The Reagan Reversal

Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War

Beth A. Fischer

• Publisher: University of Missouri
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9780826273123
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique

It is often assumed that Ronald Reagan's administration was reactive in bringing about the end of the cold war, that it was Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" and congenial personality that led the administration to abandon its hard- line approach toward Moscow. In The Reagan Reversal, now available in paperback, Beth A. Fischer convincingly demonstrates that President Reagan actually began seeking a rapprochement with the Kremlin fifteen months before Gorbachev took office. She shows that Reagan, known for his long-standing antipathy toward communism, suddenly began calling for "dialogue, cooperation, and understanding" between the superpowers. This well-written and concise study challenges the conventional wisdom about the president himself and reveals that Reagan was, at times, the driving force behind United States-Soviet policy.

1

Introduction

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM is now in the throes of a major transformation. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the cold war have profoundly changed the international political arena. The bipolar arrangement that structured international relations for nearly forty years has collapsed, and it remains unclear what type of system will replace it. This transformation began during the Reagan presidency. It was during the mid-1980s that U.S.-Soviet relations shifted from cold war antagonism toward rapprochement.

The conventional view is that the United States played a reactive role in bringing the cold war to an end. Washington simply responded to the momentous changes that were taking place within the Soviet Union. When Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the USSR in 1985, the Kremlin became more conciliatory toward Washington. In response, the Reagan administration abandoned its hard-line posture toward Moscow. According to this view, Gorbachev's “new thinking” and congenial personality led the Reagan administration to seek a rapprochement. Washington simply followed Moscow's lead. For example, in his classic work American Foreign Policy since World War II, John Spanier contends that Gorbachev faced a domestic crisis upon taking office. The Soviet economy was nearing a complete breakdown, and apathy and lack of discipline in the workplace were keeping productivity low. Gorbachev had little choice: Soviet resources had to be devoted to domestic rebuilding rather than to fostering a strong global presence. The Soviet Union could no longer afford to maintain its sphere of influence, or to compete in an expensive arms race. Consequently, Gorbachev was forced to seek a rapprochement with the United States. According to Spanier, the Reagan administration merely responded to Gorbachev's new conciliatory posture. Alexander George supports Spanier's assessment. George writes, “The…milieu of East-West relations profoundly changed…largely because Mikhail Gorbachev changed the ‘reality’ of East-West relations by setting into motion fundamental reforms in the domestic structure of the Soviet Union and by introducing a radical reconceptualization of the Soviet approach to international relations.”¹

Indeed, both liberals and conservatives have an interest in perpetuating the notion that Washington changed its Soviet policy only after Moscow had begun to reform.² Ideological liberals had been critical of the Reagan administration's initial hard-line policy and military buildup, fearing that such policies raised the probability of a superpower war. Many also questioned the president's intellectual prowess. Already critical of Reagan's Soviet policy, liberals are therefore inclined to accept the view that Gorbachev led the president on the path to ending the cold war. A lucky bumbler, Reagan was simply in the right place at the right time.

Conservatives, on the other hand, also have reason to support the idea that Reagan responded to changes in Soviet policy. In this view, the administration's original hard-line rhetoric and military buildup forced the Soviet Union to its knees. Gorbachev had to seek a rapprochement with Washington because his country could no longer compete with the United States. By standing firm, President Reagan had forced the Kremlin to capitulate in the cold war. Moscow succumbed, and democracy proved victorious.

This book challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the Reagan administration's role in ending the cold war. It contends that Washington did not merely respond to changes within the Soviet Union. In fact, the Reagan administration began seeking a rapprochement with the Kremlin before the Soviets began to reform. The White House switched to a more conciliatory policy toward Moscow in January 1984—fifteen months before Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union, and more than two years before the introduction of glasnost and perestroika.

As will be detailed, the Reagan administration's stated policy toward Moscow was especially hard-line through October 1983. On October 31 Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam delivered a speech on superpower relations that epitomized the administration's early position toward Moscow. Dam contended that East and West were engaged in a zero-sum competition for spheres of influence. The Soviet Union posed the most immediate threat to U.S. security, he argued, as was evidenced by their massive military buildup and the manner in which they “intervened” militarily throughout the globe. Dam declared that the primary aim of U.S. policy was to thwart Soviet expansionism, and that Washington would continue to take a hard-line approach as long as the Soviets continued their “quest for absolute security.” He also warned that superpower relations were not likely to improve in the near future. “We are now in a period of uncertainty as to the immediate future of U.S.-Soviet relations,” he cautioned. “We should be wary of illusions about the possibility of quick or dramatic breakthroughs.”³

