The Development of the Social Self

Mark Bennett, Fabio Sani

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781135426170
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Drawing upon the perspective of social identity theory, The Development of the Social Self is concerned with the acquisition and development of children's social identities. In contrast to previous work on self-development, which has focused primarily on the development of the personal self, this volume makes a case for the importance of the study of the social self - that is, the self as defined through group memberships, such as gender, ethnicity, and nationality. A broad range of identity-related issues are addressed, such as ingroup identification, conceptions of social identities, prejudice, and the central role of social context. Based on contributions from leading researchers in Europe, Australia and the US, the book summarises the major research programmes conducted to date. Furthermore, the closing chapters provide commentary on this research, as well as mapping out key directions for future research. With a unique focus encompassing both social and developmental psychology, The Development of the Social Self will appeal to a broad spectrum of students and researchers in both disciplines, as well as those working in related areas such as sociology and child development.

1 Introduction: Children and social identity

Mark Bennett and Fabio Sani

The developing self has been a source of intermittent interest to psychologists ever since the early pioneering contributions of Baldwin (1895), Cooley (1902), James (1890), and Mead (1934). Though much research has been directed at the development of that aspect of the self-concept referred to as the personal self (the self defined by idiosyncratic features, such as personality traits), the aim of this book is to consider the development of the social self, that is, the self defined by one’s membership of social groups – for example, gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and subcultural groups. Broadly, our project is undertaken within the framework afforded by the social identity approach (Tajfel, 1972, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975, 1982), a social-cognitive perspective that sees the self-concept as the outcome of a self-categorisation process. At its heart is an acknowledgement of the interdependence of self and social context. The chapters of this volume address the development of a range of phenomena that fall within the purview of the social identity perspective – for example, social categorisation, self-conception, social comparison, and prejudice.

One of the central insights of the social identity approach is that groups can become part of the self-concept. This contention contrasts starkly with developmental psychologists’ almost exclusive treatment of groups as external to the self, as merely an influence upon the self. Within the social identity approach, the self is taken to comprise both personal and social identity, and neither is seen as in any sense more fundamental or authentic than the other. Theoretically, treating groups as constitutive of the self is important in that it becomes possible to specify relations between selfconceptions and many aspects of social behaviour; moreover, it is to recognise that our social identity is associated with actions and cognitions that are discontinuous with those that arise from personal identity.

In this chapter we note the case for a developmental approach to the study of social identity. Briefly, we also consider the complementarity of social psychological and developmental approaches to the self. Following this we provide an introduction to the theoretical position underpinning this volume, that is, the social identity approach. Finally, we outline the content of the book’s chapters.

SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SELF-CONCEPT

A major impetus for this volume has been the recognition, on the one hand, that social psychologists have neglected the development of self, and on the other, that developmentalists have focused largely upon the personal self. That is, most research on the development of the self-concept has been conducted by developmentalists and has addressed children’s conceptions of themselves in terms of idiosyncratic attributes, such as personality traits, abilities, and preferences. (See, for example, Harter, 1998, 1999, for comprehensive reviews.) Little attention has been directed at the development of the social self. Nonetheless, it is clear that children are de facto members of many social groups; they are also members of groups that they themselves create. In our view, it is important to understand when and how social categories become constitutive of the self, such that children subjectively identify with them. As Ruble et al. (Chapter 2) put it, we need to understand children’s developing sense of “we”. In addition to its importance at the level of description, the developmental study of the social self is important insofar as it is clear that, among adults, social identities mobilise specific forms of group-related action and perception, such as cooperation with and attraction to in-group members (e.g., see Hogg & Abrams, 1988). As we see it, a key aim in the longer term is to understand the ontogenesis of the relation between social self-conceptions and social action. More generally, the focus upon children’s developing social identities seems a significant enterprise given that one’s social identity “creates and defines the individual’s place in society” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, pp. 40–41).

To address the development of the social self, we believe, necessitates reference to both social and developmental psychology. However, a backward glance at self research in developmental and social psychology reveals a striking degree of disciplinary insularity. A cursory inspection of papers in the two disciplines shows that, apart from standard genuflections towards founding figures, such as Baldwin, Cooley, James, and Mead, references are largely nonoverlapping. This is perhaps surprising given clear parallels in terms of the sorts of topics that have been studied. For example, both developmental and social psychologists have examined self-esteem, selfefficacy, and, most conspicuously of all, self-representations. And both have adopted broadly cognitive views of the self, reflecting a commitment, whether implicit or explicit, to Mead’s (1934) fundamental insight that “Selfconsciousness, rather than affective experience [. . .], provides the core and primary structure of the self, which is thus essentially a cognitive rather than an emotional phenomenon” (p. 173).

