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âThe Easy Communication of Sentimentsâ
Frances Burney, Charlotte Smith and the Complications of Sympathy
This chapter looks at the representation of reading in the work of Frances Burney and Charlotte Smith, two leading exponents of the novel of sensibility. It argues that the development of this sub-genre was heavily informed by the key eighteenth-century concept of âsympathyâ, which increasingly could be used to describe the relationship between writer and reader, and an especially active kind of reading. Sympathetic reading, in the sense of sympathy implied by David Hume and other moral philosophers of the early to mid-eighteenth century, is a welcome source of sustenance for the heroine in Smithâs first two novels, Emmeline, or The Orphan of the Castle (1788) and Ethelinde, or The Recluse of the Lake (1789), and it is also an attractive, though not always achievable, ideal in the early novels of Burney. However, by the 1790s reading of this kind is frequently portrayed as complicated and fraught, and an alternative model of sympathy, derived from Adam Smithâs The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) begins to inspire portrayals of the reading process. Focusing particularly on Burneyâs last two novels, Camilla, or a Picture of Youth (1796) and The Wanderer, or Female Difficulties (1814), this chapter demonstrates that this new theory of sympathetic reading, based on an âactor/spectator modelâ, while potentially beneficial for the heroine if exploited skilfully, could also lead to a dangerous form of over-identification and a lack of both critical and moral judgement.
Crucial to the development of the key eighteenth-century concept of sensibility is the activity of reading. John Mullan has shown how Samuel Richardson, a leading figure in the development of the âsentimental novelâ, fostered a âsociety of readers and correspondentsâ in order to try and control the traffic of âsentimentsâ, or âharmoniously organized feelingsâ (1988:6, 7).1 Following Richardson, he argues, novelists âwere able to position each private reader as the exceptionable connoisseur of commendable sympathies, and to imply such a readerâs understanding of the communication of sentiments and the special capacities of sensibilityâ (13). He claims that âit is as if the very form of the novel in the eighteenth century implied a contract, by the terms of which a reader was set apart from the anti-social vices or insensitivities which the novels were able to representâ (13â14). For Markman Ellis, too, âan ideology of readingâ is âimplicit to the culture of sensibilityâ (1996:43). He observes that âperiodicals like The Ladyâs Magazine launched repeated attacks on the pernicious influence of novels on the virtue of young women, but it is important to realise that they did so alongside their own examples of sentimental fictions, excerpted and serial novels and enthusiastic reviews of fictionâ (47). Ellis suggests that in eighteenth-century discourse on the novel âreading and writing are privileged locations of womenâs sentimental reformationâ (47), and indeed that âreading sentimental fiction, writers imagined, was an active participation in the reform of societyâ (48).
One way of configuring this relationship, this âcontractâ between writer and reader, is through another concept fundamental to eighteenth-century thought: âsympathyâ. According to David Marshall, âeighteenth-century works of fiction, autobiography, autobiographical fiction, aesthetics, and moral philosophy often turn and return to the question of the effects of sympathy: the question of what happens when readers of novels, beholders of paintings, audiences in the theatre, or people in the world are faced with the spectacle of an accident, suffering, or dangerâ (1988:1). Marshall shows how âthe effects of sympathy, the problem of theatricality, and the power of fictionâ (7) are interconnected in the work of Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau and others, and argues that âworks of fiction of the period can be read as philosophical meditations on both the effects of sympathy and what was seen as the problematic experience of reading novelsâ (5). Working on a slightly later period, Thomas J. McCarthy has demonstrated how the hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher, in particular his belief that âsuccessful reading and understanding spring from sympathyâ (1997:33), influenced Romantic writers and critics. McCarthy draws especially on the criticism of Coleridge and Hazlitt in order to âillustrate the extent to which sympathy was a value in this period, both as a way of interacting and as a way of readingâ (33). For Coleridge, McCarthy notes, sympathy makes the reader into âan active creative beingâ, and âthe âconversationâ between interpreter and text [ ⌠] can happen only after a reader is transformed into a participant, a process which must âcome from within,âfrom the moved and sympathetic imaginationââ (47). McCarthy concludes that âthe belief that sympathetic participation in a work of art played a vital role in the creative process was widespread in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuriesâ (50).
This Romantic conception of sympathy, as an active, creative âway of readingâ, evolved from its more socially-oriented connotations. According to the leading moral philosophers of the early and mid-eighteenth century, sympathy is a ânatural affectionâ that depends on social intercourse. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, for example, sets out to prove that âto have the natural affections (such as are founded in Love, Complacency, Good-will, and in a Sympathy with the Kind or Species) is to have the Chief Means and Power of Self-Enjoyment: and that to want them is Certain Misery and Illâ (1711:99). He equates âhuman Sympathyâ with âsocial Affectionâ, and claims that it âaffords a greater Enjoyment in the way of Thought and Sentiment, than any thing besides can do in a way of Sense and common Appetiteâ (107). This is proof, for Shaftesbury, âhow much the mental Enjoyments are actually the very natural Affections themselvesâ (107). He argues further that âAn Enjoyment of Good by Communication, A receiving it, as it were, by Reflection, or by way of Participation in the Good of othersâ (107) forms a âconsiderable partâ of all human happiness:
For later philosophers, sympathy can involve a range of emotions, and does not have to mean simply âsharing Contentment and Delightâ. The crucial point is that it is a social experience and takes us into the feelings of other people. Thus for Francis Hutcheson, sympathy is a âPublick or BENEVOLENT Desireâ, which involves pursuing âwhat we apprehend advantageous to others, and do not apprehend advantageous to our selves, or do not pursue with this viewâ (1728:13). He criticises followers of Epicurus, who maintain âthat all our Desires are selfishâ (13), arguing that this runs contrary to the feelings of âNatural Affection, Friendship, Love of a Country, or Community, which many find strong in their Breastsâ (14). Even the most staunch defenders of Epicurus acknowledge, he claims, âa publick Sense in many Instances; especially in natural Affection, and Compassionâ by which âthe Observation of the Happiness of others is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their Misery the Occasion of Pain to the Observerâ (14). According to Hutcheson:
Hutcheson explains further that we have âpublick Passions about the State of others, as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their Moral Qualitiesâ (71). Thus while âwe naturally desire the absent Happiness of others; rejoice in it when obtained, and sorrow for it when lostâ, we also, according to Hutcheson, âhave Aversion to any impending Misery; we are sorrowful when it befals any Person, and rejoice when it is removedâ (71). When our âpublick Affectionsâ are joined with âmoral Perceptions of the Virtue or Vice of the Agentsâ (72) they are strengthened still further. Hutcheson comments that âwhen Good appears attainable by a Person of Moral Dignity, our Desire of his Happiness, founded upon Esteem or Approbation, is much stronger than that supposed in the former Classâ (72), while âthe Misfortune of such a Person raises stronger Sorrow, Pity, or Regretâ (72).
