Education and the Social Construction of 'Race' (RLE Edu J)

Peter Figueroa

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136510243
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Éducation
• Subtopic: Éducation générale

Does the education system help or hinder the fight against racism? This volume provides a constructive critique of the Swan Report of 1985 and of sociological research into racial and ethnic relations. The author undertakes a searching philosophical and sociological analysis of multicultural and antiracist education. He shows how the education system itself can reinforce racist assumptions and behaviour in society, but also argues that through educational and social reconstructing it can promote constructive cross-cultural relations.

1 Beyond rational choice

BANTON'S ‘RATIONAL CHOICE’ THEORY

One of the weaknesses in many of the debates in Britain during the post-war period about minority ethnic pupils in the British school system, and about multicultural and antiracist education has been insufficient attention to important underlying philosophical issues and theoretical issues of a sociological nature. Michael Banton, a senior British sociologist, is one of the few sociologists in Britain to have focused on issues of ‘race’ relations throughout most of this post-war period (for example, Banton 1955, 1959, 1967, 1977, 1983a, 1985a and 1987); but he has only given passing attention to educational issues (for example Banton 1983b). Although a dialogue with his views on ‘racial’ and ethnic relations is not a main purpose of this book, these views, at least in his more recent publications, provide an excellent and distinguished example of a dominant way of thinking in many quarters today – one which is very different from the philosophical and theoretical approaches which underpin the views I develop in this book. It seems, therefore, a useful starting point to discuss briefly and critically Banton's recent and influential ‘rational choice’ theory of ‘racial’ and ethnic relations (see, for example, Banton 1983a, 1985a and 1987) – especially since he has claimed that one of the ways in which this theory has merits over other theories is that it has clear implications for social policy and practice (Banton 1983a: 389).

According to Banton's ‘rational choice’ theory (Banton 1983a, 1985a and 1987), ‘racial and ethnic relations’ are not a special kind of social relations (for example, Banton 1985a: 135). ‘Physical and cultural differences do not of themselves create groups or categories’ (Banton 1983a: 105). Race and ethnicity are not natural or fixed categories. It is only when physical and cultural differences ‘are given cultural significance and used by humans for their own purposes that social forms result’ (Banton 1983a: 105). It is when they are used to allocate roles that groups or categories arise.

Thus ‘racial and ethnic relations’ need, according to Banton, to be seen within a general theory of social relations. For Banton the best such theory is the ‘rational choice’ or exchange theory of social relations. The starting point for this is ‘a view of social action as the allocation of scarce means to competing ends’ (Banton 1987: 122). The first assumption of the theory is that of optimization, namely that ‘individuals act to obtain maximum net advantage’ (Banton 1987: 122) – that is, to increase their own benefits and to reduce their costs. But they live in a world of scarcity. They are thus in competition with each other. However, as they differ, having differing tastes and resources, they bargain and exchange goods and services with each other, in pursuit of their own advantage (Banton 1983a: 136; 1985a: 121). In other words, they act ‘rationally’ (see Banton 1983a: 108) – or, if they do not, one must ask: at what cost? The important point is that ‘rational choice’ theory looks at all behaviour in terms of ‘rationality’ (Banton 1983a: 108). Banton concedes that all beh aviour may not be ‘rational’; but he nevertheless clearly seems to think that ‘rationality’ is the basic distinguishing feature of human behaviour, and that the criterion of ‘rationality’ may be applied to all behaviour.

The second assumption is that past action constrains present choice (and present action future choice). One implication of this second assumption is that the resources available to a person constrain that person's options: those who command more resources have more alternatives. According to Banton another implication is that under normal circumstances ‘changes will result in greater rationalization of social relations, reducing inconsistencies and resolving conflicts in the social pattern’ (Banton 1987:122), for individuals will always be seeking the ‘best buy’.

Furthermore, this ‘rational choice’ theory relies upon the principle of prescriptive altruism. This is ‘a rule requiring recognition of binding mutual interdependence and a willingness to forego selfish gratification’ (Banton 1987: 124). This is necessary since: ‘Humans can develop then-potential only if they are brought up in social groups’ (Banton 1987: 124).