Despite obvious disciplinary similarities at the level of substantive interests, there have nonetheless been considerable differences in terms of theoretical orientation and methods. For example, considering the two fields’ study of self-representations, quite contrasting traditions are apparent. Within social psychology, cognitive approaches to the self have been highly influential at least since Markus’ (1977) introduction of the concept of self-schemas, that is, knowledge structures pertaining to the self. (See also Higgins, 1987; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984.) Among developmentalists, too, the self has been conceived in cognitive terms and a considerable amount of attention has been given to self-representations (Harter, 1999). However, the developmental study of the self has been embedded in an entirely different tradition: that of cognitive-developmental theory – specifically, Piagetian and neoPiagetian theory (e.g., Case, 1992; Fischer, 1980). Here, a guiding assumption has been that general conceptual development plays a central role in determining the emergence, form, and increasing differentiation of selfconceptions. That is, researchers have sought to account for age-related structural growth in self-conceptions in terms of cognitive ontogenesis.

A further difference is that social psychologists, unlike most developmentalists, have asked questions about process-related issues. For example, what are the motivations underlying particular social identities (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999), and how do social identities guide particular types of action (e.g., Reicher, 1984)? Developmental psychologists, however, have more typically sought to describe the changing contents of children’s self-conceptions (e.g., Damon & Hart, 1988; Keller, Ford & Meacham, 1978).

A further and key difference is that within social psychology, particularly under the influence of social identity theory, social self-conceptions (i.e., social identities) have been studied insofar as they are hypothesised to be consequential with respect to a broad range of inter- and intragroup phenomena. That is, social identity theorists have examined the relationship between self-conception and many forms of social behaviour, such as cooperation, conformity, crowd behaviour, group polarisation, and so on. Developmentally oriented work, however, has typically sought to describe developing self-conceptions as an end in themselves, or as outcomes of particular socialisation experiences (although for exceptions, see for example Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Harter, 1998, 1999).

A more general difference between the developmental and social psychological study of the self is in the sheer range of topics studied: Unsurprisingly, perhaps, given the greater prominence of the self-concept in social psychology, many more topics have been studied here than within developmental psychology. Thus, broadly speaking, developmental psychologists have been concerned primarily (though not exclusively) with the initial emergence of the self-concept (Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1979; Rochat, 2001), the development of, and social influences upon, self-representations (Harter, 1999), and selfesteem (Harter, 1987). Social psychologists, however, have addressed a prodigious range of self-related topics, including self-affirmation (Steele, 1988), self-awareness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), self-complexity (Linville, 1985), self-discrepancy (Higgins, 1987), self-enhancement (Wills, 1981), self-handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978), self-evaluation maintenance (Tesser, 1988), self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) self-representations (Markus, 1977) self-presentation (Schlenker, 1980), self-verification (Swann & Read, 1981), and so on. Nonetheless, there are signs that the developmental study of the self is poised to become an increasingly significant focus of research (as reflected, for example, in major symposia at international conferences and recent research-based volumes, e.g., Brandstädter & Lerner, 1999; Demetriou & Kazi, 2001; Harter, 1999; Moore & Lemmon, 2001).

ON THE BENEFITS OF A CLOSER ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

Such differences as we have thus far identified to some extent reflect differences in the disciplines’ orientations. Social psychologists are interested in processes of social influence, conceived in its broadest sense (see Allport, 1968; McGarty & Haslam, 1997). Developmentalists, however, focus primarily on change over time. These differences in orientation suggest possible benefits of closer association between the two disciplines, something noted by many before us (e.g., Brehm, Kassin, & Gibbons, 1981; Durkin, 1995; Eckes & Trautner, 2000; Flavell & Ross, 1981; Masters & Yarkin-Levin, 1984). Initially, let us turn to possible contributions of developmental psychology to social psychology.

Typically, social psychology has not dealt well with the issue of change, either generally or in the specific field of the study of self. Nor has it been much interested in the particular contents of self-representations. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that important changes in the content of the self-concept occur over the life-course, and that these may have significant implications for many aspects of psychological functioning. As Eckes and Trautner (2000) have commented, “transitions such as reaching puberty, becoming a parent, or retiring can be conceptualised as sensitive periods systematically influencing an individual’s self-construal” (p. 7). Thus, an appreciation of the particular contents of self-representations and how they change is likely to be central to an understanding of self-functioning during the various phases of adulthood. Clearly, developmental psychology offers much in terms of the analysis and measurement of change (e.g., Brandstädter & Lerner, 1999; Lerner, 1998) and may represent a valuable resource to self theorists working within social psychology.