Only ten weeks later, however, Washington reversed course. On January 16, 1984, President Reagan delivered an address on superpower relations that proved to be the turning point in his administration's approach to the Kremlin. With this speech, Reagan began seeking a rapprochement. The president expressed a more nuanced understanding of the superpower relationship, and introduced new policy goals and strategies. In sharp contrast to Dam's remarks two months earlier, he played down the ideological differences between the two capitals, and spoke at length about the superpowers' “common interests.” Foremost among these interests, he asserted, was the desire for peace. Reagan warned of the dangers of war, and declared that the United States posed no threat to the security of the Soviet Union. The president also spoke of the urgent need to address “dangerous misunderstandings” between the two capitals. Toward this end he called for the immediate institutionalization of high-level dialogue, new efforts in arms reduction, and the implementation of a wide range of confidence-building measures. The aim of U.S. policy was now to facilitate “cooperation and understanding” between the superpowers.⁴

President Reagan's January 16 address was not simply an aberration. Rather, it was a turning point. Throughout 1984 and 1985 others within the administration echoed Reagan's call for “cooperation and understanding” between the superpowers, and underscored that Washington “posed no threat” to Soviet security. The superpowers had a common interest in avoiding war and “misunderstandings,” they reiterated. Likewise, Reagan officials continued to speak of the “imperative” need for superpower dialogue.

The policy changes that Reagan introduced in 1984 are striking for a number of reasons. Most importantly, they are remarkable because they were implemented before the Soviets began to reform. In January 1984 Yuri Andropov was general secretary of the USSR, and there was no indication that Moscow intended to introduce radical changes to its foreign policy The old guard within the Kremlin was still fighting the cold war. The conventional view that Washington responded to changes within the Soviet Union is therefore inaccurate.

The degree to which the administration altered its stated policy toward Moscow is also striking. This was not simply a case of “fine-tuning.” Both policy goals and strategies changed in 1984. In many respects, these changes represented a wholesale reversal of the administration's earlier policies. The Reagan administration had been the most vehemently anticommunist administration in U.S. history. The president himself had been denouncing communists for over forty years, since he had been an actor in Hollywood. He had repeatedly asserted that democracies must do all they can to undermine communism and to stop its spread. It is remarkable, therefore, that Reagan would suddenly begin speaking of “common interests” and the need to join together to solve global problems.

The speed with which the Reagan administration switched course is also extraordinary. On October 31, 1983, Deputy Secretary Dam struck a hard-line posture toward the Soviets, and suggested that superpower relations would not improve in the near future. On January 16, 1984, the president began seeking a rapprochement with the Kremlin. The Reagan administration reversed course within a mere ten weeks.

Finally, the Reagan administration not only changed its stated policy, but it significantly revised its image of the Kremlin and its understanding of the nature of the superpower relationship. Such revisions are highly unusual. For example, before 1984 official policy statements exhibited a Manichaean understanding of superpower relations: Moscow and Washington were engaged in a zero-sum competition for spheres of influence. The Soviets were the enemy. There was no common ground. However, beginning in 1984, the administration's policy statements revealed a more complex image of the Kremlin and a more nuanced understanding of superpower relations. While Soviets and Americans had ideological differences, they also had many common interests. This change in the administration's view is curious because psychological studies have repeatedly shown that fundamental beliefs about others tend not to change. Moreover, images of one's enemy tend to be especially entrenched. It is striking, therefore, that the Reagan administration would revise its image of the Kremlin.⁵

The primary aim of this book, then, is to determine why the Reagan administration so abruptly reversed course in January 1984. If Washington was not simply responding to Soviet overtures, then what caused the changes in U.S. Soviet policy?

Although the literature on U.S. foreign policy is vast, there has been comparatively little theoretical work regarding change in such policy. Much of the literature focuses either on the policy-making process, or on the substance of American foreign policy. Both types of studies tend to ignore the issue of change. For example, policy-making studies typically focus on how different actors, such as interest groups and bureaucratic organizations, seek to influence policy outcomes. Such studies focus on factors that constrain policy change, rather than on factors that may facilitate or catalyze a change in policy.⁶

Likewise, studies that have focused on the substance of U.S. foreign policy have also ignored the issue of change. This is no doubt due in part to the relative stability of U.S. policy throughout the cold war. For four decades Washington divided the globe into spheres of influence and sought to contain communism. The struggle between communism and democracy defined not only Washington's position toward the East, but also its relations with Europe, Asia, and the Third World. Because U.S. foreign policy was relatively stable, scholars focused on issues related to stability.

