Plato

Robert Hall

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134339181
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

First published in 1981 this unique study discusses the evolution of Plato's thought through the actual developments in Athenian democracy, the book also demonstrates Plato's continuing responses to changes in political theory and argues for a new understanding of Plato's goals for the state and his ultimate concern for the moral well-being of the citizens.

Chapter 1
The Athenian Democracy

Plato was born in 427 BC into a noble and wealthy family, a circumstance usually guaranteeing a successful career in politics. He did not play the expected political role, however, because of his dislike of prevailing conditions in Athens. Prior to his birth Athens had evolved into a powerful democratic state with a bustling economy and a continually increasing trade. The principal factor in the rise of Athens was her navy, which was the largest and strongest in the Greek world. For glory and profit Athens gradually transformed the defensive Delian League of Greek states into her empire. A desire for more power, more influence and more trade brought Athens into a collision course with the land-based power of Sparta in 431 BC in the great Peloponnesian war. The Spartans were naturally conservative and content with the status quo, but they finally became alarmed at the seemingly endless Athenian thirst for power and expansion and decided on war to curb Athens’ growth (Thucyd., I, 23, 6). (For a different view that takes issue with this standard interpretation cf. de Ste. Croix, 1972, esp. pp. 290–2.)

Plato saw the war and Athens’ eventual defeat in 404 BC as a sign of her inadequacy to meet the political, moral and spiritual needs of the people. What Plato viewed as a decline in values was due to the cynicism and desire for immediate gratification that was, in part, brought on by the sufferings and deprivations the Athenians experienced in the war. But it was also attributed to earlier movements of thought that presented a world view that was ‘scientific’ or naturalistic in providing explanations of the nature of the world and its processes that avoided any reference to teleology or the action of the gods. Plato believed such a naturalistic world view was responsible for the development of a moral relativism that denied any absolute or unchanging standards of morality and society. Society was based not on nature, but on an implicit recognition by men that organized social existence was necessary for their survival and advancement. The prevalence of these views around him and the decline of values they caused was a prime factor in Plato’s development as a political and moral thinker.

Plato’s exposure to Socrates was a second influence that shaped his life from his youth. Plato took up the search for universal moral values which Socrates never succeeded in finding. The execution of Socrates in 399 by the restored democracy, like the excesses of the Thirty after the Peloponnesian war, had much to do with Plato’s decision not to undertake the political career which beckoned him as a wealthy and wellborn youth. Instead he turned inward to speculation and developed in the dialogues the theory of forms, that notion of an eternal intelligible world which contained within it certain unchanging and perfect moral and political ideals which could serve as models. To implement his educational and political goals, Plato founded his famous academy while he was still fairly young in the early years of the fourth century. Enduring for some 900 years, the academy was a center for the training of future political leaders of the cities of Greece. During the last two of his three visits to Sicily, Plato attempted to reproduce his ideals in Syracuse; he was unsuccessful because of the refusal of Dionysus, the tyrant of Syracuse, to follow his advice. Plato died in 347 BC.

The customary division of Plato's dialogues is threefold. The early dialogues reflect more of the thought of the historical Socrates and are exercises in elenchus or refutation. The middle group of dramatic dialogues presents Socrates as the chief speaker but their content goes beyond the interests and concerns of the historical Socrates. Finally in the late dialogues the dramatic element largely disappears, and the chief speaker is someone other than Socrates. The late dialogues are occupied chiefly with critical discussion of method and a painstaking and subtle analysis of logical and epistemological problems; as well as, in the case of the Politicus and the Laws, an extensive analysis of political and constitutional matters.

Although for him there was no clear-cut distinction between theory and practice, Plato's political development can be said to reflect more of a practical rather than a theoretical concern. His founding of the academy, his attempts to put into practice his ideals in Syracuse despite his realization that given the circumstances they probably would not succeed, his profound study of Greek institutions and his proposals for reform as manifested in his political dialogues in the critical as well as constructive aspects surely suggest the necessity of a radical political and social change. It is to that change that Plato dedicated himself in his dialogues.

The Laws did not merely continue traditional political institutions but sought to give them a new meaning and direction based on the Republic’s view of the true nature of reality of the state, and of the individual soul. By this further development of the Socratic concern for care or tendance of the soul, Plato saw the soul’s moral well-being as distinct from that of the polis, but dependent upon it for its realization. As a complement to his treatment of the Republic’s ideal polis as a means of exploration of the justice of the individual and as an embodiment of the principles of the best state, Plato provides us with an implementation of his ideal of the best state and of the moral individual in the practical polis of the Laws. Whether we consider the ideal polis of the Republic or the practical state of the Laws, we can see that Plato’s constant preoccupation is developing that kind of society which will bring about what he, and of course the Athenians as well, had always considered the principal goals of the state: freedom, unity or friendship among its citizens, and wisdom.

