically, however, it was this exclusion that helped the indigenous peoples to maintain their cultural distinctiveness, as their inability to communicate with their German overlords made it more difficult for them to be assimilated with the local landowning classes.

In this period there was no sense of collective cultural self-awareness in the Estonian and Latvian territories, due in large part to the diversity of the various groups. While the term eesti (Estonian) did not appear until the 1850s, with the local population referring to itself as maarahvas (country people), the term Letten (Latvian) had come to replace undeutsch (non-German) as the designation of the peasants in southern Livonia as early as the 1500s (Smith, D.J., 2001, p. 3). There are a number of possibilities to explain this development. Given that the thirteenth century had been a time of intense fighting in Livland, we can assume that there was a great deal of internal migration as people fled the war or looked for new land to replace that which had been taken from them. Another possibility is that the increase in power of the new German feudal elite led to the corresponding decline in the power of the autochthonous elites. With no unifying focus, the incentive or ability to maintain distinguishing characteristics gradually waned, until the various ethnic groups identified themselves as one collective entity. The third, and perhaps most convincing, theory is that the German ruling class represented such a strong Other in terms of language and culture that the self-identifying characteristics of the various ethnic groups became largely insignificant in relation to each other.

The Lithuanian empire and the development of Lithuanian identity

While the history of the indigenous Estonian and Latvian peoples was one of subjugation and foreign domination, the Lithuanian territories could boast an independent monarchy and an empire stretching almost as far as the Black Sea. Nevertheless, although it retained quasi-independence until the late eighteenth century, this was at the expense of the development of a cohesive cultural identity.

The unification of the various pagan Lithuanian tribes was achieved around 1230 by Grand Duke Mindaugas, a process hastened by the threat of invasion from both the east and the west. Acts of war united the whole population in a common hatred of the enemy, while contact with outsiders generated the idea of ‘otherness’, an important factor in the fostering of one’s sense of Self. By 1290 the Teutonic Order had conquered eastern Prussia and subjugated Semigallia and Courland and made various attempts to annex Lithuania, with the aim of linking the conquered territories and Christianizing the entire Baltic littoral. While the Order was assuaged for a while after Mindaugas’s conversion to Christianity in 1250–1, the threat of invasion returned following the king’s assassination in 1263, when the local population reverted to their old ways. By the late thirteenth century, the cause of converting the last pagans in Europe drew a great deal of support from Crusading armies in the West and from the Holy See. In response, the Lithuanians sought to neutralize this dual threat to their independence by fomenting dissent between the Order and the Church. They did so by highlighting the schism between the two regarding the rights of non-Christians. The knights believed that pagans had no entitlement to land, property and liberty and that Christians should enjoy the right to invade the territory of pagan populations and seize their land and property in order to convert them to Christianity. While this discourse legitimized their actions in the region, forming the basis of their policy of expansion, it clashed with Christian thinking and brought them into conflict with the Church (Lieven, 1997, p. 388).

In order to safeguard their eastern border, Lithuania pursued a policy of expansion, annexing land and acquiring new allies on the way. This strategy proved so successful that, by the late fourteenth century, the Lithuanian empire was larger than the combined principalities of Muscovy, which it challenged for the leadership of the Russian lands. During this period, however, rivalries within the Lithuanian nobility left the state much weakened vis-à-vis both Russia and the Teutonic Order. In a bid to strengthen his country’s position, Prince Jogaila of Lithuania accepted the Polish crown in 1385 and the following year signed the treaty establishing the Union of Kreva. Although the alliance provided Jogaila with greater military power against the Russians and the Teutonic Knights, the price he had to pay was high. He was required to convert himself and his subjects to Christianity, return to Polish aristocrats the territory which they had lost in recent years and ‘associate the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Kingdom of Poland in a permanent union’ (Davies, 1981, p. 117). While the union with Poland is often blamed for halting the development of Lithuania as an independent nation, Robert Lord has argued that – had it not allied itself with Poland – it ‘would probably soon have become Russified and riveted to the Byzantine civilization of the East’, given that Lithuanians were outnumbered ten to one within their own empire by Orthodox White Russians and Ukrainians (1923, p. 39). Moreover, the empire used Old Church Slavonic as its language of diplomacy and had no ‘centralised administrative system to compensate for its national and religious diversity’ (Lane, 2001, p. xxii).

Although the union did succeed in preserving Lithuanian autonomy, the unequal nature of this arrangement was evident from the start. Although formally a Christian state from 1387, Lithuania was not made an independent province of Rome, as was usually the case, but came under the control of the Polish church province of Gniezno. Lithuania’s subordinate role was formalized in 1569 with the Union of Lublin, diminishing Lithuanian autonomy and shaping Polish–Lithuanian relations for almost two centuries. While many Lithuanian nobles were sympathetic to the idea of Lithuanian autonomy and the preservation of national symbols, they were also attracted by Western ideas and cultures and by the status and power enjoyed by their Polish counterparts, which eventually made them vulnerable to assimilation. To enjoy the benefits of social advancement, Lithuanians had to adopt the Polish language and culture and give their primary allegiance to the state and not to the cultural group with which they shared ethnic ties. As a result, according to Jerzy Łukowski, the ethnic Lithuanian ruling elite became fully Polonized by the late sixteenth century, with the Lithuanian language spoken only by the peasantry (1991, p. 3). Other historians, however, insist that, while these nobles did indeed adopt Polish language and culture, they nevertheless maintained a sense of Lithuanian identity (Lubamersky, 2001). Adam Mickiewicz, for example, began his most famous poem, Pan Tadeusz, with the declaration ‘Litwo! Ojczyzno moja!’ (‘Lithuania! My homeland!’).

The impact of the Reformation on national consciousness

By the sixteenth century, the status of the peasantry in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian lands was very low. Economic conditions were harsh, and they were denied the most basic rights and freedoms. While the indigenous peoples of the Baltic littoral would thus potentially have been a receptive audience for the Reformat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction: identity, discourse and power
• 1. Identity and political legitimacy: independence won and lost
• 2. The years of Soviet occupation: independence lost and won
• 3. State- and nation-building: the politics of identity
• 4. The politics of foreign policy: relations between the Self and the Other
• 5. Identity, security and the idea of Europe
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Interviewees
• Index