The European Union and Human Security

External Interventions and Missions

Mary Martin, Mary Kaldor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781135178932
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This edited book examines European external interventions in human security, in order to illustrate the evolution and nature of the European Union as a global political actor.

In 2003, the EU deployed its first external mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with a military force to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Since then it has instigated over 18 civilian and military missions to deal with humanitarian crises all over the world. This book presents a series of eight case studies of external interventions by the EU covering the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Indonesia, to illustrate the nature of the EU as a global actor. Using the concept of human security to assess the effectiveness of these missions in meeting the EU's aim of being a 'force for good in the world', this study addresses two key issues: the need for an empirical assessment of EU foreign and security policies based on EU intervention in conflict and post-conflict situations and the idea of 'human security' and how this is applied in European foreign policy.

This book will be of great interest to students of European Security, EU politics, human security, post-conflict reconstruction, and IR in general.

Mary Kaldor is Co-Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Prior to this she worked at Sussex University as Jean Monnet Reader in Contemporary European Studies.

Mary Martin is a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, the London School of Economics. From 2006-2009 she was co-ordinator of the Human Security Study Group. She was formerly a foreign correspondent and European editor for The Daily Telegraph and Guardian newspapers.

1
The AMM and the transition from conflict to peace in Aceh, 2005–2006¹

Kirsten E. Schulze

On 15 August 2005 three decades of armed insurgency in Aceh were brought to an end. The Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), which was struggling for an independent Acehnese state, and the Indonesian government concluded an agreement which would grant Aceh wide-ranging autonomous powers within the Indonesian Republic. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was facilitated by the Finnish Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) with backing from the European Union (EU). The EU also played a key role in overseeing the implementation of the agreement. It led the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from 15 September 2005 until 15 December 2006 in conjunction with some ASEAN member countries.

This chapter looks at the peace process, the MOU, and the role of the AMM. It briefly discusses the AMM’s establishment, funding and training before moving to the focus of this analysis, namely the role the AMM played with respect to the decommissioning of GAM weapons, the redeployment of the Indonesian security forces, monitoring the reintegration of former combatants, and the monitoring of human rights as well as the legislation for the governance of Aceh. It analyses the AMM through the framework of the human security doctrine as outlined in the September 2004 Barcelona Report.²

This chapter will pursue two lines of argument. It will argue that the AMM performed better with respect to traditional security than human security. Thus the decommissioning to schedule of GAM weapons, which was essential to building Indonesia’s confidence, as well as the redeployment of Indonesian security forces, so crucial for GAM, were exemplary. The reintegration of former combatants and human rights monitoring were more challenging and the AMM’s performance fell short on implementing the principle of the primacy of human rights and following a bottom-up approach. However, it will also be argued from a broader perspective that the AMM’s mission was nevertheless a success, not least because one of the factors allowing it to succeed was the very same lack of focus on implementing the human rights elements of the MOU. This made it possible for the AMM to ultimately complete its mission in the highly sensitive context of Indonesian domestic politics. The other four reasons for the AMM’s success were: the commitment to the peace process of GAM and the Indonesian government; the leadership and impartiality of its head of mission, Peter Feith, and the mission as a whole; the support of the UK embassy in Jakarta as well as Sweden and Finland during the setup phase; and the quick amnesty and the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA).

The Aceh conflict, the MOU and the role of the AMM

In October 1976 an armed insurgency erupted in the Indonesian province of Aceh on the island of Sumatra. This insurgency was fought by GAM, which sought to liberate Aceh from what it saw as Indonesian ‘neo-colonial’ control. GAM drew upon popular Acehnese discontent for its support. At the heart of this discontent and the conflict were antagonistic centre-periphery relations, which gave rise to political, social and economic grievances. The first set of grievances related to repeatedly broken promises of autonomy by the central government first under President Sukarno from 1951 to 1959 and again under President Suharto from 1967 to 1998. These were compounded by economic grievances after the discovery of natural gas in 1971. Under Suharto the revenue of Aceh’s natural resources flowed to Jakarta with little if any wealth returning to the province. At the same time the population was subjected to the by-products of the discovery of gas, namely dispossession, dislocation, industrialisation, pollution, foreign corporations, urban–rural migration, the influx of non-Acehnese workers, and enclave development in North Aceh. Prices rose and urban poverty increased, placing considerable strains on Aceh’s social fabric.

The final set of popular grievances related to the Indonesian counter-insurgency operations from 1976 onwards, in particular the period from 1989 to 1998 when Aceh was known as daerah operasi militer (DOM)³ or military operations area. During this period Indonesian security forces in their pursuit of GAM perpetrated large scale and systematic human rights abuses against the Acehnese population.