At various stages of its constitutional development, the Athenian state displayed these principles in different ways. Athens’ role in bringing about the Peloponnesian war, the defeat, the moral and spiritual decline during the war years into the fourth century, the political factionalism and abuse of political power, the prominence of convention as the basis of justice and the state, the doctrine that might is right, and the wanton individualism that cared only about the good of the self and not the common good of the community, all these factors as perceived by Plato indicated to him that something was seriously wrong in the implementation of these principles in a democratic Athens. But before considering how these principles fared in the democratic state, some mention should be made of its important institutions and the significance of Athens’ commitment to the maintenance and expansion of her empire.

Aristotle’s comment that the demos or people relished acting as a monarch (Pol., 1313b 37–8) was an accurate description of the Athenian radical democracy of the late fifth and fourth centuries. The people had complete sway over the selection of their leaders and all important powers of the state. All male citizens over 18 belonged to the assembly which had final control over all important decisions concerning domestic and foreign affairs. The people selected from their number by lot the members of the other important constitutional bodies such as the council of 500 or the courts. By majority vote in assembly (through the showing of hands) they elected the ten generals or strategoi who were to be their military leaders, and in some cases, their political leaders for a year (and longer if the people re-elected them for additional year terms). Memberships in all these bodies as well as almost all the magistracies was open to all citizens 30 years old or older regardless of their economic and social background. The term of all offices was one year and allowed for rotation of the people in governmental offices to obtain a maximum of popular participation in the state. All successful candidates had to pass a scrutiny not of their fitness for office, but of the legitimacy of their citizenship and of their observance of various civic and familial duties. Outgoing officials underwent a searching examination, usually in the courts, of the performance of their duties. Any citizen had a right to question the record of any official during his term of office and after.

The assembly worked in concert with the council of 500, which primarily served as a clearing house for matters to be put before the assembly. But even here the assembly was able to modify whatever the council sent to it for consideration or to suggest and act on its own agenda. The power of the people was clearly demonstrated in the courts manned by hundreds of citizens. Many political careers were advanced or blighted because of the nature of the litigation brought before the courts of the people. The courts became the arenas of rivalry for power with the better orator usually winning the day. The judgment of people was final; no appeal from their verdict was possible. The people were the absolute power, ‘for the masters of the judicial verdicts became masters of the state’ (Bonner and Smith, 1968, p. 378).

Plato’s position on the Athenian democracy of the late fifth century and the fourth can be better understood if we briefly consider some aspects of Thucydides’ account of the relation between the radical democracy and the development of Athenian imperialism. For it is the spirit and character of the Athenian people that precipitated the move towards imperialism and determined the character of Athenian domestic life and politics (Grene, 65, pp. 31–2).

Thucydides in his History separated moral from political judgments. If, for example, he seemed to express moral disapproval of the desire for power and pleonexia, getting more than what is fitting or what is one’s due, he did not let that moral judgment cloud his intellectual appraisal of its political success. He accepted the fact that the Athenians were naturally interested in practical action and in the winning of power as well as for fame, honors, renown (de Romilly, 1963, p. 79). A leader like Pericles had as an idealized goal in the quest for empire that of glory, but the ordinary individual displayed simply a lust for power, along with a lesser degree of lust for material possessions. Thucydides believed that the Athenians’ actions reflected a fundamental law of human nature: the principle of force that the stronger rule over the weaker (de Romilly, 1963, pp. 336–43).

For Thucydides the exercise of power according to this law had a built in tendency towards hybris or excess. Within his political analysis of imperialism, Thucydides distinguished between a moderate, well-reasoned and thought out pleonexia as in the case of Pericles, and an immoderate, senseless pleonexia that reflected hybris, domination of reason by the passions or emotions as with Cleon or Alcibiades (de Romilly, 1963, pp. 60–1). As long as Pericles was in power, all was well with Athens, and the success of her imperialistic policy was assured.

The application of the principle of pleonexia after the death of Pericles is illustrated in two well-known incidents related by Thucydides. The Athenian decision to spare the inhabitants of Mytilene, a subject ally that had revolted against Athenian rule, was based not on any moral considerations, but on its expediency for preserving the Athenian empire (III, 44, 2–3). Again in the famous Melian dialogue, the Athenians demanded that despite its desire to remain neutral, the island state ‘obey the Athenians like the rest of the islanders’ (V, 84, 2). Athens’ demand was in accordance with nature. Both gods and men agreed that men ‘by a necessity of their nature wherever they have power…always rule’ (V, 105), an application of the law of force. Spurning the Athenian demand, the Melians went to war and were defeated. The men were put to death and the women and children became slaves.

The implication of Thucydides’ ‘law of force’ (de Romilly, 1963, p. 338) was that might, if wisely and temperately exercised, was justified if not right according to the way things were in the world. Plato’s entire political philosophy took issue with Thucydides’ political realism that the quest for power could be judicious and moderate. He sharply questioned whether the rule of the strong was justified because it was successful. Plato probably did not know Thucydides’ History (de Romilly, 1963, pp. 364–5) but the idea that the strongest should rule the weaker was a characteristic view of his times to which many Athenians and some Sophists subscribed.

