Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament

1919-1934

Carolyn J. Kitching

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781134675043
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

In the aftermath of the Great War, multilateral disarmament was placed at the top of the international agenda by the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. This book analyzes the naval, air and land disarmament policies of successive British governments from 1919 to 1934, articulating their dilemma either to fulfil their obligations or to avoid them.
Daring and controversial, the present study challenges the hitherto accepted view that Britain occupied the high moral ground by drastically reducing its armaments and argues that, during this period, British disarmament policy was reactive and generally failed to provide the leadership that this extremely sensitive time in international politics demanded.

1 INTRODUCTION

Britain’s approach to the problem of international disarmament during the period between the two world wars has received very little attention compared with the amount of research carried out on British foreign policy in general. The importance of the subject has, in the main, been overlooked by those who have attempted to explain the breakdown in international relations which resulted in the Second World War. Yet the disarmament question is a significant factor in this breakdown, being closely inter-linked with the search for security and stability which were so notably absent during the period. The present study seeks to redress this imbalance in the historical literature by analysing Britain’s attitude towards disarmament in the crucial years 1919–34.

The majority of studies of international disarmament between the two world wars have covered either specific conferences or issues or shorter time periods than that covered in the present study. These include Dick Richardson’s study of the 1924–9 Baldwin administration, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (1989), Brian McKercher’s study of the same period, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924– 1929 (1984) and an analysis entitled The Washington Conference, 1921–22, edited by Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (1994). Christopher Hall’s Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921–37 (1987) basically covers the naval disarmament question. As regards older works, John Wheeler-Bennett published two studies covering the disarmament and security questions, Information on the Reduction of Armaments (1925) and Disarmament and Security Since Locarno, 1925–1931 (1932). He also published two books on disarmament per se. One, entitled Information on the Problem of Security (1917–1926) was co-edited with F.E.Langermann in 1927, while the other, an in-depth study of the World Disarmament Conference of 1932–4, The Pipe Dream of Peace, was published in 1935. These studies are all very thorough, but are dated and suffer from Wheeler-Bennett’s marked anti- French, pro-German bias. Other studies of the World Disarmament Conference are Dick Richardson’s unpublished MA thesis entitled The Problem of Disarmament in British Diplomacy, 1932–1934 (1969), and John Underwood’s unpublished Ph.D. thesis entitled The Roots and Reality of British Disarmament Policy 1932–34 (1977). More recently, in 1995 and 1993 respectively, there have been articles in edited volumes by Dick Richardson on ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference, 1932–34’, and, jointly with the author of the present study, on ‘Britain and the World Disarmament Conference’.¹ Another recent work, The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918–1957, edited by Ahmann, Birke and Howard in 1993, contains important articles by Zara Steiner on ‘The League of Nations and the Quest for Security’, and Philip Towle on ‘British Security and Disarmament Policy in Europe in the 1920s’.² A volume edited by Brian McKercher in 1992 entitled Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899–1939, also contains articles on specific disarmament conferences and related issues.³

There have been significantly fewer studies of British disarmament policy over the full period covered by the present work. Rolland Chaput produced a study in 1935, entitled Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, and in 1980 David Shorney wrote a Ph.D. thesis entitled Britain and Disarmament 1916– 1931, which also examined disarmament policy in relation to foreign policy, as well as looking at the effects of party politics and public opinion on the formulation of disarmament policy. The latter study ended prior to the commencement of the Disarmament Conference. Thus only Chaput covers the whole of the period presently under review and whil he had the irreplaceable benefits of contacts with both observers and policy-makers, he did not have the benefit of access to government records or the private papers of members of the policy-making élite. Moreover, like Wheeler-Bennett’s works, it is dated.

Chaput’s terms of reference were to encompass ‘the attitude and policy of the British government throughout the various negotiations for naval, military and air disarmament’ in an attempt to answer the question ‘[w]hat is the position of Great Britain on disarmament and what role does it play in the scheme of British foreign policy?’⁴ In reaching an answer to his question he concluded that:

the British Government proceeded along the path of disarmament so long as this path ran parallel to that of its traditional foreign policy. Where these paths diverged, the British Government elected to follow the known road to security in preference to the theoretical Utopia of world brotherhood.⁵

At a very general level, this conclusion mirrors that of the present study. What Chaput was unable to do, however, because of the limited sources upon which he was able to call, was to analyse the intricacies of discussions surrounding the evolution of disarmament policy within the confines of the Cabinet room and the corridors of power within Whitehall. Moreover, the framework of his approach meant he was unable to make effective comparisons between successive governments. Thus, not only is his study dated, it is methodologically and analytically limited. In addition, contrary to Chaput’s view that disarmament was successfully integrated into British foreign and security policy during the period under review, it remained very much a separate problem, and as such was handled in very different ways by the individual governments of the period. This often resulted in a confused approach to the problem. As the present study will show, the Conservative-dominated administrations effectively had no disarmament policy at all; or rather, they attempted to ignore a subject which they demonstrably failed to understand. In contrast, the two minority Labour governments at least tried to define a distinct disarmament policy, though their success in its implementation was necessarily hampered by their tenuous hold on power as well as by internal differences of opinion.