The Helsinki peace process started in January 2005 and was concluded successfully on 15 August. While the negotiations emerged shortly after the December 2004 Asian tsunami devastated Aceh’s coastal areas, the peace process was not the direct result of the natural disaster that preceded it. Instead, it was the outcome of five interlinked factors. First, Indonesia’s imposition of martial law in 2003 with full international backing dealt a severe blow to GAM’s key strategy of internationalisation. GAM realised it simply did not have the international support it thought it had. Second, GAM’s civilian shadow government was virtually destroyed and its military capacity significantly reduced by the Indonesian counter-insurgency operations. Third, GAM, in light of the first two factors, started to reconsider its negotiating position. This included a willingness to consider interim options short of independence. Fourth, the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Vice President Jusuf Kalla (JK) provided an Indonesian government that was both personally committed to reaching an agreement and able to deliver a hitherto factionalised political elite.⁴ And fifth, there had already been secret contacts between the Indonesian government and GAM dating back to summer 2003 and more serious back-channel talks since October 2004.⁵

The negotiations were facilitated by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and the CMI, a Finnish NGO. Ahtisaari had been contacted by Finnish citizen Juha Christensen who had spent two decades working in Indonesia, in particular in Sulawesi where he had developed a good working relationship with then businessman Jusuf Kalla. When Kalla was elected vice president, Christensen saw an opportunity to help resolve the Aceh conflict. Ahtisaari shared Christensen’s assessment and approached the European Council. The involvement of the EU at this point was minimal. While the EU had been involved during the previous series of negotiations at the Tokyo Conference in May 2003, it had not been proactive since.⁶ Javier Solana seized upon the opportunity and asked Ahtisaari to ‘come up with something’ that the EU would then ‘take further’ and fund.⁷ They agreed on a timeframe, January to August 2005, which suited the CMI’s desire to keep the negotiations as well as the EU budget-line focused. Above all, however, the EU decided to underwrite this project because it believed that the circumstances were right. As Andreas List of the European Commission explained:

The domestic factors were the most important. External factors cannot impose peace. Without GAM or Indonesian government consent Ahtisaari would have failed. GAM was about to be crushed. Another 2–3 months and they would have been totally defeated. But they would have come back and the Indonesian government knew that. So that’s why they wanted to talk. Once the domestic factors were in place we could deliver the external factors. First, Ahtisaari. Second, the trust and the weight of the EU. And third, the combination of the two.⁸

The MOU and role of the AMM

The MOU comprised five sections: first, the governing of Aceh; second, human rights; third, amnesty; fourth, security arrangements; and fifth, the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (Memorandum 2005). The section on the governing of Aceh addressed political participation, the economy, and the rule of law. It stipulated that a new law would be promulgated to enter into force no later than 31 March 2006. Everything except foreign affairs, external defence, national security and fiscal matters would be devolved to Aceh. Aceh would be consulted with respect to international agreements and has the right to use regional symbols including a flag, a crest and a hymn. The Indonesian government would facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties within 18 months from the signing of the MOU. All Acehnese will be issued with new identity cards.⁹

With respect to the economy, the MOU granted Aceh the right to raise funds with external loans and to set interest rates beyond those set by the Central Bank. Aceh could raise taxes and seek foreign direct investment. It also had jurisdiction over living natural resources in its territorial sea as well as being entitled to retain 70 per cent of the revenue from all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources. And GAM would nominate representatives to participate fully in the commission established to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction.¹⁰

The legal code for Aceh would be redrafted on the basis of the universal principles of human rights and Aceh would receive its own independent court system. The appointment of the regional police chief and prosecutors would require the consent of the Aceh administration. Moreover, all civilian crimes committed by military personnel in Aceh would be tried in Acehnese civil courts.¹¹ Addressing the issue of human rights the MOU stipulated that Aceh would receive a human rights court as well as a truth and reconciliation commission.¹² GAM members would be granted amnesty and those imprisoned would be released within 15 days of the signing of the MOU. The subsequent use of weapons by GAM personnel would be regarded as a violation and would lead to a disqualification from the amnesty.¹³ Former prisoners, ex-combatants, and civilians who suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict would have all political, economic and social rights, and their reintegration into society would be facilitated including receiving farming land, employment or adequate social security. Ex-combatants also would have the right to seek employment with the organic police and military.¹⁴ As for security arrangements, hostilities would end with the signing of the MOU. GAM would be required to demobilise all its 3,000 troops and to decommission 840 weapons between 15 September and 31 December 2005. Indonesia, in turn, would be required to withdraw all non-orga...

Table of contents

• Series: Routledge Studies in Human Security
• Contents
• Contributors
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The AMM and the transition from conflict to peace in Aceh, 2005–20061
• 2 The EU response to the Asian tsunami and the need for a human security approach
• 3 The European Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo – a force for good?
• 4 Human insecurity in Lebanon
• 5 The deterioration of human security in Palestine
• 6 Intervention and independence in Kosovo
• 7 Crossing boundaries
• 8 A human security strategy for Afghanistan
• Annex
• Index