It is not difficult to see how these passions about the happiness or misery of others could be extended to fictional characters. Hutcheson notes âhow unfit such Representations are in Tragedy, as make the perfectly Virtuous miserable in the highest degreeâ, since âthey can only lead the Spectators into Distrust of Providence, Diffidence of Virtueâ (73). Equally, in his view, âthe Success of evil Characters, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit Representation in Tragedyâ, since it raises the âPassions of Sorrow, Distrust, and Suspicionâ (76). Hutcheson discusses specific examples of âmixed Charactersâ who âcome short of the highest Degrees either of Virtue or Viceâ (77), including Oedipus and Creon, declaring that âall Dramatick Performances, both Antient and Modernâ are capable of raising such âcomplicated Passionsâ (77). His theory of passionate response is, however, not confined to drama; he claims that âwhen we form the Idea of a morally good Action, or see it represented in the Drama, or read it in Epicks or Romance, we feel a Desire arising of doing the likeâ (69).
For David Hume, too, our sympathy can extend to fictional characters. In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739â1740) Hume urges the reader to âtake a general survey of the universe, and observe the force of sympathy throâ the whole animal creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to anotherâ (1978:363). According to Hume, Man is âthe creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantagesâ; indeed he claims that âwe can form no wish, which has not a reference to societyâ (363). It follows for him that âwhatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor wouâd they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of othersâ (363). He claims that âno quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our ownâ (316). As David Mercer observes, in the Treatise Hume âthinks of sympathy primarily as the transference or communication of an emotion, sensation, or even an opinion from one individual to anotherâ (1972:21). Mercer characterises Humeâs notion of sympathy as âa kind of emotional infectionâ (21), and âa kind of infectious fellow-feelingâ (36), and notes that âthe equation between sympathy and infection or contagion runs as a distinct thread through the Treatiseâ (36).
The importance of sympathy for Hume becomes even more apparent in Book III of the Treatise (Of Morals), where he argues that it âproduces our sentiment of moralsâ (577). He explains that
For Hume it is this ability to âtake us [ ⌠] out of ourselvesâ which ties sympathy so closely to moral virtue. He claims that
Hume thus rejects the idea that moral judgements are based on our ânearness or remotenessâ (582) to the person being judged. Instead he argues that âwe over-look our own interest in those general judgementsâ and âconsider not whether the persons, affected by the qualities, be our acquaintance or strangers, countrymen or foreignersâ (582). It is vital for Hume that men âchoose some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of themâ (591), since this will mean that âin judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose character is examinâdâ (591). This need for a âcommon point of viewâ extends to the examination of âcharactersâ we have not met. Thus although âour servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as represented in historyâ, we do not say, according to Hume, âthat the former is more laudable than the latterâ (582). He asserts that âexperience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentimentsâ, since ââtwere impossible we couâd ever make use of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present situationâ (582). Similarly, Hume argues that as long as we conform to âour calm and general principlesâ, we âblame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one performâd in our neighbourhood tâother dayâ (584).
For Hume then, sympathy is both âa very powerful principle in human natureâ and âthe chief source of moral distinctionsâ (618). It involves âthe easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to anotherâ, and enables us to make âmoral distinctionsâ by âtak[ing] us so far out of ourselvesâ and leading us to a âcommon point of viewâ. In Mercerâs words, sympathy is for Hume âthe medium of moral judgementâ (45). The adoption of âsteady and general points of viewâ means that our judgement can extend to characters we read about as well as those we have met; whether these be historical or fictional. Indeed this is not a distinction that bothers Hume; in an early section of the Treatise he argues that âif one person sits down to read a book as a romance, and another as a true history, they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their authorâ (97â98). Reading is thus for Hume a potential site of sympathetic exchange and moral judgement; it has the ability to take us âout of ourselvesâ and enable us to âarrive at a more stable judgement of thingsâ.
Humeâs notion of sympathy as âinfectious fellow-feelingâ informs depictions of reading in the novel of sensibility. In Frances Burneyâs first novel, Evelina, or the History of a Young Ladyâs Entrance into the World (1778), for example, reading is able to evoke an âeasy communication of sentimentsâ. In answer to some facetious Lords who are pestering the heroine, her mentor Mrs Selwyn reveals that Evelina passes her time in ââa manner that your Lordship will think very extraordinary [ ⌠] for the young Lady readsââ (1968:275). Though few details are given throughout the novel of Evelinaâs reading matter, and she is rarely shown reading, part of Lord Orvilleâs courtship involves their reading together: