Ethics, Knowledge and Truth in Sports Research

An Epistemology of Sport

Graham McFee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781135276164
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

The study of sport is characterised by its inter-disciplinarity, with researchers drawing on apparently incompatible research traditions and ethical benchmarks in the natural sciences and the social sciences, depending on their area of specialisation. In this groundbreaking study, Graham McFee argues that sound high-level research into sport requires a sound rationale for one's methodological choices, and that such a rationale requires an understanding of the connection between the practicalities of researching sport and the philosophical assumptions which underpin them.

By examining touchstone principles in research methodology, such as the contested 'gold standard' of voluntary informed consent in the natural sciences and the postmodern denial of 'truth' in the social sciences, McFee demonstrates that epistemology and ethics are inextricably linked. Drawing on a wide range of examples, from the laboratory to the sports field, McFee explores the concepts of 'knowledge' and 'truth' in sports research and makes a powerful case for a philosophical deepening of our approach to method and methodology in sport. This book is important reading for all advanced students and researchers working in sport, exercise and related disciplines.

Part I
Overview

1
A vision of the ethics and epistemology of qualitative research into sport

Introduction

It is becoming a commonplace that researchers must concern themselves, not merely with collecting data, but with the nature of that data as data (the kind of knowledge it represents) and with the conceptualizations these researchers assume of their methods and practices (see, for instance, Punch, 1998: 46–63). Accounts of the nature of empirical research tend to classify that research, first, as natural-scientific or something else (usually, social-scientific) – where the first is sometimes just called “scientific”!; and, second, as quantitative or qualitative. Indeed, some texts use these contrasts to characterize methodological questions for research. Then the questions become:

1 Is the research design natural-scientific or not?

2 Is the research design quantitative or not?

Faced with this framework, much empirical research involving sport claims to be social-scientific and to be qualitative. At least, the research that is my concern in this text would self-define in these ways (perhaps for want of anything better), although I say something about the alternatives. Similarly, its typical disciplinary self-definition is as sports sociology or sports psychology, although others (such as sports history) are not excluded. But my target in this text begins from the first pair of contrasts (and the associated categories) themselves, rightly lumped together as a concern with the epistemology of research: that is, with the view of knowledge that the research presupposes. Thus, to repeat, the specific focus of this text is as a contribution on the epistemology of (broadly) social-scientific research into sport, primarily for postgraduate researchers and their supervisors.¹ In such research into sport, human subjects are treated (roughly) as though they were indeed human beings, able to answer (and ask) questions.

As a terminological point, I prefer the term “subjects” for those who are researched. This is presently unfashionable:² participant is probably the preferred locution. Thus, the code of conduct of the American Psychological Association (APA) no longer makes “… reference to the term ‘research subject’ …” (McNamee et al., 2007: 74–75). But my preference here reflects my desire to emphasize the researcher’s mastery over his/her research data: he/she is the one who analyses and presents it. Hence I would not dispute the substance of the claim that “[t]he protection of the research participant is a key element of research ethics” (McNamee et al., 2007: 189; emphasis mine). But this is not incompatible with calling the involved person a subject. For, first, as emphasized throughout, what I call a “subject” is recognized as a person, suitable for moral treatment. Were this stress only achievable through adherence to the term ‘participant’, or something similar, I would use that term, re-writing this text in that way. But, second, my preferred term, “subject”, provides a safeguard against conceptualizing these “participants” as co-contributors, or something similar. In not wishing to down-play the powers and capacities of subjects, talk of participants can effectively over-rate them – an ‘other side of the coin’ mistake. The over-rating tendency should be rejected. Yet something crucial is also missed if the agential-subjects in such research are regarded as though they were the comparatively uncomplicated subjects of other research.

Situating our investigation

As noted, this text contributes to discussion of the ethical demands and epistemology of research for researchers, primarily postgraduate researchers, into sport. It specifically focuses on the epistemology of broadly social-scientific research into sport: research based in, for instance, sports sociology, sports history, philosophy of sport.

