Civil Society and the Internet in Japan

Isa Ducke

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781134113439
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Computer Science
• Subtopic: Computer Science General
• Index: Computer Science

Using case studies, interviews, and empirical sources, this book analyzes the strategies and impact of Internet use by civil society actors and asks how useful it is for their work – does the availability of Internet tools change the way citizens' groups work, does it influence their effectiveness, and does it do so differently in Japan from other countries?

Four fascinating studies take a closer look at the role of the Internet during the history textbook controversy; strategies of small citizen's groups; comparisons between internet use in Japan, Korea and Germany; and how the internet is used as a platform to discuss the dispatch of Japanese troops in Iraq.

Isa Ducke has produced an original work that will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese politics, media and information technology and civil society.

1
Introduction

Civil society needs networks. In fact, networking is what everyone else is doing too, but for civil society actors it is arguably one of the most important activities since they lack many resources that other political actors have. Thus, they have to rely on the power of information and ideas (Keck and Sikkink 1998:17). What could be better suited to such networking than the Internet? It is not only a net in itself but also an affordable tool—in the countries researched here, even for very small organizations and many individuals.

This book shows how Japanese civil society actors use the Internet, and asks how useful it is for their work. Does the availability of Internet tools change the way citizens’ groups work? Does it influence their effectiveness, and does it do so differently in Japan compared to other countries?

By most accounts an active civil society is regarded as an important factor for the functioning of democracy. This is especially true for direct democratic models, where the communication and deliberation of policies among the citizens is clearly part of the functioning of the system. However, it also holds for representative democracies, where civic communication and deliberation can improve the choice of representatives, and add knowledge, viewpoints and ideas to the representatives’ decisions.

Barber’s concept of ‘strong democracy’ (2003) explicitly adds a strong element of public discussions about a broad range of topics to the general—direct or representative—model. Individual citizens and the institutions of civil society can provide both topics and viewpoints and fuel such a discussion, as long as they have access to an arena where their viewpoints can be heard. Indeed, various forms of media have become the most important space where politics take place (Habermas 1962:292; Castells 1996:476). They form a major part of the public sphere where opinions can be voiced and viewpoints exchanged. It is obvious that all forms of democracy, direct as well as representative, can only benefit if as many citizens as possible have access to as large a share of the public sphere as possible. Participation in the public sphere does not affect the legitimacy of making political decisions. In a representative democracy the decision-making power remains with the elected representatives (Habermas 2001). The Internet presents itself as an ideal medium where citizens can communicate and be heard, exchanging and producing resources through networking and discursive learning (see Betsill and Bulkeley 2004:479, 486). Inequalities in Internet access will, at most, replace the existing inequalities in traditional media access, at least in terms of self-expression. By far, most people can indeed receive information via traditional media, at least radio and TV and, to a lesser extent, newspapers and other written media. However, dissemination of one’s own views in traditional media is only possible for a very small minority. Just consider what people are prepared to do to be on TV for a few minutes. The Internet may still exclude many, but it offers a far broader sphere for public deliberation than traditional media. To civil society organizations, it offers opportunities to amplify their voice with the help of networking to make up for a lack of financial and organizational resources compared to other actors.

Equalization or normalization?

A debate is occurring about the validity of the assumption that the Internet is good for both civil society networking and for public debate, and thus for democracy. While some researchers argue that the Internet with its new, informal and horizontal ways of communication provides a better platform for minority groups, and will create a more equal society, others are concerned about negative aspects, such as the digital divide. After an initial euphoria, many researchers now suspect that the Internet does not change political processes, and that a normalization sets in.

‘Imagine if the Internet took hold in China. Imagine how freedom would spread.’ It was not only George W.Bush who appeared optimistic regarding the impact of the Internet (Bush 1999): since Rheingold’s (1993) assertion that the Internet would change politics, some practitioners have reported positive results, and researchers found a positive impact on political participation, especially for certain groups or certain countries—South Korea in particular is regarded as a prime example of an equalizing effect of the Internet (Uhm and Hague 2001:5; JoongAng Ilbo 2003; Lee 2005; see also Margolis and Resnick 2000; Norris 2000; Axford 2001:4; Painter and Wardle 2001).

The unquestioningly optimistic accounts have decreased in recent years, however, and most researchers now limit their optimism to specific conditions or conclude that the Internet offers the potential to improve only some things. For example, Åström (2001:5– 7) argues that online deliberation benefits direct and interactive democracy, but offers only little advantage for indirect democracy. Stromer-Galley and Jamieson (2001:175, 187) emphasize the impact on hierarchies in enabling ‘direct contact between leaders and led’, and Morrisett (2003:30) sees the Internet as improving at least the groundwork for informed choices and action with its potential for information and deliberation. Publicity of political activity, as such, has for centuries been regarded as a desirable check on abuse of power, or a test of the validity of arguments, and the Internet should have a positive impact because of its ability to generate more publicity (Setälä and Grönlund 2005, referring to Bentham and Kant).

