Negotiation and Conflict Management

Essays on Theory and Practice

I. William Zartman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781134086900
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book presents a series of essays by I. William Zartman outlining the evolution of the key concepts required for the study of negotiation and conflict management, such as formula, ripeness, pre-negotiation, mediation, power, process, intractability, escalation, and order.

Responding to a lack of useful conceptualization for the analysis of international negotiation, Zartman has developed an analytical framework and specific concepts that can serve as a basis for both study and practice. Negotiation is analyzed as a process, and is linked to other major themes in political science such as decision, structure, justice and order. This analysis is then applied to negotiations to manage particular types of conflicts and cooperation, including ethnic conflicts, civil wars and regime-building. It also develops typologies and strategies of mediation, dealing with such aspects as leverage, bias, interest, and roles.

Written by the leading exponent of negotiation and mediation, Negotiation and Conflict Management will be of great interest to all students of negotiation, mediation and conflict studies in general.

Part I Negotiations in concept

1 The study of negotiation³

I William Zartman

DOI: 10.4324/9780203945254-3

Considering the length of time that states have bargained with each other, it is surprising that there has been so little analysis of the process of negotiation. Lately, however, there has been a sudden flurry of interest. Yet most of the new material is either a continuation of or an overreaction to old ways of looking at diplomacy. Assuming that purposefulness is as characteristic of students as of practitioners of diplomacy, the inadequacy of most current writing suggests that the subject is highly resistant to systematic study. The tendency of some writers to continue in the same old vein might also be taken to suggest that the traditional study of diplomacy fills a need, even if it does not satisfy the equally important necessity for analysis of negotiations. On the other hand, some current reactions to the old diplomatic studies do attempt to provide systematic negotiations analysis, but they seem to be one of current political science’s “huge missteps in the right direction.” (Hoffmann 1960).

Diplomacy and bargaining

Any attempt at a systematic study begins with precise use of terms. A distinction has been implied between “study of diplomacy” and “analysis of negotiations,” even though in the past “diplomacy” and “negotiations” were often used synonymously and without too much confusion. Yet, it is important to make a distinction. Diplomacy is an art or a skill, and the term will be used here to mean the pursuit of national policy goals through international communication. The study of diplomacy is essentially a prescriptive study. The great writers on diplomacy – Thucydides, Machiavelli, de Callières (1963[1716]), Pecquet (1738), de Felice (1978[1778]), Nicolson (1963) – amassed suggestions for effective behavior on the part of diplomats. The diplomatic historians attempted to describe the application of these principles in specific cases. Neither tried to analyze the dynamics of a negotiation process in any abstract or rigorously comparative sense. What is more significant is that the contemporary students of diplomacy – Morgenthau (1960), Aron (1966), Lall (1966), Ikle (1964), Fisher (1969) – have also sought to establish, or to confirm by new methods, prescriptive principles for successful diplomacy. They may have brought new wisdom, benefited from new methodology on detailed aspects, or uncovered new situations and characteristics in the world of the cold war and the United Nations, but they are still studying diplomacy and its principles.

Such studies are helpful, and they move far toward the limits of what is realistically possible. Particularly if the analysis starts from behavioral principles, it can at best conclude that these principles were unevenly observed and that success or failure is attributable to tactical ploys or mistakes of varying degrees. If the analysis is made from the basis of power principles, success or failure is prima facie evidence of observance or disregard of the proper relation between ends and means. Behavioral principles may go no further than Dale Carnegie in pinstripe; yet, admittedly, as long as de Callières and Nicolson are not applied with perfection, admonitions to do so can be very useful to a state’s diplomatic agents. Power principles can also be useful, by reminding states to keep their bank balances big enough to cover their shopping lists.

If both types of principles’ approach lead to circular or at least commonplace conclusions – the one that failure results from lack of skill, and the other that failure results from lack of capability – it is because analysis on this level can only go so far. The behavioral principles approach permits detection of national styles and perhaps a balance sheet of skills and weaknesses, but it does not permit analysis of confrontations or negotiating processes. The power principles approach would lose some of its tautology if notions of power, capability, means, and influence were further analyzed to show how outcomes were brought about. The first approach does not even permit this, for it is dealing not with unifying concepts but with noncomparable principles – as sound as the Book of Proverbs but often as contradictory.

