Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power

Friendships in Flux?

Brendan Taylor, Brendan Taylor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• ISBN:
  9781134138562
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

During recent years, in its traditional role as an important Asia-Pacific regional power, Australia has had to cope with a rapidly changing external security environment and a series of new challenges, including a rising China, an increasingly assertive United States, and most notably the Global War against Terror.

This book considers the changing nature of Australia's identity and role in the Asia-Pacific, and the forces behind these developments, with particular attention towards security alignments and alliance relationships. It outlines the contours of Australia's traditional role as a key regional middle power and the patterns of its heavy reliance on security alignments and alliances. Brendan Taylor goes on to consider Australia's relationships with other regional powers including Japan, China, Indonesia and India, uncovering the underlying purposes and expectations associated with these relationships, their evolving character – particularly in the post Cold War era – and likely future directions. He discusses the implications for the region of Australia's new 'Pacific doctrine' of intervention, whether Australia's traditional alliance preferences are compatible with the emergence of a new East Asian security mechanism, and the impact of new, transnational and non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and failed states.

Part 1
Laying the table

1 Introduction

Brendan Taylor

Australia’s security alignments and alliance relationships—for so long a key component of Australia’s national security and defence policies—are currently experiencing a period of profound upheaval. This change is the product of a combination of factors, including the rise of China; important shifts in Japan’s postwar security policies; an increasingly assertive United States; the emergence of a distinctive ‘East Asian’ identity (that could conceivably manifest itself in some form of new regional security mechanism excluding the United States); the ongoing global ‘war on terror’ (or recently dubbed ‘Long War’); a growing awareness of the potentially broader geopolitical challenges posed by ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states; as well as apparent shifts in Australian public attitudes toward a number of key foreign-policy actors and issues.

The changes taking place in Australia’s security alignments and alliance relationships are significant because they are occurring at a time when an increasing number of scholars are questioning the broader relevance and sustainability of formal alliance structures, with some even going so far as to predict their outright disappearance within the next decade. In the Australian case, however, a number of its alliances and alignments have actually strengthened in recent times. By way of example, the fact that Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel and Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) soldiers recently completed an unprecedented ‘tour of duty’ together in Iraq, and that Canberra and Tokyo are now in the process of developing a new security agreement, is symbolic of an increasingly close Australia–Japan strategic partnership that looks set to deepen. Potentially in direct competition to this—but riding on the back of an increasingly indispensable economic relationship—there are signs of a new strategic tie emerging between Australia and China. The imperative to cooperate on a range of ‘non-traditional’ threats, such as terrorism and maritime security, has also resulted in efforts to breathe new life into the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). In these instances, therefore, the Australian experience appears to run directly counter to what contemporary thinking on alliance politics would anticipate.

Conversely, however, a majority of Australia’s security alliances and alignments (and those which have traditionally been its most important) are coming under increasing strain. Despite being in a healthier position than perhaps at any other time during its history, for instance, Australia’s alliance with the United States is being subjected to mounting pressure as Canberra struggles to strike an appropriate balance in its relations with Washington and a ‘rising China’; to participate in the East Asia Summit (EAS), which explicitly excludes the sole superpower; and to remain sensitive to a somewhat alarming negative shift in Australian public attitudes toward the United States. Likewise, deep public scepticism, coupled with fundamental cultural and perceptual differences, continues to complicate Australia’s often-troubled relationship with Indonesia and is likely to preclude indefinitely the development of any deeper strategic tie between the two. Australia’s longstanding security relationship with Papua New Guinea (PNG) is currently in an even more precarious position following the collapse of the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP), while many (on the Australian side of the Tasman Sea at least) continue to query the utility of maintaining Closer Defence Relations (CDR) with New Zealand.

Inadequate attention has thus far been given to the above trends, not only in the context of what they might collectively portend for Australia’s national security in the twenty-first century, but also in terms of what broader applicability the Australian case may have for policymakers and defence planners in other countries, as well as to broader scholarly debates regarding the changing shape of security alignments and alliance relationships. This book aims to shed light on these issues by reflecting upon where the security alignments and alliance relationships of Australia—a key middle power in the Asia–Pacific region—have come from; by taking stock of where they currently stand; and by contemplating where they might be heading.

The book is divided into four parts, each titled to complement its overarching ‘friendships’ theme. Part 1 (‘Laying the table’) is designed to introduce and contextualize the volume. Following on from the Introduction, in Chapter 2 Bill Tow lays much of the groundwork for the remainder of the book. Tow’s contribution provides a theoretical treatment of how traditional security arrangements (alliances, alignments and coalitions) are adapting and evolving to the demands of what many commentators regard as a new strategic age. Tow begins by contemplating how well traditional theories of alliance politics relate to these changing security dynamics, before adopting a more region-specific focus and considering which theoretical perspectives might best explain ongoing challenges to organizing security in the Asia–Pacific. Tow’s basic argument is that, while state-centric security partnerships continue to be germane to the current strategic environment, from a theoretical standpoint these must be explained and validated quite differently from their Cold War predecessors. The broad and varied range of security partnerships in which Australia is currently engaged—and which, indeed, provide the focus for this volume—certainly appears consistent with the incredibly complex and increasingly demanding strategic context to which Tow refers. However, he also goes on to acknowledge that this ‘somewhat controversial’ security posture that Canberra has adopted—allying and coalescing with great powers that could easily become rivals while simultaneously aligning with an emerging Asia– Pacific community—is by no means a risk-free one. This is a theme, of course, which re-emerges throughout the course of the volume.