In other studies, the benefit of the Internet is seen as limited, not to certain aspects of democracy but to certain groups for whom the Internet increases opportunities. They can include sexual and ethnic minorities and groups outside the mainstream political system, or groups who operate on a local-government level or use issue-oriented (rather than person-oriented) mobilization (Castells 1997:350, 352; Grönlund 2001:6; McLelland 2003:143). Norris emphasizes the flexibility of some smaller groups that facilitates their successful use of new technologies: those benefit especially ‘smaller, less well-resourced and adaptable challengers with many potential supporters online, like Green parties’ (Norris 2001b:12), or transnational groups like the ‘Campaign to Ban Landmines’. To some extent, these benefits depend on similarities in the group’s member profile and the user profile of the Internet (e.g., affluent and educated) (2001a:21; Norris 2002).

An additional benefit for small groups is that they often have a clear common identity and interest and thus find internal agreement on their self-presentation easier than large organizations with diverse aims and audiences. Thus, they can profit from the opportunity to reach a broad audience with just one homepage, rather than tailoring their self-presentation to different media and audiences (Geser 1998).

The argument that issue-oriented campaigns benefit more from online activism resembles that made by Keck and Sikkink (1998:27) on the benefit of right/wrong issues for transnational campaigns: in both cases, resource mobilization is a key factor. For example, mobilizing the time and physical presence of supporters is generally easier for clear black-and-white issues, especially those with a ‘villain’, and also for personalized campaigns with an identification figure. Organizing helpers and other resources for abstract, structural issues is far more difficult. Since online campaigns require less resource mobilization—much more can be achieved by fewer people—these latter, issue-based campaigns can benefit relatively more from the opportunities of the Internet (Geser 1998).

Most of the optimists who see the Internet as an equalizer still agree that the positive impact they are expecting has been slow to materialize. So far, the Internet may have helped some smaller activist groups, and only those that were already active and mobilized, to ‘punch above their weight’ (Gibson et al. 2004b:198) but, on the whole, the opportunities are judged to be ‘not fully utilised’ (Leggewie and Bieber 2001:45) or ‘under-explored and under-exploited’ (Tsaliki 2003).

This viewpoint gradually merges into the ‘normalization’ position: more sceptical researchers think that the old patterns will just be replicated (Gibson et al. 2003). The technology alone will not change the way people act, they argue, and political processes will continue broadly as they did before the advent of the Internet—just as previous technologies like television did not cause major revolutions.

Most Internet communication appears direct and unmediated, and this immediacy is regarded as a key factor for the utilization of the Internet’s democratic potential. In fact, however, much of the information available on the Internet is still screened and thus replicates the control patterns of traditional media. Messages sent to the BBS or mailing lists often have to be approved or may be censored. Websites have an editor, and providers have to screen contents for their lawfulness. In the case of unmediated information, which is also available, its amount is often too overwhelming to be useful, and it lacks a legitimizing authority to sort it (Axford 2001:15; Mekata, in Asahi Shinbun 2003e:28). Barber stresses that the point of democratic online interaction is not to eliminate all mediation (Barber 2003:42).

The prevailing communication style—mostly one-way and passive—is another area where the expected radical change fails to appear. Researchers note that most people still rely on TV for their political information (Moog and Sluyter-Beltrao 2001:56). Since the Internet is still mostly text-based and not radically different from other media, its impact on political communication is not very high (Åström 2001:19). Most people use the Internet for entertainment and commercial activities rather than for political participation, and the sceptics argue that this will not change greatly, at least in industrialized societies. Margolis and Resnick point out that a political impact of the Internet is more likely in countries where ordinary means of dissent, such as demonstrations, letters to the editor or electoral decisions, are unavailable or stifled (Margolis and Resnick 2000:211).

Some scholars go even further and suggest that the Internet might not only have little or no impact, but that it could have a negative impact on equal democratic participation, for example by widening already existing participation gaps. The concept of the digital divide (see pp. *–*) postulates that differences in Internet access and use even increase inequalities, and thus produce an ‘Athenian democracy’ where only an elite group has access to democratic deliberation (Castells 1997:351; Norris 2001b:3). In addition, the tendency to likeminded exchanges in ‘mini-public spheres’ could even reduce discussion and deliberation rather than encourage it. Some researchers have found that these segregations tend to assist the fringes rather than the mainstream, and especially the far right (Åström 2001:5; Dahlgren 2001:76). This argument is not so different from that of the optimists, who argue that the Internet will give smaller groups outside the mainstream a stronger voice—only that most of them envision disadvantaged minorities rather than political extremists as beneficiaries.

In this introduction, I will first develop some definitions of key terms used throughout the book and give a short overview of the literature. I will then briefly describe the outline of the book and touch upon some methodological issues.

Definitions

Civil society

The term ‘civil society’ is often used but rarely defined. Its explicit or implicit meanings vary greatly among different authors—from Tocqueville, who referred to ‘[t]hose associations only which are formed in civil life, without reference to political objects’ (1840) to Habermas, who explicitly mentions the visibility within the political public sphere as a condition (1992:443–4). Gramsci, who is often referred to in relation to this subject, never found a single definition for the term. He juxtaposed civil society with political society but not necessarily with the state (1971).

