Pointing

Where Language, Culture, and Cognition Meet

Sotaro Kita

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781135642129
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Pointing has captured the interest of scholars from various fields who study communication. However, ideas and findings have been scattered across diverse publications in different disciplines, and opportunities for interdisciplinary exchange have been very limited. The editor's aim is to provide an arena for such exchange by bringing together papers on pointing gestures from disciplines, such as developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, sign-language linguistics, linguistic anthropology, conversational analysis, and primatology. Questions raised by the editors include:
*Do chimpanzees produce and comprehend pointing gestures in the same way as humans?
*What are cross-cultural variations of pointing gestures?
*In what sense are pointing gestures human universal?
*What is the relationship between the development of pointing and language in children?
*What linguistic roles do pointing gestures play in signed language?
*Why do speakers sometimes point to seemingly empty space in front of them during conversation?
*How do pointing gestures contribute to the unfolding of face-to-face interaction that involves objects in the environment?
*What are the semiotic processes that relate what is pointed at and what is actually "meant" by the pointing gesture (the relationship between the two are often not as simple as one might think)?
*Do pointing gestures facilitate the production of accompanying speech? The volume can be used as a required text in a course on gestural communication with multidisciplinary perspectives. It can also be used as a supplemental text in an advanced undergraduate or graduate course on interpersonal communication, cross-cultural communication, language development, and psychology of language.

Chapter 1

Pointing: A Foundational Building Block of Human Communication

Sotaro Kita

Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics

This volume examines pointing gestures from a multidisciplinary viewpoint. Pointing has captured the interest of scholars from different disciplines who study communication: linguists, semioticians, psychologists, anthropologists, and primatologists. However, ideas and findings have been scattered across diverse journals and books, and researchers are often not aware of results in other disciplines. To date, there have been few opportunities for interdisciplinary exchange of information. The aim of this volume is to provide an arena for such exchange.

The prototypical pointing gesture is a communicative body movement that projects a vector from a body part. This vector indicates a certain direction, location, or object. Why is investigation of pointing gestures important? Because it is a foundational building block of human communication. Pointing is foundational in four respects.

First, it is ubiquitous in our day-to-day interaction with others. When communicating about referents locatable in the speech situation, pointing is almost inevitable. Even when we talk about referents that are distant in space and time, we often point to the seemingly empty space in front of us. Such pointing assigns a certain meaning to the location in the space, and we point back to the same location later in the discourse (see McNeill, chap. 12). The assignment of a meaning to a location by pointing is part of the grammar of signed languages. Pointing in signed languages is equivalent to, and used as frequently as, pronouns in spoken languages (“every four signs in signed discourse is a pointing sign”; see Engberg-Pedersen, chap. 11).

Second, pointing is a uniquely human behavior. In other words, pointing separates humans from primates, just like the use of language does. Primate behaviors that closely resemble pointing lack some of the key components of human pointing (see Povinelli et al., chap. 3; Butterworth, chap. 2). A careful examination sharply delineates the fundamental difference between primate and human communication.

Third, pointing is primordial in ontogeny. Pointing is one of the first versatile communicative devices that an infant acquires. Pointing emerges out of its antecedent behaviors, such as undirected extension of the index finger, several weeks before the first spoken word (see Butterworth, chap. 2; Masataka, chap. 4).¹ Once infants start uttering words, they produce a word and a pointing gesture together. How infants use pointing predicts their later language development to some extent (see Goldin-Meadow & Butcher, chap. 5; Butterworth, chap. 2). In addition, the caregiver’s pointing is probably one of the important cues with which infants establish a connection between a word and its referent.

Fourth, pointing does not merely indicate a vector, but it can serve to create further types of signs. For example, a pointing gesture can create an iconic representation by tracing a shape or movement trajectory (see Haviland, chap. 7). It sometimes even leaves a visible mark, “inscribing” a shape on a surface (see Goodwin, chap. 9).

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Because pointing is so ubiquitous and we interpret it with such ease, it might appear that pointing is a trivial phenomenon. On the contrary, as demonstrated by all of the chapters, careful examination reveals that the versatility and interpretability of pointing are based on complex underlying biological, psychological, and semiotic processes. Some issues regarding these processes recur in different chapters in the volume.

One such issue is biological determinism and the putative universality of index finger pointing (see Wilkins, chap. 8; Masataka, chap. 4; Butterworth, chap. 2; Povinelli et al., chap. 3). The question is whether humans are biologically programmed to point with an extended index finger, making index-finger pointing universal across cultures. Although it is anatomically difficult for chimpanzees to extend only the index finger (Povinelli et al., chap. 3), human infants produce index-finger pointing from early on in studies conducted in the United States, Europe, and Japan (see Butterworth, chap. 2; Masataka, chap. 4). This might suggest the biological determinism of index-finger pointing. However, in these cultures, adults also frequently use index-finger pointing. Thus, questions still remain. Is infants’ index-finger pointing a biologically programmed choice? Or is it due to the input and reinforcement from adults? (See Masataka, chap. 4, for the discussions about the possibility of culture-specific reinforcement.) A more conclusive answer to these questions requires a future study on children’s early pointing in a culture where adults do not use index-finger pointing at all or do so only rarely. As noted in Wilkins’s chapter, some preliminary reports suggest that such cultures may indeed exist.

Furthermore, Wilkins’ chapter notes that even in cultures where indexfinger pointing is commonly used among adults, its function vis-à-vis other forms of pointing (e.g., flat-hand pointing) differs from culture to culture. Kendon and Versante’s chapter provides a meticulous description of functions associated with different forms of pointing used by Neapolitans. The range of forms used as pointing gestures (i.e., different hand shapes and the choice of other articulators such as the lips²) and the form–function mapping in a given culture clearly have to be learned by children.

Another recurring issue in the chapters concerns semiotic processes that underlie interpretation of a pointing gesture. The general problem is that the referent of a pointing gesture can be ambiguous in many ways. Does the pointing indicate a direction (e.g., north)? If so, what is the origo from which the direction should be interpreted: from the location of the gesturer, or from some other reference point? (See Haviland, chap. 7, for discussions on pointing with a “transposed” reference point.) If pointing does not merely indicate a direction, it has a target object or location. If the target is an object, does it simply refer to the object, or does it predicate that the object is located at its location (see Engberg-Pedersen, chap. 11)? Furthermore, which aspect of the object is indicated? To take an example from Clark’s chapter (chap. 10), pointing in the direction of a car could be a reference to the car itself, to the color of the car, or to a piece of junk.

There are different suggestions as to how one can narrow down the domain of possible referents. Goodwin (chap. 9) suggests, for example, that an “activity framework” specifies which features of the environment are relevant for the ongoing activity and hence are likely to be the referent of a pointing gesture. In addition, different forms of pointing may correlate with particular types of referents (see Kendon & Versante, chap. 6; Haviland, chap. 7; Engberg-Pedersen, chap. 11; Wilkins, chap. 8; Kita, chap. 13).

Even if one identifies the referent, further pragmatic inferences may be needed to get to the intended interpretation. First, an associative link from the direct referent to the inferred referent may have to be taken into account. For example, a pointing gesture can be directed toward an empty chair (the direct referent) in order to refer to the person who normally sits in the chair (the inferred referent; see Haviland, chap. 7; Clark, chap. 10). Second, a pointing gesture can be interpreted as a social act such as “imperative,” which demands a response from the communication partner. For example, an infant may produce a pointing gesture that can be interpreted as a request, “give me that” (see Butterworth, chap. 2; Povinelli et al., chap. 3). Finally, the accompanying speech can narrow down possible interpretations of a pointing gesture (see e.g., Goodwin, chap. 9). Goldin-Meadow and Butcher (chap. 5) note that infants in the one-word stage often combine a word and a pointing gesture, which together comprise a proposition.

To complicate matters further, a pointing gesture may not have a preexisting target, but may be directed toward seemingly empty space. “Abstract deixis” in cospeech gesture (see McNeill, chap. 12) and “indexical signs” in Danish Sign Language (see Engberg-Pedersen, chap. 11) are such cases. In these cases, a physically empty location is assigned a meaning by virtue of being the target of a pointing gesture. Haviland discusses a related case, which involves pointing gestures directed toward a concrete target. In the description of the structure of a sugar-cane press, the speaker points to a wooden post of a house. However, he does not intend to refer to the house post. He uses the house post as a prop. It stands for a supporting post of an imaginary sugar-cane press, which he “builds” with a series of gestures. These are examples of Silverstein’s (1976) “creative” function of indexical signs. The interpretation of such creative pointing gestures is constrained not only by the linguistic context, but also by the “deictic field” (see especially McNeill, chap. 12), which is populated by imaginary entities that are also established by other creative pointing gestures. Note the similarity and the difference between activity frameworks and deictic fields. An activity framework imposes a more abstract structure on a cluttered physical environment, whereas a deictic field projects a richer structure on a physically minimal environment.

OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT VOLUME AND BEYOND

Having laid out some of the issues that cross-cut the chapters, we now turn to the structure of the volume. The first four chapters concern the ontogeny and phylogeny of pointing. The first chapter by Butterworth provides an overview of the literature on developmental and primate studies on pointing and joint attention. He argues that index-finger pointing is a uniquely human behavior (e.g., there has been no report on primates in the wild using index-finger pointing among themselves). He maps out the developmental path of pointing from its antecedent behaviors to the role it plays in early language development.