In addition to highlighting the need to look at development during adulthood, there is a need too to understand early origins of self-processes. “It is elementary yet widely overlooked by social psychologists that the phenomena they study do not arise out of nowhere, forming miraculously just before their subjects come to university” (Durkin, 1995, p. 3). That is, we need to acknowledge the developmental histories associated with social processes, specifying origins and developmental trajectories. Moreover, the possible antecedents of aspects of adult functioning in childhood experiences could profitably be addressed. In the absence of an appreciation of these sorts of distal causes, as Durkin comments, social psychology “risks becoming a science of proximal effects” (p. 6).

Recently, Pomerantz and Newman (2000) have argued forcefully that “attention to developmental psychology would enrich research programs within social psychology by providing new perspectives on the issues with which the field grapples” (p. 301). For example, they suggest that the study of developmental origins can provide insights into individual differences. They also discuss how young children’s initial reactions to classes of social stimuli may provide a window onto what become basic and automatic responses in adulthood. At a methodological level they note that replication on samples of children (invariably more representative than samples based on undergraduate populations; Sears, 1986) provides evidence for the robustness of effects. Thus, developmental research can provide a powerful source of theory confirmation. And in the absence of confirmatory evidence (i.e., where children’s behaviour is found to differ from that of adults), we must question the assumption of a theory’s universality; the challenge to understand developmental origins and change then becomes pressing.

Turning to the benefit to developmental psychology of a closer acquaintance with social psychology, we suggest that a fundamental gain will be a better understanding of cognitive and behavioural variability over social contexts – a theme that emerges in many of the chapters of this volume. A key feature of much social psychological theorising (and particularly self-categorisation theory) is the attempt to specify relationships between contextual variables and intra-individual variability in social behaviour and cognition, including, of course, self-related phenomena. A central goal, then, is to account for the fact that individuals’ behaviour and cognition covaries with social contexts. Generally speaking, at the intra-individual level, developmental psychologists have not accorded context an essential role¹: In looking primarily at change over time, change over contexts has frequently been overlooked. Where contextual variation has been examined, this has often been in an ad hoc empirical way, rather than in a more principled and theorised way, as is typical in social psychology generally, and within the social identity approach particularly.

In seeking to understand the development of the self, it is apparent that social and developmental psychology each provide important insights. Social psychologists, while neglecting processes of change over time, give attention to social processes within given contexts; developmentalists, however, focus upon change over time, often disregarding changes over contexts. Thus, an approach that integrates the strengths of the two disciplines may be fertile indeed. However, as Eckes and Trautner (2000) have argued, an integrative approach “must not confine itself to simply adding to the first perspective what the second has to offer and vice versa. Quite the contrary. At the intersection of developmental and social psychology many issues will emerge that pose new kinds of challenges for theorizing and research” (p. 12). In particular, a social-developmental perspective should aspire to explore the possible ways in which context varies with age, since the impact of contexts upon self-processes is likely to be importantly mediated by cognitivedevelopmental factors. Following Eckes and Trautner, then, we suggest that the social-developmental study of the self must recognise that the self is subject to both social and developmental processes, and that these processes are likely to be reciprocally influential.

Our discussion thus far implies an ambitious programme of work on the development of the social self. This book represents an attempt to make a start on this project, bringing together some of the best current work in this new area of inquiry. In seeking to explore children’s social selves, we take the view that the social identity approach represents a valuable theoretical resource. It is a theoretical perspective that has had a colossal impact on the social-psychological literature; if there is a more promising theoretical basis for the investigation of the developing social self, we are unaware of it. For our developmental readership, to whom the social identity approach may be relatively unfamiliar, we now provide a brief statement of the origins and major features of the two main theories that comprise the social identity approach.

THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, both the theoretical and the methodological foundations of social psychology were shaken by a wave of criticism coming from social psychologists themselves (Gergen, 1973; McGuire, 1973; Ring, 1967). A pervasive sense of dissatisfaction rapidly spread throughout the community, causing what has been characterised as a “crisis of confidence” (Elms, 1975). It was in this climate that a fast-growing group of European social psychologists – led by Henri Tajfel in Britain and Serge Moscovici in France – attempted to create a “new look” social psychology. The declared aim of this group of scholars was to revalue and emphasise the “social” dimension of human behaviour (Doise, 1982; Jaspars, 1980; Tajfel, 1984) by creating an anti-individualistic and anti-reductionistic social psychology.

As far as the specific field of group processes was concerned, the antireductionistic stance was represented by what we now know as the “social identity approach” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988), which developed throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. This approach now comprises two main theories, social identity theory and latterly self-categorisation theory.

Social identity theory

The initial focus of the social identity approach was the study of intergroup behaviour (Bi...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Tables
• Figures
• Contributors
• 1 Introduction: Children and social identity
• Part I Basic issues
• Part II Identities
• Part III Applications
• Part IV Epilogue