Ethics and Professional Persuasion

A Special Double Issue of the journal of Mass Media Ethics

Ralph D. Barney

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781135586614
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filología
• Subtopic: Estudios de comunicación

Examining the applied media ethics question of professional persuasion, this special double issue resulted from a colloquium and conference on allowable ethical limits of deception in professional persuasion. Participants were invited to reason their way toward a threshold that would define acceptable deception for a professional persuader in pursuit of favorable market and public opinion conditions for a client. As a whole, this issue covers a broad range of views and expressions of opinion that often come close to defining the threshold between morally acceptable and morally outrageous persuasion.

The TARES Test: Five Principles for Ethical Persuasion

Sherry Baker
Brigham Young University

David L. Martinson
Florida International University

❏ Whereas professional persuasion is a means to an immediate and instrumental end (such as increased sales or enhanced corporate image), ethical persuasion must rest on or serve a deeper, morally based final (or relative last) end. Among the moral final ends of journalism, for example, are truth and freedom. There is a very real danger that advertisers and public relations practitioners will play an increasingly dysfunctional role in the communications process if means continue to be confused with ends in professional persuasive communications. Means and ends will continue to be confused unless advertisers and public relations practitioners reach some level of agreement as to the moral end toward which their efforts should be directed.

In this article we advance a five-part test (the TARES test) that defines this moral end, establishes ethical boundaries that should guide persuasive practices, and serves as a set of action-guiding principles directed toward a moral consequence in professional persuasion. The TARES Test consists of five principles: Truthfulness (of the message), Authenticity (of the persuader), Respect (for the persuadee), Equity (of the persuasive appeal) and Social Responsibility (for the common good). We provide checklists to guide the practitioner in moral reflection and application of TARES Test principles.

Individuals active in some area of professional persuasive mass communication—that is, advertising, public relations, and so forth—frequently have a difficult time defending what it is they do from a societal, common good, and ethical perspective, in their own minds as well as in their conversations with others.

Defenders—apologists—for advertising and public relations, although not denying that ethical considerations have been a problem, also contend that critics often overstate the case. Speaking specifically to the question of societal value, advertisers frequently contend that without advertising the American free enterprise system simply would not exist. In this they echo the rhetoric of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun in his opinion for the court in the landmark Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976) case that afforded commercial advertising limited First Amendment protection. In his opinion in that case Justice Blackmun wrote

Advertising, however, tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable, (p. 765)

Legendary public relations scholar Scott Cutlip (1994) presented a similar societal justification for public relations when he asserted that "the social justification for public relations is to ethically and effectively plead the cause of a client or organization in the free wheeling forum of public debate" (p. xii). Cutlip maintained that in a democratic society the practitioner serves the common good by helping to bring about a process in which "every idea, individual, and institution ... [has] a full and fair hearing in the public forum" (p. xii).

Ethical Problem in Persuasive Communications

It seems clear that proponents believe the persuasive "professions" can serve the public interest and that persons active in those professions can be ethical. Unfortunately, the "can" too often does not translate into a reality of fact. That is, although proponents argue advertising can serve the economic or social system by providing important consumer information, too frequently it operates dysfunctionally by providing misinformation, inflating the cost of goods and services, and inducing individuals to make purchases that are not in either their short- or long-term interest.

The same is true in regard to public relations. Although many practitioners will insist Cutlip (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 1994) is correct in asserting that practitioners can serve the public interest by helping to make various points of view articulate in the marketplace of ideas, in fact those same practitioners too frequently serve to disrupt that marketplace by serving special interests at the expense of the common good (p. 133). Furthermore, instead of providing useful information, practitioners frequently "clutter ... [the] already-choked channels of communication with the debris of pseudoevents and phony phrases that confuse rather than clarify" (Cutlip et al., 1994, p. 133).

One needs to ask, Why? Why do the persuasive professions at least appear to evoke in persons a proclivity toward acting in a less than ethical manner and in ways that are detrimental to the common good or public interest? Critics argue that such a response is intrinsic to the very nature of much of persuasive communication. That is, efforts to persuade—despite all the efforts at rationalization—can not really be differentiated from manipulation, coercion, propaganda, or all of these.

More supportive of efforts to persuade is the work of Andersen (1978) who defined ethical persuasion as "a communication activity that unites people ... [while it] permits maximum individual choice" (p. 3). For Andersen, ethical persuasion centered around an effort "to effect a desired voluntary change in the attitudes and/or actions of" (p. 7) those to whom particular persuasion efforts are directed. For communication ethicists Jaksa and Pritchard (1994), Andersen's emphasis on voluntary change was critical. Jaksa and Pritchard stated

... [this emphasis on voluntary change] in the person being persuaded ... distinguishes persuasion from indoctrination and coercion, which do not allow significant choice. But it also suggests that ethically acceptable modes of persuasion do not rely on deceptive manipulative tactics.... [Jaksa & Pritchard] support those forms of persuasion that show respect for individuals as capable of making significant choices ... those capable of rational choice are respected only if manipulative and deceptive tactics are avoided. (p. 76-77)

"The advantage of a lie without telling a literal untruth"

It has been suggested that to allow for voluntary change, the persuader must provide for something at least approaching what Klaidman and Beauchamp (1987) termed substantial completeness—"that point at which a reasonable ... [person's] requirements are satisfied" (p. 35). Although ethics may not dictate that the persuader provide a scientifically verifiable summation of a particular issue, one can insist that such efforts "be directed toward genuinely informing ... [others]—not creating false impressions, whether or not what is communicated might be literally, in at least some fashion, true" (Martinson, 1996-1997, p. 44).

