The three chapters in Part I question where the concept of transnational organised crime (TOC) came from, why it came to dominate official discourse on the contemporary security of Western social orders and what the consequences have been for the emergence of a âglobalâ law enforcement regime or, more provocatively, a global âprotection racketâ.
Mike Woodiwissâs chapter distinguishes between âlimitedâ and archaic conceptions of TOC. Whilst the latter has a long historical provenance, in terms of governmental concerns over the smuggling of contraband and consequent circumvention of customs and excise duties, the former has its origins in more recent policy discourse on the perceived threat from âMafia-type organisationsâ to the integrity of Western political-economies. Woodiwiss traces the frenetic policy-making activity on this threat, which occurred in international fora such as the United Nations, G7/P8 and European Union over the past decade, back to the domestic security concerns of the US Federal Government after the Second World War. In the context of the pre-war New Deal, Rooseveltâs administration had emphasised the opportunities for organised crime that were generated by poor corporate governance and the connivance of ârespectable societyâ and had, consequently, implemented reforms to reduce these opportunities. Post-war federal administrations, however, eschewed this focus on the inter-dependencies of licit and illicit business. Thus, in the context of McCarthyism, the focus of governmental discourse shifted to the threat presented by ethnic, âun-Americanâ, outsiders, in particular from the Italian community, poisoning an âotherwise satisfactoryâ political economy. The official imprimatur for this âalien conspiracy theoryâ of organised crime was first given in the Kefauver Commission of 1950â1 and reiterated in subsequent Presidential Commissions on organised crime under Lyndon Johnson (1967) and Ronald Reagan (1983). Reaganâs Commission adapted this official discourse to acknowledge the increasing problem of drug trafficking as the principal basis for organised criminal activity and broadened the list of outsiders to include Asian and Latin American âcartelsâ. Throughout, the conceptualisation of organised crime as a problem of ethnic outsiders remained the same, as did the promotion of law enforcement strategies as the most appropriate policy response. In addition to âpluralisingâ the alien conception of organised crime, the Reagan Commission was notable for hypothecating US âforeign assistanceâ policy to the control of organised crime and recommending that aid to drug producing and trans-shipment countries should be reviewed on an annual basis in terms of the extent to which these countries comply with US crime control strategy.
For Woodiwiss, the concept of transnational organised crime has its origins in this internationalisation of US law enforcement, a process that included the colloquium held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC in September 1994 that included presentations from the Heads of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and gave birth to a ânew global pluralistâ understanding of organised crime. Two months later this understanding underpinned the âWorld Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crimeâ convened by the United Nations in Naples, which propelled the threat of TOC to the forefront of the international and foreign policy agendas of Western liberal democracies. In these terms TOC is portrayed as a specifically American idea exported, with increasing global reach, by US law enforcement and intelligence agencies through the threat of reductions in foreign assistance to those countries failing to sign-up to the US agenda (see Nadelmann, 1993).
Yet, it was suggested in the ESRC seminar discussions provoked by this chapter and other contributions that the Naples conference represented a coincidence of interests between the US, the member states of the European Union and the internal politics of the United Nations itself. It was argued that, by 1994, EU member states had already been forging a common security agenda around the threat of TOC; in particular, concerns over cross-border crime were a key facet of the Third Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, regarding issues of âJustice and Home Affairsâ, including the establishment of the European Police Office (Europol), signed in 1992. The preoccupation of concerns over the threat of TOC to member states of the European Union was traced back further to debates over the criminogenic consequences of the removal of internal border controls in the Single Market; consequences that were anticipated in the establishment of the Shengen Group in June 1985, which, âincluded measures on visa regime harmonization, hot pursuit and the establishment of a computerized data exchange systemâthe Shengen Information System (SIS)â (Benyon, 1996: 395). This âEuropeanisation of crime and police issuesâ has also been traced back further to the establishment of a number of âsecurity clubsâ during the 1970s, such as Berne, Quantico, Vienna, Pompidou and TREVI, âpartly in response to American attempts to control Interpolâ, but also in response to âfears about political violence and radical fundamentalism, tales of urban insecurity, and immigration issues fused with concerns about the so-called âfourth freedomâ: the freedom of movementâ (Bigo, 2000: 69â70). Thus, although there was resistance amongst EU policy elites to the simple adoption of US law enforcement strategies, their own perceptions of security led to broadly the same outcome.