The academic study of sport generates a number of issues which, while not unique to sport, are posed with special intensity in that case. In part, this reflects strong traditions within the academic study of sport invoking the procedures of the natural sciences – such as physiology, biomechanics, psychology (on some conceptions) – but also those deploying social scientific and humanistic investigations, such as those mentioned earlier. So any satisfactory discussion of researching sport should treat each tradition judiciously, while giving appropriate weight to both. Thus the first tradition, which I call “sports science”, utilizes the epistemological assumptions and the conception of ethical researching it associates with the natural sciences; the second makes similar moves – and a wide variety of them – drawing on assumptions and conceptions from (broadly) the many versions of social scientific investigation.³

At first blush, these two research traditions seem incompatible: each conceptualizes knowledge, truth, and research (especially the soundness of research) in its own terms. In doing so, each rejects the conceptions of the other tradition. Further, each foregrounds a style of research which is problematic from the other’s point of view. If one’s cases for research ethics begin from overt, laboratory-based experimentation with control groups, then covert, broadly ethnographic modes of enquiry can seem methodologically unsound. And vice versa. Rather than give, say, equal treatment to these traditions, this text urges, first, the fairly uncontentious claim that each fundamentally misconceives what the contrasting tradition is doing and, second, that each misrepresents the central concepts that are taken for granted in its own tradition. So that, for example, the sports scientists are unreliable guides in their advocacy of the scientific method. Since both traditions are wrong even in their own preferred area, little weight need be given to them here, beyond searching for the insight (if any) that grounds each. Then one moves forward by considering the implications of the realization that each tradition is a mixture of distinct insight (to be preserved) and shared confusion (to be set aside), locating the points of impact. But, throughout, considerations for social theory, such as sociology, provide the primary focus here. So the natural scientific enquiries are discussed only insofar as they shed light on such social investigations.

Researching cultural forms and practices

Once we recognize sport as “a constitutive element of … popular culture” (Tomlinson, 2005: xiv) or as a set of culturally-valued practices (Alderson and Crutchly, 1991), researching it centrally involves researching cultural forms or practices. Yet how are these to be researched? Clearly, lots of methods suggest themselves, especially if we hope to capture that culture as it stands. For instance, participant observation, oral history, and interviews (especially semi-structured interviews) offer the opportunities to investigate cultural contexts with the minimum of disturbance to what would have occurred had there been no research. Other methods, such as formal interviews, focus groups, and questionnaires, may be more intrusive, or they may take the subject out of the sporting activity itself. But what unites such methods for our purposes is their concern with the context-laden activity: hence, with at least some of the culture within which sporting activities take place, as well as with the sporting activities themselves (to draw a tendentious contrast). Moreover this conception of researching sport invites us to take a generous view of what is part of that activity. So that we could consider, not just, say, the team and its results, but also the coaching and training, the fan-base, the location of the stadium, and so on. Further, a concern with the institutional forms and settings of sport may lead us to include the governing bodies, perhaps in relation to competitions and events as well as rule changes. Then international bodies, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), may have a place. For these are not mere adjuncts to the sporting activity, but can provide the context within which such activities are made possible. We can imagine similar lists drawn up for the variety of sports and the variety of our concerns with them. But, in all cases, the research-question will be inflected by its need to include, or rule out, such material. For that determines the degree to which the research aims at naturalism, as well as the scope of that research.

A distinctive aspect of the view here is the close relation of the epistemological questions or issues to the ethical ones, demonstrated later. For example, the conception of the role of the researcher is shown to be essentially ethical: obligations on the researcher to the research community and to the discipline are ethical obligations. But those obligations have implications for the practice of sport research; and hence for its epistemology. Further, conceptions of one topic, and especially misconceptions of it, might be expected to apply more generally. For each element is held in place by that collection of shared assumptions which, in the research context, is called a methodology (contrasting it sharply with the kinds of methods it supports). If the issue raised, the question (then) asked, the knowledge (thus) generated, and the treatment of subjects are all part of a unified package – as our use of the term “methodology” here suggests – one would expect to find commonalities for consideration.

So, what conception of knowledge – that is, what epistemology – is presupposed by one’s research into sport? In effect, my answer begins with two more (related) questions, and an assertion. The questions:

a What kind of interest does one have in sport? And

b What kinds of subjects is one deploying in one’s research? And, in particular, are they human subjects (viewed as agents)?

Suppose the first question is answered broadly in terms of the social-science disciplines,⁴ which often suggests a broadly naturalistic approach, and the second by granting human agential-subjects. Then our research will be of the kinds centrally discussed here. For the upshot of these responses identifies what might be called a qualitative research base (although that would be a new, or technical, use of the term) since it encompasses both concern with human subjects and treating those subjects as persons. Then (the assertion) the research epistemology of those engaged in what is thereby classified as qualitative research has an ethical dimension.

This text has, in effect, two over-arching ideas. The first, behind the book as a whole, is that high quality research into the social aspects of sport (as into other areas of social research) requires sophisticated consideration of the ethical and epistemological commitments specific to social research, of a kind typically not provided even in quite reliable guides to the detail, or the techniques, of such research.⁵ In their justified concern with methods, such books can ignore methodology. Then the second idea, determining the structure of this book, is that the ethical questions interpenetrate the epistemological ones, and vice versa. The obligation to behave well in research is an ethical obligation. But, as an obligation to one’s disciplinary background or field of study, it extends beyond simply one’s treatment of research subjects. Further, the dependability of one’s research designs places obligations on the research. So any satisfactory discussion of research design must address both ethical and epistemological questions. Were this right, one could not simply include a small sketch of one issue while elaborating the other. Yet that is what many texts offer. This pairof commitments determines the uniqueness of this work.

For a book aimed at sport researchers, sport (or even sport research) is rarely addressed directly. Even some examples come from outside sport research. But many traditional distinctions deployed in researching sport (especially that using human beings as ‘subject’) are misconceived. Thus examples must also be found elsewhere, since much research into sport is flawed in precisely the ways that this text aims to draw out. In particular, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is less revealing than is often supposed. And the contrast between research in the natural and the social sciences – sound as far as it goes – fails to capture many crucial features of research into sport: for instance, in neglecting how the research subjects are conceptualized. Further, similar confusions are perpetrated in attempts to characterize researchers’ relations to research subjects as independent of how they engage with those subjects. However, actual pieces of flawed research are not typically discussed in detail (say, with quotation) since, in being too specific to this particular piece of research, such discussion readily turns into a critique of that actual piece of research only. Similarly, an example that is too hypothetical seems just a straw man, set up simply for target practice. Thus many of my examples, although based on genuine research projects, are presented abstractly, either to avoid the focus on the detail of the project or to steer clear of modifications the piece’s author later introduced. Hence, while research into sport, especially social-scientific research, provides the vast majority of the contexts for the discussions, other broadly social scientific investigations suggest similar topics, giving my points here application in these cases also.⁶

Qualitative versus quantitative

As already mentioned, much research is self-defined as quantitative or qualitative – while granting some reservations about the usefulness of these classifications. Of course, research designs where the outcome is presented as numbers or quantities differ from those where it is not. Moreover, that such-and-such is a good way to present the data tells us something about the nature of those data; hence, about the conception of truth and knowledge supporting these being the data. Sport-researchers call their data or investigations quantitative to make points they take to be important. These typically include the data’s suitability to statistical analysis, or the ease with which one data-set can be compared with another. So, too, in calling their data or investigation qualitative, sport-researchers are usually making an oppositional point to the effect that their research deals with persons; and, as far as possible, recognizes the importance of the contexts which are the sites of the subject’s characteristic behaviours – such as playing sport and training for it, or being a sports fan, or some such.

But these ‘qualitative’ virtues could also be claimed by research (for instance using large-scale questionnaires) which is amenable to statistical analysis, and where the interaction with the subjects is at one remove. (This is often achieved by pre-coding of responses, so that subjects are, in effect, merely selecting from a set of responses – including other! – offered by the researcher.) This is very far from the full interaction of two persons, which usually involves their talking with each other. Similarly, much research calling itself qualitative may actually become quantitative in execution: that is, the data generated may be viewed and analyzed in mathematical, and hence quantitative, ways. For instance, ways of coding the data (for instance, using the NUD*IST or Ethnograph computer programmes)⁷ can effectively turn data originally based on human discussion – say, as transcripts of discussions or interviews – into data suitable to b...

Table of contents

• Ethics and Sport
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Related papers/presentations
• Part I Overview
• Part II The nature of qualitative research
• Part III The place of truth
• Part IV Ethics for research
• Part V Conclusion
• Appendix Considerations of exceptionlessness in philosophy: or, everything goes with beer
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index