Another basic principle underlying the theory is that of group alignment. Individuals band together to achieve their ends, through collective action (Banton 1985a: 13; 1987: 124). Or they ‘follow a strategy that assumes others will engage in such action… Social groups result from… the goal-seeking actions of individuals’ (Banton 1987: 124). In fact, social groups are only coalitions, and individuals can weaken, strengthen or cross group boundaries. Relationships between different parties (individuals or groups) ‘are maintained only as long as they are rewarding to the parties’ (Banton 1983a: 403).

Banton seeks with his ‘rational choice’ theory to account only for aggregate behaviour, not for individual acts (Banton 1983:108–9; 1987: 139). This does not mean that the group is the unit of analysis, but that the concern is with overall patterns, which are the outcome of individual variations. The approach is one of methodological individualism, which accepts that groups ‘are constituted from individual behaviour and are subject to continual change as individuals respond to changes in their circumstances’ (Banton 1987: 140). The starting point is individual behaviour, but recognition is given to the constraints on it and to ‘the way in which individuals are organised in collectivities’ (Banton 1987: 140).

Social relations generally are treated as though they are a form of market relations. Banton recognizes, however, that, if uncontrolled, the ‘free market’ is ultimately socially destructive – for each individual would be fighting just for himself or herself. Banton (1983a: front fly-leaf) therefore refers to Meade (1973: 52) with approval, quoting him as follows: ‘the ideal society would be one in which each citizen developed a real split personality, acting selfishly in the market place and altruistically at the ballot box’. One needs on the one hand ‘economically efficient’ selfishness, and on the other an ethical search for justice and a rule of voting to choose between conflicting views.

The central argument in Banton's (1983a: 12) theory is that ‘competition is the critical process shaping patterns of racial and ethnic relations’. Within the framework of this theory Banton sets out five characteristics of ‘racial’ and ethnic relations, and indicates five over lapping theories corresponding to these. The five characteristics are the definition of ‘racial’ and ethnic groups by boundaries, in terms of identification signs, perceived social location, existence in historical time, and differential values.

Thus, there is first of all the theory of boundaries according to which physical and cultural differences are used to create groups and categories, with ethnic groups resulting from inclusive processes and ‘racial’ categories from exclusive ones. When groups encounter, individuals identify with their own group, since that is where the rewards lie. The boundaries are affected by ‘the form and intensity of competition’ (Banton 1983a: 104; 1987: 126) which takes place when groups interact. Boundaries tend to dissolve when people compete as individuals. Such competition is called bargaining (Banton 1985a: 13). But elsewhere Banton (for example, 1985a: 124) refers to bargaining between groups. When people compete as groups, boundaries tend to harden and the possibilities of inter-group ‘harmony are reduced (Banton 1983a: 136; 1985a: 13). The essence of group competition is monopoly’ (Banton 1983a: 123).

It is not the ethnic or ‘racial’ content of the identity that is important, but how the group processes (and especially the processes of inclusion and exclusion) work. As already indicated it is not the physical or necessarily the cultural differences as such that are important, but the social significance they are given and how they are used to allocate roles.

Banton also seems to imply that there is a ‘race’ relations cycle. In ‘the earlier phases’ of the encounter between ‘groups’ there is group competition. Subsequently, comes ‘racial’ ideology as a rationalization (Banton 1983a: 206). Then in later phases, group competition yields place to individual competition – and to the dissolving of boundaries (see Banton 1983a: 208).

According to the theory of signs, relations between groups vary with ‘the characteristic that is the basis for group formation’ (Banton 1987: 127). It is typical of groups based on ‘race’ that membership is involuntary and is transmitted in families. Also the same features have different ‘sign value’ in different societies, it being ‘human societies which rather arbitrarily draw distinctions and use them to create or reinforce social discontinuities’ (Banton 1987: 128).

The theory of categories deals with ‘discontinuities in the assessment of status’ as between groups (Banton 1987). There can either be a two-category system or a multi-category system. In the former the general assumption that one side can only gain at the loss of the other helps to maintain the categories. ‘The solidarity of one group evokes the solidarity of the other so that conflicts easily escalate’ (Banton 1987: 128). The categories in multi-category systems are mostly based upon occupational monopolies. Further: ‘While the weaker groups may enter into coalitions to advance their political interests it may not be possible to maintain them for long’ (Banton 1987: 129).

The theory of group power (Banton 1987:129) ‘is concerned with the terms on which members of groups exchange goods and services, and with the way power affects the implicit bargaining about price’. Banton refers to power as ‘the securing of submission or compliance’ (Banton 1987: 129) and he speaks of ‘the superior part’ exercising power ‘in order to obtain a service’ (Banton 1987: 129). The things that power derives from ‘can all be considered as resources’ (Banton 1987: 130). This includes both natural and human resources. Resources can remain unharnessed, or they can be mobilized. An individual will join in group mobilization ‘only when he expects the benefits of his participation to exceed the costs’ (Banton 1987:136, where he cites Hechter et al 1982).

Finally, in the theory of discrimination, Banton (1987: 132–3) holds that: The intensity and form of competition in a market influence the amount of discrimination that is possible and can reduce or increase any motivation to discriminate. In a competitive market the incidence of discrimination should decline/But Banton (1987: 133) also holds that ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ avoid risky decisions which may result in costly mistakes. Furthermore, he (Banton 1987: 134) states that: ‘People generalize from information available to them, often despite its being insufficient, and this can set up a self-fulfilling prophecy.’

Banton (1987: 135) insists that discriminatory behaviour may be rational behaviour. Thus he cites the example of an employer who discriminates against a particular group because of a belief that the members of that group will be bad employees. Banton maintains that such an employer has acted rationally ‘judged by the conventional criteria of business reality’, even if not from the standpoint of society.

He does grant that: ‘Racial discrimination can be seen as a public bad’ from the point of view of society as a whole (Banton 1987:135). ‘Racial harmony’ will then be the public good to be sought. It is, however, difficult to define positively. Hence ‘it is better to define racial harmony as an absence of discrimination and other features which embitter social relations or may come to do so’ (Banton 1987:135). He does imply that among such undesirable ‘pollutants’ is ‘grossly unfair relations’ even if they ‘may for a time appear harmonious’ (Banton 1987: 135).

CRITIQUE OF BANTON'S THEORY

First of all the name, ‘rational choice’ theory, is at the least misleading. In attempting to justify the name and clarify the theory, Banton (1985c: 590) indicates that he preferred ‘rational choice’ over ‘social exchange’ because ‘exchange is only one part of the domain of choice’. At the same time he (1985c: 590) asserts that it is not a theory of choices, but rather ‘a theory of boundaries’. Subsequently Banton (1987: 122) has stated that the name ‘rational choice theor’, is used ‘to indicate that this theory is a member of a family of theories which start from a view of social action as the allocation of scarce means to competing ends’. He (1987: 123) also says that: ‘The rationality … in question is not a property of some actions rather than others, but a criterion for studying the pattern of behaviour over time.’

But since the words ‘rational’ and ‘rationality’ already have folk and technical meanings, it is confusing to use them in yet some other way. Furthermore, why use the word ‘choice’ if the theory is not a theory of choices? And why apply the criterion of ‘rational choice’ to certain patterns of actions if we know they do not actually involve rational choice?

However, the problem is not just one of names, but also of substance. Banton is concerned with choice and does make assumptions about rationality. Thus he (1985c: 591) concedes that he ‘did not sufficiently specify the mechanisms by which individual choices can generate social patterns’, and he clearly considers that group boundaries are affected by individual choices.

More centrally, Banton uses ‘rational’ in a narrow sense with two aspects: self-interest and instrumentality. Instrumentality, of course, corresponds to the notion of the allocation of scarce means to competing ends. But self-interest goes beyond this and narrows down this principle considerably, since the ends of actions are not necessarily in the interest of the actor, nor necessarily perceived by the actor as so being: they may, for instance, be in someone else's interest, and may be perceived as such. One may genuinely and without regard to one's own self-interest be motivated by other-interest or group interest. For example, many parents in their day-to-day lives put the interest of their offspring above their own. Even the sociobiologists' attempt to account for this in terms of the promotion of one's own genes would require a notion of species-interest or ancestor-interest rather than pure self-interest.

However, even action based on other-interest or group-interest can be ‘rational’ in the sense of being based on instrumental calculations. It is perfectly possible to be concerned with the economic allocation of scarce resources to ends which are not self-interested. Means-ends calculative maximization of self-interest is but a sub-set of the means-ends calculative maximization of ends.

