Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933-1941

The Road to Global War

Christian Leitz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134687367
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

How did the Second World War come about? Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933-1941 provides lucid answers to this complex question. Focusing on the different regions of Nazi policy such as Italy, France and Britain, Christian Leitz explores the diplomatic and political developments that led to the outbreak of war in 1939 and its transformation into a global conflict in 1941.
Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933-1941 details the history of Nazi Germany's foreign policy from Hitler's inauguration as Reich Chancellor to the declaration of war by America in 1941. Christian Leitz gives equal weight to the attitude and actions of the Nazi regime and the perspectives and reactions of the world both before and during the war.

1 Hitler and Mussolini

The road to alliance in war

[N]o state is better suited than Italy as an ally for Germany.¹

In 1928 Hitler completed a rambling and repetitive exposition of policy objectives, otherwise known as his (unpublished) ‘second’ or ‘secret book’. In the manuscript Italy stands out as the country that held the greatest interest for the leader of the NSDAP.² Hitler’s verdict was resoundingly positive. The fact that Italy, in spite of its pre-war alliance with Germany, had joined the country’s enemies in 1915 and that, in 1919, it had gained South Tyrol with its large German-speaking community did not deter Hitler from his total devotion to achieving an alliance with Italy. Instead he demonstrated a very distinct commitment to explaining away both issues.

As early as 1919, at the very beginning of his political career, Hitler declared in a speech that Italy had entered the war due to its hatred of Austria, not because of any antagonism towards Germany.³ The same argument he used repeatedly to explain away as unnecessary the previous conflict between Germany and Italy. Put plainly, Austria was ‘the determining force which drove the Italian people’ to go to war – ‘and the visible possibility of being able to benefit their own Italian interests’.⁴

By far the most significant of the ‘Italian interests’ was South Tyrol with its large Italian population, but also its substantial Austrian minority. In 1920, Hitler did not yet offer an explanation of how to resolve the obvious conflict of interests over that particular territory. It was clear, however, that the issue was certain to disrupt his goal of an alliance with Italy. At this early point in his political career, Hitler was, in fact, still in agreement with other German nationalists in demanding the integration of the territory into a Greater Germany.⁵ Within the Nazi movement this stance found its official reflection in the party programme of 1920. By the end of the 1920s, however, the programme had been changed on Hitler’s orders. South Tyrol was now deleted from its text and replaced by Alsace-Lorraine.

Even in the late 1920s, some members of the NSDAP still found it difficult to accept the new direction. Yet, Hitler’s radical change of mind – to put an alliance with Italy above a return of South Tyrol – had already been completed in the early 1920s. When, in 1922, Benito Mussolini made it clear that he would not give up the territory, Hitler adopted the position which he would not abandon until after the fall of the Italian dictator in 1943. Henceforth, to Hitler ‘the South Tyrolean question did not exist any longer’.⁶

In Mein Kampf Hitler reiterated that he was opposed to a war for the sake of South Tyrol.⁷ Even the growing public disquiet in Germany with the repressive Italianisation policies employed by the Fascists in the region did not sway Hitler who instead stuck to his guns – even against critics from within Germany’s nationalist right.⁸ The ‘secret’ manuscript of 1928 was, in fact, probably written with the very question of South Tyrol as a direct trigger.⁹ In the manuscript, Hitler devoted long sections to this particular issue. His conclusion, expressed at various points in the manuscript, was crystal-clear.¹⁰ ‘If the sagacity of the fascist regime one day succeeds in making friends of Italy this will be worth more than if it educates 200,000 [according to Hitler the number of Germans in South Tyrol] into becoming bad Italians.’ In other words, Hitler believed that an alliance with Italy would always be worth the ‘sacrifice’ of South Tyrol.¹¹

Hitler’s devotion to bringing about close German-Italian relations cannot simply be explained by the fact of Mussolini. Although Hitler was putting his views and objectives on paper when the Fascist leader had already placed himself at Italy’s helm, Hitler’s demand for an alliance with Italy predated the establishment of Mussolini’s dictatorship.¹² Not surprisingly, however, Hitler allotted particular significance to the fact that ‘with the victory of fascism in Italy the Italian people has triumphed [over] Jewry’.¹³ From the early days of Mussolini’s reign Hitler and his party expressed obvious admiration for ‘the brilliant statesman’.¹⁴