The evolution of policy responses to TOC in the European Union since the Naples conference is covered specifically in Martin Elvinsâs chapter. He traces this evolution from the Dublin European Council meeting of December 1996, at which the threat of TOC was first defined as a policy issue for the EU in its own right, through to the publication in December 2001 of a joint CommissionâEuropol report, âTowards a European Strategy to Prevent Organised Crimeâ. The joint report built upon the EUâs New Millennium strategy for the âPrevention and Control of Organised Crimeâ, announced in May 2000, which Elvins identifies as containing, âthe definitive account of how the threat from TOC is conceived at EU levelâ. Significantly the New Millennium strategy acknowledges an increasing threat from organised criminal groups âoutside the territory of the EUâ, but identifies EU nationals and residents as posing âa significantly greater threatâ. Organised crime is portrayed more in terms of an enemy within rather than as an alien conspiracy. Nonetheless, the strategy perpetuates the focus, common to official narratives of TOC, on groups of individuals who collaborate for prolonged periods of time and who threatenâwhether from within or withoutâan otherwise satisfactory political economy, given their pursuit of profit and political power. The New Millennium Strategy makes this conception explicit in its depiction of groups that are, âstrengthening their international criminal contacts and targeting the social and business structure of European societyâ. In these terms organised crime is defined in opposition to âlegitâ European society, rather than as interdependent with this society, thereby reproducing the dichotomy of licit and illicit corporations, or the âunderworldâ and âupperworldâ, that has been so deeply entrenched in popular and policy discourse on organised crime (Edwards and Gill, 2002b). The actual interdependencies between nominally licit and illicit entrepreneurs are examined in greater detail in subsequent parts of this text (see also Block, 1991; Edwards and Gill, 2002a; Ruggiero, 2000;) but what is of importance here is Elvinsâs suggestion that the threat of TOC is really the latest episode in a longer-running discourse on the security and definition of what the European Union stands for as an emerging social order. In this discourse, TOC is defined as both an internal and external threat to the project of European political and economic integration. Apropos Bigoâs (1994) concept of the âsecuritisation processâ, Elvinsâs chapter identifies how the threat of TOC has been used by European political elites to fortify their vision of European integration and how this vision has been advanced through a policy-making process that subordinates issues of transparency, accountability and open democratic deliberation over alternative conceptions of European social order and, ipso facto, the threats to this order (see also the chapters by King and Bogusz, Rawlinson and Goodey in Part III).
An implication of Elvinsâs argument is that the promotion of concerns over TOC at the Naples conference coincided with, and suited the purposes of, the extant security discourse of EU policy elites. The chapter by Sheptycki expands this thesis further by drawing on Charles Tilleyâs theory of âstate-making as organised crimeâ. It is argued that the threat of TOC has increased in salience for Western policy elites over the past decade because it provided a useful device for legitimating their project of building institutions for governing the globe, post-Cold War, in accordance with their commitment to neo-liberal principles of political economy. Given their failure to provide substantive evidence on the scope and impact of this threat, Sheptycki argues that it is difficult to support official narratives on the ârealityâ of TOC and the consequent argument that the development of transnational policing strategies is simply an enlightened and necessary response to security threats that cannot be addressed by nation-state authorities alone. For Sheptycki, the absence of such evidence, or even more sophisticated methodologies and research programmes that could illuminate the threat of TOC, justifies a more sceptical interpretation of the real factors that are driving policies for the co-ordination of international security and intelligence operations. He suggests that the real agenda is akin to a âprotection racketâ in which the project of building a new, neo-liberal, world order is legitimated by law enforcement agencies that are âself-replicating and self-guidingâ in manufacturing various threats of TOC against which they can provide the necessary security. This agenda is discernible in the promotion of new technologies of control, such as âintelligence-led policingâ, and new targets of control, such as the confiscation of criminal proceeds. In articulating the threat of TOC in this way, law enforcement agencies and their neo-liberal political masters establish themselves as the expert centres of authority on issues of global security. As a consequence, alternative conceptions of global security, which emphasise âthe underlying conditions that produce crime in the first placeâ, are discredited or simply excluded from policy debates (see Edwards and Gill, 2000b).
Such exclusion is facilitated by the democratic deficit in global governance, wherein the transnational policing enterprise is left unfettered by politically accountable policy-making processes. Were these present, Sheptycki argues, it would be possible to shift the ethos of policy discourse on security away from the self-indulgent scaremongering of the protection racketeers towards a concern with the real causes of insecurity and social harm in the world, which he sees as the failure of political authorities to address questions of social justice, human rights, the rule of law and respect for the environment on a global scale. Whilst the prospects for this shift are even bleaker in the current, febrile, context of global security, following the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center of 11 September 2001, the nascent âWar on Terrorismâ should not be allowed to preclude a more imaginative debate over security in the new world order.