Differences of opinion on the question of the term ‘disarmament’ as well as on methods of its implementation are a theme that runs through the present study. A brief analysis of the theory and practice of disarmament is given in Chapter 2, which serves to demonstrate the basis of successive British governments’ failure to understand the concept, and therefore its implementation. Chapter 2 also sets out the background to the problem; how disarmament came to be on the international agenda in the first place, and consequently why Britain was faced with the dilemma of choosing between two equally unwelcome policy alternatives. Basically, ministers came to the conclusion that Britain could either accept her obligation to disarm, by international agreement in accordance with the Peace Treaties of 1919, with the risk of compromising her ability to uphold her Imperial commitments, or she could ignore, or actively avoid, meeting this obligation, with the risk of jeopardising European stability because of its impact on German revisionism and French insecurity. Either way, British security was perceived to be at risk.

The question of differences of opinion is also brought out in Chapter 3, which constitutes a brief examination of the views on disarmament of a representative cross-section of members of the policy-making élite. The importance of the human element in policy formulation and implementation cannot be overlooked, and, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, many of the individuals concerned looked less than favourably on the prospect of Britain reducing the level of her armaments in line with an international agreement rather than purely in line with her own perceived requirements. This analysis of individual attitudes demonstrates how difficult it was for those few politicians and civil servants who had a real commitment to disarmament to counter the more pronounced anti-disarmament, or simply indifferent, stance of the majority of their colleagues.

The study then goes on, in Chapters 4 to 8, to analyse in detail the attitudes taken by each individual government during the period 1919–34. Within these administrations, the level of government discussion of disarmament varies considerably depending on the length of time for which the administration was in power, as well as its actual commitment to addressing the problem. The Lloyd George coalition, for example, believed it was carrying out a policy of disarmament in that it very rapidly reduced the level of Britain’s armed forces immediately after the Great War, and was also responsible for taking a firm stand over the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–2. The Bonar Law/Baldwin administrations of 1923, on the other hand, took no firm steps towards disarmament although one member of the latter, Lord Robert Cecil (later Viscount Cecil of Chelwood), did attempt to push forward a considerable measure of indirect disarmament via the machinery of the League of Nations. This, however, was in a private rather than official capacity. Subsequently, the first Labour government was in power for too short a period and lacked the necessary majority to take significant steps, though its commitment to creating the ‘right atmosphere’ produced a considerable breakthrough in relations between the Powers over the question of reparations. Baldwin’s 1924–9 administration, whilst improving the international perception of security through the Treaties of Locarno, took no significant steps to evolve a comprehensive disarmament policy, and, in fact, the few steps which it did take had a largely negative effect. From 1929–31, the second Labour government again suffered from the lack of a majority but was nevertheless able to make considerable strides towards indirect disarmament and security through the League, and towards a significant measure of naval arms control via the London Conference and Treaty. The chapter relating to the National government between 1931 and 1934 is, of necessity, longer than the others as it covers the intricacies and detail of the final attempt to solve the disarmament dilemma—the World Disarmament Conference of 1932–4. It was at this point that British ministers finally realised they could not escape their dilemma. Decisions had to be taken, and Britain must accept the consequences of those decisions. The study concludes with the collapse of the Disarmament Conference, when the disarmament question was dropped from the international agenda and the question of rearmament took its place.

The importance of the present study is that, for the first time in over sixty years, Britain’s approach to the problem of international disarmament is treated as a whole. Admittedly, in order to encompass the time-span involved, it has been necessary to omit some of the more detailed, or less significant, discussions which took place on the subject during the period under review, and to concentrate on the major developments.⁶ Questions of chemical warfare and the arms trade, for example, are not covered.⁷ But such omissions do not in fact detract from the overall view of British policy during the sixteen-year period covered as, in general, they merely serve to underline the basic approach adopted by successive governments. Again, in order to cover such a long time-span, it has been necessary to concentrate on British sources; it is, after all, the British point of view which the study seeks to analyse. Reference is made to such sources as German, French and United States foreign policy documents in order to gauge reaction to British policy, but in the main the study concentrates on the purely British angle. Within the British government archives at the Public Record Office, a ‘tiered’ approach has been adopted. Extensive use has been made of Cabinet and Committee of Imperial Defence records, and selected Foreign Office documents, while the private papers of Cabinet ministers and civil servants have been examined in order to contrast the more personal observations of the policy-making élite with the official government records.