It is precisely at this point that problems begin to surface. Advertising and public relations practitioners too often use "torturous linguistic contortions" to achieve what Gaffney suggested was "the advantage of a lie without telling a literal untruth" (Martinson, 1996-1997, p. 43). The case study law books are filled with such examples. Certainly one of the classics in this regard is the Federal Trade Commission order that "ITT Continental Baking Company ... correct a false impression created by a long-term series of advertisements for the company's Profile bread" (Middleton & Chamberlin, 1994, p. 322). Profile advertising had implied

That consumers could lose weight by eating Profile bread because it contained fewer calories than other breads. Actually, Profile bread contained the same number of calories per ounce as other breads. Therefore, if a person kept a better figure while eating ITT Continental's bread, it was because Profile bread was sliced thinner. (Middleton & Chamberlin, 1994, p. 322)

Is it any wonder that advertisers and public relations practitioners are viewed in such a negative light when one recognizes that examples such as the Profile "fewer calories" campaign are too often more reflective of behavior that is normal for the industry rather than exceptional? Advertisers and public relations practitioners are distrusted because the public—with good reason—has come to recognize that too frequently the goal in persuasive communication centers around exploiting them in a manner that is, in fact, "detrimental to ... [the public's] own preferences, interests, or well being" (Jaksa & Pritchard, 1994, p. 76).

Defining the problem, of course, is less dilhcult than advancing—from an ethics perspective—an answer. Surely there would not be so much unethical persuasive communication if there were not some benefit in engaging in such wrong actions. Many feel they are "forced" to use less than ethical means because the use of such means are essential to achieving the desired end. Chided for their use of stereotypes, for example, many in advertising are likely to respond "Gee, I'd really like to avoid these stereotypes, but I've got to use them to survive" (DeFleur & Dennis, 1998, p. 337).

The “Relative Last End” of Professional Communications

One will never be able to articulate a practical means to achieving at least something approaching a level of minimally acceptable ethical behavior in persuasive communications until there is greater agreement as to what is that last end toward which persuasive communication is directed.

It is essential to note, in this context, that what is being considered here is a relative last end—but, nevertheless, something beyond increased sales or an improved corporate image. When Cutlip (1994), for example, spoke about assisting clients in an effort to inject their views into the marketplace of ideas, there is an unstated assumption that there is an end that will be achieved in that process. Hopefully, that end goes beyond increased profits for the particular organization the practitioner represents.

For the philosopher, "a thing is intended either for its own sake or for the sake of something else" (Fagothey, 1976, p. 85). There have, of course, been "pitched battles" between teleologists who argue an act should be judged ethical or not based on its consequences, and deontologists who argue an action must be judged ethical or not according to the means utilized to achieve the desired end. Most would agree, however, with Fagothey that "a means always supposes an end" (p. 85). More specifically

... [A means] is called a means precisely because it lies on a mean, or middle, position between the agent and the end, and its use brings the agent to the end. The same thing may be both means and end in different respects, for it may be sought both for its own sake and for the sake of something further. This is called an intermediate end, and there may be a long series of such intermediate ends, as when we want A in order to get B, B in order to get C, C in order to get D, and so on. (Fagothey, 1976, p. 85)

That is why one speaks of a relative last end as the goal of persuasive communications in the immediate context. In a strict philosophical sense, what is being discussed is an intermediate end—as contrasted with an ultimate or absolute last end. It is, of course, well beyond the scope of this particular effort to consider questions germane to what may be the ultimate or absolute last end of those engaged in persuasive communications—that must be left to philosophers and theologians. What is of primary concern here is examining that relative last end toward which a discussion of applied ethics in the persuasive communication can and should be directed.

The immediate end in some forms of persuasive communication is readily identifiable. Wells, Burnett, and Moriarty (1992) stated that the goal (end) of product advertising is "to inform or stimulate the market about the sponsor's product(s). The intent is clearly to sell a particular product, to the exclusion of competitors' products" (p. 13).

The immediate goal (end) of public relations, on the other hand, is subject to some debate even among practitioners. Cutlip (1994), for example, has consistently identified the practitioner as an advocate—insisting that "the advocate's role is essential in a dem...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Contents
• Foreword
• Public Relations Ethics: Contrasting Models from the Rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates
• Philosophy Meets the Social Sciences: The Nature of Humanity in the Public Arena
• Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda
• Responding To Propaganda: An Ethical Enterprise
• The TARES Test: Five Principles for Ethical Persuasion
• Better Mousetrap? Of Emerson, Ethics, and Postmillennium Persuasion
• Toward a Professional Responsibility Theory of Public Relations Ethics
• Communication in the Unfettered Marketplace: Ethical Interrelationships of Business, Government, and Stakeholders
• Cases and Commentaries
• Book Reviews