Cognition and Emotion

Reviews of Current Research and Theories

Jan de Houwer, Dirk Hermans

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781136980947
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Emotions are complex and multifaceted phenomena. Although they have been examined from a variety of perspectives, the study of the interaction between cognition and emotion has always occupied a unique position within emotion research. Many philosophers and psychologists have been fascinated by the relationship between thinking and feeling.

During the past 30 years, research on the relationship between cognition and emotion has boomed and so many studies on this topic have been published that it is difficult to keep track of the evidence. This book fulfils the need for a review of the existing evidence on particular aspects of the interplay between cognition and emotion.

The book assembles a collection of state-of-the-art reviews of the most important topics in cognition and emotion research: emotion theories, feeling and thinking, the perception of emotion, the expression of emotion, emotion regulation, emotion and memory, and emotion and attention. By bringing these reviews together, this book presents a unique overview of the knowledge that has been generated in the past decades about the many and complex ways in which cognition and emotion interact. As such, it provides a useful tool for both students and researchers alike, in the fields of social, clinical and cognitive psychology.

1
Theories of emotion causation: A review

Agnes Moors
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

In this paper I review a selection of emotion theories. I propose a framework in which various theories can be placed and compared. The framework is organised around the question of emotion causation. The aim is to highlight what theories of emotion causation have in common and where they move apart. Before looking at the explanations for emotion provided by various theories, I briefly consider what it is that these theories try to explain. As I illustrate in the first section, disagreement among emotion theories already starts here.

DEFINING EMOTION

Asked about a definition of emotions, many theorists start by listing a number of components that they consider as being part of a prototypical emotional episode. I use the term emotional episode to indicate anything starting from the stimulus to the later components or the immediate consequences of the emotion. The notion of emotional episode is thus potentially broader than the notion of emotion. Examples of components are: (a) a cognitive component; (b) a feeling component, referring to emotional experience; (c) a motivational component, consisting of action tendencies or states of action readiness (e.g., tendencies to flee or fight); (d) a somatic component, consisting of central and peripheral physiological responses; and (e) a motor component, consisting of expressive behaviour (e.g., fight and flight and facial and vocal expressions). These components correspond to functions such as: (a) stimulus evaluation or appraisal; (b) monitoring (which may serve the further function of control or regulation); (c) preparation and support of action; and (d) action. Table 1.1 depicts these components with their corresponding functions.

It should be noted that within this list of components, the definitions of the terms cognition and feeling is not unitary. The meaning of the term cognition seems to shift depending on the category with which it is contrasted. Cognition can be understood in the broad sense of the mental when it is contrasted with somatic and motor responses. Several scholars

Table 1.1 Examples of components and corresponding functions

define mental processes as those that are mediated by representations. Representations are functional notions invoked to explain variable stimulus–response relations. They come into the picture when a stimulus does not invariably lead to the same response (with the same quality and intensity) at different points in time and in different contexts (Bermudéz, 1995; Moors, 2007). Cognition is understood in a more narrow sense when it is contrasted with other mental concepts such as motivation and feeling. It has been argued that goals are mentally represented but that they have special dynamic qualities that are not shared by other kinds of representations (e.g., the activation of goal representations accumulates over time and persists in the face of obstacles; Bargh & Barndollar, 1996). Thus, when contrasted with motivation, cognition can be defined as based on non-dynamic representations. When contrasted with feeling, cognition can be defined in the narrow philosophical sense of the Intentional¹ part of the mental (Green, 1996). Feeling corresponds to the phenomenal part of the mental. A mental state is Intentional by virtue of being directed at or about something. It is phenomenal by virtue of having irreducible qualia that are entirely subjective (e.g., Block, 1995; Nagel, 1974).² It is worth noting that there exist other narrow views of cognition. One narrow view is that cognitive processes are mediated by propositional representations (as opposed to perceptual ones, see below). Another narrow view is that cognitive processes are non-automatic (as opposed to automatic). A final narrow view is that cognitive processes are rule based (as opposed to associative). In sum, the cognitive component can be understood in the broad sense of mental or in the more narrow sense of non-dynamic, Intentional, propositional, non-automatic, or rule based.

The component of feeling or emotional experience is sometimes understood in the narrow sense of the phenomenal part of the mental (see above)

1 Following Searle (1983), I write Intentionality in philosophical use with a capital I and intentionality in ordinary use with a lower case i.

2 A state can be directed at something by forming a representation of it. Thus, in this view, cognitive processes also correspond to representation-mediated processes. Note that according to this view, the mental is broader than the representational; it also includes phenomenal states that are non-representational.

and sometimes in the broader sense of conscious experience, with both a phenomenal and an Intentional aspect. Some authors even argue that emotional experience only has an Intentional aspect. According to them, emotional experience is about the other components in the emotional episode (appraisal, action tendencies, and somatic and motor responses).

Emotion theorists disagree about the exact number and nature of the components they include in the emotional episode. The definition of components is one source of disagreement. For example, inclusion of a cognitive component is more likely when cognition is defined in a broad than in a narrow sense (cf. Lazarus, 1982, versus Zajonc, 1980). Needless to say, there are many other sources of disagreement about the components to include (cf. the special issue edited by Frijda, 2007, in Social Science Information).

Emotion theorists not only disagree about the components that they include in the emotional episode, but also about the component(s) that they include in or identify with the emotion (Prinz, 2004). Some theorists isolate one (or a few) component(s) from the emotional episode and call it emotion. For example, James (1890) equated emotion with the feeling component. Frijda (1986) singled out the motivational component as the phenomenon to be explained, equating emotions with states of action readiness. Several theorists include all or most components of the emotional episode in their definition of emotion (Clore & Centerbar, 2004; Scherer, 2005). It may be noted that some theorists treat the motor component as a consequence of emotion rather than as a part of it. Others distinguish between spontaneous and planned behaviour, treating the former as a part of emotion and the latter as a consequence.