If there is a criterion for analysis in either form of the principles approach, it is that of success or failure. Yet it is illusory as a central concept, for it provides no help in making fine analytical distinctions. Analyzing diplomacy on the basis of success or failure is as insightful as analyzing coalition or legislative behavior on the basis of bills passed. The referents are so relative, the participants so fluid, and the relevant area of analysis so much larger than the terrain chosen for study that only a little is learned. In sum, the principles approach to the study of diplomacy provides useful lessons for diplomats, but little in the way of analysis of the negotiating process (how outcomes are attained).

The implication is that negotiation analysis offers something different. Analysis is systematic, comparative, and at least somewhat replicable, even if not fully “scientific.” Negotiation is the process of combining divergent viewpoints to produce a common agreement. While more precise than “diplomacy,” it is broader than “bargaining,” and therein lies the problem of approach. In reaction to the inadequacies of the diplomatic principles approach, there has been a recent spurt of effort to analyze bargaining through the use of game theory and matrix methodology (Rapoport 1960, 1966; Schelling 1960; Midgaard 1968). To the extent that this type of analysis deals with strategies for chosing precisely quantifiable alternatives, it is valuable. Some analysts have found it to be applicable to labor-management negotiations over wage increases, even if such important corollaries as strike costs and fringe benefits are recognized to be quantifiable but less easily relatable (Walton and McKersie 1965; Siegel and Fouraker 1960). To the extent that game theory allows the formulation of hypotheses and principles that can then be essayed in negotiations analysis, it is also useful. But for the most part, matrical analysis cannot be directly applied to international negotiations. Where the study of diplomatic principles was too broad and too fluid to answer questions of “how” and “why,” game theory, by its very precision, is too narrow.

This judgment can be examined in greater detail by reviewing the assumptions of the approach. One is that quantitative utilities can be assigned to alternative positions or outcomes. In fact, many positions in most negotiations cannot be expressed either as a single quantifiable item or as several quantifiable and relatable items; as long as one of a complex of subjects under negotiation cannot be reduced to quantifiable, relatable form, it is hard to see how the whole process of choice can be matrically expressed, let alone determined.

Furthermore, even if at some point alternatives could be described as utilities, the process of reaching that point – as much or more a part of negotiations than the rest – is excluded from the analysis.⁴ Since the process of nailing down general principles is usually a major problem in negotiations, and since even quantifiable utilities are often finally reconciled on the basis of midpoint, other reference points, or criteria that have a contextual significance other than their innate utility, quantitative analysis is of limited value. In this situation, it seems difficult to reduce a negotiations set to a succession of matrices, let alone a single matrix. Game theory is useful in analyzing the choice of whether to negotiate or not; once negotiations have started, it is not directly applicable to an analysis of the process – even idealized – of arriving at an agreement.⁵

A second assumption also runs up against the “process nature” of negotiations. Game theory strategies are often based on noncommunicative negotiation, or alternatively, on an assumption that when communication is present the major problem is one of trust. It is perhaps paradoxical that “prisoners’ dilemmas” are more common in diplomacy, as defined, than in negotiations. Although motives may be suspect, information incomplete, secrecy broken, and leaks and indirect outside pressures part of the negotiations process – all indicating that communication may be only partial and always open to interpretation and evaluation – communication is an essential part of negotiation. But the problems it poses in most negotiations primarily concern interpretation, not trust.⁶