Part 2 of the book (‘Dining with giants’) examines Australia’s security relationships with each of the region’s great powers—the United States, China, India and Japan. Paul Dibb begins his chapter on the Australia–US alliance by observing that, for more than five decades now, this relationship has weathered and adapted to situations of great strategic change—a resilience which he attributes to Australia’s penchant for securing ‘a great and powerful friend’, in addition to the increased regional influence, intelligence access, defence science and technology collaboration, and provision of advanced US military weapons which the relationship bestows to its junior partner. However, he goes on to address the difficult question of whether these obvious alliance benefits will continue to indefinitely outweigh the costs. Dibb identifies five issues which could potentially put this all-important strategic relationship under immense strain in the coming years. These issues include differences between Canberra and Washington over the (re)emergence of China; the relative decline of Australia’s regional strategic weight; the persistence of a revolutionary mindset in Washington that is intent on using America’s superior military power to reshape the world; a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan; and the rise of anti-American sentiment in Australia. While acknowledging that Canberra and Washington currently have close commonality of views when it comes to fighting the ‘war on terror’, and while concluding that an Asia–Pacific region without the United States would be a dangerous place for Australia, Dibb goes on to question whether the ‘war on terror’ will ultimately be able to overcome these potential differences and thereby unite the United States and Australia to the same extent as previous wars.

In Chapter 4, Brendan Taylor and Des Ball then examine the ‘transformation’ which is underway in security relations between Washington’s two closest regional allies: Australia and Japan. They demonstrate how this transformation has taken the form of increased security collaboration in the ‘war on terror’, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance efforts and military exercises, and observe that it has also been reflected in a number of significant policy pronouncements. Ball and Taylor attribute this intensification in Australia–Japan security relations to a range of factors, including their converging threat perceptions in relation to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and international terrorism; many of the political and ideological commonalities between the two countries; the fact that both Australia and Japan are in some respects ‘outsiders’ in East Asia; as well as to the dynamics of their respective bilateral alliance relationships with the United States. While Ball and Taylor suggest that these factors collectively point toward a gradual strengthening of the Australia–Japan security relationship, however, they also conclude that the potential impediments to any further advancement of strategic collaboration—including resource disparities in the military sphere, fundamentally different strategic interests and diverging perceptions of China’s (re)emergence—should not be underestimated.

Michael Wesley, in the subsequent chapter, discusses the related, though perhaps more enduring dilemma that Australian policymakers have faced of how to chart their own independent course through the Asian regional order in a manner that remains consistent with this country’s commitments under the Australia–US alliance. During recent years, this seeming contradiction has come into sharper relief around the issue of China’s (re)emergence. In approaching Sino–Australian relations, Wesley suggests that Canberra has developed two distinct (though clearly interrelated) strategies for reconciling this cognitive dissonance. The first has been to bind China into the existing Asia–Pacific order of institutions and norms with a view to ‘socializing’ Beijing’s behaviour. The second has been to endeavour to quarantine or ‘decouple’ the management of Sino–Australian ties from the often turbulent US–Sino relationship. While this dual-track strategy presently appears to be enjoying considerable success, Wesley concludes that the volatile nature of the US–Sino relationship and its susceptibility to future crises should provide reason for pause. While it would clearly therefore be premature to celebrate any definitive end to the cognitive dissonance between Australia’s regional and alliance prerogatives, Wesley goes on to observe that China’s growing level of resource dependence upon Australia, coupled with Canberra’s increasing strategic value to Washington (particularly in the Southeast Asian and South Pacific subregions), means that Australia is currently in a better position that at almost any time previously to manage this dissonance in its relations with China and the United States. However the true test of whether Canberra is able to adjust to and maximize the potential benefits of these new material realities will, in Wesley’s view, come in the form of a future US–Sino confrontation. In the event of such, he concludes, there is much for Canberra to gain in following the ‘studied silence’ practised by many of its Southeast Asian neighbours.

In Chapter 6, Sandy Gordon analyzes Australia’s sometimes troubled, and often insubstantial security relationship with Asia’s other rising power— India. As Gordon suggests, however, with India’s economic and military rise continuing apace, and as the strategic interests of Canberra and New Delhi become increasingly coincident, this relatively well-entrenched pattern of passing antagonism and persistent neglect seems almost certain to change. Gordon identifies significant Australian and Indian interests in the Indian Ocean and beyond, suggesting that the greatest commonality is likely to be found in relation to transnational security issues—as opposed to more traditional, state-centric concerns—with energy security, international terrorism, natural disasters and maritime security coming near or at the top of that list. In order to build upon those common interests so as to construct a more solid and realistic platform for the relationship, Gordon suggests that most progress is likely to be made on those issues of joint interest to India and Australia which fall outside their respective bilateral security relationships with the United States. Only in this context, he contends, will New Delhi genuinely come to view Canberra as an independent and legitimate partner in the Indian Ocean. The other key variable in the future of the Australian–India security relationship, of course, remains the issue of whether Canberra will ultimately acquiesce to the sale of uranium to India. As Gordon concludes, a decision in the affirmative would do more than any other factor to enhance the current state of this still-hesitant security tie. As he also concedes, however, such a decision would have significant economic, political and strategic implications extending well beyond Australia’s security relationship with India.

The focus of the book moves closer to home in Part 3 (‘Working the room’), which examines Australia’s security relationships with countries in its nearer region—Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. In Chapter 7 Allan Gyngell discusses Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia. This is a relationship which, for reasons of strategic geography, is of immense importance from Canberra’s perspective, but which has also been historically fraught with difficulty. Gyngell traces the evolution of this delicate relationship from the 1960s and the establishment of a formal Defence Cooperation Program in 1968, through the troubles of the 1970s associated with the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, the subsequent mismanagement of the territory and the deaths of five Australian journalists at Balibo. He describes the revitalization of the Australia–Indonesian security relationship which occurred during the Keating years, as embodied in the 1995 ‘Agreement on Maintaining Security’. Consistent with the overarching ebb and flow in relations between Canberra and Jakarta, however, he also describes how the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the Australia-led East Timor intervention of 1999 led to the abrogation of this agreement. Gyngell goes on to describe how the relationship has recovered in the period since 2001, however, with the two countries responding to a range of ‘new’ security challenges such as people smuggling, illegal fishing and terrorism. This broadening in Australian–Indonesian security relations was formalized in November 2006 with a new framework for security cooperation. While concluding that Australian and Indonesian strategic objectives appear likely to remain broadly convergent and, therefore, on this relatively positive trajectory into the foreseeable future, Gyngell also suggests that we should not underestimate the potential for border issues (particularly over PNG and East Timor) as well as deep-seated societal antipathies in both countries to continue to unsettle the relationship.

In Chapter 8, Hugh White then examines Australia’s security relationships with—and perceived strategic responsibilities towards—the small islands of its immediate neighbourhood in the Southwest Pacific. Notwithstanding the useful contributions which New Zealand has made toward managing problems in this part of the world (and which are discussed at greater length by Robert Ayson in Chapter 9), this is very much a part of the world where Australia is essentially a ‘lonely superpower’ facing immense political and strategic challenges. White’s contribution analyzes the more engaged and muscular approach toward this region which has become one, if not the defining feature of the Howard years. He considers the evolution of this approach which, as White demonstrates, actually reflects deep and enduring Australian strategic interests. He also examines the problems this approach has encountered thus far and the future prospects for this socalled ‘Howard Doctrine’. Reflecting upon the lessons that might be gleaned from what he considers a necessary policy shift towards recognizing Australia’s key interests and responsibilities in the stability of its small near neighbours, White contends that this particular ‘work in progress’ still has a long way to go if Australia is to develop the requisite comprehensive approach to meeting the goals it has identified under the Howard government. Consistent with this, White also concludes that the sheer scope of the task at hand, coupled with the length of time which will be needed to accomplish it, suggests that Canberra will need to act more efficiently and effectively than it has done thus far in developing new forms of closer interaction with its nearest neighbours, if it is indeed to help them overcome their deep-seated problems.

It seems likely that Australia will continue to work closely with another near neighbour—New Zealand—in striving to realize this optimal approach that White advocates. It is this trans-Tasman connection that Robert Ayson dissects in Chapter 9. As Ayson notes, this is a relationship which has historically exhibited an unusual mix—particularly for two such ‘natural’ alliance partners—of competitive and collaborative elements. Notwithstanding the close historical and cultural ties between the two—forged, not least, on the battlefields of Gallipoli—he begins by observing that the Australia–New Zealand alliance is one that was initially shaped by their common involvement in a range of other multilateral relationships, such as ANZUS. While it took the ANZUS crisis of the mid-1980s, somewhat ironically, to provide the impetus for more direct collaboration between Canberra and Wellington, Ayson details how the Australia–New Zealand security relationship itself almost went into terminal decline during the late 1990s in response to the radical defence reforms introduced by the Clark government in New Zealand. In yet another peculiar twist of fate, however, New Zealand’s contribution to the Australian-led East Timor intervention of 1999 breathed new life into the relationship. Notwithstanding sharp differences between Canberra and Washington over the US-led invasion of Iraq, Ayson also suggests that a case can be made that the ‘war on terror’ has had a similar effect on Australia–New Zealand security ties. With further disturbances in the so-called ‘arc of instability’ continuing to focus the minds of policymakers in both Canberra and Wellington, and with a range of other nontraditional security challenges requiring trans-...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contributors
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Acronyms and abbreviations
• Part 1 Laying the table
• Part 2 Dining with giants
• Part 3 Working the room
• Part 4 Washing up
• Selected bibliography