Further, emotion theorists disagree about whether the components in the emotional episode occur sequentially, and, if so, whether they occur in a fixed order. Among those that accept a fixed order, there is disagreement about the particular order proposed. Theorists who assume a fixed order and who equate emotion with one component often consider the other components in the episode as causes and consequences of the emotion. Theorists who assume a fixed order and who equate emotion with the entire emotional episode can still split the emotional episode in an antecedent and a consequent part. It may be noted that the relation between sequentiality and causality is an asymmetric relation. Causality implies sequentiality (causes precede their effects), but sequentiality does not imply causality (early parts precede late parts, but do not necessarily cause them).

Essential for a definition of emotion is that it demarcates emotions from phenomena that are not emotions. I list a number of demarcation criteria that have turned up in the literature. Some theorists exclude from the class of emotions phenomena that lack one of the components that they consider essential for emotions or the emotional episode. For example, reflexes (e.g., startle reflex) have been refused the status of emotions because they do not have a cognitive component or because they bypass stimulus evaluation (cf. Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). Sensory experiences such as feeling cold or pain are not considered emotions because they are pure feelings that lack Intentionality (they lack a cognitive component, defined in the philosophical sense of the term). Attitudes and preferences have been excluded from the class of emotions because they lack clear somatic and motor correlates (Lang, 1985; Scherer, 2005).

It may be true that some components are necessary for emotion, yet no component seems to be unique (Frijda, 2007; Parrott, 2007). Indeed, cognition, feeling, motivation, and somatic and motor responses may be present (even all at once) in phenomena that are not emotions. To illustrate this, Frijda (2007) mentioned the example of a piece of soap that slips through one’s fingers under the shower and that leads to a shift in action tendency, manifested in feeling, somatic responses, and the action of groping for the soap. All the components are there, yet many authors will be unlikely to categorise this as an emotional episode. Theorists have therefore proposed additional criteria that may help set the boundaries of the class of emotions. Some additional criteria have to do with the content of components. One criterion specifies the content of the appraisal component. Appraisal theorists have argued that emotions occur when a stimulus is appraised as relevant and/or (in)congruent to a central goal (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Moors, 2007; Scherer, 2005). In the soap example, the event may be relevant only to a goal of minor importance. Some theorists (even some appraisal theorists) have left the possibility open that emotions arise when the stimulus is appraised as positive or negative, independent of current goals (Frijda, 2007; Scherer, 2005, takes this to be the case for the emotion disgust and for emotions elicited by music). A second content criterion specifies the content of the experience component. Many theorists have argued that the experience of an emotion must have a positive or negative flavour (e.g., Ortony & Turner, 1990), thereby excluding neutral states such as surprise and interest. Other additional criteria are based on quantitative features. For example, Scherer (1984, 1993b) proposed that a phenomenon can be called an emotion when all (or most) components are recruited in a co-ordinated and synchronised manner. A final set of criteria has been proposed to delineate emotions from moods. These include duration (emotions: short; moods: long), intensity (emotions: high; moods: low), and the presence or absence of a specific target (emotions: present; moods: absent).

Emotion theorists not only disagree about the boundaries of the class of emotions, they also disagree about how they think the class of emotions or emotional phenomena should be internally structured. A first group of theorists takes a limited set of emotions with a special status, called basic emotions, as the building blocks of emotional life. Basic emotions can be recombined or elaborated to form non-basic emotions. Members of this group of theorists vary with regard to the number and identity of the emotions they enumerate as basic. This is because they rely on different criteria for inclusion and discrimination within this set. Examples of criteria are that each basic emotion has a unique neural signature (Darwin, 1872/1965; Ekman, 2007; Izard, 1977; Panksepp, 1982, 1998, 2000), a unique pattern of appraisal values (e.g., Roseman, 1991), a unique action tendency (Frijda, 1986), a unique physiological response pattern (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983), a unique facial expression (Ekman, 1984), and a unique experiental quality (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). A second group of theorists takes a small set of sub-emotional variables as the building blocks of emotional life. Members of this group vary with regard to the number and nature of the variables they postulate. For example, several appraisal theorists put forward six or more appraisal variables (e.g., novelty, valence, goal relevance, goal congruence, coping potential, and agency). These variables are conceived of as dimensional by some authors (e.g., Scherer, 1984, 1994) and as discrete by others (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; see Roseman & Smith, 2001). The combination of values on discrete/dimensional appraisal variables gives rise to a large/infinite number of specific emotions. For another example, Russell (2003) put forward the dimensional variables of valence and arousal. These are variables of experience and neurophysiological activity. Contrary to the appraisal variables mentioned above, however, Russell’s building blocks do not combine to form specific emotions (see below).

Given the many ways in which emotion theories can differ, there are many ways in which an overview of them can be organised. I choose to organise theories according to their views of emotion causation, and, related to this, the order in which they place emotional components within an emotional episode. This means that I discuss only theories that have an explicit, unique view of emotion causation. It also means that I compare the selected theories especially with regard to their view of emotion causation. There are, of course, other ways...

Table of contents

• Contents
• Contributors
• Introduction
• 1 Theories of emotion causation: A review
• 2 Do feelings have a mind of their own?
• 3 The perception and categorisation of emotional stimuli: A review
• 4 Measures of emotion: A review
• 5 The psychology of emotion regulation: An integrative review
• 6 Emotion and memory narrowing: A review and goal-relevance approach
• 7 The effects of emotion on attention: A review of attentional processing of emotional information
• 8 The influence of affect on higher level cognition: A review of research on interpretation, judgement, decision making and reasoning
• Author index
• Subject index