In their twisted interpretation of events, the Nazis even drew comparisons between Hitler’s activities in Bavaria and Mussolini’s rise in Italy. In November 1922, Hermann Esser proclaimed that ‘what a group of brave men in Italy have done, we can also do in Bavaria. We’ve also got Italy’s Mussolini: his name is Adolf Hitler.’ Even foreign observers saw an obvious parallel between the leader of the Fascists and the leader of the National Socialists. On 18 October 1922, The Times, for instance, referred to Hitler as Mussolini’s promising Bavarian pupil.¹⁵

How then can it be explained that Italy came to play such a central role in Hitler’s foreign policy considerations – to the extent that the aim of an alliance with Italy overrode Hitler’s ‘one doctrine: people and fatherland’, his firm belief that ‘all who must be reckoned as belonging to German folkdom must be equally holy to it’, to a point where South Tyrol ‘among all the severed territories [was] indeed the one most unimportant to us in a vital sense’?¹⁶

In Hitler’s mind National Socialism, once in power, would have to strengthen Germany’s weak international position step by step. Domestic preparations aside, Germany, first and foremost, needed to gain allies abroad. To conclude such alliances, however, might mean temporary concessions and sacrifices, hence Hitler’s benevolent attitude towards Italy’s incorporation of South Tyrol.

Consequently, in 1928 Hitler made a strong case for an alliance with Italy.¹⁷ Only eight years later, in November 1936, Mussolini grandly referred to the ‘Axis’ which had been created between Rome and Berlin. At that point still more of a propaganda statement than a proper formal commitment between the two states, Mussolini’s comment was eventually followed by the official act of Italy’s accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact one year later, by the signing of a cultural agreement in November 1938 and by the signing of the ‘Pact of Steel’ in May 1939. Finally, in June 1940, with Fascist Italy’s entry into the war and its limited contribution to the defeat of France, Hitler’s earlier deliberations had clearly become reality. In 1928 he had argued that ‘a victory over France with Italy’s help will bring us Alsace-Lorraine at the least, and at most, the freedom to carry out a genuine large-scale territorial policy.’¹⁸ In June 1940, the ‘least’ objective had been achieved while the ‘most’ was already on the cards.

This brief summary of the major milestones on the road to the German-Italian alliance conceals, however, the fact that this road had been winding, not straight. Only to a limited degree was Hitler able to steer Germany’s relations with Italy into the ‘right’ direction. In the early stages of the Nazi regime decisions taken by the Führer and other Nazi leaders tended in fact to alienate Fascist Italy rather than bring it closer to the Third Reich. While Austria was to become the central cause of disagreement, Nazi policies in other areas, most notably in Southeast Europe (and even in Spain during that country’s civil war), also influenced Mussolini’s stance. To arrive at an understanding of how the eventual alliance came about, both Italy’s own foreign policy and the policies of Britain and France need to be taken into consideration. It is sufficient to say at this point that, at Stresa in April 1935, and thus only a-year-and-a-half prior to Mussolini’s coining of the infamous term Axis, the three countries which had been allies in the First World War renewed their commitment to keep Germany in check. At that point, it seemed almost impossible that Hitler’s firm hope for a German-Italian alliance would be realised. Instead, ‘the Italians were [then] among the prime agitators against Germany’.¹⁹

In 1933, the portents for a close relationship between the two dictatorships had appeared more favourable.²⁰ Although Italy and Germany had emerged from the First World War at opposing ends, the two countries shared a sense of dissatisfaction about the peace settlement. More specific to the subsequent relationship between the Nazi and Fascist regimes were the concurring views of the two extreme right-wing organisations. As with all other radical right-wing groupings, Hitler’s National Socialists and Mussolini’s Fascists shared a total contempt for parliamentary democracy. This scorn was, in fact, not restricted to each movement’s country of provenance. It was undoubtedly pleasing news to Hitler’s ears that Mussolini repeatedly expressed his disdain for the Weimar Republic (and, in particular, for one of its major representatives, Gustav Stresemann). Closer relations between Italy and Germany, Mussolini argued, were only possible if a strongly right-wing government took control of the latter.²¹ Not surprisingly, both Hitler and Mussolini also shared the belief that only a dictator could achieve a radical redesign of their countries’ political, social and economic life and, above all, substantially expand their international influence.

Hitler’s takeover of power encouraged Mussolini in his belief that Europe was becoming increasingly fascist.²² According to Ulrich von Hassell, Germany’s ambassador in Rome, ‘[t]he coming into power of a political regime regarded in Italy as a sister or even daughter movement was evaluated in Rome as an event that could lend support to the world position of Fascism and create the possibility of close cooperation.’²³ Hitler, as has been noted, was totally committed to achieving a very close relationship with Italy. Mussolini, however, did not immediately seek closer ties to the Nazi regime. While applauding the inauguration of the new regime in Germany, the Duce preserved a certain distance between himself and Hitler. Instead of wholeheartedly embracing the ‘new’ Germany as an ally (as Hitler had hoped) Mussolini even hesitated about meeting its new leader.