The contributions to Part I and the seminar discussions provoked by them differ in attributing the origins of TOC to: the hegemonic influence of US domestic and foreign policy concerns; the process of European political and economic integration; the construction of a new, neo-liberal, world order; and even the utility of this threat for key actors within the United Nations, who were seeking to advance their own bureaucratic interests in increasing the profile of crime control on the UNâs policy agenda during the 1990s. Common to these interpretations, however, is scepticism about official narratives of the threat posed by TOC and the efficacy of those policing strategies entailed in these narratives. As Sheptycki argues, to be sceptical is not to deny the social harm that can be caused by the illicit activities that have been conflated into the idea of TOC, such as trafficking in drugs, people, nuclear materials and body parts. But we must also acknowledge the social harm caused by other practices, such as the dumping of toxic waste, insider dealing, tax evasion, fraud and the systematic corruption of state âkleptocratsâ, that have, hitherto, been absent from policy discourse on the threat of TOC to global security. To recognise this broader repertoire of social harm and to acknowledge the possibility of governmental interventions that transcend the self-referential appeal for more refined law enforcement is to understand that global security is fundamentally a question of political deliberation, not technical expertise. Subsequent parts to this book examine the contribution that social scientific research on TOC can make to this deliberation.
References
Benyon, J. (1996) âThe politics of police co-operation in the European Unionâ, International Journal of the Sociology of Law 24: 353â79.
Bigo, D. (1994) âThe European internal security field: stakes and rivalries in a newly developing area of police interventionâ, in M. Anderson and M. den Boer (eds) Policing Across National Boundaries. London: Pinter.
ââ(2000) âLiaison officers in Europe: new officers in the European security fieldâ, in J. Sheptycki (ed.) Issues in Transnational Policing. London: Routledge.
Block, A. (1991) Perspectives on Organised Crime: Essays in Opposition. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Edwards, A. and Gill, P. (2002a) âCrime as enterprise? The case of âtransnational organised crimeâ â, Crime, Law and Social Change 37: 203â23.
ââ(2002b) âThe politics of âtransnational organised crimeâ: discourse, reflexiv-ity and the narration of âthreatâ â, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4, 2: 245â70.
Nadelmann, E. (1993) Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement. University Park, PN: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Ruggiero, V. (2000) Crime and Markets: Essays in Anti-Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1 Transnational organised crime
The global reach of an American concept
Michael Woodiwiss
Transnational organised crime, in a literal sense, has a history as old as national governments and international trade. Piracy, cross-border brigandage, smuggling, fraud and trading in stolen or forbidden goods and services are ancient occupations that increased in significance as nation states were taking shape. Piracy and cross-border brigandage have now been banished to parts of the world where state authority is weak. However, the other occupations have flourished in recent years in most parts of the world, irrespective of the strength or weakness of the authority of individual states or the collective efforts of the international community.
Transnational organised crime in the limited sense that most commentators and policy-makers use has a much more recent history. Since the early 1990s, it has usually been used as a synonym for international gangsterism in general or the âMafiaâ or Mafia-type organisations, in particular. In this sense, âtransnational organised crimeâ has become a term that is now an integral part of the vocabulary of criminal justice policy-makers across the world. Many governments are in a continuous process of devising new ways to combat what for most is a newly discovered problem. Multilateral treaties, United Nations conventions and transnational law enforcement institutions are proliferating and intelligence agencies once fully employed in Cold War activities now take on such presumed entities as the âMafiaâ, the âCamorraâ, the âYakusaâ, the âTriadsâ or any others that may be given a Mafia label as identification. These groups, according to experts cited in a 1993 United Nations discussion guide, effectively constitute organised crime since it âconsists of tightly knit, highly organised networks of operatives that pursue common goals and objectives, within a hierarchical power structure that spans across countries and regions to cover the entire worldâ (United Nations, 1993).
This chapter presents a brief outline of American efforts to conceptualise organised crime and transnational organised crime. It argues that the USA has successfully exported its analysis of organised crime problems despite evidence of its inadequacy.
Organised crime first became the subject of academic and professional study in the 1920s and 1930s. It is important to note, however, that organised crime was not such a loaded term then as now. The phrase was usually understood literally as âsystematic criminal activityâ or as being synonymous with âracketeeringâ and was not chiefly associated with specific criminal groups. The word âracketâ was by then well established as meaning an illegal business or fraudulent scheme and it followed that racketeering was understood to refer to such activities as dealing in stolen property, insurance frauds, fraudulent bankruptcies, securities frauds, credit frauds, forgery, counterfeiting, illegal gambling, trafficking in drugs or liquor, or various forms of extortion. It was also generally understood that criminal networks could and often did include the active involvement of police, politicians, judges, professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, and ostensibly legitimate businessmen. Indeed, as an early definitional article by Alfred Lindesmith (1941: 119) put it, âorganised crime⌠requires the active and conscious co-operation of a number of elements of respectable societyâ. Most serious commentators also understood that fundamental political, legal and economic changes were necessary at local, state and national levels to reduce the damage done by organised crime.
The work of Raymond Moley, August Vollmer and most city or state crime surveys of the period made it clear that, as long as corruption and ineptitude existed in the law enforcement and criminal justice systems, organised criminal activity would flourish. For these comment...