A third assumption is that of rationality and conservatism. There is no intent here to reopen the roving debate on the meaning and reality of rationality. If the term refers to a logical, purposeful, and informed decision, the point can quickly be made that, even if purposeful, negotiators’ decisions are not always logical or informed and that purposes vary and even combine, there is no guarantee that a negotiator can prefer a single outcome over all others, that he can choose such an outcome in any but a tautological way, or that his ability to do so is a necessary assumption for the analysis of negotiations. In other words, negotiators often do not – even unconsciously – make a matrix for themselves and systematically line up their alternatives. To the extent that this is true, game theory strategies are an element of prescriptive, not descriptive, analysis and thus are not helpful for analyzing what actually happened or will happen. Nor even what should happen, for not all negotiators are willing or able to choose a single fixed strategy, or to replay the game often enough to choose a mixed strategy. In fact, a negotiator may well gamble: he can gamble that the other side will, or does not see the matrix as they may do, that they can change their alternatives and even reverse their choices at a later moment, or simply that irrational elements – such as an ideologically “predictable” wave of history or an eventual change in situational realities or the rules of the game – will save them from the unfavorable portions of their chosen outcome. Idealized situations of pure strategy can produce indirect insights of great value, but their very idealization (or theoretical nature) removes the element that makes them directly applicable to negotiations. Mainly because of these problems, the systematic tools that are being developed for the analysis of games of pure strategy have not found useful application in the analysis of real cases of negotiations. To repeat, however, this does not mean that such analysis is useless; its value is simply limited.

The main question to answer in a comprehensive analysis of negotiation, it seems, should be: how are divergent viewpoints combined to produce a common agreement?⁷ If Lasswell’s definition of politics applied to “negotiation” is set up as an equation to be solved for an unknown, X marks the “how” (Zartman 1974). “Who” refers to the parties negotiating, “what” refers to the outcome, and “when” refers to the end of the process. “Who?”, “What?” and “When?” are simple factual questions that can be answered in any set of negotiations. Finding the answer to “How?” depends on a further breakdown of analytical questions, and leads to an investigation of power in the context of negotiation, since the combining of divergent viewpoints is an exercise in “the process of affecting the policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened)… deprivations [or gratifications] for non – conformity,” i.e., power (Lasswell and Kaplan 1951, p. 76; cf. Bacharach and Baratz 1970). Several schematic answers can be essayed, to suggest an approach.

Alternatives

The first answer to the question “How?” suggests that divergent positions are combined by limiting alternatives. Negotiation is a process of defining and reducing alternative positions until a unique combination is reached that is acceptable to all parties; it is a collective decision-making process with discrete “sides,” since a decision is “a choice among alternative modes of action.” (Rossi 1958, p. 364). The value of this conceptual approach is that it focuses on choices and the means of arriving at a result, thus approximating the real process pursued by the participants. Its limitation is that it does not indicate any dynamic in the process of negotiation; although this approach answers “How,” it does not tell why one particular means of limiting alternatives is chosen over another (except in some form of the commonplace observation that one means seems to be “most applicable”).

There are four ways of limiting alternatives. One is to make one alternative appear more attractive than others, either by promising additional side effects or by predicting benefits inherent in the favored alternative. A second is to make one alternative appear less attractive than others, either by threatening sanctions if it is chosen or by warning of inherent or associated deprivations (Rapoport 1966, p. 129). The third is by making one alternative appear to be already chosen, through the use of commitments and obligations. The last is by making some alternatives appear to be already eliminated, either by fait accompli or by simple incapacity:

The first pair of means for limiting alternatives is promise and prediction (cf. Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965, pp. 480, 483–4; Schelling 1960, pp. 43–6). Both involve future gratification, but promise refers to a volitional adjunct to agreement whereas prediction provides gratification through the agreement itself. The terms are used here in a more precise sense than commonly understood, so that analytical distinctions may be presented. Although the European Six made greater use of promises than the Africans (since they had more to promise), each Association Convention concluded with a number of ancillary engagements or promises from both sides: the Africans promised not to recognize East Germany, the Six promised the African Eighteen to study means of increasing consumption of tropical products, and the French promised to continue supports and supplement aid on a bilateral basis when possible. In negotiations with Libya and Spain for military bases, the US has used promises of aid to make the rest of its terms acceptable to the other side. The North African states have continually predicted outcomes in the interest of the Six by showing how the development and unification of the Maghreb would follow EEC Association.

The second pair is threat and warning (cf. Ikle 1964, pp. 62ff; Schelling 1960, pp. 35–43, 103ff, 123ff; Rapoport 1966, pp.93, 125; Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965, pp.480, 483–4). Both involve future deprivations, but a threat is volitional whereas a warning refers to future consequences beyond the warner’s control. In both Yaoundé negotiations, the African states frequently warned of the political instability that would occur if Europe did not aid their economic development; they threatened not to enter a new Association that did not satisfy their demands, but the threat was not convincing. Indeed, even when talks temporarily broke down – in the Yaoundé, Maghreb, and East African sets – the parties were at pains to state that they were not threatening rupture, i.e., that break up was not a real alternative. Africa, including the Maghreb and Commonwealth countries, used warnings more frequently than threats in dealing with the Six, since their signature was just about the only item of value that they could voluntarily withhold. The Europeans made crucial use of threats (in the guise of warnings) when they told the Eighteen that rejection of European packages would weaken the position of the Africans’ friends among the Six and result in a worse offer.

The third pair consists of commitment and obligation (cf. Ikle 1964, pp. 65–8, 175 on countertactics; Schelling 1960, passim). Both involve publicly tying the hands of one party: a committed party ties its own hands whereas an obligated party has its hands tied by another. Both constitute a presumed preselection imposed on the chooser. The process of negotiations itself builds up a structure of commitments and obligations as it goes along. Some of the commitments in the Eurafrican negotiations were arrived at before the negotiations ever began, by far the most important being the Europeans’ commitment to unity. The Rome Treaty and the 1957 (North Africa) and 1963 (Commonwealth) Declarations of Intentions implicitly or explicitly committed the Six to “success” (i.e., an agreement) once negotiations had started. GATT and UNCTAD also served as commitments, although their precise nature remained open to interpretation. Again, the terms of the Yaoundé agreement acted as a commitment for the Six in the Lagos and second Yaoundé negotiations since Europe could not give Nigeria better terms than it had given the Eighteen, nor could it let the Eighteen’s terms fall substantially.

Obligation is a subtler matter. While the Six had committed themselves to some sort of agreement with various African groups, the Africans tried to turn this general commitment into an obligation to a particular agreement by saying that anything less would not satisfy the terms of the original commitment. They also tried to create an obligation out of their inherited economic situation – the ex-French colonies tried to pin the obligation for maintaining their price support system on the metropole which had begun it, and the Commonwealth and other nondiscriminatory states tried to oblige the Six not to ask more concession than their former metropoles had sought. Richesse oblige was little invoked during the Yaoundé negotiations but rose in importance in the institutional interim between the 1962 and 1968 negotiations.

The final pair of means for limiting alternatives is fait accompli and simple incapacity (cf. Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965, p. 485 on fait accompli; Schelling 1960, p. 37, on coercive deficiency as simple incapacity). Unlike the previous pair, these means impose their preselection on the object. Both remove the possibility of accomplishing alternatives, the first by eliminating them directly (things that cannot be undone) and the second indirectly by showing that they are unfeasible (things that cannot be done). When the Six gradually reduced the benefits of Algeria’s de facto status they were in fact narrowing the status quo which Algeria could eventually seek to restore by finally deciding to negotiate a de jure relation. In its bilateral postcolonial relations A...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Introduction
• PART I Negotiations in concept
• 1 The study of negotiation
• 2 The 50% solution
• 3 Negotiation as a joint decision-making process
• 4 Negotiation as a search for justice
• 5 Justice in negotiation
• 6 The Structuralists' Paradox in negotiation
• 7 Prenegotiation Phases and functions
• 8 In search of common elements in the analysis of the negotiation process
• 9 Order as a political concept
• PART II Negotiation to manage conflict
• 10 International mediation
• 11 Negotiations and prenegotiations in ethnic conflict The beginning, the middle, and the ends
• 12 Structures of escalation and negotiation
• 13 Negotiating the rapids The dynamics of regime formation
• 14 Ripeness revisited The push and pull of conflict management
• 15 Negotiating with terrorists When, how and why?
• 16 Methods of analysis Case studies
• Notes
• Reference
• Index