Social Psychology and Organizations

David De Cremer, Rolf van Dick, J. Keith Murnighan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781136937897
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Social Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This book is one of the first to provide an overview of recent developments in social psychological theory as it applies to organizational issues. It brings together outstanding scholars whose research touches the interfaces of social psychology, IO psychology and organizational behavior.

Social psychology deals with social interactions between individuals and groups. As individuals populate, run, and confuse (!) organizations, analyzing individual behavior and interpersonal interactions is critical for understanding organizational effectiveness and success, as well as individual satisfaction and well-being. The chapters in this volume address the critical topics for current and future organizational life such as prosocial and antisocial behavior, ethics, trust, creativity, diversity, stress, conflict, power and leadership and many more.

Section IV

Contemporary Issues

11
The Value of Diversity in Organizations:
A Social Psychological Perspective

Katherine W. Phillips

Northwestern University

Sun Young Kim-Jun

Northwestern University

So-Hyeon Shim

Northwestern University

What is the value of diversity? This is a profound question that has spawned a proliferation of scholarly research, popular books, and civic dialogue. The desire to develop a compelling answer to this question is warranted. Demographic changes in the workforce, changes in the way organizations structure themselves, and changes in the competitive and global landscape of business have all contributed to diversity becoming more prevalent in the modern workplace (Toossi, 2006; Triandis, Kurowski, & Gelfand, 1994; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Despite its increasing pervasiveness, the ability of problem-solving groups (where the integration of unique perspectives is critical) to consistently reap measurable benefits from and avoid the negative consequences associated with diversity remains elusive (for reviews and meta-analyses see Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Kochan et al., 2003; Mannix & Neale, 2005; Milliken & Martins, 1996; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Webber & Donahue, 2001; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). In this chapter we will review relevant social psychological and organizational research on diversity and present a model of the psychological processes underlying the effects of diversity. Our goal here is to develop a better understanding of how and why diversity can be beneficial by integrating the apparently contradictory results from the literature on diversity in problem-solving teams and in organizations. The conventional wisdom that diversity is beneficial because people who are “different” will bring different perspectives to the table is challenged, and an alternative value of diversity focusing on the effects of diversity on all members of a group will be presented. The implications of this perspective for the changing demography of the workforce is readily apparent as the ability to effectively capture diversity’s benefits will be increasingly important for organizations.

THE CONCEPT OF DIVERSITY

As a precursor, it is imperative to develop a shared definition of diversity. In 1998, Williams and O’Reilly drew from the vast literature on self-categorization and social identity theories (Tajfel, 1972, 1974; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and defined diversity as resulting “from any attribute people use to tell themselves that another person is different” (Williams & O’Reilly, p. 81). This definition allowed researchers to encompass more under the umbrella of diversity than just the typical demographic characteristics such as race and gender. Researchers have thus examined the effects of many attributes on group functioning, including functional background, age, tenure in the organization, personality differences, and numerous naturally occurring social or minimal group distinctions (for examples, see Chen & Kenrick, 2002; Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Loyd, 2006). A more recent definition provided by van Knippenberg and Schippers (2007) in their review of the diversity literature covers an even broader spectrum: “diversity may be seen as a characteristic of a social grouping (i.e., group, organization, society) that reflects the degree to which there are objective or subjective differences between people within the group (without presuming that group members are necessarily aware of objective differences or that subjective differences are strongly related to more objective differences)” (p. 519). Although there has been a proliferation of labels to distinguish different sources of diversity (e.g., Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Jackson, May, & Whitney, 1995; Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Pelled, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999), we adopt a distinction that we believe is consistent with the definitions provided here and more broadly encompasses both social psychological and organizational traditions.