For Plato, Pericles and the other so-called great statesmen of Athens, Themistocles, Miltiades and Cimon may have been able to apply the law of force with better results than their successors in the fourth century and also have been more skilled in providing the people with harbors, naval fleets, magnificent public and religious buildings (Gorg., 517a–19a). But still they were giving the people what they wanted, not what was good for them (Gorg., 502d–e). True statesmen would transform their desires and make them want to become moral. But this would require knowledge that they did not have.

While Thucydides may not have seen any necessary connection between Athenian democracy and imperialism, it seems clear that Plato found more than an incidental correlation. Of course for him all existing forms of government revealed the desire for gain (Rep., 548a ff.). Democracy evolved into a tyranny characterized by a single overmastering passion. Although in its constitution Athens was not a tyranny, to Plato the people and its leaders seemed gripped by the desire of pleonexia in both private and public affairs.

In addition to its promulgation of the law of force, of the legitimate rule of the strong over the weak, Thucydide’s History relates how a ‘greater lawlessness’ (II, 53, 1) rose through the terrible effects of the plague that devastated Athens and the cynicism bred by the war and its sufferings; people ignored earlier religious and moral restraints on self-indulgence. Pleasure was always taken as it came. With a person’s life in constant jeopardy whether he was pious or impious, personal gratification and self-interest might as well take precedence over obedience to the law, piety towards the gods or concern for the good of the community. This notion of ‘seizing the day’ became a persistent attitude in Athenian popular opinion down to Plato’s time (Thucyd., II, 53, 2–4; Plato, Rep., 560–1; Isocrates, Areop., 20; Hammond, 1976, p. 167).

Another continuing feature in the fourth-century democracy noted by Thucydides in his History was the pervasiveness of factionalism in all of the Greek states. Political factions were formed in the various states not to act in accordance with the established laws for the common good, but the factions acted against the laws solely to gain personal advantage and power (III, 82–4). The instability and divisiveness of such factional strife continued in Athens well into the fourth century and discouraged many able individuals, including Plato, from participating in politics (Hammond, 1976, pp. 234–5).

While to some of Plato’s contemporaries and to many of us today, Athens in the late fifth and fourth centuries may have seemed to be a free, united state ruled generally by wise leaders chosen by the people, Plato’s view in the dialogues was much more skeptical. The principles of freedom, unity and fellow feeling and wisdom so crucial to the development of the polis from Solonian times seemed in the radical democracy to pass dialectically into their opposites. (For a different modern assessment cf. Jones, 1957.)

The people were free in the most important sense of freedom for the Greek states. They were autonomous and free from domination by other states. Freedom in the radical democracy also meant the political freedom extended to all citizens so that in theory any citizen could serve with pay in almost any governmental position. Such freedom meant freedom of speech especially in the assembly, although at times individuals who differed from the opinions of the majority would be fearful of revealing disagreement that might be thought disloyal to the state (Thucyd., VI, 24, 4; Isoc., On the Peace, 3–8). But despite the existence theoretically of complete political freedom, the people could elect their important leaders such as the generals only from members of the great and wealthy families of Athens.

Only individuals with the right family and social connections could belong to a sort of social and political club called a philoi whose support was usually the only way for the politically ambitious to attain power. But the demos, the moderately well-to-do or the poor could not fully play the political role the democratic constitution allowed them since they had none of the obvious advantages enjoyed by the politically ambitious aristocrat. Even the poorest citizen was guaranteed a ‘voice in his city’s affairs’, but ‘to make that voice heard, coordination, prestige, and influence were very important’ (Connor, 1971, p. 29).

Pericles became the father of a new breed of statesman. Although he was a member of one of the great families of Athens, Pericles saw the political advantage of taking the people as his ally. Others after him followed his lead, especially those who had wealth but no important familial connections. New words appeared to express this courting of the people or demos, ‘philodemos’, love of the people, and ‘polisphilia’, love of the state (Connor, pp. 99–108). An individual ambitious to become a leader of the people now had to be proficient in rhetoric. Through his rhetorical skills in the assembly and other public forums, he would gain the necessary popular support either to be elected as general or to be influential in important decisions. Training in rhetoric was costly, so that usually only wealthy individuals could attain the necessary proficiency in speech to vie for ...

Table of contents

• POLITICAL THINKERS
• CONTENTS
• Dedication
• PREFACE
• Chapter 1 The Athenian Democracy
• Chapter 2 The Controversy of Convention or Nature as the Basis of the State
• Chapter 3 The Inadequacy of Convention as a Basis for Society
• Chapter 4 The Education of the Rulers in the Republic
• Chapter 5 The Justice of the State and the Justice of the Individual
• Chapter 6 Law in the Republic, Politicus and Laws
• Chapter 7 The States of the Republic and Laws
• Chapter 8 Plato’s Political Heritage
• Bibliography
• INDEX