The End of the Cold War and The Third World

New Perspectives on Regional Conflict

Artemy Kalinovsky, Sergey Radchenko, Artemy Kalinovsky, Sergey Radchenko

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781136724299
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Freedom
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book brings together recent research on the end of the Cold War in the Third World and engages with ongoing debates about regional conflicts, the role of great powers in the developing world, and the role of international actors in conflict resolution.

Most of the recent scholarship on the end of the Cold War has focused on Europe or bilateral US-Soviet relations. By contrast, relatively little has been written on the end of the Cold War in the Third World: in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. How did the great transformation of the world in the late 1980s affect regional conflicts and client relationships? Who "won" and who "lost" in the Third World and why do so many Cold War-era problems remain unresolved? This book brings to light for the first time evidence from newly declassified archives in Russia, the United States, Eastern Europe, as well as from private collections, recent memoirs and interviews with key participants. It goes further than anything published so far in systematically explaining, both from the perspectives of the superpowers and the Third World countries, what the end of bipolarity meant not only for the underdeveloped periphery so long enmeshed in ideological, socio-political and military conflicts sponsored by Washington, Moscow or Beijing, but also for the broader patterns of international relations.

This book will be of much interest to students of the Cold War, war and conflict studies, third world and development studies, international history, and IR in general.

1 Gorbachev and the Third World

Svetlana Savranskaya

Between 1985 and 1991, the Soviet Union retreated voluntarily from its overseas empire, thus ending several decades of competition and confrontation that had been central to the Cold War.¹ In the late 1970s, the Soviet leaders found themselves overextended and overtaxed by the burden of supporting regimes which proclaimed themselves to be socialist-oriented but were mainly economically underdeveloped dictatorships, and by the serious deterioration of relations with the US after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some retrenchment would be expected after such expansion. However, what actually happened went beyond the imagination of most perceptive analysts – to a complete redefinition of Soviet and then Russian relationships with the developing world. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and worked together with the UN and the US to bring peace and national reconciliation to Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. The Soviets drastically cut their military aid and withdrew almost all military facilities from Vietnam and Cuba. The central arms control relationship with the US and the transformation in Europe lowered the importance of the developing countries for the Soviet Union, at the same time as it could no longer afford the costs of extended commitments.

This chapter does not presume to provide a comprehensive analysis of Third World conflicts at the end of the Cold War, but has a rather limited scope – focusing on Gorbachev and his policies in the Third World using the new evidence available on this topic from Russian archives.² Rather than concentrating on the resolution of specific conflicts during the perestroika period, I will try to address the following questions: how did Gorbachev's views about the Third World evolve and where did it fit in his priorities? What did he hope to accomplish in the Third World, what were his strategic goals, and what was he able to accomplish?

Gorbachev's priorities in 1985

One important element to be mentioned from the outset is the lack of knowledge about issues in the Third World with which Gorbachev came to power. Coming from the Stavropol Krai in Southern Russia and serving for most of his time in Moscow as Secretary for Agriculture, Gorbachev was not really aware of all the intricacies of Soviet policy in the Third World, and saw them mostly in the context of the global competition with the US and the ideology of national liberation. At the same time, Gorbachev was a true student and a protégé of Yuri Andropov, who had a keen interest in the Third World as the place where the ultimate competition between the two systems would be decided. Andropov also, as the head of the KGB, knew the real state of the Soviet economy and the burden the allies put on his country. That knowledge and also the experience of the 1970s made Andropov critical of the almost automatic support of Third World regimes which proclaimed themselves Marxist.

Gorbachev's main priorities were domestic economic reform, ending the Cold War, and stopping the arms race, without which reform would be impossible. The main, pressing, issue in the Third World, as he saw it, was the war in Afghanistan, which he called the “bleeding wound” at the 27th Party Congress. Ending the war in Afghanistan was at the top of his list. Gorbachev took his Leninism, if not his Marxism, seriously, constantly going back to Lenin for ideas. As far as the Third World was concerned, he believed both in competition with the US, but also in the self-determination of developing countries. The real change that the “new thinking” contained in this sphere was reducing the role of ideology in international relations and abandoning the goal of building socialism in every possible location. In his presentation to the Politburo on Afghanistan on 13 November 1986 he said:

We don't seek socialism there. Our objective is to have a friendly neutral neighbor [. . .] What we don't want is the Americans with their bases. If there are no US air or military bases, they can decide everything else on their own.³

Gorbachev's rhetoric on the Third World showed early signs of change, but also continuity with the old policy. At the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meeting in Sofia on 22 October 1985, Gorbachev, following the usual ritual of such meetings, devoted a section of his speech to the situation in the Third World, calling on the allies to pay special attention to states of “socialist orientation,” putting them into the larger context – “their successes are perceived in the world as confirmation of the . . . socialist choice. And to the contrary – their failures are used to discredit it.” He mentioned the situation in Angola, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe in the context of the need to help them defend against external aggression, but it was India that drew his attention most, as the biggest country of the Non-Aligned Movement and as a key to building collective security structures in Asia. In a way, his treatment of the developing world was more about security and competition with the US than it was about socialist choice. In the same speech, he mentioned the role of developing countries in the anti-war and anti-imperialist struggle, but not in terms of progress toward socialism, only as far as the arms race was concerned.⁴ All in all, Gorbachev was calling for holding Soviet positions but not expanding them, and he gave no encouragement to the idea of world revolution.

Thus, Gorbachev started with a gradual redefinition of Soviet interests – away from supporting Marxist-Leninist regimes and towards cultivating strategic allies in the Third World. There was little new in that approach. It was more in line with the traditional realpolitik views about foreign policy – in other words, capitalist orientation of prospective allies was fine if there were common anti-US grievances. It was very much in line with Andropov's thinking – Gorbachev's mentor talked about cutting costs and avoiding overextension in the Third World – which Gorbachev must have internalized at least to some extent. According to Karen Brutents, deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, already under Andropov superpower interests came to the fore of Soviet policy in the Third World, and Brutents connected this development directly to the origins of Gorbachev's “new thinking.”⁵ This approach meant that now the important countries were not Ethiopia and Mozambique, but India, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. In the Third World the goal became to remove excessive financial obligations and burdens and correct the most outrageous mistakes like Afghanistan. In the beginning of the Gorbachev administration, he basically relied on the same strategy as Andropov would have, just with reduced expenses and scaled down ideological rhetoric. That way, it fitted well with Gorbachev's overarching strategy, which placed domestic reforms at the forefront.

Criticism of Soviet Third World policy before Gorbachev

Already in the 1970s, along with Soviet expansionism in the developing world and especially in Africa, criticism of this policy started to emerge within the Central Committee and in influential research institutes in Moscow. Senior Soviet decision makers, with the important exception of the head of the International Department, Boris Ponomarev, shared a somewhat paternalist approach to the Third World and looked at it as a periphery of world politics.⁶ The key Cold War relationship was with the US and NATO. Local situations in the developing countries were often evaluated in terms of class struggle and the competition between the two visions of the future – how many regimes called themselves Marxist, or socialist-oriented. Expectations from such countries were quite primitive – if they followed the socialist model, they could count on Soviet assistance. At the same time, geostrategic considerations were also prominent – Soviet military bases clearly followed Soviet ideas – in Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia – resulting in a sort of socialist colonialism.

The Soviet understanding of détente included freedom of competition in the Third World while stabilizing and improving the central relationship with the US and engaging in arms control. This notion was never accepted by the US, and détente began disintegrating in the late 1970s precisely because of Soviet expansionism in the Third World. As Zbigniew Brzezinski famously said, referring to the war in Somalia, “SALT lies buried in the sands of Ogaden.”⁷ This fact did not go unnoticed among Soviet foreign policy specialists, and elicited a negative reaction among the more progressive part of the elite. Karen Brutents was especially vocal in his criticism, calling for the reorientation of Soviet Third World policy away from “insignificant” allies to large states with important geostrategic locations – even if they were capitalist-oriented. This approach, obviously, was gaining ground with the Soviet leadership, especially after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In late 1983, Andropov had a long conversation with Brutents about the Third World and asked him to draft a memo about a new approach to the developing world.⁸ People like Georgii Mirskii and Kiva Maidanik at Moscow's Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Russian acronym: IMEMO) argued that the Soviet Union should stop being a hostage to irresponsible leaders proclaiming themselves Marxist, who were becoming dependent on bigger and bigger subsidies from the Soviet Union.⁹ It was understood among Soviet Third World watchers that the attractive power of the socialist idea had begun to grow dull. Most often, the socialist-oriented regimes were poorer and less developed than their neighbors, and often could not feed their own citizens, which made them appeal for more Soviet aid in return for ideological purity and support for the Soviet Union at the UN. No wonder there were anti-Communist rebels in almost all of those countries. Something had to be done.

A fresh start in Soviet policy to the Third World, 1985–1987

As mentioned above, Gorbachev came to power with very little exposure to the Third World, and no particular strategy other than the general Andropovian approach. However, over the first two years of his tenure, he developed a more systematic policy guided by a coherent set of ideas, which, however, he did not have time to implement fully. Gorbachev's early Third World policy was driven by anti-imperialism and the spirit of competitiveness, and by the need to revive the appeal of socialism.

As in many other spheres of foreign policy, Gorbachev wanted a new start which would invigorate Soviet foreign policy and benefit domestic reform. The new policy was designed to be proactive; in no way did it envision a retreat from established geopolitical gains like Angola or Mozambique. It was decided to make a new breakthrough in relations with Latin America, create new security structures in Asia in partnership with India, improve relations with China, and keep supporting Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam and most important revolutionary regimes in Africa. In one important initiative, Eduard Shevardnadze traveled alone to Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay in 1987 in preparation for a Gorbachev visit to Latin America. His predecessor, the formidable Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, had never visited Latin America. Central America was seen as especially important both strategically and politically – strong leftist movements right at the back door of the US. The Soviet Union was not going to abandon Cuba and Nicaragua, and in fact it increased its assistance to Nicaragua in 1985 by 40 percent and, initially, the decision was made to supply MiG fighter planes and other military equipment to fight the US-backed Contras, as a measure countering US trade embargo against Nicaragua.¹⁰

From the start, India became one of the most important countries for Gorbachev. He envisioned a strong partnership with India based on a commonality of problems and aspirations. He saw an overriding need for the two countries to ensure peaceful conditions for internal modernization, which would not be undermined by the drain of an arms race. Gorbachev believed that this relationship “became one of the generators of those ideas, which constitute the ‘theoretical skeleton’ of the new world order.”¹¹ India held a special appeal as the leader of Non-Aligned Movement, as the country with a strong tradition of good friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev found an ideal partner in Rajiv Gandhi – a young reformist leader with global aspirations, who came to power not much earlier than Gorbachev himself. As in many bilateral settings, the personal communication and chemistry were crucially important for Gorbachev, the ability to talk openly and sincerely about domestic and global problems was the key to success in any joint endeavor. Pavel Palazchenko noted that “Gorbachev found it much easier to talk with Gandhi than with Reagan or some other leaders. Their rapport was total and their discussions were genuinely frank.”¹² Rajiv Gandhi, who made his first foreign trip as Prime Minister to Moscow, became an important peer for the Soviet leader. One can understand many of Gorbachev's views and hopes for the Third World by reading memoranda of his conversations with the Indian leader available at the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow.

In May 1985, during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Moscow, Gorbachev emphasized the common interests of all countries and peoples in questions of war and peace. Those interests would allow us “to create some sort of common front of pressure on the American imperialism and its allies in order to induce it to engage in genuine negotiations.” Gorbachev proposed countering US military expansion in Asia by constructing a new security system for the continent, along the lines of the European security system, creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. He also noted great prospects for Soviet–Indian economic cooperation and trade.¹³ It was an energetic and ambitious conversation, very characteristic of early Gorbachev policy in the Third World. Gorbachev's arguments were quite anti-American, and sounded like a call for bringing India closer to the Soviet side of the Cold War, and building a separate regional security system. During the visit, the Soviet and Indian leaders signed several agreements on trade, economic and scientific-technological cooperation for the period to 1990, and on building several big industrial enterprises in India. Gorbachev gave his full public support to the initiative of six non-aligned countries – India, Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden – calling for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery means, prevention of an arms race in space, and signing of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. While this initiative was hailed in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev lamented that it was completely ignored by the US.¹⁴

Another strong theme in Gorbachev's rhetoric about Third World countries was the unequal trade and economic relations between them and capitalist countries, and the exploitation of the developing world. Gorbachev developed this theme in June 1986 with Indian Foreign Minister Shiv Shankar, when they touched, specifically, on the US policy of robbing developing countries and the need to fight it globally. This theme was not just invented by the Soviets; in fact...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• The End of the Cold War and the Third World
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction: the end of the Cold War in the Third World
• 1 Gorbachev and the Third World
• 2 The decline in Soviet arms transfers to the Third World, 1986–1991
• 3 China’s changing policies toward the Third World and the end of the global Cold War
• 4 The impact of the Cold War’s end on the Arab–Israeli conflict: a view from Israel
• 5 The failure to resolve the Afghan conflict, 1989–1992
• 6 From battlefield into marketplace: the end of the Cold War in Indochina, 1985–1989
• 7 India and the end of the Cold War
• 8 Nicaragua, Chile and the end of the Cold War in Latin America
• 9 The “missing Cold War”: reflections on the Latin American debt crisis, 1979–1989
• 10 Brazilian assessments of the end of the Cold War
• 11 Were the Soviets “selling out”?
• 12 The ending of the Cold War and Southern Africa
• 13 “The battle of Cuito Cuanavale”: Media space and the end of the Cold War in Southern Africa
• Bibliography
• Index