The following are all quite recent and explicit definitions of civil society. They demonstrate the breadth of meanings associated with the term:

I define civil society as the medium through which one or many social contracts between individuals, both women and men, and the political and economic centres of power are negotiated and reproduce.

(Kaldor 2003:45)

Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres.

(Habermas 1996:367)

Civil society is a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, nevertheless, entered freely rather than imposed either by birth or by some awesome ritual.

(Gellner 1995:42)

Civil society is:

[the] arena in which people come together to advance the interests they hold in common, not for profit or political power, but because they care enough about something to take collective action.

(Edwards 2001:2)

Several authors have attempted to categorize these different concepts for civil society. Mary Kaldor (2003:5–7), for example, distinguishes five different understandings of the term:

1. The understanding as ‘societas civilis’, with a focus on the lawful environment and civility.
2. The bourgeois concept used by Marx and Hegel: the ‘Bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ encompasses everything between family and state, including markets and economic organizations.
3. The activist view, emphasizing active citizenship, self-organization, and the influence of citizens.
4. The neo-liberal position which concentrates on charities and voluntary associations that perform welfare functions for the state.
5. The less universalistic postmodern concept, including, for instance, fundamentalist movements.

Of these, the first and last are today least used and are only partially relevant to this study. Other categorizations often distinguish between three types of civil society concepts, often roughly corresponding to Kaldor’s bourgeois, activist and neo-liberal concepts. Edwards (2004) finds three different conceptualizations: first as associational life; second as a good society; and third as a public sphere. On a somewhat different level, Kaviraj (2001:289–306) finds that most concepts of civil society describe it in a dichotomy, be it in contrast to natural society, to the state or to community.

A number of factors differ among the various concepts: does civil society describe a state (of civility), a sphere or a body of actors? What exactly is its relation to the nation state? Is it a normative or a descriptive concept? Can activities in the civil society by definition only be for the common good, or can they also promote private or sub-group interests (Fraser 1997; Kaviraj 2001)?

Since most concepts of civil society apparently include the different aspects of actors, place and values, it does not make sense to limit the concept to only one of these aspects. Civil society, for most authors, consists of both organizations and the environment that makes them possible, of both social values and a set of institutions (Hall 1995:2). However, the focus varies between different authors. In many concepts of civil society, the focus is on the people who act in it: these are either seen as individuals, or more often as groups. Other views emphasize the way these individuals or groups interact: they share certain values and follow certain rules and laws, and they act not only for their own profit but for the benefit of all. Again other authors emphasize the environment in which these groups function and communicate with each other and with other actors. In that case, the arena where such a discourse takes place, i.e. the public sphere (or public spheres) (see Fraser 1997), becomes a key feature of civil society.

Depending on this emphasis, civil society can be seen as either a part of the state, or as its counterweight. On the one hand, civil society acts within the state in so far as it relies on the rules and laws that guarantee both the civility of exchange and the sphere in which it takes place. On the other hand, the actors making up civil society are distinct from government and state institutions.

In particular, the connection between civil society and democracy is a topic of debate. The simple equation that a strong civil society automatically means more democracy (see Baker 2002:2–3) often relies on a simplified concept of direct democracy. Others focus on deliberation and debate by a large public. They should also strengthen indirect democracy as they give more people the opportunity for involvement in issues, and it is more likely that all aspects are considered and all arguments sufficiently tested (Barber 1984; Habermas 2001).

There is some consensus in these descriptions, definitions and categorizations of civil society. Most contemporary concepts of civil society define it as different from both the state and economic corporations. Some define the latter aspect explicitly as being ‘non-profit’, and many are, at least implicitly, normative (see Edwards 2004:37–53). The examples appearing in civil society literature, as well as the expectations for civil society (and its larger role) implicate that civil society is inherently ‘good’. In most cases, this means not only that it is desirable to have a strong civil society, but also that every individual actor in this framework is morally ‘good’.

The non-profit status of many civil society actors also suggests that civil society acts for the common good and is therefore altruistic. However, the legal requirements for registering a non-profit organization do not always guarantee that the organization has noble aims, or does indeed serve the benefit of all. Indeed, criticism of non-profit groups is not all that uncommon: Hudock (1999) even claims that international developmental NGOs (INGOS) are ‘not necessarily a contribution to civil society’ even if they do not make profit and act with the best intentions (but the wrong results). One could also argue that citizens’ groups, like all networks, are ‘held together by the perception of individual advantages’ (Koehn and Rosenau 2002:107) and that everyone has some personal advantage even from non-profit, voluntary work. Even leaving subtle questions of egoistic aspects of altruism (regarding...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Civil Society and the Internet in Japan
• Routledge contemporary Japan series
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Note on the text
• Glossary and abbreviations
• 1: Introduction
• 2: The Internet and new technologies in Japan
• 3: Civil society in Japan
• 4: Use of the Internet by political actors in the Japanese-Korean textbook controversy
• 5: Website strategies of small citizens’ groups
• 6: How umbrella organizations in Japan, Korea and Germany use new technologies
• 7: The Internet as a platform for political participation and mobilization in the debate about the dispatch of troops to Iraq
• 8: Conclusion
• Appendices
• Notes
• Bibliography