We will use the term social category diversity to refer to distinctions that serve as a salient basis of categorization into in-group (people who are like me) and out-group (people who are not like me). This social category diversity may come from salient demographic characteristics such as race, gender, or nationality or any characteristic that may not be immediately visible yet can be rendered salient in the context and thus be used to categorize group members. Using this definition, characteristics such as functional background, geographic location, and political affiliation can all be considered elements of social category diversity (e.g., Lount & Phillips, 2007; Phillips & Loyd, 2006). Furthermore, minimal distinctions such as ostensible preference for a type of painting or having a red shirt versus a blue shirt can also count as leading to social category diversity (e.g., Allen & Wilder, 1979). The critical feature here is that people use these social characteristics to tell themselves that some subset of the group of people is “like me” and that some of them are not (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Consistent with this typology, Harrison and colleagues (1998) adopted the term surface-level diversity, defined as salient characteristics that are more immediately apparent in groups (Harrison et al., 1998; Jackson et al., 1995; Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Riordan, 2000).

Social category diversity exists alongside informational or opinion diversity in task groups. Informational diversity captures the differences in information, opinions, perspectives, and modes of thought and action that are relevant for the task at hand being completed by a group. When individuals are brought together to solve problems in groups, they often possess different information and perspectives that can be used to inform the group. In fact, for many problem-solving groups, which we concentrate on in this chapter, the very reason they are brought together is to garner the diverse knowledge and perspectives that are uniquely held by different group members (e.g., Argote, Gruenfeld, & Naquin, 2000; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996; Phillips, Mannix, Neale, & Gruenfeld, 2004; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995).

Much research on diversity in groups uses social category diversity, such as functional background, as a proxy for informational diversity. In our conceptualization, the actual functional background differences themselves are considered social category diversity (e.g., marketing, engineering, finance), and the information, opinions, and knowledge that these different individuals bring to the table is measured and conceptualized as informational diversity. Past organizational research on diversity has assumed that social category diversity is congruent (i.e., perfectly correlated) with informational diversity (Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Loyd, 2006). In the case of functional background differences, the level of congruence between social category and information diversity may indeed be relatively high (i.e., members of the marketing group share similar information, opinions, and perspectives and members of the engineering group possess different information, opinions, and perspectives from the marketers), but this same level of congruence may not exist for all sources of social category diversity. Hence, the definition of diversity provided by van Knippenberg and Schippers (2007) embraces an important distinction, namely, that the “objective” differences people see between themselves and others do not necessarily reflect the differences that these individuals have for the relevant task. We now turn to research examining the impact of social category diversity on teams and discuss the implications of assuming congruence with informational diversity in organizations.

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CATEGORY DIVERSITY

Much of the previous research on diversity has assumed that any benefit accrued from social category diversity comes from people who are “different” bringing different perspectives to the table. Indeed, researchers have typically interpreted their findings in ways that assume people with different characteristics are the individuals who can bring unique perspectives to the group. However, attributing these unique perspectives solely to the presence of those with different, or out-group, characteristics ignores the possible influence of those with similar, or in-group, characteristics. For example, Thomas and Ely (1996) predicted that important benefits would accrue from demographic heterogeneity in organizations because members of different groups such as women, Hispanics, Asian Americans, African Americans, and Native Americans could bring different or new perspectives and approaches. Furthermore, Cox, Lobel, and McLeod’s (1991) research on the effects of ethnic diversity on a group task demonstrated that individuals approached tasks differently depending on their ethnic differences. Moreover, previous research arguing that diversity in a group is linked to higher levels of conflict presume (not measure) that increased conflict in diverse settings occurs because people who are different disagree and clash with each other (e.g., Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999). Given the methodological designs of these studies, it is also possible that reports of increased conflict in diverse groups are at least partially due to members of the social majority disagreeing and clashing with one another. Past interpretations of the value of diversity have thus presumed that individuals in the social majority group will necessarily share the same information and perspectives with one another (i.e., members of the social majority could not be the source of the disagreement).

However, researchers have occasionally questioned this assumption of congruence between social category and informational diversity by proposing that differences in task perspective may come from where they are not expected (Janis, 1982; Jehn et al., 1999; Lawrence, 1997). According to Jehn et al. (1999), “Social category diversity may not always reflect other types of diversity (e.g., information diversity and value diversity)” (p. 742).More recently, Phillips and colleagues suggest that there may be fundamental psychological processes underlying the relatively widespread presumption by laypeople and researchers alike that there is congruence between social category and informational diversity (Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips, Northcraft, & Neale, 2006; Phillips et al., 2004). In this chapter, we suggest three psychological mechanisms that account for how social category diversity affects people’s affective and cognitive functions and their subsequent performance. These mechanisms are intended to help us better understand the widespread assumption about the congruence between social category and informational diversity.

First, individuals expect socially similar others to agree with them more on both task-relevant and irrelevant issues with socially dissimilar others (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips et al., 2004; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). In particular, Phillips and Loyd’s (2006) findings support this psychological process by showing the influence of dissenting social majority members in diverse versus homogeneous groups. In two experimental studies they examined two different sources of social category diversity (functional background and geographic affiliation) and argued that expectations can cause diverse groups to benefit from the mere presence of people who are different, regardless of whether those “different” individuals have unique perspectives to share.

In their first study, Phillips and Loyd (2006) told MBA student participants that they would be working in a three-person team composed of the participant and either two other MBA students or one fellow MBA student and a medical student. This led to two conditions: (1) the homogenous condition, in which all members of the team were MBA students (same functional category); and (2) the diverse condition, in which one of the members was a medical student (different functional category). Given the composition of the groups, there was always a majority of MBA students, so the participant was always a member of the social majority. The participants were then told that their opinions about which market to target for a medical device was in disagreement with the opinions of the other two members of the group, who were in agreement with one another. Thus, the participant was always a dissenting social majority member. The findings of this first study revealed that participants expected greater task perspective similarity with socially similar (i.e., MBA students) than with socially dissimilar others (i.e., medical students). In addition, when their expectations for similarity were violated, participants were more surprised and irritated by disagreement from the socially similar individuals (i.e., the other MBA students) in homogeneous settings than with the socially similar individual in diverse settings. Furthermore, participants in diverse groups expected a more positive and accepting group experience than those in homogeneous groups. These findings suggest that task-relevant categorization (functional background) triggers expectations of where task perspective similarities are likely to exist.

In their second study, Phillips and Loyd (2006) explored the possibility that individuals expect greater task perspective similarity with socially similar than socially dissimilar others even when the category is irrelevant to the task at hand. In this study, the task-irrelevant distinction was the side of campus in which the participants lived (north or south campus); in the diverse condition, there was one group member from one side of campus and two from the opposite side of campus, whereas in the homogeneous condition, all group members were from the same side of campus. In addition, interacting groups were brought together to make a decision about the best company for another company to acquire. The task was an information-sharing one that allowed for the exchange of unique information and opinions (McLeod, Baron, Marti, & Yoon, 1997). In both homogeneous and diverse conditions, one of the group members—the dissenting social majority member—held an opinion that was different from that held by the rest of the group because the dissenting social majority member’s packet contained information about the companies that was different from that given to the other two members of the group.

The results of this second study suggest that even task-irrelevant characteristics (e.g., geographic location) can trigger expectations of similarity. More specifically, Phillips and Loyd (2006) found that when a member of the social majority voiced a different opinion, homogeneous group members had more negative feelings and engaged less in the task than diverse group members because their expectations that socially similar others would agree with their task perspective were violated. In contrast, when a member of the social majority possessed a different opinion in diverse groups, members perceived the groups as more positive and accepting of alternative viewpoints, there was more persistent and confident voicing of dissenting perspectives, and greater task engagement. These results are consistent with arguments that group members expect differences in knowledge or opinions from individuals who are socially dissimilar (Phillips, 2003; Thomas-Hunt, Ogden, & Neale, 2003). As such, group members seem more likely to consider unique perspec...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• SERIES FOREWORD
• ABOUT THE EDITORS
• ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
• SECTION I: INTRODUCTION
• SECTION II: LEADERSHIP, POWER, AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE
• SECTION III: CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND DECISION MAKING
• SECTION IV: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES