Political Theories of Modern Government (Routledge Revivals)

Its Role and Reform

Peter Self

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781135156145
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This reissued work, originally published in 1985, is a uniquely broad and original survey of theories and beliefs about the growth, behaviour, performance and reform of the governments of modern Western democracies. After analysing the external pressures which have shaped modern governments, the author examines four different schools of political thought which seek to explain the behaviour and performance of governments, and which offer different remedies for the pluralism, corporatism and bureaucracy.

To examine and test these general theories, the author looks closely at how governments actually work. The book is illustrated with examples drawn from various Western societies. The final chapters present the author's own conclusion about the future role of government, the limits of market philosophy, the future of politics, and the principles and problems of institutional reform.

1
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY?

This book is concerned with theories about the behaviour, performance and reform of modern governments. The governments in question are those generally described as ‘Western democracies’ which have capitalist or ‘mixed’ economies. Foremost in my mind are the English-speaking democracies of the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, with a particular stress upon the first of these, which I know best. In a general way (and sometimes specifically) the analysis applies also to other democracies in Western Europe and Scandinavia. However, the coverage does not extend either to Communist states or to Third World countries which would require a different kind of analysis.

Throughout the book I shall attempt to relate the theories to the broader social context in which they have arisen. Thus the next chapter takes a general look at the environmental changes—technological, economic and social—which have impacted upon the scale and functions of modern Western governments. Superficial as such a survey must necessarily be, it will hopefully offer some insight into the basis (and also the limitations) of the theories discussed in the following four chapters.

Each of these four chapters deals with what may be described as a school of thought about the nature of modern governments (although one chapter, the corporatist one, deals with several such schools for reasons which will emerge). Moreover, these chapters proceed in sequence to different and broader (which need not mean superior) levels of analysis. Chapter 3 reviews explanations of government behaviour derived from individual motivations, particularly those of the rational, self-regarding individuals posited for purposes of analysis by the ‘public choice’ group of economists; Chapter 4 reviews the pluralist analysis of the influence of organized groups and individual public agencies; Chapter 5 moves to the level of the ‘corporate state’, used here as a focus for several theories concerned with the development of government as an encompassing and integrated system subject to strong structural pressures; while Chapter 6 takes up theories dealing with the efficiency and power of modern bureaucracies.

It may be objected that a series of brief reviews cannot do justice to the fullness and variety of the various ‘schools of thought’. The criticism must be admitted. In an age of massive academic publishing (motivated perhaps more by the ‘publish or perish’ imperative than the expectation of a large readership), when for example there are over fifty major works and a multitude of articles bearing the general impress of the ‘public choice’ school, it would be absurd to attempt coverage in depth in one chapter.

But the objector should consider two points. The first is that a student or general reader faced with a massive flow of writings emanating from authors espousing quite different schools of thought, and following different methodologies, will very likely not be able or even attempt to relate the theories together. Students are more likely to stay within the frame of discourse recommended by their teachers, or else to use different frameworks for different subjects (say, public choice theory for a public policy course, and neo-Marxism for theory of the state), without being more than vaguely aware of their gross inconsistencies. Those who wish to dig deeply into a school of thought are free to specialize, but for many a broader view of theories about modern government is surely helpful, and is all too hard to obtain within the modern academic world.

Secondly, my aim in any case is not a pedagogic exercise of analysing the writers. Rather is it to examine and draw upon various theories for the contributions which they can make to a better understanding of the nature of modern government and the prospects for its future evolution and reform. Consequently, the last two chapters put forward my own conclusions about the future role of governments, and about the kind of political reforms which are needed if governments are to work better.

Before proceeding further it may be useful to inquire what we mean by political theory. A distinction is sometimes drawn between traditional political philosophy and modern political theorizing. The former is said to be concerned with large general questions about the nature of the state, political obligation, the rights and duties of individuals, the nature of a good society, and so on. By contrast modern political theories of a ‘scientific’ or sociological form are claimed to be empirical, specific and ‘positive’ rather than ethical in their nature.

This distinction does not stand up too well under examination, but it derives some of its plausibility from the nature of modern politics (Runciman, 1963). Thus it is only in the last century or so that the development of modern parliamentary regimes, mass electorates, political parties and pressure groups has established politics as a specialized and complex type of activity. Similarly, while the foundations of the study of comparative government were laid over 2000 years ago by Aristotle, past types of government bear only a very limited resemblance to the enormously complex structures of the governments of Western democracies.

While politics as a profession has become much more specialized, politics as a motive to governmental action has increasingly (and particularly in the last few decades) invaded almost every aspect of human life, and indeed of animal life as well. Almost any issue is capable of being and often is politicized. By politics here I am not referring to the ‘small p’ which exists in any organization, in clubs or in families, except (which is an important proviso) where such activity is closely or clearly related to the functioning of government. But there are important respects in which the activities of the political system have become diffused, expanded and absorbed into society; or, as some critics would say, society has been absorbed into the political system.

