1 Introduction
Education is traditionally regarded as a domestic issue. Policy decisions about what will be paid for, what students will be taught, who will teach them, and where they will be educated are made with regard to national histories, cultural norms, and local political conditions. Over the past two decades, however, global management trends have influenced similar changes to Kā12 education systems worldwide, including two of the most different systems in the industrialized world: the United States and Japan.
In the United States, beginning with the establishment of common schools, local communities have traditionally controlled their own schools. Even though states have legal responsibility for public schooling and the federal government has increased its education spending, each district has traditionally developed its own curriculum, hired and allocated personnel, set its own school admissions policies, and created its own annual budgets. This fragmented structure has created variation in teacher quality, spending, curriculum, facilities, and student achievement among school districts.
In Japan, the Meiji leaders of the late 19th century created a unified national education system in order to catch up with the West. They established a national Ministry of Education to control every aspect of education. The Education Ministry and its advisory councils (shingikai) have traditionally set a mandatory national curriculum, teacher training and pay regulations, school attendance rules, and guidelines for education spending. In Japanās hierarchical structure, the traditional role of local communities and school personnel was to faithfully implement Education Ministry bureaucratsā policies.
U.S. and Japanese education systemsā main similarity was that each was dominated by educational specialists: elite educational bureaucrats, national legislators specializing in education, and educational interest groups, in particular teachersā unions. These closed education policy communities produced policy stability and incrementalism. Studies of Japanese education policy by T. J. Pempel, Leonard Schoppa, and Robert Aspinall have described a Japanese education policymaking system easily deadlocked over controversial issues.1 Studies of U.S. education policy by Jennifer Hochschild and Nathan Scovronick, Michael Kirst, and Terry Moe describe how structural fragmentation, norms protecting local control of schools, and powerful interest groups have impeded significant national education reform.2
Nevertheless, in recent years, U.S. and Japanese national governments have both restructured their education systems in ways that challenged traditional power arrangements. In 1994, for the first time ever, the U.S. federal government mandated a national education policy for states and districts. The Goals 2000 and Improving Americaās Schools Act required states to set curricular standards for all public school students and to assess student performance on those standards. In 2002, the federal government enacted the No Child Left Behind Act, which required states to install a specific testing and accountability regime. In Japan, the national government formally deregulated and decentralized the education system after decades of policy immobility. The 1997 Program for Education Reform authorized the first public school choice programs as well as six-year secondary schools. In 2004, the Trinity Reform decentralized control over billions of dollars in national education funding to prefectural governments. It also opened a window of opportunity for Education Ministry bureaucrats to enact a mandatory national student achievement test, an independent school evaluation system, and tighter regulation of school personnel.
Three global trends in the education policymaking environmentāwidespread belief that failing schools threatened economic competitiveness, widespread acceptance of New Public Management, and weakening and divided education interest groups, particularly teachersā unionsāfacilitated a politics of structural education reform very different from traditional education policymaking. With broader participation, different dominant actors, a different agenda, and different political cleavages, structural education reform politics were unpredictable, faddish, and chaotic compared with traditional education reform politics (Table 1.1).
The politics of structural education reform revolved around a series of partnerships between national politicians and elite bureaucrats. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Ryutaro Hashimoto, and Junichiro Koizumi attracted attention to perceived problems with the education systemās structure and built winning reform coalitions. Elite bureaucrats from the U.S. Department of Education, White House, Japanese Cabinet Office, Ministry of Education, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications networked in policy circles and shaped the terms of debate to make structural education reforms feasible and legitimate.
The core partnership was supported by state-level leaders from the National Governorsā Association in both the United States and Japan and U.S. Council of Chief State School Officers, as well as leading business associations such as the Japan Federation of Business (Keidanren) and the Business Roundtable.
The structural education reform agenda in both the United States and Japan drew heavily from the New Public Management (NPM). As opposed to traditional education reforms, structural education reforms explicitly avoided addressing curriculum, instructional strategy, or educational resources. Instead, the NPM promised to improve education by focusing on performance rather than āinputs,ā such as money, facilities, the number of teachers per student, or teacher quality. Rather than worrying about these issues, structural reforms promised to improve student learning by simply redistributing authority in a ālooseātightā arrangement. If governments held schools tightly accountable for student performance but loosely regulated them to encourage local innovation, education would improve.