The demise of the cold war has brought an end to this period of relative stability. The United States has been forced to adjust to the emerging world order, as has every other nation. Each has had to reassess its role in the international arena, its relationship to other nations, and the structure and purpose of existing international organizations. Foreign policy change is becoming more prevalent. Therefore, it is imperative that it be studied more closely. As Charles F Hermann has observed, “We are on the dividing line between epochs. Under these circumstances it is not enough for those engaged in…foreign policy studies to examine regularities and patterns of association under assumed conditions of ceteris paribus. We need a much more vigorous effort to characterize the conditions that can produce decisions for dramatic redirection in foreign policy.”⁷ In short, there is a need to consider foreign policy change more systematically.

There are two broad types of foreign policy change. On the one hand, there are cases in which foreign policy changes because a new government or a new leader has come to power. The new government's vision of foreign policy differs from its predecessor's, and it therefore implements policies which differ from those of the previous government. The second broad type of foreign policy change occurs when an existing government chooses to change course. In these cases, a catalyst of some sort causes the government to reassess its standing policy, and to move in a new direction. Hermann calls such instances cases of “self-correcting change—when the current actors change their course in foreign policy.”⁸

Scholars have posited four main sources of self-correcting policy change.⁹ In the first instance, changes in the international environment may cause governments to revise their foreign policies. For example, the rise or fall of great powers, the outbreak of war or peace, the creation or dissolution of alliance systems, and other factors may cause a state to change its foreign policy. Structural realists argue that “governments respond in a rational (or at least, reasonable) manner to the reward and punishment contingencies of the international environment.” If these reward and punishment contingencies shift, so too does a government's foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz has argued more specifically that in an anarchic, bipolar world, the international distribution of capabilities is the primary determinant of a state's behavior. If this distribution changes, then so will a state's approach to international affairs. As Janice Gross Stein has succinctly put it, “Rational states recognize structural change, reorder their interests, adjust their policies to maximize their interests, and adapt.”¹⁰ A government that fails to adapt, risks its survival.

Foreign policy might also change in response to domestic politics. In democratic societies, shifts in public opinion can put pressure on a government to revise its approach to foreign relations. An administration might be especially sensitive to changes in public attitudes during an election year. Failing to respond to constituents' views during such a time might conceivably lead to a government's fall from power.¹¹

Hermann also points out that “bureaucratic advocacy” might cause a government to redirect its foreign policy. In such cases a group or faction within the government becomes an advocate of change. The members of this group may be located in one agency, or they may be scattered among different organizations. Regardless, they have some means for regular interaction. In order to be effective, these advocates have to be in a position to determine policy outcomes, or have access to those who have such authority.¹²

Finally, foreign policy change may be leader-driven. In such cases “change results from the determined efforts of an authoritative policy maker, frequently the head of government, who imposes his own vision of the basic redirection necessary in foreign policy. The leader must have the conviction, power, and energy to compel his government to change course.”¹³ If a leader has the authority to direct foreign policy making, then a change in his or her views could lead to a change in official policy. Cognitive psychology focuses on questions pertaining to decision making and learning, and thus can be especially useful in understanding a leader's changing views. “Psychologists remind us that policy makers react not to the international environment as such, but rather to their mental representations of that environment,” Philip E. Tetlock has rightly noted. “To understand the evolution of policy we need to understand our cognitive biases and limitations: our tendencies to oversimplify complex problems, to be oblivious to trade-offs, and to assimilate new evidence into our preconceptions.”¹⁴

As already noted, individuals do not change their views easily. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger argued that political leaders are particularly disinclined to change their minds. “It is an illusion to believe that leaders gain in profundity while they gain experience,” he has written. “The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office.”¹⁵ Nevertheless, there has been a burgeoning literature on the relationship between “learning” and foreign policy making. In his pioneering studies during the early 1980s, Lloyd Etheredge was one of the first to introduce the concept of learning into studies of policy making. Etheredge drew upon various sources in psychology and organizational studies in an effort to define learning in a way that could be useful for political scientists. Subsequent work on learning has, for the most part, fallen into two categories. On the one hand, some scholars have focused upon defining “learning” in a more explicit manner. For example, in their volume, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy; Breslauer and Tetlock and colleagues consider in detail the relationship between leaders' changing beliefs and their nations' foreign policies. The authors' aim is to refine the concept of learning. Consequently, they employ a learning theo...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. Introduction
• 2. America's Soviet Policy, 1981–1985
• 3. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Making: The Impact of the 1984 Presidential Election
• 4. The Passive President: Reagan's Advisers and the Change in U.S. Soviet Policy
• 5. The Reagan Reversal: The Case for Leader-Driven Policy Change
• 6. Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Index
• About the Author