The overall thesis put forward is twofold; first that Britain had no positive strategy towards international disarmament during the period under review, unless a policy of merely reacting to moves made by others can be classed as a strategy, and second, that, with one or two notable exceptions, the members of the British policy-making élite did not understand the very concept of international disarmament. On this point the central argument is that British ministers, in public at least, consistently argued that the arms reductions undertaken purely for reasons of economy following the First World War, effectively constituted unilateral disarmament, and that no further effort was required. The reality of the situation was far different. The provisions of both the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations demanded that all Powers reduce the level of their armaments, by international agreement, in order to achieve international stability and security. Britain’s unilateral reductions, whilst admittedly stretching her military commitments to their limits, were carried out without reference to the obligations for multilateral disarmament, and were never taken below the level required for her own security. In practice, British ministers were confronted by a dilemma— a choice between equally unwelcome alternatives. If, on the one hand, Britain were to carry out her commitment to reach an international agreement she could conceivably be compelled to make force configurations which were not in line with her own perceived requirements. On the other hand, if Britain abrogated her international commitment, she would not only break her moral obligations under the Treaty and the Covenant, but help to provoke German revisionism and promote a situation which would almost certainly lead to increased instability and to the rearmament of all the European Powers.

In practice, Britain’s answer to the disarmament dilemma was to avoid being placed in a position of actually having to confront the problem for as long as this strategy remained possible and, when this option was no longer available, to try to ensure that the blame for failure to meet international obligations was placed firmly on the shoulders of others. It can, of course, be argued that a policy of international disarmament was not the correct course for the powers to adopt during the inter-war period; and certainly international tensions and instability did little to contribute to the possibility of a successful agreement. This, however, is not the point at issue. All the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant were committed to the search for disarmament through international agreement, and therefore its wisdom, or otherwise, is not discussed in the present study. What is important is that, given the commitment to reach an international agreement, the Powers, but more especially Britain, appeared to do little to redress the main cause of instability—the problem of Franco-German relations. Again and again the question of Anglo-French security relations arose in Cabinet discussion, and successive governments could hardly fail to recognise that France’s insecurity precluded her from making further reductions in the level of her armaments without compensatory security guarantees. Theoretically, of course, Britain had it in her power to alleviate France’s insecurity through an alliance or military commitment; and the prospects for negotiating an international disarmament agreement would have been considerably enhanced if Britain had adopted such a course. But governments continually shied away from this possibility, on the grounds that it would merely increase the discrepancy between Britain’s military commitments and her ability to uphold them. Such a course would also necessitate changes in Britain’s military configuration and (probably) increases rather than decreases in men, matériel and expenditure. In other words, rather than seeing an enhanced security relationship with France as a possible way out of the dilemma, British ministers perceived it as part of the dilemma. In this sense, the dilemma was self-imposed. It is recognised that the possibility of France accepting any guarantee which Britain could provide became increasingly remote with the passage of time, as evidence of German rearmament became increasingly impossible to ignore, but even in the early part of the period under review, Britain consistently avoided realistically confronting the security question.⁸ Overall, therefore, whilst it may be impossible to predict with complete accuracy what effect an Anglo-French security agreement would have had on the quest for international disarmament, given that the Powers were committed to disarmament it appears illogical and short-sighted on the part of the British government to refuse to take possibly the only course which might have made that policy viable.

2
THE CONCEPT AND
CONTEXT OF DISARMAMENT,
1919–34

The concept of disarmament

Before embarking on a detailed analysis of British disarmament policy in the years 1919–34, it is important to define what exactly is meant, for the purposes of this study, by the term ‘disarmament’. It has been used to cover all conditions, from the complete abolition of armaments, to the reduction of levels of armaments, and even to the increase in their level where the aim is to achieve a measure of limitation and control. It can thus be seen that the term is open to great misinterpretation, and in order to avoid such misinterpretation a number of political scientists, after the Second World War, began to use the term ‘arms control’ rather than the traditional ‘disarmament’ as the generic word for negotiations which sought to limit armaments by international agreement. Control of armaments, it was felt, removed the apparent anomaly of a ‘disarmament’ agreement which actually led to an increase in their level. As far as Hedley Bull, one of the most important of the British political scientists to adopt this phrase, was concerned, the aim was to counter the proponents of ‘general and complete disarmament’ such as Philip Noel-Baker.¹ The academic debate over ‘disarmament’ and ‘arms control’, however, did not really begin until the 1950s and so is not dealt with in the pres...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgements
• 1: Introduction
• 2: The Concept And Context Of Disarmament, 1919–34
• 3: The Human Element
• 4: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918–22
• 5: The Conservative Governments, 1922–3, And The First Labour Government, 1924
• 6: The Conservative Government, 1924–9
• 7: The Labour Government, 1929–31
• 8: The National Government, 1931–4
• 9: Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography