Moral Education (International Library of the Philosophy of Education Volume 4)

Norman J. Bull

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781135171377
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

A companion volume to Moral Judgement from Childhood to Adolescence specially written for teachers and students of education. This volume includes analysis of the broad stages in the developmental pattern; of the key variables that must shape it, and of their function in moral judgement; and of the principles that must lie behind a moral education that has autonomy as its goal. The book concludes with practical proposals for a sequential pattern of moral learning, and the methods of approach appropriate to it.

Part One
Stages of Development

1
Morality

Stages and Levels

The term ‘morality’ derives from the Latin plural mores, meaning ‘manners’ or ‘morals’. We use it to mean the generally accepted code of conduct in a society, or within a sub-group of society. Thus, we speak of an individual as leading ‘a moral life’, or of ‘public-school morality’. But we also use the term, secondly, to mean the pursuit of the good life—and that is by no means necessarily the same as following the accepted social code. Indeed, moral progress has always been made by individuals who have gone against the accepted morality of their day, and who have generally suffered for doing so.

At once, then, we begin to recognise that there are different levels of moral behaviour. We may illustrate them more fully from driving a car. At the lowest level, a man may drive with complete disregard for anyone else. His sole concern is his own pleasure, limited only by care to avoid doing himself injury. His sanctions or controls are simply pleasure and pain. At a second level a man may drive with care, but only from fear of the law and of the consequences of breaking it. At this level the sanctions are punishment and, its obverse, reward. At a third and higher level a man may also drive with care, but motivated by concern for others and for his reputation among them. Here the sanctions are social praise and social blame. At a fourth, and highest level, a man may drive with care, motivated solely by his own inner principles of conduct. He is dependent neither upon the external constraint of law nor upon the external force of public opinion. His overriding concern is not simply living with others, but living with himself—for his sanctions are internal. They are self-praise and self-blame.

Here, then, are four broad levels of moral conduct. While they may be analysed and defined with far greater subtlety and precision, they serve as a yardstick for the study of moral behaviour. The first may be called pre-moral. The second is essentially an external morality. The third is part external and part internal. The fourth is wholly internal.

While these four levels serve as a general framework, we must be aware throughout of the infinite complexity and variety in moral motivation. Each individual behaves at different times and in different situations on different levels. Indeed, a driver may act upon all four levels on one and the same journey, as the circumstances change. Again, so complex are the roots of moral behaviour that these levels are often intertwined. A driver may be hard put to it, at any given moment, to give one single motivation for his driving with care.

But not only are these the four main levels of moral conduct. They are also the broad stages through which a child develops into a moral being. We must at once define in what sense we may use this term ‘stage’. We are certainly not thinking of a bus progressing along a fixed route from one fare-stage to the next, so that each stage is left behind at a given moment and a new one reached. We are thinking, rather, of the complex human personality. A ‘stage’, in this context, is a broad period of development, not an exact distance between two fixed points of maturation. Such stages, secondly, may and do overlap within the individual. In particular, they may run parallel in differing contexts and moral situations. Thirdly, they will naturally vary from one individual to another, depending upon the variable factors shaping both the individual and the environment. Above all, as we have already observed, all these stages may survive into adulthood, where we may see them as different levels of moral conduct.

Moral Judgement

It is in terms of these four broad stages that we may seek to understand the development of the child in the moral sense. But how are we to secure evidence? The difficulties are immense—and they form one reason for the comparative neglect of such study in the past. Psychoanalytic theories have the advantage of not being susceptible to scientific investigation. Any other type of study is open to serious criticisms. Thus, it can be charged with being inherently subjective —assuming that there can be such a thing as pure objectivity in any study of man. Even the framework of development that is adopted may make subjective assumptions. Any results achieved may, therefore, be suspect—and, in so complex and fluid a field as the moral, solid statistical findings are not easily come by.

One approach would be to observe and to analyse the behaviour of children in concrete and normal—if fabricated—moral situations. A massive piece of such empirical research has been made (Hartshorne & May, 1928–1930), but it has small value today. Another, and far more dynamic, approach is that pioneered by Piaget (1932). In painstaking interviews with small groups of children, he sought their attitudes to the games they played, and their judgements upon stories of moral situations familiar and relevant to them. Their moral judgements, within different areas, were analysed to produce a stage sequence of development. A somewhat similar approach was used in the research from which this book derives.

1 Moral Judgement and Moral Behaviour

Such an approach is open to criticism. First, what relationship is there, if any, between moral judgement and actual conduct? How far are the child’s judgements, however genuine, sure to be acted upon? If no association can be proved, what is the value of such judgements? And, in particular, what is the validity of any developmental pattern derived from them?

No claim could be made for strong correlation between moral judgement and moral behaviour. Indeed, statistical substantiation for such relationship would not be easy to achieve. Even if the individual knows the right thing to do, so much depends upon motivation, the actual situation, and—according to some adolescent girls—even mood.

Yet it remains true that moral knowledge and understanding are prerequisites of moral action. No one can act upon a moral principle, or precept, or rule, unless he is first aware of it. He must, for example, have learnt respect for the property of others if he is to know that he should resist the temptation to take it when safe opportunity offers. He must have learnt something of personal relationships, and of respect for the other person, if he is to know that he should refrain from telling a lie when it would be to his own advantage to do so. No one can practise the Golden Rule of reciprocity unless he is aware of it—and, above all, has understanding of its application to concrete situations.

Moral judgements derive from moral concepts. These have matured, with time and experience, and their roots go deep. It can at least be held that they furnish evidence of potential moral action; and the more so as moral principles become interiorised and a sense of guilt becomes a reality of moral experience and so a moral control.

2 Moral Judgements purely Cognitive?

Emphasis upon ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ raises a further question. Are not moral judgements purely cognitive? May not the child being tested be playing a purely intellectual game—giving theoretical answers to theoretical questions? What possible indications of his true moral concepts can be given by such judgements? May they not be totally unrelated to the powerful emotional and motivational factors that must profoundly affect his actual conduct?

Spurious judgements, bearing no relation to the child’s own attitudes, are the more likely if he is asked direct, personal questions, whether he is seeking to please or to conceal. They are also likely if the child, even if presented with a concrete though imaginary situation, is asked what the child involved in it ought to do. The development of projective psychology offers tools that bypass such defects. Tests can be devised picturing a moral situation into which the child ‘projects’ himself. By identifying himself with the child portrayed, putting himself in the child’s place, he unwittingly reveals his own inner attitudes. Projection tests, being both indirect and impersonal as well as concealing their purpose, are far more likely to tap genuine attitudes.

Much more important, however, is the nature of moral judgement. At least some psychologists hold that all thinking is emotionally toned. It is certainly strongly so in the moral field. The responses of children of all ages to moral situations involving what they regard as the greatest evils are far from being coldly cerebral. A boy of 9 years, describing guilt, says,

‘Your mind goes all sort of beating fast.’

A boy of 15 years gives a terse definition of conscience:

‘Every rotten thing you do sticks in your mind.’

A girl of 17 years holds that

‘Lying is all right for reasons of love.’

Moral judgements, it appears, are orectic as well as cognitive. They involve, that is to say, not only the mind, but also appetite and desire, feeling and striving, emotion and will. They involve the person, not simply his mind. When elicited from areas of deep, moral concern, they stem from genuine, often deeply held attitudes, and powerful motivations.

Moral Situations

We have already had to make reference to the actual situation, in terms of both moral behaviour and of moral judgement. The cardriver will judge the changing situations and vary his actions accordingly. The child’s judgements can only effectively be elicited in terms of concrete, if imaginary, situations.

Every moral judgement is made within the context of a concrete situation. It will be shaped and moulded—though not determined —by the situation. Just as history never repeats itself, save in broad patterns of similarity, so moral situations are never identically the same, save in their broad patterns of similarity. The implications of this situational factor are far-reaching, and it will be one of our major concerns.

The gravest defect of traditional moral education has been its teaching of blanket moral principles (‘Thou shalt not…’), with small, if any, reference to concrete situations. Transfer of learning was assumed. But there is both generality and specificity in the moral life. There must, on the one hand, be general principles—of honesty, truthfulness and so on. We assume this in daily life, when we say a certain man is ‘honest’ or a certain woman ‘trustworthy’. Indeed, without it communal life would be impossible. But ‘circumstances alter cases’; the general principle must be adapted to the specific situation. The stern moralist, insisting rigidly on the principle, subordinates persons to rules and love to law. It is the application of the principle to the situation, and above all the derivation of the principle from situations, that must be the basis of effective moral education.

The adolescent grapples, often with small help, with shaping the principle to the situation. Would it be right, for example, to lie to the teacher by not telling on a friend?

‘No. But I wouldn’t betray my friend. I can’t say “trust” because you are breaking someone’s trust in lying. Friendship is sticking by someone.’

Again, is lying always wrong?

‘It’s all right to lie if you feel you would hurt someone if you did not.’ ‘Hurting people is more serious than telling white lies.’

Here the principle is being adapted to the situation. Law is being subordinated to love.

Moral judgements are not made in a vacuum. The situational element is a vital factor in each such judgement. This is not to hold —as ‘situation ethics’ appears to do—that judgement is determined by the situation. Judgement is the application, and therefore adaptation, of principle to situation. The principle must be known, and the situation assessed. Both are involved.

Judgements will therefore vary from one type of situation to another. It follows that, in testing, judgements must be sought from a variety of situations—just as, in moral education, experience must be given in a similar variety of situations. It follows, too, that, in seeking to trace development in moral judgement, we must bear in mind that the individual may be at different stages in different areas of moral concern.

Variable Factors

Varying stages of moral judgement in the child and varying levels of judgement in the adult both reflect differences in the shaping of moral concepts. Their complexity, as well as their variety, suggest the different influences at work. These vary from one individual to another; and these variable factors must be taken into account in seeking to trace development. Key variables are: relationships in the home; the pattern of discipline in the home; the school environment; the socio-economic environment; religious influence; intelligence; and, by no means the least significant, sex. All such factors are involved. All are threads contributing to an intricate moral pattern.

It follows that no part of the total environment can be ignored. No part of it can opt out of moral responsibility. Certainly no parent or teacher, or other adult in relationship with children, can deny moral influence. Even impersonal contacts play their part. We find, for example, that the ideals—if not idols—of many adolescents are the glamorous and successful young adults, known from the film and television screen, taking the place of ideals from literature and history of previous adolescent generations.

It follows, too, that we are by no means narrowly concerned simply with ethics. Certainly ethical concepts are involved. But we are no less concerned with the relevance of psychology and sociology, in particular, to the process ...

Table of contents

• Contents
• Part One Stages of Development
• Part Two Factors in Development
• Part Three Developmental Moral Education
• Select Bibliography
• Index