Table 1.1 Traditional Education Politics vs. Structural Education Reform Politics | Traditional Education Politics | Structural Education Reform Politics |
Main Participants | Predictable: | Unpredictable: |
| Education Specialists | Presidents, Governors, non-education Bureaucrats + Education Specialists |
Dominant Coalition | Education Policy Community: | Moderate Structural Reformers: |
| ā¢ National, state, and district Education Bureaucrats | ā¢ National Politicians: Presidents and Prime Ministers |
| ā¢ Legislators specializing in education | ā¢ Business Associations: Keidanren, Business Roundtable |
| ā¢ Teachersā Unions | ā¢ State Associations: National Governorsā Association |
Dominant Agenda | ā¢ Curriculum | ā¢ āLoose-Tightā redistribution of authority |
| ā¢ Instructional Strategy | ā¢ Focus on Outcomes/Performance, not on Inputs/Resources |
| ā¢ Resources | |
Political Cleavage | ā¢ Political Party | ā¢ Local vs. Elite |
| ā¢ Sectoral Issue | ā¢ Shifting, dependent on timing |
Policy Process | Predictable, Immobile | Chaotic, Ad-Hoc |
Policy Outcomes | ā¢ Incremental Change | ā¢ Waves of Change |
| ā¢ Fragmented Policies | ā¢ Widespread adoption of trendy reforms |
The restructuring trend in education swept the world, including countries as diverse as Britain, Sweden, Brazil, and Mexico. According to comparative education expert Hidenori Fujita, āThe restructuring of education has been a global concern since the 1980s.ā3 International organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) played important roles in spreading NPM ideas as best-practice educational management.4
In the United States and Japan, the partnership between national politicians and elite bureaucrats was built on a specific type of NPM restructuring. Government actors avoided politically polarizing reforms that empowered parents and businesses through tuition vouchers and outsourcing. Rather than holding schools accountable through market-based competition, the politicians and bureaucrats adopted a self-consciously moderate reform agenda with two core characteristics. First, schools should be held accountable for results, not āinputs.ā Governments should tightly regulate performance, but not resources or process. Schools should be held accountable through evaluation systems based on standardized tests and centralized incentive systems, not through market competition. Second, educational authority should be realigned but only within the existing public education system.
In the mid-1990s, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto demonstrated how politically successful this moderate structural reform agenda could be; it has overshadowed more traditional education reform ever since. Instead of debating what to teach or how to teach, national debate has focused on who should decide what to teach and how to evaluate students and educators. The moderate reform agenda has also overshadowed more conservative market-oriented as well as progressive resource-oriented reforms. Education reform has focused on who should set curriculum, how to measure student achievement, and who should spend education budgets. It has not focused on how to create more competition among schools or how to redistribute resources more equitably.
As enacted, however, structural education reform in the United States and Japan diverged from expertsā recommendations and advocatesā plans. To win important symbolic victories, politicians allowed elite bureaucrats to craft the details of reform in ways that protected bureaucratic authority. As a result, the Japanese and U.S. national governments created ātightā accountability systems but did not deliver ālooseā regulation to allow schools to innovate. U.S. state bureaucrats won significant curricular authority through standards-based accountability. Japanese prefectural bureaucrats gained billions of dollars of budgetary authority through fiscal decentralization. However, national governments failed to empower school leaders to build teams or identify spending priorities.
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES VERSUS IN JAPAN
Because the United States and Japan are so different, one would also expect their structural education reforms to be different. This book highlights the many similarities in U.S. and Japanese structural education reform over the past fifteen years but recognizes differences that emerged in the U.S. and Japanese reform episodes.
U.S. and Japanese politicians and bureaucrats played different roles, and NPM reforms entered national education agendas in different ways. Although both Japanese and U.S. politicians were critical reform initiators, U.S. presidents more actively shaped reform initiatives and negotiated deals than their Japanese counterparts. Conversely, elite bureaucrats in both countries networked in policy circles and shaped reform to maximize bureaucratic authority, but Japanese bureaucrats were more proactive policy entrepreneurs. In fact, noneducational specialists from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as Education Ministry bureaucrats played key roles in structural education reform.
In the United States, structural reforms entered the national education agenda as education reforms; in Japan, structural reform initiatives ultimately included the education sector. Presidents Clinton and Bush applied structural reform logic to reauthorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which are scheduled regularly. Japanese Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Koizumi orchestrated sweeping structural reform campaigns across several policy sectors that aimed to revitalize the stagnant Japanese economy and restore trust in the ruling conservative coalition. Hashimotoās and Koizumiās structural reform campaigns added education onto reform agendas midstream. They pursued education reform to win short-term victories that would allow them to pursue more difficult campaign promises, such as bureaucratic reorganization and postal privatization. Once structural reform ideas had been imported to national education agendas, they were incorporated by Education Ministry bureaucrats into later education reform campaigns initiated by Prime Ministers Mori and Abe.
EXPLAINING STRUCTURAL EDUCATIONAL REFORM TIMING: THREE GLOBAL TRENDS
Two recent studies of U.S. education policymaking seek to explain how the Clinton and Bush Administrations enacted interventionist federal education policies after centuries of local control and decades of piecemeal federal action. Patrick McGuinn argues that heightened partisan electoral competition combined with educationās increased political salience laid the foundation for a new education policy regime focused on standards, t...