Thus governments now provide an enormous variety of services, many of which were once provided and still are often also provided by private organizations. The number of regulatory agencies is legion, and the number of laws and administrative regulations which theoretically require, although they often do not receive, the compliance of citizens is past anyone’s reckoning. There are vast numbers of ‘hived off’ or semi-independent public agencies, and also government sponsored or regulated private agencies, all sometimes lumped together in the inaccurate term QUANGO (inaccurate because the term actually refers to quasi non-governmental agencies). Then again, bureaucracy contains many specialists who might be doing much the same work for private organizations, and vice versa; and groups of public servants increasingly organize themselves and behave like private pressure groups, unless expressly prohibited. Private interests as well as public bodies have their spokesmen within government, and quasi-judicial inquiries (such as, for example, public inquiries in Britain) have often to resolve disputes between a mixed bag of different public and private bodies. All these are familiar features of the administrative state or, as some would conceive it, the pluralist state.

Thus the empirical features of modern political systems are novel and complex, and attract the attention also of a novel army of analysts and researchers. The information now available about political systems is by historical comparison enormous and growing rapidly, even if some inner secrets remain carefully guarded. Political theories must thus cope with massive empirical data of a novel kind.

Some years ago now the theme of the ‘end of ideology’ also gave a new slant to political theorizing. This thesis seemed to make the broader ethical issues of traditional political philosophy much less interesting or relevant. Indeed, Sheldon Wolin (1960) feared that political philosophy might be on the way out, and offered his book as a memorial to the kind of discourse which was once engaged in by reflective thinkers. The ‘end of ideology’ theme was sustained by the supposed convergence of politics towards the general goals of economic growth and modernization; by the appearance of a host of experts offering technical solutions to political problems; and by the pragmatic and incremental character of modern party politics.

All these arguments seem less persuasive in the 1980s now that political conflict has heightened and experts (notably economic experts) are less trusted or followed. All the same, most policy making in Western democracies continues to follow incremental lines, droves of experts continue to offer technical advice, and extremist goals or theories command rather little assent. Hence it could still be argued that modern political theories must deal with a realm of possible choices which are narrow or marginal by comparison with the issues of political philosophy. However, this proposition has frequently been true of practical policies, save in periods of revolution, while the rapidity and uncertainty of change in modern societies suggests that political stability and pragmatism may be resting on weak reeds.

In any event, this type of analysis misses the reasons for the continued relevance and indeed re-emergence of philosophical and ideological issues. A political theory has to make some choice of methodology and it is difficult indeed to separate this choice from the old issue of an individualist versus a collectivist (or ‘systems’) type of approach. The choice of approach in turn strongly influences both the kinds of explanation given for the political system, and the remedies offered for correcting its failures. The more systematic and rigorous the methodology, the stronger becomes its influence upon the subsequent analysis.

We are not dealing here with purely pedagogic positions. Behind methodology there often lies ideology, in the sense of a ‘world view’ of the nature of man and his social relationships. Behind the individualist approach lies a long history of social contract theories, which explain the nature of the state from reflections upon the intrinsic nature of man, and which prescribe the functions and limits of government by reference to individual rights or individual preferences. The converse position is to derive government from social norms or values which can be used both to explain and to prescribe its scope and character; or alternatively (and very differently) to explain political development in terms of historical laws and of necessary power relationships between classes, nations or other groups.

I am not saying that one cannot escape the methodological and ideological traps of dogmatism. I would accept that there are better and worse ways to seek objective knowledge. The point to note here is the recent increase in the ideological content of theories of government. The rebirth of social contract theories, and of theories of individual rights and their perversion by government, is matched by the rebirth of Marxist thought about the necessary subservience of modern Western governments to the imperatives of capitalism. Of course social contract theories can be used in a defensible rather than dogmatic style of philosophic analysis, and not all political theories are intentionally ideological. My point is that the rebirth of ideology may very possibly be connected with a rise of political conflict, and growing criticism of or disillusionment with the performance of modern governments.

A short consideration of methodology at the start of this book therefore seems desirable. Those who find discussions of methodology boring or superfluous can turn to page 16 where the main argument begins.

One can distinguish between propositions which are open to refutation or modification by empirical evidence, and propositions which consist of circular chains of abstract logic or of metaphysical statements that can not be tested. This distinction is difficult, because theories sometimes mix their propositions or shift from one level of argument to the other.

The most familiar example of this dualism is Marxism. An assertion that governments serve the interests of capitalism can be made an empirical proposition if I will entertain evidence that it is false wholly or partly, and that it is truer of some periods and of some states than of others. On the evidence available, my own opinion is that the interests of capitalism are one important explanation (but only one) of modern governmental behaviour. Again, I do not believe that the interests of capitalism as perceived and acted upon by government depend wholly upon inescapable structural pressures, since it seems likely that something at least depends upon particular interactions between capitalists and government agencies which can be empirically investigated.