Hitler was instead made to feel that to achieve ‘his’ alliance with Italy would prove to be a more difficult feat than he had anticipated. When, in April 1933, Hermann Göring and Franz von Papen, both just below Hitler in the hierarchy of the new German government, made separate, but simultaneous visits to Italy they were, in fact, treated with condescending courtesy.²⁴

Two important concerns caused Mussolini to remain cautious. First, the Fascist leader was influenced by the international repercussions that might well have followed if Italy had moved too close to Germany. The evolution of Mussolini’s Four-Power-Pact proposal of March 1933 demonstrates that the Italian leader, while acknowledging Germany’s position in Europe, saw the need to accommodate British and French demands in order to achieve his own revisionist objectives. In its initial form the proposed pact appeared advantageous to the revisionist objectives of the new German government. During the subsequent negotiating process, the German government witnessed, however, a growing reconciliation of French and British concerns. When the pact was finally signed on 15 July (though it was never ratified by Italy and Germany), it had become ‘an inconclusive declaration of good intentions’²⁵ which basically reconfirmed the intermediary role of the League of Nations.

Mussolini’s second anxiety pertained directly to a major focus of the new regime in Germany. While the Duce expressed his delight with the repressive domestic policies adopted by the Nazis, he remained distrustful of the regime’s foreign policy goals and policies in Austria, South Tyrol and Southeast Europe. The major bone of contention between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy proved to be the country separating the two, Austria. Hitler was as plainly convinced that Austria needed to be incorporated into a Greater Germany as he was about the need for an alliance with Italy. Not only was he certain that Austria would be united with Germany, he even believed that this unification – or, if need be, annexation – would come about very quickly. In 1931, Hitler, in fact, predicted that ‘one year after the seizure of power Austria will join us voluntarily.’²⁶

Put simply, Hitler’s resolution to ‘lead Austria back to Germany’ can be explained by his own personal background and, as already emphasised, his ardent belief in bringing all Germans together in one Reich. These two factors are without doubt of central significance to an understanding of the Nazi regime’s policy vis-à-vis Austria. Nonetheless, Austria’s place in the Weltanschauung of Hitler and other Nazi leaders deserves closer examination.

Hitler’s personal attitude towards Austria was, to say the least, ambivalent; indeed, as far as Austria as an independent state was concerned, his attitude was outright hostile. In October 1924, on the news that his Austrian citizenship had been withdrawn, Hitler claimed that he was ‘not hurt by the loss of the Austrian citizenship because I have never felt Austrian, but always German. My love for my Austrian Heimat is as great as my disgust towards the Austrian state.’²⁷ As Hitler constantly stated, this disgust applied, in fact, as much, if not more, to the Habsburg Empire as to the post-war Austrian Republic.

It is common knowledge that Hitler grew up in the Habsburg Empire until he fled to Germany just before the First World War. Recently, Brigitte Hamann has provided an excellent and detailed study of those crucial years in Hitler’s life with a particular emphasis on the years he spent in Vienna. By bringing together a wealth of socio-economic and cultural information, Hamann offers a lucid insight into the environment in which Hitler grew up.²⁸

Of direct relevance to this study is Hamann’s analysis of Hitler’s views on Austria. Hitler never had any qualms about expressing his disgust with the Habsburg Empire and its multitude of nationalities. ‘Like the pan-Germans, even when he was still in high school he saw no future for the German-Austrians in Hapsburg’s multiethnic empire but was hoping for an Anschluss to the German Reich in the near future, which first required that the multinational empire be shattered and the Hapsburg dynasty removed.’²⁹ While the First World War sealed the fate of the multinational Habsburg Empire, it did not lead to the inclusion of Austria in the German Reich and resulted instead in the creation of an independent Austrian republic.

Hitler clearly ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1 Hitler and Mussolini: The road to alliance in war
• 2 ‘Getting onto closer terms with the gangsters’: France, Britain and Nazi Germany
• 3 Hitler, Poland and Germany’s conservative elites: From Non-Aggression Pact to conquest
• 4 The road to ‘Barbarossa’: Hitler and the Soviet Union
• 5 Nazi Germany and Southeast Europe: From economic satellites in peace to partners and victims in war
• 6 The Nazi regime and the American hemisphere
• 7 Falling between two stools: Nazi Germany’s East Asian policy
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index