In the following chapter, Povinelli, Bering, and Giambrone discuss the comprehension of pointing by chimpanzees. The results of their experiments indicate that, unlike young children, chimpanzees lack the understanding that a body part projects a vector toward a particular direction, and, more crucially, they lack the understanding that the communication partner has to mentally represent the direction. The lack of “mentalistic” understanding of pointing by chimpanzees is in sharp contrast to human infants, who check whether the communication partner is attending the same referent (cf. the chapter by Butterworth).

Two chapters on the development of pointing follow. Masataka studies the earliest part of development, namely, the stages that lead up to the emergence of adultlike pointing gestures around the age of 11 months. He proposes that undirected extension of the index finger is one of the key antecedent behaviors for pointing. Index-finger extension tends to be synchronized with speechlike vocalization. In addition, index-finger extensions occur more often when the caregiver reacts to the infant’s vocalization in a timely manner and when an infant is confronted with an unfamiliar object. In other words, the situation that leads to index-finger extension is very similar to the situation in which pointing gestures are commonly observed in older infants, namely, verbal communication with a caregiver about a noteworthy object. Furthermore, a longitudinal study has revealed that a sharp drop in the frequency of index-finger extension is immediately followed by a sharp rise in the frequency of pointing.

A later stage of the development is covered by Goldin-Meadow and Butcher, who investigate pointing between the one- and two-word stages. They have found that the onset of utterances in which a word and a pointing gesture refer to two separate entities is a good predictor for the subsequent onset of two-word utterances. In other words, infants package two ideas into a message first in a pointing–word combination and then in a word–word combination.

Four chapters on the ethnography of pointing follow. These chapters examine naturally occurring pointing gestures and contexts of their use, as well as people’s meta-knowledge about various types of pointing gestures. Kendon and Versante investigate the relationship between different shape features of pointing and their functions in Neapolitans’ gestures. Their analysis of the contexts of use reveals an elaborate system of pointing in this famously gesture-rich culture.

Haviland illustrates various types of semiotic complexity of pointing gestures using data from Tzotzil speakers of Mexico (an 18-month-old child and adults). He discusses relationships between various pointing forms and their functions, relationships to speech, and the influence of spatial and sociocultural contexts on the interpretation of pointing.

Wilkins problematizes what it means to claim universality of index-finger pointing by underscoring the culture specificity of form–function relationships. He examines form–function relationships in the Arrernte community (Central Australia) from a perspective that emphasizes meta-knowledge. He found that some of the hand shape used for pointing in this culture are unusual from Euro-American perspectives. For example, he reports transitional middle-finger pointing by young children.³

The last in the series of chapters on the ethnography of pointing is the chapter by Goodwin. He analyzes pointing by archaeologists at an excavation site and by an aphasic patient. He examines various semiotic and interactional structures that support how interactants interpret pointing. Such structures can be exemplified by “activity frameworks,” mentioned earlier, and “participation frameworks,” which determine how participants of an activity attend to each other and to things in the environment relevant for the activity.

The following chapter by Clark puts pointing in a larger theoretical context. He proposes a general theory of how people indicate. He contrasts semiotic characteristics of two ways in which people indicate: “directing-to,” which includes pointing, and “positioning-for” (or “placing”). One of the fundamental differences between the two is what is manipulated for the purpose of indication. In directing-to, one moves the attention of the communication partner to the referent, whereas in positioning-for, one moves the referent to the location of the communication partner’s attention.

Engberg-Pedersen investigates different linguistic functions of pointing gestures with both the hand and gaze in Danish Sign Language. She has found that a pointing sign with the hand serves as a pronoun, a determiner indicating specificity of a referent, or a “pro-form” performed simultaneously with ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1 Pointing: A Foundational Building Block of Human Communication
• Chapter 2 Pointing is the Royal Road to Language for Babies
• Chapter 3 Chimpanzees’ “Pointing”: Another Error of the Argument by Analogy?
• Chapter 4 From Index-Finger Extension to Index-Finger Pointing: Ontogenesis of Pointing in Preverbal Infants
• Chapter 5 Pointing Toward Two-Word Speech in Young Children
• Chapter 6 Pointing by Hand in “Neapolitan”
• Chapter 7 How to Point in Zinacantán
• Chapter 8 Why Pointing with the Index Finger is Not a Universal (in Sociocultural and Semiotic Terms)
• Chapter 9 Pointing as Situated Practice
• Chapter 10 Pointing and Placing
• Chapter 11 From Pointing to Reference and Predication: Pointing Signs, Eyegaze, and Head and Body Orientation in Danish Sign Language
• Chapter 12 Pointing and Morality in Chicago
• Chapter 13 Interplay of Gaze, Hand, Torso Orientation, and Language in Pointing