However, if it is held that capitalism necessarily dominates and controls government everywhere until revolution intervenes for ‘structural’ causes which do not turn on the motives of individual actors and can be known only by their alleged effects (which in turn must be assumed due to capitalism), we enter a philosophic theory beyond the reach of evidence. Modern neo-Marxists are of course well aware of this problem and introduce a variety of qualifications, such as the conflict between different ‘fractions of capital’, and the concept of ‘the relative autonomy of the state’. However, the state is often conceived to be ‘relatively autonomous’ only in the sense that some appearance of impartiality and a mild degree of autonomous action is supposed to be once again useful to capitalism.

If we explain these relationships by elitist theories which envisage the co-option of politicians by capitalists, we are closer to a testable theory. Admittedly, the influence of capitalism may not depend simply upon direct contacts between capitalists and public officials, but upon the way that these officials think it necessary to support capitalism for the sake of their own objectives. However, the nature and extent of these structural pressures are unlikely to be constant, and need investigation. Empirical testing in the social sciences is difficult and rarely conclusive, but if theories are to be true, they must utilize and account for such empirical evidence as can be found, and not occupy a hermetically sealed box of circular argument.

Another type of political theory is that of the public choice economists. The methodology used here is that of neoclassical economics. Axioms or postulates are first stated, together with certain initial conditions, and deductions are then made about consequential behaviour. One necessary assumption is that individuals act rationally, i.e. they have adequate information and order their preferences consistently. Another assumption is that individuals are ‘utility maximizers’, which means crudely that they will always seek ‘more for less’, e.g. more satisfaction for the same outlay or a smaller outlay for the same satisfaction. If these assumptions are now applied within an appropriate environment, such as fully competitive markets, some consistent predictions can be made about economic behaviour.

The ‘scientific’ character of economics, in so far as this really exists, stems from the statistical uniformities of behaviour which result from a vast number of exchange transactions conducted through the medium of a common numerator (money), and motivated by a simple yardstick of individual economic advantage. The instrumental and egoistic nature of market exchanges in modern Western societies is not just a question of theoretical assumption, but is on the whole socially expected and acceptable. An instrumental concept of economic exchange requires the support of particular laws and culture; for example, it was much less applicable in the Middle Ages and may indeed, as some liberals fear, be becoming slowly less applicable today. Economics can offer general laws and predictions only to the extent that enough individuals do in fact behave like ‘economic man’. Beyond this point, economics has to descend from its perch into the same limited and qualified empirical generalizations which characterize the other social sciences.

The question raised by the public choice economists is how far politics can be treated as an exchange relationship governed by the same instrumental and egoistic motives as are often assumed in economics. James Buchanan argues that an individual is the same person, and can therefore be expected to behave in the same way in his political and his economic relationships (Buchanan, 1965). But is this true? The problems of much weaker measurement and prediction in politics need not invalidate the economic approach itself, although they raise many problems about its application. However, the public choice theorists themselves have demonstrated the paradoxical and mutually frustrating results which seem to follow logically from rational egoistic behaviour, not only in politics but in many contexts outside the rather special context of competitive free markets (Schelling, 1978).

This being so, can we assume that political man does behave like economic man? How does he avoid the traps of egoism? Even if we can usefully assume that ‘political man’ does often act egoistically, we must locate him in a situation of much greater complexity and uncertainty over the nature of his interests than is the case with market exchanges. This situation may move us away from the possibility of generalized predictions based upon simple assumptions into the real world of varied institutions and cultures.

A question is: does this economic methodology represent a philosophic position which is sealed off against contrary empirical evidence? In principle it is certainly not the intention of these theorists to deny evidence or to be dogmatic. One problem may be that the ‘scientific’ status of economic methodology itself has been much exaggerated. Because it uses the hypothetico-deductive methods which characterize the physical sciences, economics has been able to some extent to share also their prestige. However, as Blaug (1980) points out, theoretical economics is not at all adequately open to the test of falsification by empirical research which is crucial to the physical sciences. In applying the same methodology to politics, some members of this school set up an abstract model, quote any empirical evidence which supports their deductions and ignore any which does not. The results may still be interesting where enough behaviour (as with economics) conforms with the predictions, and concessions are made to empirical realism. However, when applied to politics, this methodology can produce an artificial and insulated style of reasoning, whose mathematical formulations conceal the barrenness of the actual argument, and whose starting point is a narrow view of human nature.

What then is the status of political theories? If the theories are genuinely empirical, as they claim to be, ...

Table of contents

• Other books by Peter Self
• Dedication
• CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION
• 1 MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
• 2 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE
• 3 THE INDIVIDUALIST STATE
• 4 THE PLURALIST STATE
• 5 THE CORPORATIST STATE
• 6 THE BEHAVIOUR OF BUREAUCRACY
• 7 THE FUTURE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
• 8 APPROACHES TO POLITICAL REFORM
• GUIDE TO FURTHER READING
• REFERENCES
• INDEX