There are actually two closely interrelated sets of issues here: that of self-interest versus other-interest (or of egotism versus altruism), and the more general one of the relations of the individual and the social. Banton recognizes that there is a problem, but his theoretical solutions are not satisfactory.

One approach which he takes is to endorse, as we have seen, Meade's view that the good citizen requires a split personality (Banton 1983a: front fly-leaf). As a sociological or economic theory, or as a social philosophy, this is untenable, and illustrates the inherent con tradictions of dichotomous thinking. How is supposedly economically efficient selfishness to hold together with the ethical search for justice?

The ethical search for justice implies taking every person, including all others, as an end in themselves rather than as a means. This is ultimately what equality means. That concept will be further explored in Chapter 3. But in economically efficient selfishness – or ‘rationalit’ in the narrow sense given to it in ‘rational choice’ theory – the supreme end and value is oneself; and everything else and all other persons are reduced to means to that end.

Rational choice theory with its basic principle of economically efficient selfishness implies at base all-out war of every one with everyone else. The principles on which it claims society is based would lead to the disintegration of society. Rather than the anti-egalitarian, closed and inherently conflictural principle of one's own advantage above everything else, what is needed, as I shall argue in Chapter 3, are egalitarianism and openness. One can just as rationally work towards these goals as towards self-interest, and it is only by taking them as basic values that one can consistently expect constructive interrelations be tween individuals and groups.

More recently Banton (1987: 123–4) has approached the ‘problems’ of self-interest versus other-interest and of the individual versus the social by adopting the principles of ‘prescriptive altruism’ and of ‘group alignment’, as we have seen. But, as stated, these do not overcome the basic contradictions of the dichotomous thinking. They are clearly secondary to the prime assumption that social action is driven by the principle of the maximization of one's own net advantage. The account offered of the generation of the principle of prescriptive altruism in the mother-child relationship is a purely contingent and empirical one; whereas the assumption of optimization is stated as an inherent and necessary one. Similarly, the principle of group alignment is offered merely as a matter of convenience, secondary to the assumption of optimization, and, indeed, merely as a means by which individuals can attain their ends.

Thus, in the utilitarian conception, the social would seem to be secondary to the individual, reducible to the individual, merely a contingent coming together of individuals each in pursuit of their own maximum net advantage. But the social is neither simp ly the sum of individual action, nor is it something contingently added on. The human person is inherently social. Human beings necessarily become what they are in interaction with others. They always appear in a given socio-cultural situation, and their access to reality is always through a pre-given culture, which is of course social in origin, in its functions, and in so far as it is shared. (Yet each individual makes this culture his or her own, selectively, and modulates or modifies it – though in interaction with others.) Even the so-called basic wants or needs of the human person are inevitably culturally mediated – as can be seen, for instance, in diet and in the beliefs, taboos and practices that surround food, raw or cooked. It is not possible to attribute priority either to the individual or to the social, and neither can one be reduced to the other. This theme will be further developed in Chapter 2.

Banton's ‘rational choice’ theory is narrow, not only in the sense that it limits its criterion of rationality to self-interested instrumentality (omitting non self-interested instrumentality), but also in so far as it neither directly addresses non-instrumental rationality nor non-rational behaviour. Rationality is not just a matter of self-interest nor of instru mentality, but also of value orientation, value-consistency, and correctness with reference to certain criteria – such as the rules of logic and of empirical knowledge.

Furthermore, Banton's ‘rational choice’ theory is also narrow in so far as it largely neglects the bases on which even self-interested calculative behaviour takes place. All action and choice – instrumental or not, reflective or ‘spontaneous’, rational or non-rational – take place within the context of values, symbolic systems, beliefs and assumptions, all of which in effect positively define the possibilities and set the limits. This is central to any theory of ‘race’ and ethnic relations, and I refer to it under the notion of frames of reference. I ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. Beyond rational choice
• 2. Racist frames of reference
• 3. What is multicultural and antiracist education? Philosophical and sociological reflections
• 4. A critique of the Swann Report
• 5. Can teachers be taught? Can attitudes be changed?
• 6. Student-teachers' images of Black people and of education for a multicultural society: A case study
• 7. Racism in school: A case study*
• 8. Bias in examinations*
• 9. White schools — black marks: Constructed ‘underachievement’
• References
• Index